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

Towards a Safer Society

the Knowledge Contribution of Statistical Information

Istat

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Towards a Safer Society
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INTRODUCTION

During past years the National Institute of Statistics was very plugged away at developing crime statistics. Indeed criminality is a particularly difficult phenomena to be measured, most of all due to the underreporting of events to police, that causes an important dark figure of crime. The percentage of reporting to the police depends on the type of crime, its seriousness, the burden of the suffered damage.

Statistics based on reporting are very important to understand the situation regarding safety, but they are not enough.

According to the model just adopted by some countries as United States and Great Britain, Istat has carried out two victimisation surveys on citizen's safety, one in 1997-98 and the other in 2002. Such surveys allow us to estimate the dark figure of criminality, victims' characteristics and unsafety perceived by people and results will give light on unexpected aspects that will make us going over some stereotypes.

Within this Convention many new important data will be disseminated, and various international experts have been invited to intervene on the topic.

The Convention aims are to summarise the crucial points about criminality, starting from the more recent studies. In the first section the main results of victimisation surveys from various Countries will be presented. In the last 30 years in many Western Countries attention was paid to crime events and the situational characteristics of its occurrence. Very important, especially for safety policies, is knowledge about at risk groups, that is people more likely to be targeted as victim of a crime. What is the exposition to the risk for the victim, is an outlook of opportunities for the poten-

tial crime author. The victimisation risk is unequally distributed in the population, and it will be interesting to verify similarities and differences among Countries.

The second section will be focused on big towns' situations. It is within them that more and more crimes are perpetrated, crimes that often affect people going periodically in such centres to work or on free time. Situations of Western European big cities are quite heterogeneous, as it is among Italian cities, and it will be very important to succeed in verifying such differences.

The third section will deal with fear and unsafety perception, a social problem of great importance. Experts on the topic since many years will address such themes. Their original contribution will be very precious.

The fourth section will focus on methodological aspects: aims and goals of the new victimisation surveys: difficulties to compare criminality statistics due to the existence of different justice systems in different Countries and to various ways of data collection; new me

thodologies based on self-reporting and crime mapping mainly used in the United States.

The importance of citizens' safety in politic programs of various Countries and in common people attention requires reflecting deeply on criminality prevention actions. Preventing criminality is the topic of the last section and represents the set of all the actions, both public and private, having as their aim not only to decrease criminal events, but also to prevent uncivilised and disorders' acts not necessarily targeted as illegal acts.

Two round tables with interventions are planned at the end of the working days. The first will deal with methodological aspects of criminality statistics. The Siena Group, Heuni, ECE and the Slovenian Statistic Institute will intervene to summarise today existing problems regarding official statistics and the opportunities to solve them both from the Statistical Institute point of view and the International Agencies one.

It will be an important opportunity to reflect about challenges addressing official criminality statistics at the European level. New frontiers will be faced as crime mapping or self reported surveys.

The second round table will be the final one. It will be opened by a summarising picture of the main Convention outcomes. The Italian Police Chief, the Spanish One, the General Interpol Secretary, the Europol

Director, and the Chief of the European Commission Unit will join the round table.

Their participation is an important sign of the real importance of reliable official statistics to plan crime prevention and against crimes policies.

Reinforcing the link and cooperation among the Scientific Community, the National Institutes of Statistics, the Interior Ministries and Police, and the International Organisms, means to highly improve crime preventing and against crime policies. For that reason Istat considers this Convention a starting point for a national and international platform to be developed in the next future, with the common aim to build a more safe society.

This volume focuses only on the scientific papers of the conference.

Luigi Biggeri

VICTIMS OF CRIME: DIFFERENCE IN RISKS

ONE

CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN SWITZERLAND: TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN RISKS

Drawing on earlier work by the authors, this paper analyses the evolution of delinquency in Switzerland from 1985 to 1999. The aim is to summarise crime trends in Switzerland between 1985 and 1999 and to propose possible explanations of them. The offences studied are burglary, vehicle theft, robbery, serious assault, rape, and homicide. Data are taken from police statistics as well as victimisation survey data. Whereas offences considered showed substantial variations since 1985, their trends can be explained by changes in routine activities and other crime opportunities.

First of all, the article provides some background information on the characteristics of the country and its population. Secondly, the methodology that underlies the comparison of both data sources is discussed. Finally, crime trends for six offences - burglary, vehicle theft, street robbery, rape, homicide, assault and threat - are presented and possible explanations of them are proposed. Thus it is shown that crime trends provide an interesting basis for testing and confront different explanations of delinquency.

1.2 Characteristics of Switzerland

Switzerland is a multi-lingual country, with German, French, Italian and Romansh speaking areas. The country is composed of 26 States called "Cantons". Each of them has a considerable degree of independence. For

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Martin Killias, University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
Marcelo F. Aebi, Universities of Lausanne & Sevilla, Spain.

example, there is one penal code for the whole country, but each canton has its own penal procedure code and its own cantonal police. A federal police exists but works on specific offences such as organised crime, white collar crime or money laundering.

After being long time a typical land of emigration, Switzerland became during the 20th Century a country of massive immigration. At the beginning of the third millennium, the country has a population of seven million people of which 20 per cent are foreigners. Thus, it has one of the highest proportions of legal immigrants in Europe. Traditionally, most of them used to come from southern Europe but, since the beginning of the 1990s, they tend to come mainly from the Balcanic countries as well as other countries outside Europe.

Although event the largest Swiss cities are relatively small (e.g., Zurich has a population of just over 330,000), most of the population live in urbanized (suburban) areas. Less than 5 per cent are employed in agriculture, and less than 10 per cent live in "real" rural areas (i.e., towns with less than 1,000 population).[1] The unemployment rate was at 2.4 per cent in 1999 and according to the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) conducted in 2000, 80 per cent of households had at least one car and 29 per cent had at least two cars.

1.3 Methodological issues

As it has been pointed out in the introduction, our analyses are based on police records and victimisation surveys. Both sources are briefly presented in this section.

1.3.1 Data on police-recorded crime

Switzerland's police statistics are far from satisfactory. Federal level police data on offences and suspects have been available since 1981; however, statistics are limited because they are based on a compilation

[1] Statistical information is from Annuaire statistique de la Suisse - 2001, Zurich: Editions "Neue Zürcher Zeitung".

of data provided by cantonal police departments (see Killias, 2001a, 45-51; 2002, 49-55). Furthermore, there is no standardization of data collection procedures or federal written rules on how to record and count offences. It is likely that while some police forces count offences at the "output" level (i.e., when the police transfer the file to the examining magistrate), other departments count offences at an earlier stage. There are also discrepancies in counting procedures (as detailed in the European Sourcebook, 1999, 80-84). For example, the 30 victims of a mass "suicide" of a sect in 1995 (many of whom were actually murdered) were counted as one "case" in the cantons of Valais and Fribourg, whereas the Zurich police would probably have recorded the total number of victims. Beyond these differences, some cantons have developed more detailed statistics. That is the case of Zurich, which provides approximately one-third of the offences that appear in the federal statistics. In the following analyses, Zurich police statistics will be used to develop reasonable estimates, whenever the federal police statistics are insufficiently detailed.

Switzerland's legal definitions of the six offences under consideration follow the European continental tradition. At the same time, police definitions by and large match legal definitions. Nevertheless, since certain survey concepts are larger than the corresponding legal definitions, we have adapted some police definitions in order to increase comparability.

For example, according to the Swiss penal code, robbery is defined as theft with violence. Therefore, taking something from another person without physically aggressing him or her (i.e. "mugging", as in the case of bag-snatching) is considered as theft and not robbery. Nevertheless, such behaviour would be considered as robbery in the ICVS. Luckily enough, police statistics give data on "muggings" separately, and therefore police counts can easily be adjusted in order to match survey measures of robbery.

The legal definition of rape includes spousal rape and the use of severe psychological pressure. Finally, and although there are several legal categories of homicide, our focus is on the overall concept of intentional homicide, both including and excluding attempts.

1.3.2 Data from victimisation surveys

The first national crime victims survey of Switzerland was carried out in two phases in 1984 (in the French-speaking cantons) and in 1987 (in the German and Italian-speaking cantons).[2] The overall sample was quite high (N=6,505) thanks to a few innovative features (Killias, 1989). Among them, it must be mentioned that it was one of the first major victim surveys conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The response rates were 71 per cent in the German-speaking cantons and 60 per cent in the Latin cantons. The reference period was defined in a way that allowed victims to mention, in the first round, any victimisation that came to mind. If respondents mentioned one of the crimes listed in the screener, they were asked a series of follow-up questions in order to determine more precisely the timing of the incident (i.e., whether it took place during the current year, the previous year or earlier). These questions reduced telescoping by separating the definitional part of the questions on offences from their temporal and spatial location. In order to test the reliability of CATI interviews, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sub-sample of respondents who had already been interviewed using CATI. CATI interviews were found to be highly reliable and there was found to be a very moderate effect of the response rate on the results.[3] Besides, the use of CATI did not introduce major biases because of the high telephone penetration rate. Beyond these methodological aspects, the survey included many questions on life-style, exposition to the risk of becoming a victim, and other independent variables.

The Swiss survey was used in the development of what became the International Crime Victimisation Survey (ICVS; van Dijk, Mayhew and Killias 1990). For example, the questions on the temporal and spatial location of incidents used in the ICVS, are based on the Swiss questionnaire. The ICVS also drew on the methodology (e.g., questions) of the British and Dutch crime surveys. Respondents were interviewed using CATI, thus

[2] The survey was conducted in two phases because of political difficulties. Since crime rates were fairly stable between 1984 and 1987, the impact of the split was likely to be minimal. In the following analyses, the two parts of the survey will be related to 1985 (i.e. the year between the two waves).

[3] As in other tests, differences were not large since refusals were mostly related to the inconvenience of an interview and not to the theme of the survey. Due probably to higher motivation as a result of personal experience, cooperation was slightly better among victims.

keeping costs relatively low and allowing the use of reasonably large samples.[4] Criticism of the result of the first ICVS, led to an extensive methodological experiment in the Netherlands. Two parallel victimisation surveys (CATI vs. telepanel)[5] were conducted in order to determine whether they yielded similar victimisation rates. Their results supported that hypothesis (Scherpenzeel, 1992). In addition, the CATI sample was randomly split into two sub-samples so that the ICVS approach in locating incidents in time[6] could be compared with the more conventional model -used in many European surveys, such as the British Crime Surveys- of asking respondents directly about incidents experienced during, for example, "the last 12 months". It was found that in the latter case, serious crimes were often telescoped into the reference period although they had occurred long before. For robbery and burglary, the rates were respectively 2.2 and 2.5 times higher than those observed using the ICVS model.[7] It can be concluded that Scherpenzeel`s (1992) experiment provides support for the use of CATI as an interview method in victimisation surveys, and also to the way in which the ICVS and the Swiss national crime survey had dealt with the problem of telescoping.[8]

Later on, Switzerland participated with sample sizes of 1,000 respondents in the ICVS conducted in 1989 and 1996. The response rates were 68 per cent in 1989, and 56 per cent in 1996. In 1998, a second national crime survey was conducted, with a sample of 3,041, followed by a third national crime survey in 2000 (that was part of the ICVS conducted worldwide during the same year), with a sample of 4,234 respondents. In the surveys of 1998 and 2000, booster samples were taken from particular city areas, in order to overrepresent the number of respondents from the immigrant communities. Such procedure allowed the development of more detailed analysis of this group of the population. The response rates for

4 The costs of a CATI interview can be estimated to be at about 20 to 25 per cent of a personal interview.

5 Survey completed on a computer at home. This method shares many features of mail surveys, but allows higher response rates and offers better control over the way the questionnaire is completed.

6 I.e. asking first about victimisations experienced over the last five years, and then only when more precisely eventual incidents had occurred (with a special focus on the current and the last year).

7 Telescoping effects were weaker for less serious offences, such as bicycle thefts, which tend to be more rapidly forgotten, than serious forms of victimisation.

8 This problem was addressed in the National Crime Victimisation in the USA, through bounding the interviews within the panels. Nowhere in Europe has this expensive method been adopted (Killias, 1993).

both the 1998 and 2000 surveys were around 60 per cent.[9] The screeners used in the various sweeps differed slightly for a few offences, therefore in this paper we have introduced some minor adjustments (using responses to follow-up questions) in order to obtain comparable data. The 1998 and 2000 screeners were identical, with minimal deviations from the 1996 version.

The main change in the 2000 Swiss crime survey was the addition of a new screening question on domestic violence (see van Kesteren et al. 2000). This lead to a 29 per cent increase in the number of survey victims of assault. For comparability reasons, that question is not included in the following analyses.

1.4 Comparing survey and police data

Comparisons of survey and police data are problematic and in any case require a series of adjustments on both data sets (Aebi, Killias and Tavares 2002). Thus, data obtained with the Swiss national crime survey had to be adapted in order to obtain valid national estimates (Killias, Lamon, Clerici and Berruex 2000). For example, the 2000 national crime survey estimated that there were 34,377 robberies in 1999 and that 50 per cent of these were reported to the police. Since there was an estimated 5,562,873 persons aged 16 or over in 1999, the survey robbery rate was 6.18 per 1,000 population at risk; disregarding repeat offences, about one in every 162 persons was robbed in 1999. All crime survey figures, of course, have confidence intervals around them. For example, the 95 per cent confidence interval for the robbery rate in 1999 was 3.82 to 8.54 per 1,000 population. Confidence intervals are narrower for offences which are more prevalent.

Swiss survey crime rates for burglary and vehicle theft are per 1,000 households, while rates for robbery and assault (wounding) are per 1,000 population aged 16 or over. Vehicle theft figures refer to completed thefts only.

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[9] In 1998 and 2000, the computation is less straight-forward than in former surveys due to the replacement of households with consenting respondents by new ones if the demographic characteristics of all available household members were already overrepresented in the sample. According to various ways of treating these cases, the response rate varies in 2000 from 54 to 65 percent.

As police data refer to recorded offences by the 26 different cantonal police forces that use their own recording rules, only minimal criteria are applied by the federal police force in charge of producing the federal police statistics. However, as about 30 per cent of the crimes recorded in Switzerland take place in the canton of Zurich and are presented in a very detailed way in its cantonal police statistics, the latter were used in order to adjust federal police data to the crime survey definitions.

1.5 Results

All surveys provided prevalence and incidence data[10] which are presented in figures 1.1 to 1.5 together with comparable police crime measures. In general, changes in survey crime rates were highly correlated with changes in recorded crime rates (Killias, Lamon and Aebi 2004). Figures 1.6 and 1.7 concerning rape and homicide show only police data, as crime surveys do not provide useful measures of that type of offences.

1.5.1 Burglary trends

Figure 1.1 shows burglary trends. The incidence, prevalence and rate of offences reported to the police per 1,000 households come from crime surveys. As federal police recorded burglaries include commercial victimisation, thefts in containers and other similar premises, Zurich police statistics - which provide the proportion of residential burglary for every year - were used to estimate police recorded residential burglaries at the national level.

[10] The number of incidents (during the last year) was recorded according to the same procedure from 1989 to 1999, but not for 1984/87. Therefore, incident rates were calculated by using estimates based on the prevalence rate for 1984/87, and the average number of incidents per victim derived from the other surveys. All incidents experienced abroad were excluded. For this reason, the rates given below may slightly differ from ICVS sources. The proportion of victimisations experienced in foreign countries is substantial among Swiss respondents and for certain offences. According to the most recent data, one robbery in three and about one in ten sexual victimisations have been experienced abroad. The rate of offences reported to the police (according to the respondent) needed to be extrapolated (i.e. multiplied by incidence/prevalence rate), since follow-up questions have been asked for the “last” incident only, as in the case of ICVS and many other similar questionnaires.

Figure 1.1 **Trends in burglary, according to survey measures and police recorded cases (unadjusted and adjusted for domestic burglary - 1985-1999** *(rate for 1,000 households)*



Source: Killias /Lamon/Clerici/Berruex 2000

Based on the national victim survey, the residential burglary rate per household decreased between 1985 and 1988, and then more than doubled between 1988 and 1997 before decreasing by around 25 per cent. Like the survey burglary rate, the police-recorded residential burglary rate almost doubled between 1985 and 1997 and decreased by 12 per cent up to 1999. Burglaries reported to the police according to victims' accounts decreased from 83 per cent to 74 per cent between 1985 and 1997 and increased to 80 per cent again in 1999.

1.5.2 Vehicle theft trends

Figure 1.2 shows trends in thefts of motorcycles and mopeds for households with at least one of these vehicles.

Figure 1.2 **Trends in thefts of motorcycles and mopeds, according to survey measures and police data - 1984 - 1999** *(rate for 1,000 households with at least one of these vehicles)*



Source: Killias/Lamon/Clerici/Berruex 2000)

Based on the national victim survey, the vehicle theft rate decreased between 1985 and 1999 by over 90 per cent. Vehicle theft recorded by the police shows a similar drop. Reporting to the police remained very stable - at an average of 90 per cent - over the entire period. It is possible that the decrease in victimisations concerned mainly joyriding, which constitutes an offence probably less consistently recorded by the police, and made largely impossible by improved safety-locks and crash-helmet requirements (see below).

The comparison of motorcycles and mopeds theft trends with bicycle theft trends (presented in figure 1.3) shows striking differences. According to the survey, the latter show a decrease from 1985 to 1988, then an increase until 1995, and finally a new decrease; while according to police data, bicycle theft increased from 1985 until the beginning of the 90's and followed a downward trend afterwards. In that context, it is interesting to note that bicycle theft trends are quite similar to the trends followed by personal offences (figures 1.4 and 1.5). This similarity will be taken into account in our Explanations section, in which we will try to provide a global explanation to such trends.

Figure 1.3 **Trends in thefts of bicycles, according to survey measures and police data - 1984-1999** *(rate for 1,000 households with at least one bicycle)*



Source: Killias/Lamon/Clerici/Berruex 2000

1.5.3 Personal offences trends

Figure 1.4 presents the evolution of street robbery, while figure 1.5 presents the one of assault and threat. Both followed similar trends.

Figure 1.4 **Trends in street robbery (including mugging), according to survey measures and adjusted police data - 1985-1999**
(rate for 1,000 respondents)



Source: Killias/Lamon/Clerici/Berruex 2000

As concerns street robbery, victim survey and police counts show analogous trends, although the peak and the bottom years differ in each data source. Based on the national victim survey, the robbery rate increased between 1985 and 1995, then decreased by about one-third between 1995 and 1997, and increased again by 40 per cent between 1997 and 1999. The police-recorded robbery rate increased by 44 per cent between 1985 and 1993, then decreased by 32 per cent until 1995, and increased again by 18 per cent by 1999. Since survey estimates for robbery are based on the rates for the last five years preceding each survey, it is possible that the 1995 estimate is inflated by very high rates in 1991 to 1993.

In fact, during that period police statistics showed an extremely important increase in such offence, which was mirrored in other European countries (Aebi 2004). The drop in 1995 in police-recorded offences may be due to section 172ter Criminal Code which became legally effective that year. According to this rule, muggings of less than 300 Swiss francs (or 200 US $), which technically speaking are theft, were no longer recorded if the victim did not file a formal complaint. The drop of robberies (and muggings) according to both indicators may also reflect the removal of open drug scenes in Swiss cities in 1994, when heroin prescription became officially available to addicts (Killias & Aebi 2000b).

Figure 1.5 **Trends in assault and threats, according to survey measures and adjusted police data - 1985-1999** *(rate for 1,000 respondents)*



Source: Killias/Lamon/Clerici/Berruex 2000

Based on the national victim survey, the assault rate increased between 1985 and 1995, then almost halved between 1995 and 1997, before increasing in 1999 to a level similar to the one registered in 1995. The police-recorded assault rate increased steadily during the period under consi-

deration. In 1999, the rate was 42 per cent higher than in 1985. At the same time, reporting to the police remained fairly stable, with an average of 28 per cent.

Finally, figure 1.6 and figure 1.7 present trends in rape and homicide.

Figure 1.6 **Trends in rape, according to police data - 1985-1999**
(recorded rate/1,000 female population)



Source: Killias/Lamon/Aebi forthcoming

Police-recorded rape rates decreased by 43 per cent between 1985 and 1994 and then increased by 26 per cent until 1999. However, it is quite difficult to interpret this trend as only few cases are reported to the police. A more interesting way of dealing with this topic is to go deeper in the questions asked to the victims, an approach that was followed by the International Victims against Women Survey (IVAWS).Unfortunately, as the first sweep took place in Switzerland in 2003 (Killias, Simonin and De Puy 2004), it is too early to talk about rape trends. As a consequence, we will not discuss this offence in the following explanation section.

Figure 1.7 shows no clear trend for homicide or attempted homicide. On the whole, homicide and attempted homicide seem slightly more prevalent in the 1990s than by the middle of the 1980s, by reasons that will be explained in the following chapter.

Figure 1.7 **Trends in homicide, attempt and total (homicide and attempt), according to police data - 1983-2001** *(number)*



Source: Killias/Villettaz/2003

1.5.4 Homicide trends

Villettaz, Killias and Mangin (2003) studied the nature of homicide using a database that covered more than 20 years. According to their data, completed homicide concerns mainly within-family conflicts.

Figure 1.8 shows that the proportion of foreign suspects increased between 1988 and 1997. The same trend has been observed with other forms of violent crime.

The slight increase of homicides (both attempted and completed) could be the result of the changes that took place in Swiss illegal drug markets during the period under study, in particular as far as the origin of dealers is concerned. In the eighties, a new population of drug dealers arrived on the market and, as a consequence, violent conflicts concerning the control of that market aroused.

Figure 1.8 **Homicide: increasing proportion of foreign suspects - 1983-2001**



Source: Killias/Villettaz/2003

For the rest of offences, some methodological issues need to be taken into account in order to compare the two different data sources.

1.6 Methodological issues

Generally speaking, burglary and all personal offences have substantially increased between the late 1980s and 1995. When appropriate adjustments are made, the increase in police statistics matched by and large the trends in crime surveys. The only exception is the 1995-1999 period, in which, according to the survey, crimes against the person decreased (1995-1997) and increased subsequently (1997-1999). This erratic change in survey trends is not matched by police data. In that context, the first question which comes to mind is, of course, whether survey methods might account for these changes.

The answer is that this is extremely unlikely. First of all, survey methods have not changed between 1995 and 1999. The screeners were, besides a few details without interest here, identical; all sweeps used CATI, and response rates were very similar. It is true that the surveys of 1989 and 1996 were conducted by a different company than the

one that conducted those of 1998 and 2000, but that would not explain why the increase from 1997 to 1999 was about as large as the drop from 1995 to 1997. The questionnaires in 1998 and 2000 were identical in all details as far as measures of crime are concerned. It also should be noted that survey measures of burglary and motor vehicle theft followed, in line with police statistics, remarkably different trends from crimes against the person. Whereas theft of motorcycles continued to decrease, burglary peaked in 1997, and decreased in 1999. Bicycle theft, finally, followed a trend similar to what has been observed for offences against the person. In conclusion, it seems unreasonable to attribute these changes to methodological problems.

1.6.1 Discrepancies between survey and official measures of crime

The federal police statistics give a higher burglary rate than the survey rate, because the federal police statistics category of burglary includes not only commercial burglaries, but also burglary from vending machines, telephone boxes, ticket machines, parking meters etc. As it has already been said, Zurich police statistics were used to weight the federal police data according to the proportion of residential burglaries. The resulting trend is lower than what victims declared having reported to the police, but matches almost perfectly the survey trends.

The rate for vehicle theft (cars, motorcycles and mopeds) was given per 1,000 vehicle-owning households. As surveys provided data on the number of owners, it was possible to extrapolate, using survey information and household statistics, the number of households with vehicles for all years. The dramatic drop in the survey vehicle theft rate during the late 1980s, was probably influenced by a change in the law, which made compulsory the wearing of crash helmets. The police data shows a similar trend, though it is less pronounced, possibly because minor incidents often went unrecorded, particularly during the 1980s, when many vehicles were located rapidly. The reduction in the popularity of mopeds among juveniles is likely to have affected `joy-riding more than actual theft; a factor which could explain why police-recording seems to have increased in recent years. As it has been said, theft of bicycles shows a different trend, which is more similar to the trends of personal offences (Killias, Lamon, Clerici and Berruex 2000).

The number of robberies experienced in Switzerland is not large enough to provide reliable annual rates, even with relatively large samples. In order to reduce this problem, the annual rates were computed on the basis of the five-year rates. This produced more stable trends, which are in line with those of other personal offences which are indeed very similar (Killias, Lamon, Clerici and Berruex 2000).

Survey definitions of robbery include bag-snatching and other forms of "mugging". In order to adjust police measures to survey indicators, such incidences (legally considered as theft) were also included. On the other hand, commercial robberies were excluded, using detailed information from Zurich police statistics[11] and weighting the federal data accordingly. Whereas survey measures include only incidents experienced by persons aged 16 or over, the police data (and related population figures) refer to the total population.[12]

The survey measures are annual rates of assault and threats. The police data include first-, second-, and third-degree cases of bodily-injury, plus threats, extortions and deprivation of liberty,[13] in order to reach a maximum of consistency with survey measures of assault (which could include experiences legally qualifying for any of these other criminal code sections). Since police measures are by far lower than survey estimates for assault/threats, it was decided to include in the police data robberies, assuming that some victims might have indicated attempted robberies or muggings under the heading of assault/threat.

Despite the inclusion of a number of related offences which might be listed under the survey measure of assault, the gap between police data and survey measures seems dramatic. This undoubtedly is due to the fact that second- and third-degree bodily-injury is prosecuted on the formal request of the victim only. In practice, this probably leads the police to record even reported offences only when the suspect is known and when the victim really insists on his or her prosecution.[14] Switzerland is indeed

11 Only robberies committed in public places (streets) were included.

12 It is not possible to exclude from the police figures incidents experienced by victims of less than 16.

13 Criminal Code sections 180 (threats, menaces/Drohung), 181 (forcing somebody to do or to tolerate something, contrainte/Nötigung), 156 (extortion, extorsion/Erpressung) and 183 (deprivation of liberty, séquestration-privation de liberté / Freiheitsberaubung und Entführung).

14 An observational study conducted in Southern Germany some 25 years ago (Kürzinger 1978) has shown that theft is recorded in over 90 per cent of cases, whereas that rate drops to 30 per cent in cases of assault. This may well depict the Situation in Switzerland as well.

one of the countries where, in the case of assault, the number of suspects matches by and large the number of recorded offences (Council of Europe 1999), whereas in countries where recording occurs at an earlier stage, the number of offences typically exceeds by far the number of suspects. Research in England and Wales has shown that the police record less than 40 per cent of reported offences against the person (Burrows, Tarling, Mackie, Lewis and Taylor, 2000). Since the police's limited resources do not allow an increase in output beyond certain limits within a short time, it is not surprising that the massive changes in trends of survey measures between 1995 and 1999 are not reflected in the output statistics of the police. Particularly during the years with open drug scenes, the police had a conservative policy of recording personal offences, according to many police sources. The 1995 rates of police recorded offences are, therefore, probably substantially too low.

1.6.2 Alternative explanations

PROPERTY OFFENCES

According to survey crime rates, residential burglary increased markedly up to 1997 and then decreased. A similar trend was seen for adjusted police-recorded residential burglary. For vehicle theft, survey crime rates and police-recorded vehicle theft were similar, showing an important decrease up to 1999.

Burglary, motor vehicle theft and personal crime not only follow different trends, but also differ in situational respects. Burglary provides access to small amounts of cash, silver and all kinds of household equipment. Traditionally, electrical equipment such as televisions, video recorders and music systems, were most frequently stolen. These equipments have lost most of their former value on local second-hand markets (Felson 2000, 1997). However, the fall of the Berlin wall brought the poor and the wealthy parts of the same continent into close proximity. Given the short geographic distance, various forms of exchange between the two sides was immediate. Beyond new lines of transportation for drugs and other illegal goods, exportation of prostitutes and cheap labour, attractive markets emerged for the

exportation of second-hand products from Western Europe, such as used cars, televisions and personal computers etc., i.e. goods which were no longer as attractive as before on western second-hand markets. Police reports also observe increasing burglaries in factories and storehouses of boutique chains, beauty-shops etc. where the burglars depart with the stocks of a full season. All this shows that burglary has changed in character since 1990, moving from an occasional activity of local offenders to a large-scale trans-border industry. In line with these developments, the proportion of suspects of Swiss nationality has dropped by 70 per cent since 1983, according to Zurich police statistics, whereas foreign nationals have increased by more than 200 per cent since 1990. Whereas burglary has shown decreasing trends in the USA and in Britain over most of the 1990s, Switzerland has, along with other European countries (Killias and Aebi 2000a), continued to experience increasing trends, along with the expansion of trans-border crime which compensated the drop in local burglaries. The recent drop, according to police statistics and survey measures, may reflect saturation of eastern second-hand markets,[15] as well as possible effects of police measures against trans-border crime in several eastern European countries who are seeking to join the European Union.[16]

This market explanation may apply also to car theft and, more generally, to motorvehicle theft, but some additional explanations based on routine-activities may be in order. Joy-riding with cars may have become increasingly difficult over the last twenty years due to the advances of security technology. With motorcycles and mopeds, joy-riding has become a risky crime to engage in, once the wearing of crash-helmets has become compulsory in 1987. Similar trends were observed by Mayhew, Clarke and Elliott (1989) in Germany and in England and Wales. The continuing downward trend of motorcycle and moped theft may be due to reduced attractiveness of these means of transportation among adolescents. Eventually, some displacement to bicycle theft may have occurred, in line with the high popularity of mountain bikes among young people in recent years. After a sharp increase (by

15 That jewellery and silver have recently become prime targets of burglars, according to police sources, might reflect a shift in opportunity structures. Such valuables might still be in demand in Eastern Europe, and they are less difficult to transport (and conceal).

16 According to observations e.g. in Poland, stolen cars need to be moved further and further to the East, whereas they used to be sold in Western Poland a few years ago.

more than 100 per cent) between 1988 and 1995, bicycle thefts have dropped along with crimes against the person in 1997, and moderately increased again in 1999.

PERSONAL OFFENCES

According to the survey crime rates, robbery and assault increased markedly up to 1995 and then decreased in 1997 and increased again in 1999. Similar trends of police-recorded robbery have been observed. For assault, police-recorded crime rates showed a more steady increase.

Excluding cases of domestic violence (which are hard to measure with crime victimisation surveys),[17] robbery, assault, sexual offences and bicycle theft, commonly occur in public areas such as streets. It is, therefore, reasonable to look for an explanation of the trends, at the level of what goes on in public areas. In urban areas with a high concentration of activities related to drugs and prostitution, offenders are likely to find many potential victims, a fact which attracts more offenders (Wikström, 1985). In 1999, a local crime survey in Zurich found that the rate of local resident street-crime victimisation was around ten times higher in Zurich's "problem" areas than in the most privileged areas of the city (Killias, 2001a). Thus, the size and the deterioration of such inner city areas may play a crucial role in overall crime levels.

Furthermore, the existence of large open drug scenes was certainly among the major factors in the increase in street crime in Switzerland's cities between 1989 and 1995 (Eisner, 1997). Open drug scenes were very much influenced by the extension of medical assistance to addicts in a few city centres. This led to a concentration of addicts and of dealers in that city centres. According to unpublished Zurich police data 73 per cent of cleared muggings and 35 per cent of cleared burglaries were committed by addicts in 1995 (Killias and Uchtenhagen, 1996).

In 1994, with the support of the Federal Government, a heroin prescription programme for a small number of addicts began and methadon substitution was extending to 15'000 addicts (regular consumers of heroin beeing estimated at about 25,000). A few weeks later, "needle-parks" in Zurich and other cities were closed.

[17] Although the Swiss (and ICVS) questionnaires of 1998 and 2000 made special efforts to identify them as well.

These measures and programmes had two consequences:

i) a dramatic drop in criminal involvement among recipients of heroin and, to a lesser extent, among those enrolled in methadone programmes;[18] and

ii) an immediate reduction in the concentration of addicts in Switzerland's urban centres.

Both consequences may have contributed to a reduction in crime.

On one hand, reduced delinquency among addicts (i.e. at the micro-level) diminished the number of motivated offenders,[19] a fact that is clearly born out in the 1998 and 2000 surveys since, according to accounts of robbery victims, the proportion of addicts among the offenders had dropped from 23 per cent in 1993-97 to 10 per cent in 1995-99.[20] On the other hand, the reduced concentration of addicts may have diminished the attractiveness of offending in certain urban areas; this may have been responsible for the drop not only in robberies, but also in assault and sexual aggression, i.e. two offences where, according to Swiss data (Killias and Rabasa, 1998; Killias and Aebi 2000b), addicts were not particularly involved in. It is feasible that both effects may have reached a major impact on macro-level crime rates between 1996 and 1997.

The recent increase in 1999 is yet hard to explain. Since, according to victim accounts, the proportion of addicts among the offenders was lower in 1999 than in 1997, a return of the drugs-crime link is unlikely to be the cause. A possible explanation is that recent migrations may have changed the shape of urban centres in 1999, and led again to increased concentration of social problems in certain areas. Within Western Europe, Switzerland received by far the highest number of refugees from the Balkan area, particularly during the winter and spring of 1999.[21] Although conviction rates have been relatively high among refugees in general over recent years (Eisner, Manzon and Niggli 1998, Office fédéral de la statisti-

18 According to police, self-report and victimisation data (collected regularly from the addicts in heroin treatment), street crime dropped by 50 to 90 percent, with serious offences showing larger decreases.

19 Drug-addicts were mostly involved in drug-trafficking, robbery, mugging, bicycle theft, and personal theft.

20 Given the low absolute numbers (n=75 and 110, in 1993-97 and 1995-99, respectively), the victim accounts of offender characteristics were analysed using five year rates. No such question was asked in the surveys conducted before 1998.

21 Officially, about 160,000 people from Kosovo alone, not included illegal immigrants, in a population of about 7 million.

que 2000),[22] little evidence is yet available to support such a hypothesis. However, the proportion of offenders whom the victims of violent crime perceived[23] as being of foreign origin has increased between 1987 and 1999 from 33 to 63 per cent in the case of robbery, from 40 to 52 per cent for sexual aggression, and from 19 to 55 per cent for assault (Killias, Lamon, Clerici and Berruex, 2000). These proportions match more or less what is shown by police statistics. It is, thus, not impossible that recent demographic changes may be at the origin of a new deterioration in urban centres, and, indirectly, of the sudden increase in crime observed in several cities - and nationwide - in 1999. An alternative (but not necessarily competing) explanation would be that youth (gang) violence increased over the last few years. Detailed analysis of trends in victimisation shows indeed that violence against teenage boys has disproportionately increased over the last two years.

1.7 Conclusion

According to our analyses, the routine activities approach as well as the changes that took place in illegal markets offer a plausible explanation to the trends followed by personal offences in Switzerland during the last 15 years of the 20th Century. For example, burglary trends can be explained as a result of changes in trans-border crime, since the enormous demand in consumer goods after 1990 led to an increasing criminal export industry of stolen goods from Western to Eastern Europe (Aebi 2004). Similarly, robbery, assault and other personal crimes have fluctuated in response to growing "needle" parks in Swiss cities between 1985 and 1993, and dropped once these open scenes began to vanish as a result of important changes in Switzerland's official drug policy (Killias 2001b). Indeed, heroin and methadone prescription became officially available to addicts from 1994. This program has been extended substantially in 1995 and 1996, to include ever since over 1,000 heroin recipients and beyond 15,000 methadone patients, out of a population of 20-25,000 regular heroin users.

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22 According to conviction records, 15 per cent of male asylum seekers aged 18 to 29 are convicted per year, compared to 4 and 3 per cent for the resident foreign and Swiss male populations of the same age, respectively.

23 By far the most important criterion of identification was language or accent, a fact that does not surprise in a country where accents play a central role in daily life. Thus, "foreign" origin means, in the present context, a social fact rather than a legal status.

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TWO

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN DENMARK, FINLAND, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN - A SUMMARY[1]

2.1 Level comparisons

Because of variations in the rules governing the collection and production of statistics in different countries, it is widely accepted that comparisons based on regularly published crime statistics do not in principle allow for the possibility of making cross-national comparisons of levels of crime (CoE, 1999:13). For this reason, when cross-national comparisons of crime levels are considered desirable, the international crime victims surveys (ICVS; van Dijk, Mayhew & Killias, 1990; Mayhew & van Dijk, 1997; van Kesteren, Mayhew & Nieuwbeerta, 2000) are a great help, despite the obvious methodological difficulties associated even with these data sets (e.g. partially high non-response rates; cultural differences). Results from all the surveys conducted between 1989 and 2000, irrespective of how many times the individual countries participated, have been summarised and are presented in table 2.1. These data are used to compare the Scandinavian countries with other European countries.

Generally speaking, the level of criminal victimisation is reported to be lower in Finland and Norway[2] than in Sweden and Denmark (however, the

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1 This paper is a shortened version of a summary published in Nordic Criminal statistics 1950-2000 (NCS, 2003).

2 Aromaa (2000:19) notes in a recent analysis, however, that Norway "may have lost its previous position as one of the definitive low-crime countries in western Europe".

Norwegian data refer only to 1989 and the Danish data only to the year 2000). For the most part, Sweden lies fairly close to the European average. Denmark and Sweden distinguish themselves (along with the Netherlands) with respect to high levels of bicycle thefts, whilst all the Scandinavian countries present levels of car vandalism and robbery that are on the whole relatively low. However, the Scandinavian countries score high on assaults/threatening behaviour. There has been speculation that this might in part be explained by higher levels of awareness and lower levels of tolerance among Scandinavian women when it comes to setting limits for the forms of cross-gender encounters that are considered socially acceptable (HEUNI, 1999:132 f; 163; 349; 432).

Table 2.1 **Victimisation during the past years according to the ICVS project - 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000** *(percentage victimised on one or more occasions)* (a)

	DK 2000	FI 1989-2000	NO 1989	SE 1992-2000	EUR9 1989-2000
Car theft	1,1	0,5	1,1	1,4	1,1
Theft from car	3,4	2,9	2,8	4,7	4,8
Car vandalism	3,8	4,4	4,6	4,6	7,5
Motorcycle theft	0,7	0,2	0,3	0,5	0,6
Bicycle theft	6,7	4,5	2,8	7,7	3,4
Burglary	3,1	0,5	0,8	1,5	1,8
Attempted burglary	1,5	0,7	0,4	0,9	1,8
Robbery	0,7	0,7	0,5	0,6	1,0
Thefts of personal property	4,2	3,6	3,2	4,9	4,1
Sexual incidents	2,5	2,6	2,2	2,1	2,2
Assaults & threats	3,6	3,9	3,0	3,7	2,7
All eleven offence types	23,0	18,8	16,4	23,4	22,7
Number of completed interviews	3.007	8.327	1.009	4.707	44.396
Response rate	66%	82%	71%	72%	50%

Source: van Kesteren et al. (2000), Appendix 4, Table 1.
(a) DK (Denmark): 2000 only; FI (Finland): 1989,1992,1996, 2000; NO (Norway): 1989 only; SE (Sweden): 1992, 1996, 2000; EUR9: Austria, Belgium, England & Wales, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain/Catalonia and Switzerland. All countries are weighted equally.

Additional data from cause of death statistics relating to the second half of the 1990s indicate (European Sourcebook, 2003:37) that levels of homicide in Denmark, Norway and Sweden are on a par with those reported in western Europe (around 1.1 per 100,000 of population), whilst Finland still

presents considerably higher frequencies (around 2.7 per 100,000 of population), something which had been noted in the criminological literature as early as the 1930s (NCS, 1997:13; Lappi-Seppälä, 2001).

The ICVS project surveys not only the extent of criminal victimisation but also other related phenomena such as levels of fear, crime-preventive measures, and attitudes towards and experiences of the police. Asked whether they felt they were at risk of being burgled during the following year, respondents from Finland, Sweden, and Denmark all ranked low (van Kesteren et al., 2000:210). Asked how safe they felt outside in their own neighbourhood after dark, feelings of insecurity were also low among Scandinavian respondents (op. cit., 212; no data for Norway). In response to the question of whether they had installed various kinds of anti break-in devices (such as burglar alarms, special locks, or bars on windows or doors), Finland and Denmark in particular came out well below the average (op. cit., 216).

2.2 Trend comparisons

Since there are no victims surveys (at either the national or European level) covering the entire post-war period, descriptions of crime trends have to be based on records of crimes reported to the police. Despite the well known shortcomings of official crime statistics, the use of such statistics to compare crime trends is a widely accepted method (CoE, 1999:13).

The number of crimes reported to the police has risen in all the Scandinavian countries since at least the beginning of the 1960s. The smallest increase is found in the number of reported incidents of homicide (the number of such reports has doubled, except in Finland where they seem to have remained at more or less the same level). The largest increase is to be found in the number of reported robberies, this being partly due to the fact that at the end of the 1950s robbery was more or less unheard of in these countries, with a total of only 1,200 robberies being registered in the four Scandinavian countries in 1960 (NCS, 2003:35). In

5 The List of waste was amended by the following Commission Decisions: 2001/118/Ec, 2001/119/Ec and 2001/573/Ec.

part, the increase is probably linked to the emergence of a group of socially marginalised older males and in part, more recently, to robberies between young males.

Crime trends in the Scandinavian countries are on the whole much the same as those found in other western European countries. Westfelt (2001) compared crime trends in Scandinavia with those in Austria, England & Wales, France, (West) Germany and the Netherlands. He found that all countries reported increases in crime, even though there were periodical local differences. Figure 2.1 clearly shows the striking similarity between the trend in registered assault and theft offences in the Scandinavian countries and that in the countries of western Europe. The similarities in crime trends have previously been noted by writers such as Heidensohn & Farrel (1991), Eisner (1995), Killias (1995), Marshall (1996), Aromaa (2000), Killias & Aebi (2000), and Entdorf & Spengler (2002).

The trend in juvenile crime constitutes a special case. The issue has been studied among others by Junger-Tas (1996), Pfeiffer (1998) and Estrada (1999). According to Estrada, levels of juvenile crime (i.e. mostly against property) increased in all ten of the European countries studied (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, as well as Austria, England, (West) Germany, the Netherlands, Scotland and Switzerland) without exception in the decades following the Second World War. In many of these countries this upward trend was broken, however, probably at some point between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s.

The trends in levels of violent offences committed by juveniles differ somewhat from the general crime trend. Here the official statistics of almost all the countries examined indicate increases over the last ten to fifteen. This picture of rising levels of violence has recently been challenged by Estrada (2001), who argues that studies stressing such increases are far too reliant on official crime statistics. In countries where alternative data are available (e.g. victim surveys, self-report studies, health care and vital statistics), these often present a different picture.

This view is supported by recent self-report surveys targeting ninth-grade students in Finland and Sweden. These surveys have been conducted since 1995 on a regular basis (Kivivuori, 2002; Ring, 2000). The questions are not completely identical across the Finnish and the Swedish surveys, but both have been developed on the basis of the ISRD (Junger-

Figure 2.1 **Assaults and thefts reported to the police in Scandinavia and five western European countries - 1950 - 2000** *(scaled series, per 100,000 of population)*(a) (b)



Source: Westfelt (2001; updated)
(a) All countries are equally counted.
R4 = England & Wales, France, (West) Germany and the Netherlands; EUR5 =ditto and Austria
(b) Y-scales intentionally omitted.

Tas et al., 1994) and many of the questions are sufficiently similar to warrant comparison. Finland and Sweden seem to share some basic trends in adolescent delinquency. For example, participation in shoplifting, stealing from school and the destruction of property seem to have decreased in both countries, while participation in violence has been comparatively stable. The percentage of adolescents refraining from participation in any offences has been increasing in both countries (Kivivuori, 2002:162) as well as in Denmark (Kyvsgaard, 1992; Balvig, 2000).

2.3 The response to crime and the sanctioning system

The number of police officers per 100,000 of population is lower in the Scandinavian countries than in either southern or western Europe. Over the period 1999 to 2001 the Scandinavian countries reported[3] a total of 177 police officers per 100,000 of the population, whilst the average for the EU member states stood at 345 (Barclay et al., 2003:17). As is the case in other European countries, however, the clear-up rate has dropped considerably over the years (figure 2.2). Exactly how this drop ought to be interpreted is not altogether clear: purely as a drop in police efficiency, for example, or as a result of increases in the number of offences which were always unlikely to be cleared, or as a combination of such factors.

The ICVS data show that the level of public satisfaction with the police is mixed in Scandinavia (Norway excluded from the comparison). Denmark and Sweden (together with the Netherlands) top the list as regards the extent to which members of the public report crimes to the police (van Kesteren et al., 2000:194). Concerning the way persons reporting crime feel the police have acted at the time the crime was reported, Denmark, Finland and Sweden present a higher than average level of satisfaction by comparison with the other countries (op. cit., 202). However, in the matter of how satisfied the respondents were with the police in general, confidence seems to be below average in Finland and Sweden, but above average in Denmark (op. cit., 206).

[3] All countries are weighted equally.

Figure 2.2 **Clear-up rates** *(all offences covered by respective criminal codes)* **in Scandinavia and five western European countries - 1950 - 2000** *(per cent)* (a)



Source: Westfelt (2001, p. 221; updated)
(a) All countries are equally counted.
EUR5: Austria, England & Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands.

The following brief description of choices of sanction concerns those imposed for all offences against the criminal code taken together (NCS, 2003:46-53). A more detailed description, looking at different offence categories, would not have been feasible given the brevity of this overview. [4] Since the majority of offences committed against the criminal code are property offences of one kind or another, the sanctions described here are in practice primarily those imposed for theft offences and the like. The data refer to the year 2000. In the case of Norway, the data had to be supplemented with “misdemeanours” since they are not included in the tables in the present publication.

Finland convicts far more people than the other Scandinavian countries (1,400 per 100,000 of population) as compared with 770 in Denmark, 570 in Sweden and 545 in Norway (misdemeanours included). Finland’s uni-

[4] For more detailed data, see Barclay et al. (2003) and European Sourcebook (2003).

que position may partially be explained by the legalistic approach characteristic of Finnish judicial practice, with its rather strict observance of mandatory prosecution and also, as has been intimated by Finnish experts, by the fact that clear-up rates have been consistently higher in Finland than in the rest of Scandinavia.

In contrast to the other countries, however, 81 per cent of those convicted in Finland receive fines (the corresponding proportions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden being 51, 54 and 42 per cent respectively). "Other sanctions" (excluding prison sentences) are used most often in Sweden (44 per cent as against 30 in Denmark, 21 in Norway and 9 per cent in Finland). This very rough outline nonetheless captures a number of the essential characteristics of the sanctioning culture of the Scandinavian countries: Sweden still emerges as the country where the philosophy of individual prevention, based on a wide variety of sanctions, is most pronounced, whilst Finland most clearly follows the classical tradition, imposing fines and prison sentences as the most common forms of sanction. Irrespective of these differences, fines are used extensively throughout the Scandinavian countries.

When it comes to the use of prison sentences, these are imposed most frequently in Denmark and least frequently in Sweden. On the other hand, the prison sentences imposed are longer in Sweden and Finland. This somewhat complicated picture provides a good indication of the difficulties faced when trying to measure and compare the relative "punitiveness" of the sanctioning systems of different countries (cf. Pease, 1994).

2.4 The prisons

Despite the above differences in the frequency and length of the prison sentences imposed in the Scandinavian countries, their judicial systems produce prison populations of a similar size. In the year 2000, the average prison population in the Scandinavian countries was low when viewed from a European perspective (59 prison inmates per 100,000 of population; the level being lowest in Finland at 55 per 100,000 and highest in Denmark at 63 per 100,000; NCS, 2003:55). The corresponding figure for western and southern Europe was 88 per 100,000 (computed from

Barcley & Tavares, 2002:7). The perception that prison sentences are harmful and should thus be avoided as far as possible retains a great deal of currency in the Scandinavian countries (Bondeson, 1998:94). However, in the most recent years, the prison populations have increased in all Scandinavian countries.[5]

The average length of stay in prison can be estimated to be shortest in Norway and Denmark (ca. 3 months respectively in 2000) and longest in Finland (ca. 7 months; but note Finland's low overall prison population). As regards the number of individuals serving life sentences, on a certain day in the year 2002 there were 16 such 'lifers' in Denmark, 74 in Finland and 106 in Sweden (KOS, 2003:110). There has been a substantial increase in the number of prison inmates serving life terms in Finland and

Figure 2.3 **Prison populations in Scandinavia and five western European countries - 1950 - 2000** *(per 100,000 of population)* (a)



Source: NCS (2003:55) and Westfelt (2001; updated)
(a) NOR3: Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
EUR5: Austria, England & Wales, France, (West) Germany and the Netherlands.

5 www.prisonstudies.org reported in March 2004 the following prisoner rates for 2003: Denmark 72, Finland 69, Norway 64 and Sweden 72 per 100,000 population.

Sweden over recent years; Norway, on the other hand, abolished life imprisonment in 1981.

Until the turn of the century, prison populations have been fairly stable in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (cf. von Hofer, 2003). Finland constitutes a remarkable exception. There the prison population has shrunk quite considerably since the mid-1970s (1976: 118 inmates per 100,000 of population). The political mechanisms underlying the decrease have been described by Törnudd (1993) and Lappi-Seppäla (2000), who - among other things - draws the conclusion that the decrease in the prison population has not had a negative effect on the crime picture in Finland by comparison with that of other Scandinavian countries (op. cit., 36-37).

2.5 Summary

This short overview of the state of the crime levels and penal systems in the Scandinavian countries, as portrayed by available statistical sources, indicates that the crime level in Scandinavia (as regards traditional offences) is similar to or lower than that of other western European countries. The extent of drug abuse in the Scandinavian countries also appears to be on a par with or lower than it is in the rest of Europe. Increases in crime rates during the post-war period have been very substantial in the Scandinavian countries just as they have been elsewhere in Europe - indicating that the recorded increases in traditional crime in Europe may have common structural roots. The 1990s have witnessed a stabilisation in theft rates, albeit at a high level. Increasing equality between the sexes might have contributed to an increase in the reporting of violent and sexual offences against women (and children), making these offences more visible. The system of formal control in the Scandinavian countries is characterised by relatively low police density, a clear-up rate that has declined, the imposition of fines in a high proportion of criminal cases and relatively low, but recently increasing prison populations.

The international crime victims surveys (no recent data available for Norway) indicate that fear of crime is comparatively low in Denmark, Finland and Sweden; and that (for this reason) people do not feel the need to take special precautions against the possibility of crime to any great

extent. Respondents appear to be fairly satisfied with the performance of the police and also support limits on the use of prison sentences.

Lahti (2000) - in his analysis of the ideological trends in the criminal policy of the Nordic countries since the 1960s - arrived at the conclusion that, although criminal policy in these countries is not unified, one can argue for the existence of a 'Scandinavian criminal policy' characterised by several common features relating to historical traditions, intensive co-operation and a similar approach to crime prevention and control. Thus, state crime prevention organizations (Crime Prevention Councils) operate in all the Scandinavian countries (BRÅ, 2001).

However, as Tham (2001) has shown, since the 1990s there are tendencies even in Scandinavia towards the reshaping of crime policy in a less liberal direction, where the political left - as, for example, in England (Downes & Morgan, 2002) - seems to have taken the lead.

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THREE

CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

3.1 Introduction

In 1857[1] the Home Office began to collect and publish data from the police on crimes which the police recorded. This data collection replaced a system whereby court statistics provided the basis for decision making on crime. For example, the justification[2] for introducing the police force in London was based upon court convictions.

The statistical series on recorded crime although criticised and subject to numerous reviews[3] had remained essentially unchanged for 150 years. Concern about the use of police statistics as an index of crime had been made for over 100 years. C.E. Troup in his commentary of the published Criminal statistics for 1882-92 commented:[4]

The first step in attempting to arrive at a sound conclusion is to determine the class of figures which can be accepted as a trustworthy index to the amount of crime. No set of figures should be used for this purpose without carefully examining all the conditions and circumstances or without making due allowance for influences, other than the actual increase or decrease of crime, which affect the figures; but in some cases the

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1 Constabulary Act 1856.
2 Speech by Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons, Metropolis Police Improvement Bill 15 April 1829.
3 Report of the Departmental Committee on Criminal Statistics December 1967.
4 Criminal Justice Statistics 1882-92, Home Office Statistical Findings 1/93.

disturbing influences are so great as to deprive statistics, which at first sight might seem to show the growth or diminution of criminality, of all value from this point of view.

The concerns expressed in 1893 continued and eventually led to the realisation that a large scale survey of victimisation for household crimes might provide an alternative and in many ways better measure of crime. This led to the first British Crime Survey covering 1981 and initially intended as a survey covering both England & Wales and Scotland. However, later surveys were restricted to only England and Wales. Surveys have taken place at varying intervals since then with a sample size of about 15,000 adults. In 1999 it was decided to carry out the survey as an annual rolling one and extend the sample size to 37,000. This increase in the size of the sample has enabled the production of sub-national information that can be compared with locally recorded crime statistics. This current paper is based on the most recently published results.[5]

3.2 Victimisation levels

3.2.1 Overall

It was estimated that in England/Wales there were 12.3 millions crimes in England & Wales against adults living in private households in 2002/3.Reflecting a coverage that excludes businesses and only includes those aged 16 and over. The level of crime rose consistently from 1981 reaching its peak in 1995 but has since fallen back to 1981 levels. However this trend is not reflected in public opinion with 73 per cent of respondents feeling that crime has risen over the past 2 years.

5 Crime in England and Wales, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 07/03.

Figure 3.1 **Trends in crime recorded in the British Crime Survey - 1981- 2002/2003**



Source: Crime in England and Wales 2002/2003
Home Office Statistical Bulletin 07/03

The trends in police recorded crime showed a similar rise to that for victimisation until 1992 but after a brief fall there has been a leveling off. However, these trends have been overlaid by a number of other changes. Firstly, the way crime is counted and the crimes included in the overall crime figures and secondly in the point at which crimes are recorded by the police to provide a more consistent basis for comparisons between police forces.[6] Thus counting is now based on the number of victims while recording occurs when the police are first made aware of the offence. The system therefore substantially differs from that seen in other parts of Europe where police recording takes place when the case is passed to the Prosecutor.[7]

6 Review of Crime Statistics: A discussion Document, London : Home Office (2000).
7 European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, Council of Europe (1999)

Figure 3.2 **Trends in number of crimes recorded by the police - 1981- 2002/2003**



Source: Crime in England and Wales 2002/2003
Crime Statistics England and Wales 1997

Different victimisation rates and recorded crimes level are partly explained by variations in the proportion of household crimes that are reported to the police. This rate is currently 44 per cent.

Figure 3.3 **Proportion of BCS crimes reported to the police - 1981-2002/2003**



Source: Crime in England and Wales 2002/2003
Home office Statistical Bullettin 07/03

3.2.2 Domestic burglary

For those households interviewed in the British Crime Survey, 3.4 per cent had experienced at least one burglary in the last year although substantially below the figure of 6.5 per cent in 1993. Two per cent were the victims of burglary with entry and 1.5 per cent were victims of attempt burglary. The average household can be expected to be the victim of a burglary about once every 50 years. However the risk for some areas and groups of people is considerably higher.

Figure 3.4 **Households most at risk of burglary - interviews - 2002/2003**



Source:Crime in England and Wales 2002/2003
Home office Statistical Bullettin 07/03

The highest risk seems to be in areas of high physical disorder, those where the householder interviewed is aged 16-24 years, those in single parent households and those in particular localities.

3.2.3 Violent crime

The British Crime Survey estimates that there were 2.8 million violent incidents experienced by adults in 2002/3, a similar level to that in 2001/2 but 24 per cent below that in 1997.

Figure 3.5 **Trends in violent crimes recorded in the British Crime Survey - 1991-2002/2003**



Source: Crime in England and Wales 2002/2003
Crime Statistics in England and Wales 1997

About one half (49 per cent) of these incidents resulted in no injury. There was a similarity between those areas and those groups of persons who were most likely to be a victim of a violent crime with those for burglary. The highest likelihood was in inner city areas.

Although no data has yet been published by 2002/3 there was a 27 per cent increase in firearms offences recorded by the police. 96 victims of homicide resulted from a shooting as compared with 73 in the previous year up by nearly a third. This compares with a 6 per cent rise in total homicides.

Robberies have nearly doubled between 1997 and 2001 but following a major Street Crime Initiative by the Government there was a 14 per cent fall in 2002/3. The increase in street robberies is not restricted to England/

Wales and major increases also took place in France and the Netherlands.[8]

3.2.4 Repeat victimisation

The British Crime Survey has enabled some estimate to be made of the extent of repeat victimisation in England/ Wales.

Figure 3.6 **Proportion of victims that were victimised more than once - 2002/2003**



Source: Crime in England and Wales 2002/2003 Home Office Statistical Bulletin 07/03

Just over one third of victims of violence (28 per cent) were victimised more than once in a 12-month period with one half victimised three times or more. The highest rates of repeat victimisation were for domestic violence and vandalism while robbery had the lowest rate at just under 1 in 10.

8 International comparisons of criminal justice statistics 2001, Home office Statistical Bulletin 12/03.

3.2.5 Who is the offender?

The Offenders Index database in England/Wales enables a linkage to be made for each conviction and sentences of all those convicted of serious offences since 1963. This unique database allows an offender's criminal career to be measured and the effectiveness of various sanctions. From this it is possible to estimate that one third of males born in 1953 had been convicted of at least one serious offence before the age of 40[9] in contrast to 8 per cent of females. In addition, a small proportion of offenders were responsible for a disproportionate number of offences with 7 per cent of males accounting for 59 per cent of all serious court appearances.

A 1993 study showed that over one half of males aged from 14 to 25 years and one third of females admitted to having committed an offence at sometime. More than 1 in 4 of the males but only 1 in 10 of the females admitted to an offence of violence.[10]

Figure 3.7 **Percentage of males and females between 14 and 25 who said they had offended at some time - 1993**



Source: Digest 4 Information of the Criminal Justice System (Home Office)

[9] Digest 4: Information of the Criminal Justice System, Home Office (1999).

[10] Young People and Crime , Home Office Research Study No 145.

It is very important to remember that offenders are often victims and vice-versa, For example street robbery or street violence. Factors important in offending behavior are delinquent peers, low parental supervision and exclusion from school.

3.2.6 Ethnic minorities as victims and offenders[11]

About 7 per cent of the population of England/Wales aged over 10 are from non-white ethnic groups. These include those of Afro-Caribbean, African or Indian sub-continent origin who either immigrated to England or are the children or grandchildren of those who did. However, more established communities such as the Chinese will also be included and increasingly those of mixed origin.

Figure 3.8 **Percentage victimised more than once iby ethnic group - 1999**



Source: Crime, Policing and Justice: the experience of ethnic minorities . Home Office Research Study 223

Ethnic minorities are found to have a higher level of victimisation than white people do with particularly high levels for those of Pakistani or

[11] Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System, Home Office (2003).

Bangladeshi origin for household crimes and black people for offences against the person. Homicides against black people have risen by over a quarter in last two years as compared with a rise for white people of less than 10 per cent. This is thought to reflect drug gangs and in a high proportion of cases no suspect is found.

One crime that has been particularly of concern since the murder of Stephen Lawrence in South London has been racist crimes. Since the inquiry[12] into this incident these crimes have been classified as racist if the victim, police or a witness thought it was. Since that time there has been a sharp rise in the number of racist incidents recorded by the police from 14,000 in 1997/98 to 54,350 in 2000/01. This rise is thought to reflect better reporting of these offences to the police and better recording by them rather than an increase in such incidents. Relative to population those of Indian sub-continent origin are most likely to be the victim of a racist crime.

Figure 3.9 **Recorded racist incidents - 1996/1997 - 2001/2002**



Source: Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System, Home Office - 2002

[12] The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, 1999.

New legislation in 1998 brought in racially aggravated offences. Although just over 30,000 such offences were recorded in 2001/2 the courts find it very difficult to convict for these offences and only 8,300 offences recorded resulted in a conviction. The most common offence is harassment.

Ethnic minorities (particularly black people) are 5 times more likely to be arrested than white people. There are marked differences in the types of offences committed with white people having a higher tendency to be arrested for burglary and criminal damage, black people for robbery and Asians for fraud and forgery and drugs.

3.3 Conclusion

It has only been in the last 30 years that attention has moved to the victim with the setting up of organizations such as Victim Support. The statistics presented here show the extent of victimisation and the welcome downward trend in the last few years. However rates remain high in certain inner city areas and for specific offences making the need to continue to monitor trends both at local as well as national level important.

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FOUR

CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN RISKS

More than 30 years ago, the government of the United States began the development of annual national indicators of crime and victimisation that would be free from the suspected biases of police records and include information about victims and their experiences. The resulting data, known as the National Crime Survey (and subsequently renamed the National Crime Victimisation Survey) have been critical to our understanding of the limits of official crime data, the correlates of victimisation risk, the nature and consequences of victimisation, and the responses to those experiences. In this presentation, I use these data from the past thirty years to describe the trends in violent and property crime in the U.S., and the trends in violent victimisation for persons in different demographic groups. To study the correlates of victimisation in greater detail, I will also use data from the mid-1990s to describe how the risk for violence is associated with individual, family, and community characteristics among youths, women, and men. I conclude with a brief summary of the challenges that lie ahead for researchers and the collectors of the data.

Let me preface these findings with a very brief history of the data. The impetus for American victimisation data began in the late 1960's and early 1970's, following the recommendations of a Presidential Commission on urban crime and unrest. Following several years of research and development, the government initially implemented two series of data collection. The first was a nationally representative survey of households and

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businesses that used a rotating longitudinal design with a six month recall period to produce national estimates of crime.The second was a supplemental set of city-level surveys, using a cross-sectional design and a one-year recall period. These two sources of data were intended to provide reliable national estimates, as well as the ability to examine urban crime and the variation across urban areas in greater detail. Shortly afterward however, budget restrictions forced the elimination of the city-level surveys, and later, the surveys of businesses. Beginning in 1973, only the national sample of households remained.

The American National Academy of Sciences assessed the strengths and limitations of victimisation data and in 1976 released a report calling for certain changes to the instrument and greater research and development. Ten years later, two sets of changes were implemented. The first, known as near term changes, consisted of alterations that would not affect overall estimates of victimisation. The second - the long term changes - were designed to increase self-reporting of victimisation by using a new cueing strategy designed to better prompt and encourage subjects to recall events, especially those that they might not themselves think of as a crime (such as a non-stranger assault or incidents not reported to the police). These long-term changes were phased into the survey using a split sample design that allowed researchers to estimate the effect of the changes on victims' reports. As expected, the redesigned questionnaire did increase the rates of reporting, but it did so in ways that varied across crime types. Rape and simple assault reporting increased the most, while crimes such as robbery and motor vehicle theft were unaffected by the changes. In order to examine trend data for the past 30 years, the changes resulting from the redesign are used to make adjustments for these crimes over the 1973 to 1991 time period.

The current National Crime Victimisation Survey (or NCVS) is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, and sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The sampling frame is a nationally representative sample of housing units and group quarters in the United States. In each sampled housing unit, all persons age 12 or older are interviewed. The NCVS provides nationally representative information on the frequency, characteristics and consequences of non-lethal violence and property crime against persons and households. Currently about 80,000 persons in 43,000 households are intervie-

wed twice each year about their experiences as a crime victim, and information about previously reported crimes is used at subsequent interviews to ensure that events are not reported twice. Households remain in the sample for seven interviews, unless the subjects move, at which time the new residents of the address replace the previous subjects. First interviews are conducted in person, and unless otherwise requested by the subject, subsequent interviews are by telephone. Participation rates are high, in the range of 90 per cent and above, in part because of the legitimacy and professionalism of the Census Bureau, and in part because participation is obtained in person rather than by mail or telephone.

Let me begin by showing the trends over the past 30 years in the most frequent of the measured crimes - property victimisation (figure 4.1). Theft (the top line in red) includes completed or attempted thefts of property or cash without personal contact between the victim and offender. Burglary (the middle line in blue) includes completed or attempted entry of a residence, most commonly with (but also without) successful theft of property or cash. Motor vehicle theft (the lower line in green) includes completed or

Figure 4.1 **Trends in property victimisation - United States - 1973 - 2002** *(rate per 1,000)*



attempted theft of an automobile, truck, or motorcycle. As you can see all three crimes decreased by at least one-half over the past thirty years, and for theft and burglary, the decline is roughly two-thirds.

Most Americans believe that burglary is the most serious of these property crimes, so it is worth taking a closer look at the burglary decline (figure 4.2). In the late1970s, the annual rate of household burglary was more than 100 per 1,000 households. Following steady declines, the rate is now approximately 30 per 1,000. To my knowledge, this dramatic and consistent decline in burglary has not been adequately explained or researched. Of course, there are numerous hypotheses, including target hardening practices (such as better locks and alarms), and the declining value of second-hand goods and preference for cash among offenders, but these hypotheses have not been directly tested. Motor vehicle theft also shows a decline, primarily over the last ten years. During this time a 50 per cent reduction in risk was observed. Many criminologists attribute motor vehicle theft declines to anti-theft devices.

Figure 4.2 **Trends in burglary and motor vehicle theft - 1973 - 2002**
(rate per 1,000)



Rates of personal (non-lethal) violence in the U.S. have declined over the past thirty years (figure 4.3). Simple assault (the top line) includes attacks without a weapon that result in either minor or no physical injury. Aggravated assault (the next line) refers to attacks or attempted attacks with a weapon (with or without injury) and attacks without a weapon that result in serious injury to the victim. Robbery (the third line) is defined as the attempted or completed taking of property or cash directly from a person using force or the threat of force. Rape (the lowest line) includes attempted and completed acts of forced or coercive sexual assault. As you can see, each of these violent crimes was roughly stable for the first twenty years of the series, but beginning around 1993, each has been in steady decline. American levels of non-lethal violence are currently at the lowest levels ever recorded by the surveys. The current rate of violent victimisation is about 23 per 1,000 persons (ages 12 and older) annually.

Figure 4.3 **Trends in violent victimisation, United States - 1973 - 2002** *(rate per 1,000)*



A closer look at the patterns in serious non-lethal violence, juxtaposed with national homicide data obtained from police records, is found in figure 4.4. Homicide trends are multiplied by ten so that the similarities in the fluctuations are more apparent. Unlike the consistent declines in property crime, in this slide we see roughly three broad eras. The first shows high fluctuating levels of violence peaking around the early 1980s, followed by somewhat of a decline until the mid 1980s. From the mid-80s until the early to mid-90s, there was a gradual upturn in violence, peaking between 1991 to 1994 (depending on the crime type). Since those peaks in the early 1990s, violence has decreased considerably, and most recently, continues to show decreases in non-lethal violence. Homicide rates, on the other hand, appear to have bottomed-out and have increased slightly in the last two years. Several factors appear to be responsible for the decline in violent crime, including; the decline of crack cocaine following a peak in the early 1990's, a decrease in unemployment during the economic expansion of the 1990s, and the very large increase in the American

Figure 4.4 **Trend in serious victimisation and homicide - 1973 - 2002** *(rate per 1.000; per 10.000 for homicide)*



prison population. The rate of imprisonment in US prisons is currently 476 per 100,000 persons. Twenty years ago, it was 141 per 100,000. There is also some evidence that the declines in intimate partner homicide ar the result of changes in the living arrangements of young men and women as well as the provision of domestic violence services.

Criminal victimisation risk, especially for violence, is higher among youth than older persons in the U.S., and because national crime rates reflect the age composition of the population, figure 4.5 displays the trends in violence for persons of different age groups. In this graph, violence includes all forms of non-lethal violence. An interesting pattern emerges when we examine these age-specific rates. Most importantly, we see that the increases in violence during the late 1980s and early 1990s are restricted primarily to young persons under the age of 24, especially teenagers. Levels of violent victimisation among persons 25 and older remained relatively stable during the time period in which youth violence increased. Thus, as was true for homicide in the U.S., the increases non-

Figure 4.5 **Trends in violent victimisation by age - 1973 - 2002** *(rate per 1,000)*



lethal violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s were primarily a youth phenomenon. Since the peak years in the early 90s, violence rates have decreased for persons in all age groups.

In all years of data collection, males have reported higher levels of violent victimisation. The differences in risk, however, have narrowed considerably over the past thirty years primarily because violent victimisation among men has declined at a faster rate than violence against women. Figure 4.6 shows that throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s, men were victims of violence at roughly twice the level of women. But over the past ten years, this difference has decreased dramatically. Males now report levels of violent victimisation that are only about 20 per cent higher than females. This narrowing of the gender gap has not been adequately studied by American criminologists.

Figure 4.6 **Trends in violent victimisation by sex - 1973 - 2002** *(rate per 1,000)*



In the U.S., violence against males is more likely than violence against females to involve offenders that are not known to the victim. If we were

to further separate the male and female trends in violence according to the victim-offender relationship, we see that the most dramatic declines over the last ten years have been for stranger crimes against males. This suggests that any explanation of the closing victimisation gap must also incorporate an account of why we have seen such decreases in male stranger violence.

Figure 4.7 shows how blacks and whites in America differ in their risk for non-lethal violence. Similar to the gender differences noted earlier, the gap in risk between blacks and whites has narrowed over time. Up until about 1993, blacks reported levels of victimisation that were about twice those of whites. Since 1993, the decline in violence has been more dramatic among blacks than it has been among whites. This trend roughly parallels the black-white patterns in homicide. However, for homicide the gap remains much larger (approximately five to one).

Figure 4.7 **Trends in violent victimisation by race - 1973 - 2002** *(rate per 1,000)*



Much of the American literature on victimisation, including my own

research, focuses on understanding the correlates of the risk for violence rather than the trends over time. This is because American levels of violence, particularly in certain areas and for certain subgroups, are so much higher than elsewhere. To study the risk for violence, multivariate analyses are necessary to separate the influences of individual, family, and community conditions. Without multivariate analyses, we are likely to draw spurious conclusions about the meaning of any given factor (such as race or family). To examine these kinds of issues, I have studied data from the 1995 NCVS that have been linked to additional data from the Census Bureau describing the characteristics of the respondents' communities. This is a unique project requiring special permission from the Census Bureau to avoid disclosure of confidential information about subjects.

My research has considered several sets of hypotheses. At the individual level, I have examined the demographic characteristics of the person (i.e., their age, race and ethnicity, and sex) as well as a crude measure of their lifestyle (that is, how often they go out in the evening during a typical week). At the family level, I have examined the size and structure of their family, their income, and how long they have lived in their current home. At the community level, I have examined the age, race and ethnic, and family composition of their community as well as the level of poverty. I examined the influences of each factor independent of all of the others to determine how much of an individual's risk for violence can by predicted by the kinds of communities or families in which they live, as well as their individual characteristics.

Before turning to those results, I should note that in the interest of time, the issues involved in these analyses are oversimplified. For instance, the data I use tell me about the kinds of communities in which an individual lives, but not all violent victimisation occurs in a person's own community. In fact, just over half of the incidents in the 1990's occurred within one mile from the subject's home. The analyses I describe were replicated according to the location of the incidents, as well as the victim-offender relationship. It was also necessary to examine youth separately from adults (primarily because youth do not choose their families the way that adults do), and to separate adult women from adult men due to the some differences in their victimisation experiences. To summarize risk patterns, I focus on the findings that are consistent across these various complexities.

Table 4.1 summarizes the influences of individual characteristics, independent of their family and community conditions. Among teenagers, women, and men, the older one is, the less likely they are to experience a violent victimisation. Males continue to experience somewhat more violence than females when we control for our lifestyle measure and other differences. However, the gap we saw earlier between black and white Americans is insignificant once we control for either family or community differences. The measure of lifestyle we examined - how often one goes out in the evenings - is significantly associated with risk among youth and adult men, but not among adult women. This is because much of women's risk comes from offenders inside her home. But adolescents and adult men who spend more evenings away from home are more likely to be victimized by violence than those who stay home more often.

Table 4.1 **Individual-level predictors of violent victimisation**

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS	Youth	Adult women	Adult Men
Age	*(-)	*(-)	*(-)
Male	*(+)	(b) *na*	*na*
Non-Latino Black	(a) ns	ns	ns
Latino	ns	ns	ns
Time Spent at Home	*(-)	ns	*(-)

(a) ns= not statistically significant.
(b) na= not applicable.

Although they have not received much attention in the U.S., family conditions are associated with violent victimisation, independent of individual and community factors (table 4.2). I will first discuss the risk factors for youth victimisation. Although family income and size were unrelated to adolescents' risk for violence, the kind of family they live in and the amount of time they have lived in their current home were associated with risk. For children in the U.S., there are primarily two distinct family types - those who live with two married parents and those who lived in single-parent family arrangements. Youth who live in single-parent families experienced more violence than those in two-parent families. So do youth who are relatively new to their community compared to those who have lived in their homes for longer periods.

Table 4.2 **Family-level predictors of violent victimisation**

FAMILY FACTORS	Youth	Adult women	Adult Men
Household Income	(a) ns	*(-)	ns
Household Size	ns	ns	ns
Length of Residence	*(-)	*(-)	*(-)
Single w/children	*/(+)	*(+)	*(+)
Single/alone	*(b) na*	*(+)	*(+)

(a) ns= not statistically significant.
(b) na= not applicable.

For adult men and women, it is necessary to consider additional family types. Compared to married men and women, adults who were living alone or raising their children alone were at higher risk for violence. This was true for all types of violence, such as stranger and non-stranger violence, and intimate partner violence as well. And like the adolescents, the adults who had been living in their home for shorter periods of time were more likely to be victimized. Family income was directly associated with lower violence among adult women only.

Table 4.3 shows how community characteristics are related to violent victimisation once we take into account the influences of individual and family factors. Living in a central-city area is associated with higher risks for violence among adults, but victimisation rates among youth are no higher in the cities than they are in the suburbs or rural areas. Of the remaining community measures, the most important predictor of violent victimisation is not poverty per se, but rather the family composition of the area. That is, persons who live in areas in which greater proportions of children are living with one parent are more likely to be victimized by vio-

Table 4.3 **Community-level predictors of violent victimisation**

COMMUNITY FACTORS	Youth	Adult women	Adult Men
Central.city	(a) ns	*(+)	*(+)
%Below peverty	ns	ns	ns
%Single w/children	*/(+)	*(+)	*(+)
%Less then 18	*/(+)	*(+)	ns
%Black	ns	ns	ns
%Latino/a	ns	ns	ns

(a) ns= not statistically significant.
(b) na= not applicable.

lence, independent of other individual and family characteristics. The proportion of young people in an area is directly associated with violence against adolescents and women, but not for violence against adult men. Youth and women who live in areas where the ratio of children to adults is greater are more likely to be victimized.

Even though community characteristics are important, the independent contribution of the community appears to be relatively minor unless one lives in the most disadvantaged areas of the U.S. figure 4.8 summarizes the general relationship between community factors and a person's risk for violence. The vertical axis represents the prevalence of violence, and the horizontal axis represents the distribution of persons according to the level of socio-economic disadvantage in their community. As you can see, for about 80 per cent of the population, community differences are not associated with risk. But as disadvantage becomes extreme, victimisation risk rises rapidly.

Figure 4.8 **Prevalence of violence across types of communities** *(adolescents and adults)* **- Six-month prevalence** *(per 1,000)*



But also note that the group most vulnerable to community conditions is youth living in one-parent families (this is shown in the top line). Their risk is much higher in disadvantaged areas than in other places, while youth living in two-parent families are better protected from the effects of their communities (the middle line). Finally, adults who live in the most disadvantaged places have higher risks for violence than adults who live in other places, however these increases are relatively small compared to youth.

Of these three sets of factors, the variables that best predict an American's risk for violent victimisation are their age, family structure, and length of residence in their home. Age is a well known correlate, but understanding why family structure and length of residence are so important is not so obvious. I believe these findings suggest the broader importance of the stability and strength of social networks. For instance, persons who have lived in their homes longer are more likely to be familiar with their communities and are better able to know whether certain locations or persons in the area are safe or dangerous. New residents, especially children, need time to develop ties and make friends in new neighborhoods, and without established neighborhood ties these newcomers are less likely to be protected by others. In America, single parent families tend to be significantly more poor than two parent families, and thus they are much more likely to live in areas of poverty and in areas with more families like themselves. In these kinds of communities, the higher proportions of young people and single adults make violence prevention and crime prevention more difficult because there are fewer adults available for monitoring youth activities, and those adults that are available tend to be more economically distressed and have less time and energy for developing strong local networks, especially if they hope to move out of their area as soon as possible.

I would like to conclude my presentation with a summary of the open questions for researchers of victimisation trends and patterns in the U.S. and some of the important challenges I expect them to encounter in the near future. First, I would argue that American trends in property crime and non-lethal violence over the past 30 years are not well understood. For instance, we do not know how much of the declines are associated with changes in target hardening or changes in criminal justice practices, or broader social changes. The lack of adequate measures for the array of plausible hypotheses is one reason, but equally important is the fact

that criminal justice policy and practice in the United States are state and local issues. Hence, there is a great deal of variation with the country, making it inherently difficult to measure and assess competing claims about why changes in crime occurred.

Second, multivariate analyses of the NCVS such as those I summarized here are not capable of telling us the precise mechanisms underlying risks for the simple reason that the survey does not collect that kind of information. Nor can it without compromising the integrity of the reports via decreases in participation or increases in testing effects. Thus, better insight into the question of why, for example, youth in single-parent families are more vulnerable to community characteristics will have to come from analyses of other data sources.

Third, although new survey data are not needed to describe the prevalence and incidence of victimisation or trends over time, they are needed to answer questions such as those I have just mentioned, especially if the purpose is the development of public policy to reduce risk. The new data must come from a variety of sources including controlled experiments and ethnographic studies involving multiple sites.

The NCVS is a critically important source of data on crime and victimisation. Without it we would know little about victim risk and consequences, and we would be forced to rely on police data to study trends over the years. Currently there are several important challenges that the collectors of the data face. On challenge is the ironic result of the welcome decline in crime -- that is, the decrease in victimisation has been of such magnitude that it is becoming increasingly difficult to show that apparently large annual changes in some crimes are statistically significant. This has often been an issue with rape and sexual assault, but now it is becoming an issue with robbery. Larger samples are needed to reliably measure changes in rare events. Unfortunately, increases in sample size are highly unlikely for the NCVS.

A related challenge is the fact that the costs of the survey are rising. To save money, the NCVS has had to undergo several sample cuts. Other changes also have been made to save money (such as reducing the number of interview attempts). Although there is no evidence that these changes have decreased the quality of the data, it is likely that they inevitably will if such changes continue.

Finally, when issues other than domestic crime are of greater priority for the federal government, it can be difficult for the administration to appreciate the need for quality victimisation data. As I noted earlier, the NCVS are gathered by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Justice Statistics. However, that statistical agency is under the authority of the Department of Justice and headed by the Attorney General of the United States -- a presidential appointee. This is a vulnerable position for a statistical office, because it means that they often must convince each administration of the value of objective crime and justice indicators. As one might expect, this task is more difficult under some political conditions than others.

FIVE

CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF RISK

5.1 Introduction

This paper gives a description of the trends and patterns of risk in criminal victimisation in the Netherlands. For that it concentrates on three subjects. First, it indicates which data sources are available in the Netherlands that can provide information on criminal victimisation. After that, trends in crime and criminal victimisation are described. Subsequently, the main developments in research in criminal victimisation are discussed that is being done in the Netherlands.

5.2 Data sources

In the Netherlands, various data sources are available that can give information on criminal victimisation. The most important are the police statistics and a variety of victimisation surveys (Dutch Crime Victimisation Survey, Police Population Monitor, International Crime Victimisation Survey and the NSCR Victimisation Survey). The different national data sources and their most significant qualities are briefly described, so that a clear picture of the potentials what the data offers can be formed.

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First, we have disposal of police statistics. Since 1950 figures on crimes recorded by the police are passed on to Statistics Netherlands. In the past completed report forms had to be send in monthly, but over the last couple of years automated records are used. The police statistics displays crimes investigated or brought to police attention and are published annually. The number of crimes are broken down into crimes and groups of crimes as described in the various criminal codes.

Furthermore, in the Netherlands several victimisation surveys exist. The Dutch Crime Victimisation Survey started in 1974 and was at first carried out by the Dutch research centre of the Ministry of Justice (WODC). Since 1980 Statistics Netherlands carries out these surveys. From the beginning, these surveys were held annually or biannually. From 1992 onwards, the structure of the survey was altered in a number of respects: for example, the selection of respondents was modified, the survey was made continuous rather than relative to a specific period of the year, and the questions were changed. Since the redesign approximately 10,000 respondents have been personally interviewed on victimisation of several types of crime, on reporting behaviour and on fear of crime. More than the other victimisation surveys, this survey focuses on the estimates of crime rates and trends in the Netherlands.

The Police Population Monitor is a telephone survey commissioned by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice. It is held every two years among a randomly selected sample of approximately 75,000 respondents. Contrary to the victimisation survey of Statistics Netherlands, this survey focuses on local and regional differences in crime rates, fear of crime and opinions on the police. The advantage of the Police Population Monitor is that - due to the large sample size - contextual effects of neighbourhoods can be studied. In the last couple of years, the measures of fear of crime and opinion on the police are also used as performance indicators for the police.

A third important survey in the Netherlands is the International Crime Victimisation Survey (ICVS). The first ICVS was conducted in 1989 covering 15 industrialised countries, mostly in Western Europe. Interviews were mainly conducted by telephone using a fully standardized questionnaire. Usually 2,000 people in each country were interviewed. Since 1989 the ICVS also took place in 1992, 1996 and 2000. Surveys have been carried out in 24 industrialised countries and in 46 cities in developing coun-

tries and countries in transition. The ICVS was set up mainly to compare crime rates between countries.

The fourth national victimisation survey mentioned was carried out in 1996 by the Netherlands Institute on Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR). Face-to-face interviews with almost 3,000 respondents were completed. The main aim of this survey was to collect data on the individual life course of the respondents. They were asked to give information about their marital, fertility, residential, educational, and employment history. Subsequently, respondents were questioned about criminal victimisation during their lives and if they had ever committed any of the specified offences. Consequently, for every year in the respondents' lives, information is available on whether they had been victims or offenders of the distinguished types of crime, as well as on the pattern of their daily routines.

5.3 Trends in crime and criminal victimisation

Based on the police statistics and the victimisation survey of Statistics Netherlands, the trends in crime and criminal victimisation of violent and property crime can be shown.

Figure 5.1 shows the level and development of violent crime based on police statistics. In 1950 the number of registered violent crimes was around 20,000 (2 per 1,000 individuals). Until the end of the nineteen seventies, this number remains fairly stable. Then the level of violent crime increases considerably to more than 100,000 in 2002 (6 per 1,000 individuals).

The broken line shows the development of the level of violent crime according to the data from victimisation surveys. At the start of the nineteen eighties more than 25 times as many crimes were registered than those recorded in police statistics.

At present, the level of violence based on victimisation surveys is still much higher than the police figures, but now "only" ten times higher. The most important reason for the decline of the dark number is that over the years, police statistics have improved considerably (Wittebrood & Junger 2002). This is not only because more reported crimes are recorded in police reports, but also because more police reports are finding there way into official statistics.

Figure 5.1 **Trends in violent crime - 1950 - 2002** *(number of incidents per 1,000)*



Source: Statistics Netherlands

Figure 5.2 shows the level and development of property crime in the Netherlands. Since 1950, police statistics have shown a rise in the level of property crime. In 1950, 60,000 crimes were recorded (6 per 1,000 individuals), and in 1994 the highest level was reached of almost a million (60 per 1,000 individuals). From then on, the number of registered property crimes declined somewhat. The level of property crime based on victimisation surveys is higher: almost 2 million. The difference in level, however, is not as great as in the case of violent crime. Furthermore, the general trend in property crime is similar in both police statistics and victimisation surveys.

What about the prevalence rates of specific types of crime? In 2002 the Dutch Crime Victimisation Survey estimates that more than a quarter of the Dutch population aged 15 years or older fell victim to at least one crime (table 5.1). The prevalence rate, however, varies in different types of crime. Six per cent fell victim to at least one violent crime. Property crimes were reported by nearly 13 per cent of the population. Bicycle theft

Figure 5.2 **Trends in property crime - 1950 - 2002** *(number of incidents per 1,000)*



Source: Statistics Netherlands

was the most common property crime: 4.6 per cent. Besides violence and theft, 12 per cent of the population fell prey to vandalism. Car vandalism is most common: almost 8 per cent fell victim to this crime in 2002.

Because victimisation surveys have been carried out for a long time in the Netherlands, the trends in the prevalence rates of victimisation can be described since 1980. The risk of criminal victimisation in violent crimes, property crimes and vandalism is presented in figure 5.3. The risk of falling victim to a violent crime (the bottom, broken line) increased in the beginning of the eighties, but after a small decrease the risk stabilised. The risk of being threatened, however, increased in the last few years. The risk of falling victim to property crime (the medium, dotted line) also increased in the beginning of the eighties. After 1986 this risk stabilised to a slightly lower level and since 1995 a decline can be noticed, which is mainly due to the decrease in burglaries. The risk of falling victim to vandalism (the top solid line) declined in the eighties, but since then it has increased. This is mainly accounted for by the increase in car vandalism.

Table 5.1 **Percentage of the Dutch population** *(aged 12 years and older)* **victimised - 2002**

	%
	6,0
VIOLENT CRIMES	
Sexual offence (a)	1,2
Assault	1,8
Threats	3,7
PROPERTY CRIMES	12,9
Burglary (a)	1,8
Bicycle theft	4,6
Car theft (b)	0,2
Theft from car (b)	2,6
Pick pocketing	2,2
Other theft	3,1
VANDALISM	12,0
Car vandalism (b)	7,8
Other vandalism	5,2
Nuisance phone calls	4,6
Other crimes	0,7

Source: Statistics Netherlands, POLS (2002)
(a) aged 15 years and older.
(b) aged 18 years and older.

Figure 5.3 **Trends in risk of victimisation - 1980 - 2002** *(in percentage)*



How does the Dutch criminal victimisation rate relate to the crime levels of other Western industrialised countries? To gain insight into this, the International Crime Victimisation Survey is used. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of the population aged 16 years and older that fall victim to at least one violent crime. On average, 5 per cent of the population in these countries indicated that they have been fallen a victim to a violent crime. The prevalence rate of violent crime is especially high in Australia, England & Wales, Scotland and Canada. The Netherlands follows in the eighth position, after Finland, Denmark and Sweden.

Figure 5.4 **Risk of violent crime victimisation in international perspective - 2000** *(in percentage)*



Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of the population that fell victim to a property crime. On average, this is nearly 15 per cent of the population. The Netherlands takes in a high position with 17 per cent victims, after Australia, Sweden and Denmark. When bicycle theft is left out (a very common crime in the Netherlands), the Netherlands still takes in the seventh position.

Figure 5.5 **Risk of property crime victimisation in international perspective - 2000** *(in percentage)*



Now that you have some idea of the level of crime in the Netherlands, the trends in crime and the comparison of the Dutch level of crime with other countries, a few developments in crime victimisation research in the Netherlands are discussed. It gives an idea of the state of affairs in research.

5.4 Main developments in Dutch victimisation research

The Netherlands was among the first countries, along with the United States and the Scandinavian countries, to conduct periodical national victimisation surveys in the early seventies. In the use of these surveys and the research of criminal victimisation in the Netherlands clear developments can be seen. As in other countries, the victimisation surveys were initially conducted for a better insight into the scope and nature of crime. But soon the surveys were also used to gain an understanding of the risks

of becoming a victim and the most significant determinants of such risks. In the past thirty years, three developments have played an important part in the research of criminal victimisation in the Netherlands.

1) Especially in the beginning, lifestyle and daily routine activities were measured using demographic and social characteristics. Present research distinguishes itself by using more precise indicators to gain insight into lifestyles and daily routine activities. Another significant improvement in this respect is the research into the relationship between victimisation and offending.

2) The second important development in the research into the risks of victimisation is the use of knowledge on the geographical distribution of crime, perpetrators and victims. Even though in the ecological tradition the attention paid to victims was limited, it has been a major influence on the current knowledge of the risks of victimisation and the significance of the social context is recognized.

3) The third important development is the use of longitudinal data. This data can offer more clarity on aspects of repeat victimisation as well as determinants of victimisation in general.

5.4.1 Lifestyle and daily routine activities perspective

It is well known that criminal victimisation is unequally distributed among the population. Like elsewhere, age is one of the strongest correlates of victimisation in the Netherlands. However, sex, household composition, education and urbanisation are also important correlates. Of course, the relationships vary somewhat between specific types of crime. The correlates are assumed to be indicators of lifestyle, daily routine activities and opportunities. Also the link between victimisation and offending, is therefore, a subject of research.

In this paper the focus is on the link between lifestyle, offending and risk of violent victimisation among high school pupils. Offenders who committed a violent crime have 10.8 per cent chance of becoming a victim of violence, while for nondelinquents this percentage is 2.3. Thus, it appears delinquents are almost five times more likely victims to violence than nondelinquents. There is also a link between delinquents of property crimes

Table 5.2 **Offending and risk of violent victimisation** *(in percentage)*

OFFENDER OF	Yes	No
Violent crime	10,8	2,3
Property crime	8,8	2,8
Vandalism	9,4	2,9

Source: Wittebrood & Van Wilsem (2000)

and vandalism and victims of violence. Around 9 per cent of delinquents of property crimes or vandalism reported being a victim of violence, while for nondelinquents this is not even 3 per cent.

These findings can partially be explained by the fact that pupils who report delinquent behaviour have a different life style. Pupils who carry a weapon, use alcohol, soft drugs or hard drugs are more likely to report being a victim. Delinquent behaviour (especially violent behaviour) increases, however, also the risk of being victimised.

Table 5.3 **Lifestyle and risk of violent victimisation** *(in percentage)*

	Yes	No
Carries weapon	10,1	3,2
Use of alcohol	5,6	3,4
Use of soft drugs	7,5	3,4
Use of hard drugs	15,1	3,7

Source: Wittebrood & Van Wilsem (2000)

5.4.2 Contextual perspective

The importance of the social context in which people live is recognised more and more in research done on criminal victimisation in the Netherlands. To show that within cities themselves crimes and victims are distributed unequally the map of Amsterdam is presented. Figure 5.6 illustrates the number of victims who were assaulted in their own neighbourhood. The darker the area, the more assault victims. In figure 5.7

the distribution of burglary victims can be seen: the darker the area, the more burglary victims. As you may have noticed, the darkest areas in the previous map are not the same as the darkest areas in this map.

Figure 5.6 **Percentage of victim of assault in Amsterdam**

Recent research in the Netherlands have shown that differences in crime rates between neighbourhoods can be explained by their different sociostructural characteristics and population composition (Wittebrood 2000, in preparation). Population composition is responsible for a substantial share of the differences in crime rates between neighbourhoods. But neighbourhood characteristics indicating social disorganization - low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility - play also a vital part. Low economic status seems to foster violent crime, in particular, while ethnic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of burglary. Thus, both individual background features and neighbourhood context have a direct impact on the risk of victimisation. Van Wilsem et al. (2003), showed that also in neighborhoods that are undergoing strong socioeconomic improvement the risk of victimisation is relatively high.

Figure 5.7 **Percentage of victims of burglary in Amsterdam**

Table 5.4 **Neighbourhood characteristics and risk of victimisation** *(in odds-ratios)*

	Violent crimes	Burglary
Low economic status	1,20	1,08
Ethnic heterogeneity	1,09	1,20
Residential mobility	1,06	1,05

Source: Wittebrood (2000, in preparation)

5.4.3 Longitudinal perspective

The final development in research on criminal victimisation focused on in this paper is the longitudinal perspective. Thanks to the NSCR victimisation survey we know more about repeat victimisation over a longer period of time than the customary time span of one year. On average, during the past 25 years, two-thirds of the Dutch population has been a victim of crime. The figures reveal that a relatively large amount of people

who fell victim to any type of crime during the past 25 years has been victimized repeatedly. For bicycle theft, for example, about 20 per cent of all victims were victimized more than once and 16 per cent more than twice.

Table 5.5 **Repeat victimisation over a 25-year period**

	0 times	1 time	2 times	2+ times
Assault	86,9	10,9	1,3	0,8
Threat	86,1	10,9	1,9	1,1
Burglary	78,7	17,4	3,2	0,7
Theft of bike	64,8	22,9	6,9	5,5

Source: Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta (2000)

More detailed analyses of the NSCR victimisation survey showed that repeat victimisation is largely due to personal characteristics that are significant to the risk of victimisation (Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta 2000). Effects of previous victimisation do exist (due to so-called “state dependence)”, but are relatively small. It seems that the risk of repeated victimisation is more randomly distributed among people when a longer period of time is examined.

5.5 Conclusion

As shown in this paper, the different data sources we have in the Netherlands, each have their own qualities. This richness of data sources is important to improve our knowledge on criminal victimisation. Although research on criminal victimisation in the Netherlands was limited for a long time, the last decade this research has been intensified and the future looks promising. But, serious problems might arise in the very near future. Statistics Netherlands have serious plans to stop conducting all their surveys, including the Dutch Crime Victimisation Survey. So, the future of this survey is very insecure. If the survey is stopped, it will have important consequences for the research on criminal victimisation, because this is the only periodical survey independent of criminal justice agencies and of policy makers.

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TREND OF CRIMES IN LARGE CITIES

SIX

CO-ACCUSED PERSONS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS IN LARGE ITALIAN CITIES[1]

6.1 The phenomenon of crimes committed by several individuals and data on co-accused

Each single event we define as crime involves the presence of at least three elements: one or more violations of a society's penal norms, one or more victims, and one or more perpetrators. The sociologic analysis of crime stems from the analysis of the structure of such elements. Let us consider the last one of these elements. While some crimes are committed by one perpetrator only, others are committed by several persons. Just as some criminals act alone, others are helped by accomplices, either systematically in some cases, or, in other cases, occasionally or at some period of their career. The Anglo-Saxon literature usually defines as “co-offending “ the taking part of several persons in one same crime. According to a more limited definition, this implies the perpetrators to be present at the same time and in the same place. Nevertheless, some

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[1] The author wishes to thank Mario Greco and Valerio Terra Abrami, both of Istat, for making available the data on which this chapter is based and for their assistance provided in elaborating and interpreting the results. The author wishes to apologise in advance for any errors of which he assumes all responsibilities. A particular thanks must go to Valerio Vanelli, who patiently and attentively worked on the files whose management presented significant problems and which have led to most of the elaborations on which this chapter is based. The author wishes to thank in particular Marzio Barbagli for having encouraged him not only to start this work but also to continue it and publish, at least partially, the results.

scholars extend this definition to the cases in which the perpetrators commit the same crime even if committing it at different moments and in different places, such drug trafficking-related crimes, which connect persons acting at different stages of the goods' sales channel, or a homicide involving in the same crime mandant and material executors, who do not share nor the space nor the time of such event.

The co-offending, thus, is a different phenomenon than that of the "bands ", "gangs ", and "criminal groups " and does not include either crime perpetrators who are connected to other crime perpetrators. Unlike the latter ones, co-offending means a crime that is materially committed by several persons who act at the same moment and in the same place. Vice-versa, a crime perpetrator can be linked to other perpetrators but not commit a crime with them.[2] Given the fact that crimes are not always committed by one individual alone, co-offending is particularly important for analysing criminality. Nonetheless, even though, recently, the international literature, unlike the Italian one, is showing an increasing interest in this matter,[3] this phenomenon remains a poorly studied field. The researches conducted up until now show that the frequency with which crimes are committed by several individuals, varies in relation to gender, age and life cycle (co-offending is particularly frequent in youth crime), social group of reference, type of crime committed, characteristics of the victim, territory where the perpetrators live. In addition, they prove that to survey co-offending is also very important for studying criminal careers. The number of perpetrators indeed represents a fundamental feature for analysing aetiologically criminality. Finally, since crimes are not only committed by "solitary " individuals, it is important to analyse the phenomenon of several individuals in one same crime in order to control crime and to attempt at reducing the number of crimes. It is indeed possible to reduce the number of crimes by reducing the number of perpetrators only if we assume that they act alone. The absence of one perpetrator will help reduce less the overall number of crimes if the impact of co-offending and the number of perpetrators in one same crime remain high. Hence, to know the frequency and the characteristics of crimes committed with other accompli-

2 For a theoretic and empirical review on Co-offending, the reference text is [Reiss 1988].

3 See, for example, [Weerman 2003] and the literature mentioned in this article.

ces would also serve the purpose of controlling and reducing crimes.

This chapter will examine the co-offending phenomenon. Nevertheless, given the specific source used, the term we will more correctly use is that of co-accused since the data available for studying this phenomenon regard a subset of the co-offending phenomenon. This subset includes all the cases where crimes committed by more than one individual were reported, without considering the number of perpetrators really involved but only those reported, which supposedly make up, in some cases, only a subset - whose proportions in relation to all the crimes committed by several persons remain of course rather obscure - of the first ones. Finally, we also consider as co-accused the perpetrators of one same crime who act in different moments and in different places, a feature of our data that drives us to adopt the extended definition of co-offending.[4]

We will first analyse (par.6.2) the differences in the number of co-accused according to the crime and the area of the country, before concentrating on the structure of the co-imputation phenomenon per perpetrator's nationality. The latter analysis will first concentrate on the different behaviour of the Italian criminals and of the foreign criminals (par.6.3), and, then, examine in detail the behaviour of each single nationality (par.6.4). The last paragraph (par. 6.5) will analyse the youth component. After reconstructing its impact according to the perpetrators' nationality, it will propose an indicator for studying the impact of the co-accused in the complaints involving minors and the different distribution of the phenomenon in Italian cities in relation to the perpetrators' nationality.

The data relate to the crimes for which the ordinary court has initiated a criminal prosecution and were directly drawn from Istat's informative system for managing proceedings at the judicial offices called Re.Ge. The analysis covers the years 1993 to 2001 and, regarding the territory profile, considers only the large Italian cities, that is, the 11 Italian cities with a population of over 300 thousand inhabitants. The archive (which uses mod. 310 for the survey) contains data on the crimes and on the persons reported: crime or crimes committed, year and month of crime, size of the

[4] In order to make it simpler, we will, in this chapter, refer to the accused as perpetrators too, though, from a strictly juridical point of view, this term is completely inexact; we will then speak of co-accused when referring to accused persons who have been reported together with other individuals for the same crime.

municipality in which the crime was committed, province, informative source, gender, nationality, presence of minors. Such archive is not an individual one, though. The complaints filed represent the analysis unit and, for each complaint, it includes the number of Italian males reported,

Table 6.1 **Complaints for crimes committed by an identified person per crime and area in which the crime was committed, contained in the computerised files of models 310-320. Large cities of the Centre North, South and Islands - survey database - 1993 - 2001**

CRIMES	Centre North (CN)	South and Islands (SI)	Italy
Murder	682	425	1.107
Attempted murder	1.209	526	1.735
Manslaughter	84	19	103
Death as consequence of another crime	59	19	78
Assaults	3.199	457	3.656
Intentional personal injuries	37.032	8.319	45.351
Affray	3.660	676	4.336
Sexual assaults	2.657	645	3.302
Group sexual assaults	79	23	102
Theft	119.340	17.416	136.756
Burglary and theft from the person	262	80	342
Robbery	16.290	6.325	22.615
Attempted robbery	4.175	1.477	5.652
Reset	46.608	17.615	64.223
Drugs (art 17 comma 1 of L 26690 n 162)	13	7	20
Drugs (Criminal association)	340	284	624
Drugs (Possession over moderate quantity)	30	38	68
Drugs (Production and trafficking)	54.225	12.625	66.850
Child prostitution	70	7	77
Instigation, exploitation and abetting of prostitution	2.539	518	3.057
Total	**292.553**	**67.501**	**360.054**

Source: the author's elaboration on the original files of archive Re.Ge., relative to the proceedings for which the juridical authorities have started a criminal prosecution, 1993-2001, provided by Istat

and minor males, the number of Italian females reported, and minor females, and the same information for foreigners. Thus, the files prevent reconstructing individually each co-accused. Table 6.1 presents the database

used, distinguishing the type of crime and the area of the country where the crime took place. If we limit the analysis to the large cities, the archive holds information on over 360 thousand complaints filed against perpetrators.

6.2 The co-imputations and their distribution in large cities

In order to make it simpler, we will classify the crimes into three families. As regards the violent crimes, the share of complaints filed against more than one individual on the total complaints reaches its highest levels in the case of consummated murders, as over 40 per cent of the complaints filed for this kind of crime involved two or more perpetrators. As the seriousness of a violent crime decreases, the incidence of the co-accused reduces too. Thus, in the case of attempted murder or manslaughter,[5] such share drops under 30 per cent. Finally, as regards intentional personal injuries and sexual assaults, it also drops to 23.1 per cent and 16.2 per cent respectively. These differences can be traced back to the different degree of planning that the afore-mentioned crimes require. The organized crime greatly weights on the share of complaints filed against more than one perpetrator in the case of consummated crimes. Likewise, as we will see later on, the share of consummated murders for which several perpetrators have been charged is higher in the large southern cities, where the weight of the organized crime on this kind of crime is much higher, even reaching 60 per cent in Palermo. On the other hand, the share of crimes attributed to the organised crime is decreasing, going from murders to consummated murders and from these to personal injuries.

Even though to a lesser extent, some differences between crimes have also been registered in the case of the crimes against property. Generally, the share of complaints filed against more than one perpetrator on the total of complaints is lower for the crimes against property than for violent crimes. Nevertheless, in this case too, despite their modest entity, some differences have been recorded among these crimes in relation to their seriousness and to whether they are consummated or attempted. In the

5 Bear in mind, as regards manslaughters, the low number of cases, which is inferior to 100.

case of consummated robberies, the complaints against more than one perpetrator exceed 30 per cent, but, in the case of attempted robberies and thefts, such percentage drops to 27 per cent. The Citizens' Safety Survey, conducted every five year by Istat,[6] has also registered, though with different values, an increase in the percentage of crimes committed by more than one perpetrator on the total of crimes, including consummated and attempted ones, as regards robberies and bag-snatchings.

The values registered by the so-called “crimes without victims “ are even lower. If we consider all the drug-related crimes, only 28 per cent of the complaints regarded more than one perpetrator, thereby showing how most of the persons charged with a drug-related crime are drug-pushers, that is, less important resellers who directly sell in the street to the consumers, or consumers-pushers.[7] The share of complaints against more than one perpetrator is even lower in the case of reset, crime for which over four complaints out of five regard only one individual. The levels of complaints filed against more than one perpetrator are on the increase only in the case of prostitution-related crimes, as over two complaints out of five regard more than one perpetrator.

The number of individuals participating in a crime is an aspect with much-defined territorial features. The higher diffusion of the large organised crime in Southern regions leads us to hypothesise a lesser incidence of the phenomenon of co-accused in the central and northern regions.[8] Such opinion is confirmed from a detailed analysis conducted on the data relative to the number of perpetrators reported for crimes committed in the eleven large Italian cities during the nineties and at the beginning of the new century. This analysis helps define better its characteristics. Only some crimes are more frequently object of complaints filed against several individuals in the large cities of the South. In particular, these crimes are those on which the organised crime plays a higher role, such as consummated murder. In the other

6 [Istat 2004, 74 and prospects 8.1].7.

7 I here use a terminology well consolidated in literature, see [Johnson, Williams and Sanabria 1990; Arlacchi and Lewis 1990, 123, fig. 4.2; Barbagli, Colombo and Savona 2003, 89].

8 We have used, in this chapter, a very simplified distribution of the Italian regions, Centre-North and South-Islands. The Central-northern regions (or, more synthetically, the North) include Piedmont, Valle d'Aosta- Vallèe d'Aoste, Lombardy, Liguria, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche and Lazio. The Southern regions include Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia.

Table 6.2 **Criminal proceedings initiated by the judicial authority per crime and number of persons reported - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CRIMES	Nr. of persons reported							N (b)
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	More than 1	
Comsumed murders	57,6	15,7	7,7	3,9	2,4	12,6	42,4	(1,074)
Attempted murder	70,2	15,1	5,5	3,6	1,0	4,6	29,8	(1,663)
Attempted or comsumed murder	65,3	15,3	6,4	3,7	1,6	7,7	34,7	(2,737)
Manslaughter	70,6	20,0	5,9	1,2	1,2	1,2	29,4	(85)
Comsumed and attempted murder and manslaughter	65,4	15,5	6,3	3,6	1,6	7,5	34,6	(2,822)
Death as consequence of another crime	34,6	10,9	1,9	0,6	1,9	50,0	65,4	(156)
Assaults	73,4	18,5	4,9	1,7	0,7	0,7	26,6	(3,612)
Intentional personal injuries	76,9	15,1	4,5	1,8	0,7	0,9	23,1	(44,525)
Affray	22,8	15,6	25,1	15,7	8,5	12,3	77,2	(4,094)
Sexual assaults	83,8	9,8	3,1	1,5	0,5	1,2	16,2	(3,255)
Group sexual assaults	27,2	34,0	20,4	5,8	4,9	7,8	72,8	(103)
Sexual assault and group violence	82,1	10,5	3,7	1,6	0,7	1,4	17,9	(3,358)
Thefts	73,1	20,4	4,0	1,6	0,4	0,5	26,9	(160,099)
Burglaries and thefts from the person	73,5	19,1	6,4	0,7	0,4	0,0	26,5	(283)
Total thefts	73,1	20,4	4,0	1,6	0,4	0,5	26,9	(160,382)
Comsumed robbery	69,7	20,9	5,3	2,0	0,8	1,3	30,3	(22,566)
Attempted robbery	72,5	20,1	4,7	1,6	0,5	0,6	27,5	(5,658)
Attempted and comsumed robbery	70,3	20,8	5,2	1,9	0,7	1,2	29,7	(28,224)
Reset	81,3	13,4	2,9	0,9	0,4	1,0	18,7	(63,416)
Drugs (production and trafficking)	72,2	19,1	4,6	1,7	0,7	1,7	27,8	(66,497)
Drugs (Possession over moderate quantity)	- (a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(74)
Drugs (Criminal association)	21,2	8,5	6,5	6,2	3,4	54,2	78,8	(585)
Drugs (Induction to use)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(6)
Drugs (art. 17, comma 1 L. 162/90)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(32)
Total of drug-related crimes	71,7	19,0	4,6	1,7	0,7	2,2	28,3	(67,162)
Child prostitution	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(81)
Instigation, exploitation and abetting of prostitution	57,3	21,8	8,6	4,6	2,7	4,9	42,7	(2,980)
Child slave trade to induce them to prostitution	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1)
Total of prostitution-related crimes	**57,0**	**21,8**	**8,7**	**4,6**	**2,6**	**5,3**	**43,0**	**(3,062)**

Source: Source: see Table 6.1
(a) Percentages omitted for N < 100 except for manslaughter and group sexual assaults.
(b) The differences between the numbers presented in table 6.1 and those presented in the next tables are due to the modest presence of missing values for some characteristics (e.g. the number of persons reported).

Table 6.3 **Trials for consummated murders initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons reported- Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	65,8	17,7	6,3	5,1	2,5	2,5	100,0	(79)	34,2
Genoa	77,4	9,4	5,7	1,9	0,0	5,7	100,0	(53)	22,6
Milan	55,7	17,6	4,5	4,0	2,8	15,3	100,0	(176)	44,3
Venice	85,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,1	7,1	100,0	(14)	14,3
Bologna	59,6	23,1	9,6	7,7	0,0	0,0	100,0	(52)	40,4
Florence	62,5	17,5	7,5	0,0	5,0	7,5	100,0	(40)	37,5
Rome	68,9	16,5	6,4	4,5	0,4	3,4	100,0	(267)	31,1
Centre North	***65,1***	***16,6***	***6,0***	***4,1***	***1,6***	***6,6***	***100,0***	***(681)***	***34,9***
Naples	46,6	16,2	8,8	3,4	6,1	18,9	100,0	(148)	53,4
Bari	45,3	10,9	10,9	7,8	3,1	21,9	100,0	(64)	54,7
Palermo	40,0	13,3	12,2	1,1	4,4	28,9	100,0	(90)	60,0
Catania	46,2	14,3	12,1	3,3	0,0	24,2	100,0	(91)	53,8
South and Islands	***44,8***	***14,2***	***10,7***	***3,6***	***3,8***	***22,9***	***100,0***	***(393)***	***55,2***

Table 6.4 **Trials for attempted murders initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	70,2	17,6	5,3	6,1	0,8	0,0	100,0	(131)	29,8
Genoa	76,7	16,5	1,9	1,0	1,0	2,9	100,0	(103)	23,3
Milan	71,5	15,6	5,2	2,8	1,2	3,7	100,0	(326)	28,5
Venice	70,6	11,8	11,8	5,9	0,0	0,0	100,0	(17)	29,4
Bologna	68,0	19,0	5,0	3,0	4,0	1,0	100,0	(100)	32,0
Florence	71,1	13,3	8,9	0,0	2,2	4,4	100,0	(45)	28,9
Rome	76,6	14,0	5,1	2,8	0,0	1,6	100,0	(435)	23,4
Centre North	***73,4***	***15,5***	***5,1***	***2,9***	***1,0***	***2,2***	***100,0***	***(1,157)***	***26,6***
Naples	62,5	16,1	4,8	6,0	1,6	8,9	100,0	(248)	37,5
Bari	51,5	20,6	8,8	5,9	2,9	10,3	100,0	(68)	48,5
Palermo	65,2	10,1	8,7	1,4	0,0	14,5	100,0	(69)	34,8
Catania	68,6	9,1	6,6	5,0	0,0	10,7	100,0	(121)	31,4
South and Islands	***62,8***	***14,2***	***6,3***	***5,1***	***1,2***	***10,3***	***100,0***	***(506)***	***37,2***

cases, the differences are negligible. Other crimes, yet, present more differences among cities belonging to the same geographical area than among cities located in different areas. Let us examine in detail the distribution of the number of accused per crime in the Italian cities.

Especially in the case of violent crimes, the share of complaints filed against more than one individual increases when going from the large cities located in the central and northern regions to those in the South of Italy and on the Islands. This structure is particularly evident as regards the consummated murders (table 6.3). The large Southern cities present a majority of crimes for which more than one individual has been reported. In Palermo, where such feature is even more evident, 3 out 5 crimes involve consummated murders with more than one individual accused. In the Centre-North, consummated murders with more than one accused amount for about one third.

Table 6.5 **Trials for attempted and consummated murders initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	68,6	17,6	5,7	5,7	1,4	1,0	100,0	(210)	31,4
Genoa	76,9	14,1	3,2	1,3	0,6	3,8	100,0	(156)	23,1
Milan	65,9	16,3	5,0	3,2	1,8	7,8	100,0	(502)	34,1
Venice	77,4	6,5	6,5	3,2	3,2	3,2	100,0	(31)	22,6
Bologna	65,1	20,4	6,6	4,6	2,6	0,7	100,0	(152)	34,9
Florence	67,1	15,3	8,2	0,0	3,5	5,9	100,0	(85)	32,9
Rome	73,6	15,0	5,6	3,4	0,1	2,3	100,0	(702)	26,4
Centre North	***70,3***	***15,9***	***5,4***	***3,4***	***1,2***	***3,8***	***100,0***	***(1,838)***	***29,7***
Naples	56,6	16,2	6,3	5,1	3,3	12,6	100,0	(396)	43,4
Bari	48,5	15,9	9,8	6,8	3,0	15,9	100,0	(132)	51,5
Palermo	50,9	11,9	10,7	1,3	2,5	22,6	100,0	(159)	49,1
Catania	59,0	11,3	9,0	4,2	0,0	16,5	100,0	(212)	41,0
South and Islands	***54,9***	***14,2***	***8,2***	***4,4***	***2,3***	***15,8***	***100,0***	***(899)***	***45,1***

This structure can be traced back to the activities of the organised crime. We know that in the South, the share of homicides due to the organised crime is much higher than the one registered in the North. It is not very fre-

quent that more than one person is involved in a homicide resulting from crimes linked to the common criminality (such as a burglary gone bad), in a misunderstanding between acquaintances, brawls or raptus, or, even within a family. On the other hand, it is frequent to find more than one person involved in a homicide linked to the organised crime. Consequently, not only does the share of consummated homicides involving more than one individual reported increase when going from North to South, but the number of perpetrators also increases. Most of the consummated homicides committed by more than one individual exceed five accused in the South while such share presents much lower sizes in the North.

Moreover, as regards the consummated homicides, the central-northern cities are less similar among them compared to the situation to be found in the cities located in the South of Italy and on the Islands. In Venice and Genoa, the large majority of the complaints filed for consummated murder involve only one perpetrator; in Milan and Bologna, on the other hand, the share of complaints filed against more than one person is much higher. In Milan, complaints filed against more than five individuals are rather frequent. Among the northern cities, Milan and Bologna seem to be the ones more similar to the southern counterparts as to the number of perpetrators of consummated murders.

The influence of the organised crime on the number of perpetrators reported in the case of consummated murders is confirmed from the analysis conducted on the other violent crimes. When going from consummated murders to the attempted ones (table 6.4), in which the weight of the organised crime decreases, the differences between the central-northern cities and the southern ones become less important. Nevertheless, the southern regions still register more frequently higher shares of complaints filed against more persons and higher numbers of perpetrators.

In the case of intentional personal injuries (table 6.6) and sexual assaults (table 6.7), the differences are rather negligible, if not absent.

There are no differences between North and South in the case of crimes against property, though in some cases, this absence is mainly due to the particular behaviour of Naples, compared to other cities of the South. In the case of consummated and attempted robberies (tables 6.9-6.11), Bari, Palermo and Catania present shares of complaints filed

Table 6.6 **Trials for intentional personal injuries initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	78,7	14,7	4,1	1,4	0,4	0,6	100,0	(5,146)	21,3
Genoa	77,1	14,5	4,6	1,8	0,9	1,1	100,0	(3,617)	22,9
Milan	79,2	13,1	4,1	2,0	0,6	0,9	100,0	(4,361)	20,8
Venice	77,9	15,1	4,5	1,1	0,8	0,8	100,0	(1.460)	22,1
Bologna	81,4	12,4	3,1	1,2	0,8	1,2	100,0	(2,379)	18,6
Florence	78,2	14,6	3,9	1,6	0,7	1,1	100,0	(3.960)	21,8
Rome	75,4	16,2	4,9	2,0	0,8	0,8	100,0	(15,383)	24,6
Centre North	***77,3***	***15,0***	***4,4***	***1,8***	***0,7***	***0,9***	***100,0***	***(36,306)***	***22,7***
Naples	76,6	15,2	4,3	1,8	0,9	1,2	100,0	(4,395)	23,4
Bari	74,3	16,2	5,3	2,4	0,7	1,2	100,0	(1,027)	25,7
Palermo	75,7	15,9	4,8	1,8	0,9	1,0	100,0	(1,847)	24,3
Catania	70,0	18,4	6,6	2,5	1,2	1,3	100,0	(950)	30,0
South and Islands	***75,3***	***15,9***	***4,8***	***2,0***	***0,9***	***1,2***	***100,0***	***(8,219)***	***24,7***

against more than one individual systematically higher than those of the large Central-northern cities. The values of Naples are, on the contrary, inferior. A very similar phenomenon can also be observed in the case of thefts, though to a lesser extent (table 6.8).[9]

[9] One must bear in mind that the item “thefts “ includes very different crimes. Thus, it is possible that the differences between North and South are annulled by the different diffusion of some types of thefts in the two areas. The victimisation surveys show that, as regards consummated and attempted bag-snatching and robberies, the frequency of more than one individual being involved is lowest in Central Italy, average in the North and highest in the South [Istat 2004, tables 8.1, 8.2].

Table 6.7 **Trials for sexual assault initiated by the legal authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	85,4	9,2	3,1	1,4	0,3	0,7	100,0	(295)	14,6
Genoa	87,4	7,3	3,7	1,0	0,0	0,5	100,0	(191)	12,6
Milan	80,9	11,4	3,6	1,7	0,8	1,7	100,0	(774)	19,1
Venice	83,6	9,8	3,3	1,6	0,0	1,6	100,0	(61)	16,4
Bologna	84,3	7,8	2,2	1,7	0,4	3,5	100,0	(230)	15,7
Florence	80,3	10,1	3,7	4,3	1,1	0,5	100,0	(188)	19,7
Rome	85,5	9,3	3,1	0,8	0,6	0,8	100,0	(896)	14,5
Centre North	***83,8***	***9,7***	***3,3***	***1,5***	***0,6***	***1,3***	***100,0***	***(2.635)***	***16,2***
Naples	85,1	10,6	1,7	1,7	0,0	0,9	100,0	(235)	14,9
Bari	83,7	9,2	2,0	2,0	1,0	2,0	100,0	(98)	16,3
Palermo	85,0	10,8	2,4	0,6	0,6	0,6	100,0	(167)	15,0
Catania	81,7	10,0	5,0	1,7	0,0	1,7	100,0	(120)	18,3
South and Islands	***84,2***	***10,3***	***2,6***	***1,5***	***0,3***	***1,1***	***100,0***	***(620)***	***15,8***

Table 6.8 **Trials for thefts initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	74,0	20,9	3,8	0,8	0,2	0,4	100,0	(12,367)	26,0
Genoa	75,9	19,2	3,5	0,9	0,3	0,3	100,0	(8,232)	24,1
Milan	68,6	25,2	4,7	1,1	0,2	0,3	100,0	(27,406)	31,4
Venice	65,5	25,2	6,9	1,5	0,4	0,5	100,0	(4,758)	34,5
Bologna	78,6	16,8	2,8	1,3	0,2	0,3	100,0	(4,761)	21,4
Florence	67,5	25,3	4,3	1,4	0,6	0,9	100,0	(5,855)	32,5
Rome	74,6	18,6	3,8	2,0	0,4	0,6	100,0	(76,107)	25,4
Centre North	**73,0**	**20,5**	**4,0**	**1,6**	**0,4**	**0,5**	**100,0**	**(139,486)**	**27,0**
Naples	*80,5*	*15,4*	*2,8*	*0,8*	*0,3*	*0,4*	*100,0*	*(8,765)*	*19,5*
Bari	67,8	24,7	5,5	1,6	0,1	0,2	100,0	(3,083)	32,2
Palermo	70,6	22,1	5,3	1,4	0,3	0,3	100,0	(5,217)	29,4
Catania	70,6	22,0	4,5	1,5	0,6	0,7	100,0	(3,548)	29,4
South and Islands	***74,4***	***19,6***	***4,1***	***1,2***	***0,3***	***0,4***	***100,0***	***(20,613)***	***25,6***

Table 6.9 **Trials for consummated robberies initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	72,9	18,6	5,9	1,2	0,5	0,9	100,0	(2,419)	27,1
Genoa	78,7	15,1	3,8	1,2	0,3	0,9	100,0	(1,132)	21,3
Milan	69,8	20,4	5,1	2,4	0,9	1,4	100,0	(4,247)	30,2
Venice	66,0	23,5	5,5	2,5	1,0	1,5	100,0	(200)	34,0
Bologna	71,8	20,4	4,9	1,3	0,5	1,2	100,0	(1,437)	28,2
Florence	72,6	20,3	3,7	1,7	0,5	1,1	100,0	(915)	27,4
Rome	67,1	23,0	5,5	2,4	0,9	1,0	100,0	(6,062)	32,9
Centre North	***70,2***	***20,8***	***5,2***	***2,0***	***0,8***	***1,1***	***100,0***	***(16,412)***	***29,8***
Naples	73,8	18,9	3,9	1,6	0,7	1,1	100,0	(3,345)	26,2
Bari	64,8	21,5	8,1	3,0	0,2	2,2	100,0	(492)	35,2
Palermo	61,4	26,4	6,7	1,8	1,5	2,2	100,0	(1,326)	38,6
Catania	61,7	23,1	8,2	2,1	1,1	3,8	100,0	(991)	38,3
South and Islands	***68,5***	***21,4***	***5,6***	***1,8***	***0,9***	***1,9***	***100,0***	***(6,154)***	***31,5***

Table 6.10 **Trials for attempted robberies initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	79,6	15,4	3,5	1,1	0,4	0,0	100,0	(544)	20,4
Genoa	76,6	16,7	3,3	1,4	0,5	1,4	100,0	(209)	23,4
Milan	75,0	17,9	4,3	1,8	0,6	0,4	100,0	(1,357)	25,0
Venice	70,2	21,1	5,3	1,8	1,8	0,0	100,0	(57)	29,8
Bologna	81,1	12,3	3,5	2,2	0,3	0,6	100,0	(317)	18,9
Florence	72,9	20,8	4,6	0,4	0,0	1,3	100,0	(240)	27,1
Rome	69,4	22,4	5,5	1,5	0,7	0,6	100,0	(1,436)	30,6
Centre North	***74,0***	***18,9***	***4,5***	***1,5***	***0,6***	***0,5***	***100,0***	***(4,160)***	***26,0***
Naples	73,6	19,9	3,9	1,9	0,2	0,5	100,0	(883)	26,4
Bari	52,6	34,2	8,8	3,5	0,0	0,9	100,0	(114)	47,4
Palermo	66,4	26,7	4,5	0,0	0,4	2,0	100,0	(247)	33,6
Catania	59,4	28,0	8,7	2,8	0,4	0,8	100,0	(254)	40,6
South and Islands	***68,4***	***23,5***	***5,1***	***1,9***	***0,3***	***0,8***	***100,0***	***(1,498)***	***31,6***

Table 6.11 **Trials for consummated and attempted robberies initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	74,1	18,0	5,5	1,2	0,4	0,7	100,0	(2,963)	25,9
Genoa	78,4	15,4	3,7	1,3	0,3	1,0	100,0	(1,341)	21,6
Milan	71,0	19,8	4,9	2,2	0,9	1,2	100,0	(5,604)	29,0
Venice	66,9	23,0	5,4	2,3	1,2	1,2	100,0	(257)	33,1
Bologna	73,5	18,9	4,6	1,4	0,5	1,1	100,0	(1,754)	26,5
Florence	72,6	20,4	3,9	1,5	0,4	1,1	100,0	(1,155)	27,4
Rome	67,6	22,9	5,5	2,2	0,9	0,9	100,0	(7,498)	32,4
Centre North	***70,9***	***20,4***	***5,1***	***1,9***	***0,7***	***1,0***	***100,0***	***(20,572)***	***29,1***
Naples	73,8	19,1	3,9	1,6	0,6	1,0	100,0	(4,228)	26,2
Bari	62,5	23,9	8,3	3,1	0,2	2,0	100,0	(606)	37,5
Palermo	62,2	26,4	6,4	1,5	1,3	2,2	100,0	(1,573)	37,8
Catania	61,2	24,1	8,3	2,2	1,0	3,2	100,0	(1,245)	38,8
South and Islands	***68,5***	***21,8***	***5,5***	***1,8***	***0,8***	***1,7***	***100,0***	***(7,652)***	***31,5***

Table 6.12 **Trials for reset initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	76,5	15,6	4,3	1,2	0,8	1,5	100,0	(4,069)	23,5
Genoa	83,6	12,1	2,6	0,8	0,2	0,6	100,0	(3,609)	16,4
Milan	76,2	16,2	3,9	1,3	0,5	1,9	100,0	(7,796)	23,8
Venice	78,4	14,0	4,6	1,5	0,7	0,9	100,0	(1,846)	21,6
Bologna	80,7	14,0	2,2	0,9	0,3	2,0	100,0	(1,519)	19,3
Florence	83,6	11,9	2,6	0,7	0,2	1,0	100,0	(4,693)	16,4
Rome	80,7	14,6	2,7	0,8	0,4	0,7	100,0	(22,404)	19,3
Centre North	***80,0***	***14,5***	***3,1***	***1,0***	***0,4***	***1,0***	***100,0***	***(45,936)***	***20,0***
Naples	86,5	9,6	1,9	0,7	0,3	0,9	100,0	(8,785)	13,5
Bari	78,1	16,1	3,5	0,9	0,3	1,1	100,0	(2,006)	21,9
Palermo	86,8	9,9	1,9	0,6	0,2	0,7	100,0	(4,038)	13,2
Catania	79,9	12,2	3,8	1,2	0,6	2,2	100,0	(2,651)	20,1
South and Islands	***84,6***	***10,8***	***2,4***	***0,8***	***0,3***	***1,1***	***100,0***	***(17,480)***	***15,4***

Table 6.13 **Trials for drug-related crimes initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	73,6	18,5	4,0	1,7	0,7	1,4	100,0	(9,688)	26,4
Genoa	75,1	15,6	4,1	1,7	0,8	2,7	100,0	(4,309)	24,9
Milan	70,5	20,0	5,1	1,7	0,8	1,9	100,0	(15,519)	29,5
Venice	76,9	13,3	2,6	2,3	0,8	4,1	100,0	(922)	23,1
Bologna	76,6	16,4	3,2	1,5	0,7	1,6	100,0	(4,846)	23,4
Florence	69,0	20,7	5,4	2,1	0,7	2,1	100,0	(4,716)	31,0
Rome	70,9	20,3	4,8	1,6	0,7	1,6	100,0	(14,580)	29,1
Centre North	***72,1***	***19,1***	***4,6***	***1,7***	***0,7***	***1,8***	***100,0***	***(54,580)***	***27,9***
Naples	74,0	17,5	4,2	1,4	0,5	2,5	100,0	(6,887)	26,0
Bari	67,8	20,4	4,8	2,3	0,4	4,3	100,0	(1,198)	32,2
Palermo	65,2	20,6	6,3	1,9	1,3	4,7	100,0	(2,474)	34,8
Catania	65,6	19,5	5,6	2,8	0,5	5,9	100,0	(2,023)	34,4
South and Islands	***70,3***	***18,7***	***4,9***	***1,8***	***0,6***	***3,6***	***100,0***	**(12,582)**	***29,7***

Table 6.14 **Trials for crimes of instigation, exploitation and abetting of prostitution initiated by the judicial authorities per city and number of persons accused - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

CITIES	Nr. of persons reported								
	1	2	3	4	5	More than 5	Total	N	Total more than 1
Turin	58,0	23,7	8,3	2,2	3,2	4,5	100,0	(312)	42,0
Genoa	68,7	11,0	9,9	2,7	1,1	6,6	100,0	(182)	31,3
Milan	61,8	20,6	5,5	4,7	2,9	4,5	100,0	(685)	38,2
Venice	57,9	31,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	10,5	100,0	(19)	42,1
Bologna	47,8	24,1	9,2	6,8	2,4	9,6	100,0	(249)	52,2
Florence	57,4	22,3	6,1	6,8	2,7	4,7	100,0	(148)	42,6
Rome	56,2	23,7	9,4	4,2	2,8	3,6	100,0	(882)	43,8
Centre North	***58,1***	***21,9***	***8,0***	***4,4***	***2,7***	***4,9***	***100,0***	***(2,477)***	***41,9***
Naples	55,8	23,8	9,5	6,8	1,4	2,7	100,0	(147)	44,2
Bari	52,8	25,0	11,1	2,8	2,8	5,6	100,0	(36)	47,2
Palermo	35,8	22,9	19,3	8,3	3,7	10,1	100,0	(109)	64,2
Catania	61,1	18,5	9,0	4,7	2,8	3,8	100,0	(211)	38,9
South and Islands	***53,5***	***21,5***	***11,5***	***6,0***	***2,6***	***5,0***	**100,0**	***(503)***	***46,5***

In the case of drug-related crimes (table 6.13) and of instigation, exploitation and abetting of prostitution (table 6.14), the incidence of co-imputations increases when going from the central-northern cities to the cities in the South and on the Islands. What is more, as regards the drug-related crimes, the number of accused increases too. For both crimes, Palermo is the city that registers the highest value regarding the share of crimes committed by more than one individual.

6.3 Structure of the nationality in the proceedings against several perpetrators

As we have seen until now, in the case of violent crimes, prostitution-related crimes and, though to a lesser extent, robberies, the incidence of co-imputations increases when going from the northern large cities to the southern ones. Nevertheless, other crimes do not follow this tendency. In the case of proceedings for violent crimes against several perpetrators, the number of accused increases when going from North to South. From these simple analyses, we can deduce that the social organization of crimes follows a structure in the South different than that in the North of Italy. The number of perpetrators is not the only difference between the two large Italian areas: they also differ per national composition of the co-accused. Given the large variety of nationalities present in Italy, and the variety of the components that each aggregate of accused can have, clearly the number of possible combinations is rather high. In order to make it all simpler, we will consider in this paragraph only four combinations. The first combination is made up of the proceedings against several Italian individuals, without considering their effective number. The second combination includes the proceedings against Italian and foreign individuals, without considering neither their nationality nor their number. The third combination involves proceedings against several foreign individuals coming from the same country, independently from their number; finally, the fourth one regards the proceedings against foreign individuals coming from different countries, considering neither their nationality nor their number. Tables 6.15a-6.15c follow this typology in order to indicate the nationality structure per area of the country where the proceedings

against several perpetrators are taking place and per large crime families: violent crimes, crimes against property and crimes linked to illicit trades.

Let us first consider all the large cities. For most of the crimes, the complaints filed against more than one individual known mainly regard Italian citizens. Except for some cases, which we will discuss hereafter, complaints against foreigners from the same country occupy the second place. While cases of complaints being filed against Italian and foreigners together are less frequent, cases of complaints involving foreigners with different nationalities are even more rare.

As regards the violent crimes (table 6.15a), the prevalence of Italian perpetrators is rather evident; although among these crimes, the sexual assaults represent an exception. The share of sexual crimes with more than one accused and where the accused are all Italian equals that in which the accused are all foreigners coming from the same country. A similar distribution can be observed for the group sexual assaults, that is, with a high share of crimes attributed to foreign accused coming from the same country.

The distribution of the crimes against property (table 6.15b) is different for thefts than for robberies. In the case of thefts, the share of crimes with more than one accused and where the accused are all Italians is indeed equal, or just slightly superior, to that where the perpetrators are all foreigners coming from the same country. Robberies committed by several Italian individuals prevail. The share of crimes committed by foreigners and Italians together or by foreigners coming from different countries is rather modest.

The situation regarding the illicit trade crimes is partially different (table 6.15c). Among these, the proceedings against Italian accused prevail in the case of reset, trafficking and production of drugs, even though, in the latter case, the share of crimes attributed to foreign accused results rather high. As far as exploitation of prostitution is concerned, the highest frequency is the one registered by the combination in which the accused are foreigners coming from the same country, immediately followed by the one in which the accused are all Italians and the one in which the accused are both Italians and foreigners together. Three-fourth of the crimes with more than one accused linked to exploitation of prostitution involve foreign citizens. In addition, crimes committed by foreigners acting together with Italians account for one-fourth of these.

The share of complaints filed against more than one individual and involving both foreigners and Italians increases when going from predator crimes - violent and crimes against property- to the illicit trade crimes. Group sexual assaults (25.4 per cent), instigation, exploitation and abetting of prostitution (21.7 per cent) and criminal association for trafficking in drugs (19 per cent) all register important shares of proceedings initiated against two or more foreigners coming from the same country.

Table 6.15 **Crimes reported of known perpetrator; percentage of complaints filed against more than one individual on the total of complaints filed against a known person per type of crime, nationality of the accused and geographical area in which the crime was committed - Italy - 1993 - 2001**

CRIMES	AREAS	Complaints with more than one perpetrator known					
		All Italians	Foreigners coming from the same country	Foreigners coming from different countries	Foreigners and Italians together	Total in association	Total accused
Murder	Centre North	18,3	12,9	1,8	4,7	37,7	(682)
	South and Islands	47,8	2,8	0,2	2,1	52,9	(425)
	Italy	29,6	9,0	1,2	3,7	43,5	(1,107)
Attempted murder	Centre North	14,4	8,5	2,5	2,9	28,3	(1,209)
	South and Islands	32,1	2,5	0,2	3,0	37,8	(526)
	Italy	19,8	6,7	1,8	2,9	31,2	(1,735)
Manslaughter	Centre North	26,2	1,2	1,2	0,0	28,6	(84)
	South and Islands	38,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	38,5	(13)
	Italy	27,8	1,0	1,0	0,0	29,9	(97)
Intentional personal injuries	Centre North	13,9	6,6	3,2	3,0	26,7	(37,032)
	South and Islands	21,6	2,1	1,2	1,3	26,2	(8,319)
	Italy	15,3	5,8	2,8	2,7	26,6	(45,351)
Affray	Centre North	21,9	2,8	0,8	3,9	29,4	(3,199)
	South and Islands	31,1	0,4	0,9	0,7	33,0	(457)
	Italy	23,1	2,5	0,8	3,5	29,9	(3,656)
Sexual assault	Centre North	6,5	8,0	1,5	2,8	18,9	(2,657)
	South and Islands	10,9	4,0	0,6	1,9	17,4	(645)
	Italy	7,4	7,2	1,3	2,6	18,6	(3,302)
Group sexual assault	Centre North	29,1	31,6	7,6	8,9	77,2	(79)
	South and Islands	69,6	4,3	8,7	0,0	82,6	(23)
	Italy	38,2	25,4	7,8	6,9	78,4	(102)

Source: see Table 6.1

Table 6.15 continued **Crimes reported of known perpetrator; percentage of complaints filed against more than one individual on the total of complaints filed against a known person per type of crime, nationality of the accused and geographical area in which the crime was committed - Italy - 1993 - 2001**

CRIMES	AREAS	Complaints with more than one perpetrator known					
		All Italians	Foreigners coming from the same country	Foreigners coming from different countries	Foreigners and Italians together	Total in association	Total accused
Theft	Centre North	11,5	14,0	3,1	2,2	30,7	(119,340)
	South and Islands	28,7	1,7	0,6	0,9	31,8	(17,416)
	Italy	13,7	12,4	2,8	2,0	30,8	(136,756)
Burglaries and thefts from the person	Centre North	6,5	10,7	2,3	4,6	24,0	(262)
	South and Islands	20,0	1,3	1,3	1,3	23,8	(80)
	Italy	9,7	8,5	2,1	3,8	24,0	(342)
Robbery	Centre North	17,5	10,1	2,5	2,7	32,7	(16,290)
	South and Islands	28,6	1,8	0,4	0,9	31,7	(6,325)
	Italy	20,6	7,8	1,9	2,2	32,4	(22,615)
Attempted robbery	Centre North	13,3	10,5	2,3	2,4	28,6	(4,175)
	South and Islands	29,7	2,0	0,3	0,9	33,0	(1,477)
	Italy	17,6	8,3	1,8	2,0	29,7	(5,652)

Source: see Table 6.1

Until now we have considered only the large Italian cities. The situation we have described, though, changes when going from the North-central regions to the southern regions and the Islands. The share of complaints filed against several Italian perpetrators reaches its highest level in the latter regions. On the other hand, the share of complaints against Italian and foreign perpetrators and the one against foreign perpetrators, either coming from the same country or from different countries, is strongly on the increase in the North. In this case, we also consider the three crime families separately.

The share of proceedings for consummated murder perpetrated by foreigners coming from the same country is the one registering the most

Table 6.15 continued **Crimes reported of known perpetrator; percentage of complaints filed against more than one individual on the total of complaints filed against a known person per type of crime, nationality of the accused and geographical area in which the crime was committed - Italy - 1993 - 2001**

CRIMES	AREAS	Complaints with more than one perpetrator known					
		All Italians	Foreigners coming from the same country	Foreigners coming from different countries	Foreigners and Italians together	Total in association	Total accused
Reset	Centre North	12,3	6,2	1,4	2,5	22,3	(46,608)
	South and Islands	14,0	1,1	0,2	1,0	16,2	(17,615)
	Italy	12,8	4,8	1,1	2,1	20,6	(64,223)
Drugs (Criminal association)	Centre North	26,5	20,9	3,2	37,9	88,5	(340)
	South and Islands	52,5	15,8	2,8	19,7	90,8	(284)
	Italy	38,3	18,6	3,0	29,6	89,5	(624)
Drugs (production and trafficking)	Centre North	10,4	10,6	5,5	3,9	30,4	(54,225)
	South and Islands	24,0	2,3	1,6	1,8	29,8	(12,625)
	Italy	13,0	9,0	4,8	3,5	30,3	(66,850)
Instigation, exploitation and abetting of prostitution	Centre North	10,8	23,7	6,6	13,1	54,2	(2,539)
	South and Islands	31,3	12,0	2,9	14,9	61,0	(518)
	Italy	14,3	21,7	6,0	13,4	55,4	(3,057)

Source: see Table 6.1

sensitive variations when going from the South to the North. In the case of murder, for example, this share even quadruples. The share of crimes attributed to Italians and foreigners together is on the increase too. It rises from 2.1 per cent in the South to 4.7 per cent in the North. As regards intentional personal injuries, it rises from 1.3 per cent to 3 per cent. At the same time, the share of proceedings against several Italian individuals goes, for the same crimes, from 47.8 per cent in the South to 18.3 per cent in the North for consummated murders, and from 21.6 per cent in the South to 13.9 per cent in the North for intentional injuries. All the other violent crimes are also registering such decreases.

Crimes against property record the same difference in the distribution

of the nationality combinations in the North and in the South. The proportion of complaints filed against several foreigners coming from the same country or from different countries and the one, though to a lesser extent, against Italian and foreign individuals acting together indeed increase when going from the South to the North. However, the share of complaints against several Italian individuals is decreasing.

Finally, in the North, 37.9 per cent of illicit trade-related crimes can be attributed to foreigners and Italians acting together while, in the south, such percentage drops to 19.7 per cent. The only relevant exception to this rule regards the crimes of exploitation, instigation and abetting of prostitution. For such crime, the share attributed to Italians only is higher in the South than in the North, while the proceedings against several foreigners register lower shares.

Thus, these data show that the crimes committed by Italians and foreigners together are relatively not frequent in the Southern cities as crimes are mainly committed by Italian individuals. In the North, it is relatively easier to register assaults committed by “mixed “ co-accused, that is, committed by Italians and foreigners together. It is difficult to know the extent to which the persons reported for having committed together the same crime make up a “group “ or a “band “. Of course, it is also difficult to obtain information on the possible different roles of the persons reported. We cannot, thus, say whether there is an elaborate division of the work among the persons reported, where each has his or her own role and receives a specialised and coordinated task. We cannot say whether there are hierarchical relationships between them, nor the person who is in charge, the person who is in a subordinate position. We do know, though, that they must frequent each other and collaborate to be reported together. We can, thus, say that there is some form of association among them, using such term sociological and not legally. In this sense, in the criminal field, the reciprocal frequentation and collaboration among Italians and foreigners do not seem at all to be lacking. In some cases, it covers a very marginal role but in other cases, such role is much less limited. Even though the data presented do have some limits - due to a share whose size cannot be verified and thus “hidden “ of non-reported crimes, and of non-reported individuals for crimes reported, and also for the caution their interpretation requires -, they leave no doubt as to the fact that

the presence of “mixed “ aggregations is more frequent in the case of illegal trade-related crimes - especially drugs and prostitution - than in the case of violent crimes and crimes against property. Such phenomenon increases when going from the large cities of Southern Italy to the Northern cities.

6.4 With whom: the structure per nationality of the complaints filed against several individuals

The analysis of the main characteristics of the complaints filed against more than one individual points out to the existence of frequentation and collaboration among foreigners coming from the same country, foreigners coming from different countries, foreigners and Italians together, especially as regards crimes related to illegal trade in the centre-North and, though to a lesser extent, foreigners coming from the same country in the case of thefts and burglaries in the centre-north. The most frequent complaints filed against several individuals involving foreigners regard foreigners from the same country, followed by Italians and foreigners acting together and, finally, foreigners coming from different countries. The complaints against foreigners from different countries include different combinations of countries and make up a very heterogeneous group. It is possible, though, to reduce the variety of these combinations, showing only the most frequent ones and trying to identify possible regularities among these. The frequency with which foreigners from different countries are reported for the same crime increases when the countries from which they come are close, especially geographically speaking. Such frequency is low in the case of citizens coming from different continents, increases when the continent is the same and registers the highest values when the countries belong to the same geopolitical set.[10]

Tables 6.16 to 6.20 show that the prevalent combinations of nationalities include foreigners coming from the same geopolitical set. Given the modest number of combinations -and because of the rather long nine-

[10] The geopolitical sets have been defined based on the grouping proposed by the French geographers of the Lacoste group, whose construction criteria can be read in the publication Lo stato del mondo, various years, Milan, Hoepli.

year period, we wish to remind that the number of complaints filed against foreigners from different countries is rather low - the tables consider only the crimes with high numbers. They also present the values relative to some of the most mentioned nationalities and indicate not only the percentage distribution of the reports but also the national composition of the co-accused, as well as the three main nationalities of the latter. They partially confirm the results obtained up until now.

If we analyse each nationality, we find a similar structure in which most of the cases is made up of complaints against foreigners coming from the same countries and complaints against foreigners from different countries. There are some exceptions though. In the case of thefts, reset, burglaries and drug-related crimes, the Algerians are more frequently reported with foreigners from another country rather than with Italians. The same can be said of the Moroccans in the case of thefts, burglaries and drug-related crimes, of the Peruvians in the case of thefts, of Senegalese in the case of drug-related crimes. Finally, in the case of drug-related crimes, the ex-Yugoslavians are reported more frequently with Italian citizens.

In some cases though, complaints filed against individuals coming from the same country are relatively low. In particular, as regards drug production and trafficking crimes, co-imputations with Italians or with foreigners from other countries are more frequent in the case of ex-Yugoslavians, Algerians and Senegalese. These differences could indicate a stronger difficulty in finding accomplices in the same country for this kind of crime. It could be that, in the case of drug trafficking, relationships with Italians or with other foreigners are more important. Nevertheless, we do not know whether the relations within one national community are less important because certain national communities disapprove such activity or because Italians exercise a stronger influence on this crime structured as a market.

It is more interesting to observe the national composition of the reports when they include several persons from different countries. The tables show that the most frequent cases regard, as previously stated, countries belonging to the same geopolitical set. Regarding thefts, for example, ex-Yugoslavians are reported together with foreigners whose first two nationalities are countries belonging to the Balkan area: Albania and Romania. Persons co-accused with Peruvians belong to the Andean America (Ecuador and Colombia), or belong anyway to the southern part of South

America. Algerians and Moroccans are reported together with persons coming from other countries of North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia in the case of Algerians, Algeria in the case of the Moroccans. We can hypothesise, though only as a supposition and without any proves, that the presence of French accused in the following tables could be due to the next generations of North African immigrants, but of course, there are no data available for verifying such hypothesis. Similar regularities can be observed for other crimes too.

Table 6.16 **Complaints filed against more than one individual for thefts in large cities, according to the nationality combination, for some nationalities - 1993 - 2001**

NATIONALITIES	With conationals	With Italians	With foreigners from another country	Total	Nr.	First three nationalities		
			Thefts					
Ex-Yugoslavia	88,5	8,1	3,4	100,0	4,681)	Albania	Romania	Algeria
Albania	89,6	5,2	5,2	100,0	(867)	Ex-Yugoslavia		
Algeria	80,3	4,8	14,9	100,0	2,541)	Morocco	France	Tunisia
Morocco	73,9	8,8	17,4	100,0	1,599)	Algeria	Tunisia	(Israel)
Perù	82,3	3,7	14,0	100,0	(802)	Ecuador	Chile	Colombia

Table 6.17 **Complaints filed against more than one individual for reset crime in large cities, according to the nationality combination, for some nationalities - 1993 - 2001**

NATIONALITIES	With conationals	With Italians	With foreigners from another country	Total	Nr.	First three nationalities		
			Reset					
Ex-Yugoslavia	69,0	19,4	11,5	100,0	(633)	Albania		
Albania	83,1	10,7	6,2	100,0	(308)	Ex-Yugoslavia		
Romania	78,7	12,6	8,6	100,0	(348)			
Algeria	58,1	19,1	22,8	100,0	(346)	Morocco	Tunisia	
Senegal	82,5	9,5	7,9	100,0	(189)			
Tunisia	37,9	37,1	25,0	100,0	(248)	Morocco	(Nigeria)	(Algeria)
Chile	76,5	9,1	14,4	100,0	(132)	Perù		

Table 6.18 **Complaints filed against more than one individual for burglaries in large cities, according to the nationality combination, for some nationalities - 1993 - 2001**

NATIONALITIES	With co-nationals	With Italians	With foreigners from another country	Total	Nr.	First three nationalities
			Burglaries			
Ex-Yugoslavia	73,7	17,2	9,1	100,0	(373)	Albania
Albania	76,5	18,4	5,1	100,0	(98)	
Romania	87,0	6,7	6,3	100,0	(223)	
Algeria	62,2	9,7	28,2	100,0	(238)	Morocco
Morocco	66,5	13,3	20,2	100,0	(346)	Algeria

Table 6.19 **Complaints filed against more than one individual for drug-related crime (production and trafficking, possession beyond modest quantity, criminal association, induction to use, art. 17 comma 1 L. 162/90) in large cities, according to the nationality combination, for some nationalities - 1993 - 2001**

NATIONALITIES	With cona-tionals	With Italians	With foreigners from another country	Total	Nr.	First three nationalities		
			Drug					
Ex-Yugoslavia	28,1	45,7	26,2	100,0	(221)	(Tunisia)	(Morocco)	(Albania)
Albania	59,3	30,7	10,1	100,0	(199)			
Algeria	41,3	15,3	43,4	100,0	(1,324)	Morocco	Tunisia	(France)
Morocco	68,8	13,7	17,5	100,0	(3208)	Tunisia	Algeria	Israel
Senegal	47,7	14,8	37,5	100,0	(264)	Others from Africa		
Tunisia	53,1	0,0	46,9	100,0	(1,554)	Morocco	Algeria	Egypt

Table 6.20 **Complaints filed against more than one individual for crimes of instigation, abetting and exploitation of prostitution in large cities, according to the nationality combination, for some nationalities - 1993 -2001**

NATIONALITIES	With conationals	With Italians	With foreigners from another country	Total	Nr.	First two nationalities
			Prostitution			
Ex-Yugoslavia	47,6	28,3	24,1	100,0	(166)	Albania
Albania	79,6	11,1	9,3	100,0	(216)	Ex-Yugoslavia
Algeria	69,6	24,1	6,3	100,0	(112)	
Nigeria	57,3	24,0	18,7	100,0	(75)	

6.5 The youth component

It is common knowledge among crime scholars that the individual characteristics that most influence the frequency with which persons commit crimes are gender and age. We also know that the absolute majority of crimes are committed by men rather than by women and that the differences between the genders are stronger as the crime committed is more serious. Scholars also know that the frequency, with which the penal norms are violated in a given population, rapidly increases during the preadolescence and the teen years, before decreasing during the years following the major age. In this case, there are also some differences according to the crime since the average age of the persons committing a theft is lower by some years than the average age of the persons committing a burglary. In this concluding paragraph, we will mainly deal with one of the two characteristics mentioned, the age. The source analysed does not provide data on the age of the perpetrators, but still gathers some information regarding the possible minor age of the reported person. By using also this so simple piece of information, we can show that the share of minors on all the persons reported for some crimes greatly varies according to the nationality.

Because of the lower number of cases, we limited the analysis to two crimes: thefts and burglaries. Tables 6.21 and 6.22 indicate the percenta-

Table 6.21 **Minors on the total of accused for theft in the large Italian cities per nationality (only nationalities with more than 100 accused for theft over the whole period) - 1993 - 2001**

COUNTRIES	CN	SI	Overall total	Nr (cn)	Nr (si)	Nr (total)
Ex-Yugoslavia	28,1	40,2	34,1	27.548	921	28.469
Spain	6,3	50,0	28,2	363	2	365
Greece	20,6	33,3	27,0	126	3	129
Italy	14,5	20,4	17,4	83.563	27.131	110.694
Lebanon	14,6		14,6	205	0	205
Albania	17,1	10,5	13,8	5.124	105	5.229
Ex-USSR	2,3	25,0	13,7	427	4	431
United Kingdom	0,7	25,0	12,9	139	4	143
Israel	4,2	20,0	12,1	337	5	342
Morocco	10,6	12,4	11,5	9.809	161	9.970
USA	11,8	11,1	11,4	119	9	128
Egypt	2,0	20,0	11,0	638	5	643
Romania	7,6	11,8	9,7	15.511	17	15.528
Colombia	2,5	16,7	9,6	1.899	6	1.905
Iraq	7,8		7,8	115	0	115
Other countries from Asia	9,3	4,2	6,7	216	24	240
Ecuador	5,3		5,3	1.168	0	1.168
Chine	9,9	0,0	4,9	152	4	156
Senegal	1,8	7,4	4,6	224	27	251
Algeria	4,6	4,5	4,6	13.364	378	13.742
Bulgaria	3,9		3,9	361	0	361
Germany	3,3	4,2	3,7	459	24	483
Brazil	6,8	0,0	3,4	296	2	298
France	6,3	0,0	3,2	1.365	30	1.395
Nigeria	2,3	3,2	2,7	266	31	297
Uruguay	5,5	0,0	2,7	165	2	167
Ethiopia	5,4	0,0	2,7	260	6	266
Peru	2,4		2,4	3.751	0	3.751
Somalia	4,5	0,0	2,3	198	1	199
Other countries from Africa	3,6	0,0	1,8	166	8	174
Poland	1,9	1,6	1,7	2.539	63	2.602
Russia	3,0	0,0	1,5	164	2	166
Tunisia	1,4	1,6	1,5	2.212	128	2.340
Chile	2,3	0,0	1,2	2.866	1	2.867
Czechoslovakia	2,2	0,0	1,1	185	4	189
Hungary	1,9	0,0	1,0	206	2	208
Libya	1,9	0,0	0,9	211	9	220
Venezuela	1,7	0,0	0,8	358	3	361
Argentina	1,4	0,0	0,7	369	3	372
Philippines	1,3	0,0	0,7	150	2	152
Switzerland	0,5	0,0	0,2	216	9	225
Moldavia	0,3	0,0	0,2	327	4	331
Ukraine	0,0	0,0	0,0	295	25	320
Total (a)	**5,4**	**7,8**	**6,3**			

(a) All the nationalities, even those with N<100.

ge of minors on the total of accused for thefts and burglaries per nationality. In 1993-2001, the nationality that registered the highest values, much higher than that of Italians, both regarding burglaries and thefts, is the Ex-Yugoslavia. Other nationalities presenting high values, among those present with a sufficient number on the territory, include Morocco, Albania and Romania.

On the other hand, other nationalities, among those mostly present in Italy, registered much lower values. Tunisia, Poland, Philippines, Senegal and Chile all recorded much lower shares of minors on the total of the accused.

It is, of course, difficult to indicate the extent to which the different incidence of minors among the accused according to the nationality depends

Table 6.22 **Minors on the total of accused for attempted or consummated burglary in the large Italian cities per nationality (only nationalities with more than 100 accused for attempted or consummated burglary over the whole period) - 1993 - 2001**

COUNTRIES	CN	SI	Overall total	Nr (cn)	Nr (si)	Nr (total)
Ex-Yugoslavia	27,1	30,0	28,6	2.653	70	2.723
Egypt	0,5	28,6	14,5	191	7	198
Italy	9,3	12,8	11,1	24.923	14.640	39.563
France	5,3	15,4	10,3	208	13	221
Morocco	12,0	5,0	8,5	2.626	101	2.727
Albania	11,8	3,2	7,5	686	31	717
Romania	13,1	0,0	6,5	1.287	1	1.288
Ecuador	6,4		6,4	140	0	140
Peru	6,2		6,2	290	0	290
Algeria	10,8	1,2	6,0	1.568	171	1.739
Chile	3,0		3,0	265	0	265
Colombia	5,5	0,0	2,7	201	11	212
Nigeria	1,4	3,4	2,4	147	29	176
Other countries from Asia	4,8	0,0	2,4	125	23	148
Poland	2,5	1,6	2,0	405	63	468
Tunisia	1,2	0,0	0,6	583	110	693
Senegal	1,0	0,0	0,5	100	5	105
Bangladesh	0,9	0,0	0,4	115	16	131
Brazil	0,0	0,0	0,0	171	2	173
Total (a)	**4,8**	**2,1**	**3,8**	**38.156**	**15.417**	**53.573**

(a) All the nationalities, even those with N<100.

also on the differences in the composition per age of these countries, since we do not have data relative to the foreign population without a residence permit. Moreover, we also know that, among the accused, those without any residence permit are considerably oversized. Nevertheless, the 2001 Census, which presents data on foreign residents [Istat 2005, 52, fig. 2.12], makes it possible to add some further elements to this framework. In the case of the ex-Yugoslavs, the share of minors on the total of the accused for theft crimes does not particularly differ from that of the minors on foreign residents, which varies from 32.2 to 34 per cent. As regards the other countries, the incidence of minors on the accused is inferior to that of minors on the residents. In the case of the Albanians, for example, the minors account for 27.6 per cent of the total residents. Nevertheless, for some other countries yet, the difference between the share of minors of the total of the accused and the corresponding share of minors on the total residents seems even higher. The percentage of Chinese minors reported for theft on the total of Chinese accused equals

Table 6.23 **Complaints filed for theft against several individuals on the total of the complaints filed against one or more individuals, specific values per nationality and age - Italy, large cities - 1993 - 2001**

DOMAINS	Italians		Foreigners (a)	
	Only minors	Only majors	Only minors	Only majors
Turin	25,0	19,3	24,8	23,2
Genoa	21,3	17,9	22,1	23,2
Milan	33,0	19,7	29,8	27,6
Venice	30,8	18,0	33,0	26,6
Bologna	22,2	18,7	13,2	20,4
Florence	28,7	19,2	30,8	24,3
Rome	31,6	14,5	43,8	33,1
Centre North	***29,5***	***16,6***	***33,1***	***29,3***
Naples	31,3	13,5	36,0	22,2
Bari	35,6	23,9	53,8	19,6
Palermo	35,6	21,5	44,7	16,4
Catania	30,7	23,4	23,1	14,7
South and Islands	***33,2***	***19,1***	***40,9***	***19,5***
Total	**31,2**	**17,1**	**33,7**	**29,0**
(N)	16.294	125.160	10.811	45.345

(a) The foreigners were reported to the total of foreigners with same nationality.

9.9 per cent, though we know from the Census that 30.8 per cent of Chinese are minors. In some cases though, the proportions are very similar. This is the case of the Algerians; 14.4 per cent of Algerian residents are minors and the share of minors accused of burglary on the total of the Algerian accused equals 10.8 per cent.

The lack of individual data prevents studying the incidence of the co-imputations in relation to the characteristics of the accused, in other words, the nationality, the gender and the age (major or minor). It is possible, though, to construct another unprocessed indicator suitable for such purpose, using the complaints as analysis units. In this case, we will have to consider all the cases that include more than one accused, at least one with the characteristics in object, and bring it back to the total of the complaints filed against at least one individual with the same characteristics. The results for the crimes with a sufficient number, thefts and burglaries, are indicated in tables 6.23 and 6.24.

Table 6.24 **Complaints filed for burglary against several individuals on the total of the complaints filed against one or more individuals, specific values per nationality and age - Italy - 1993 - 2001**

DOMAINS	Italians		Foreigners (a)	
	Only minors	Only majors	Only minors	Only majors
Turin	33,2	27,1	8,0	19,9
Genoa	25,4	21,4	16,5	18,1
Milan	40,2	29,6	19,0	19,8
Venice	28,0	34,6	21,1	24,6
Bologna	39,2	29,0	26,7	17,6
Florence	26,8	27,9	33,6	20,2
Rome	31,4	30,0	36,3	28,5
Centre North	***35,2***	***28,8***	***25,2***	***22,8***
Naples	27,2	28,5	8,3	23,3
Bari	38,7	37,5	30,0	19,4
Palermo	35,0	38,4	0,0	34,3
Catania	*36,9*	*40,9*	*25,0*	*28,4*
South and Islands	***32,0***	***33,3***	***14,6***	***24,9***
Total	**33,3**	**30,6**	**24,7**	**22,9**
(N)	3.799	23.699	1.033	7.906

(a) The foreigners were reported to the total of foreigners with same nationality.

The results show that, at least in the case of thefts, co-imputations are more common among teenagers and preteens than among adults. This difference is registered both among Italians and among foreigners. Nevertheless, it is higher when the accused are Italians. Except for the foreign adults, generally, the cases of co-imputations for theft are more common in the large Southern cities than in Central and Northern cities. In Bari, over half of the complaints filed against at least one foreign minor include two or more accused, and among the Italian minors, this share reaches one third of all the complaints filed against at least one Italian minor.

There are no systematic and clear differences in relation to the age, in the case of burglaries; nevertheless, the age structure of such crime is higher. Probably, it could be possible to survey the differences, by having individual data together with the socio-demographic characteristics of the accused available.

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SEVEN

THE REMARKABLE DROP IN CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY[1]

7.1 Introduction

According to NYPD statistics, crime in New York City took a downturn starting around 1990 that continued for many years, shattering all the city's old records for consecutive-year declines in crime rates. To verify the declines, this study obtained New York City crime data from sources independent of the NYPD, principally the National Crime Victimisation Survey. Independent data largely corroborate the NYPD statistics.

7.2 Policy implications

In 1994, the NYPD introduced an innovation in policing: “CompStat.” The drops in crime that began before CompStat continued under it, giving rise to the perception that CompStat helped reduce crime. Consequently, police departments nationwide have adopted CompStat. Yet scientific proof of CompStat's success is hard to find. Moreover, before this study, no independent evidence existed attesting to the NYPD's statistics.

Modern-day record keeping of crime statistics began in 1960, and in all the time since, crime in New York City had never fallen as manyyears in a row as it did starting around 1990, according to statistics compiled by the

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[1] Views and opinions expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official positions or policies of the United States Department of Justice.

"NYPD, " or New York City Police Department.[2] This study describes the city's record-setting period with NYPD statistics through the year 2002.

Journalists, researchers and others have occasionally questioned whether the NYPD statistics can be trusted. Some have wondered whether a change in NYPD record-keeping or perhaps even outright manipulation of the statistics may have produced the measured drop in crime, rather than real declines in criminal offending. To address such possibilities, this study compared the NYPD crime statistics to those obtained from sources independent of the NYPD.

7.3 The remarkable drop in crime according to NYPD statistics

Record-setting drop in homicide rate, 1990-1998. Up to 1990, the record for consecutive-year declines in the number and rate of homicide was the 4-year decline from 1981 to 1985. Those two records were broken from 1990 to 1998. Over that period, homicides in New York City went from 2,245 (the most ever recorded) to 633 (Appendix table 7.1). The last time the city saw fewer than 633 homicides was 1965! The 633 represent the culmination of a record 8 consecutive years of drops in the number of homicides. Similarly, over that same period, the homicide rate fell a record 8 years in a row to .086 per 1,000 population (figure 7.1 and appendix table 7.2). The last time the city saw a rate lower than .086 was 1966!

Record-setting drop in rape rate, 1993-2001. In 1993, police recorded 2,818 rapes against females in New York City (appendix table 7.1). From 1993 to 2001, the number and the rape rate fell 8 years in a row, setting a new record for consecutive-year declines in both the number and rate (figure 7.2 and appendix table 7.2). The previous record was the 7-year drop in the number and rate from 1985 to 1992. At the end of the record-setting 8-year decline, in 2001, the NYPD recorded 1,530 rapes. The last time fewer than 1,530 were recorded was 1965; 1965 was also the last time the rape rate was below the 2001 rate.

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[2] National crime rates exist before 1960 but are viewed as "neither fully comparable with nor nearly so reliable as later figures" (President's Crime Commission 1967: 20). So modern-day record keeping of crime statistics is said to have begun around 1960 in the United States.

Figure 7.1 **Homicide: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960- 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year decline s in the NYPD homicide rate was 1990 to1998.

Figure 7.2 **Rape: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD rape rate was 1993 to 2001.

Record-setting drop in robbery rate, *1990-2002*. In 1990, 100,280 residents and non-residents were allegedly robbed, according to NYPD robbery statistics (appendix table 7.1). From 1990 to 2002, both the robbery number and rate dropped 12 years in a row, shattering the former record of 4 consecutive years of robbery declines in the early 1980s (figure 7.3 and appendix table 7.2). At the close of 2002, the NYPD recorded 27,229 robberies. The last time there were fewer than 27,229 was 1966. The last time the robbery rate was lower was also 1966.

Figure 7.3 **Robbery: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960- 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD robbery rate was 1990 to 2002.

Record-setting drop in aggravated assault rate, 1988-2002. The record fall in the number of aggravated assaults began in 1988 and ended in 1999, when aggravated assault declined to 40,551 (appendix table 7.1). That's 11 years in a row of falling assault, unprecedented in New York City. The city's previous record was the short-lived back-to-back declines in 1976 and 1977. As for the aggravated assault rate, from 1988 to 2002 the rate fell 14 years in a row, setting a new record for consecutive-year rate declines (figure 7.4). The longest the assault rate had fallen before was 2 years in a row, from 1975 to 1977. The last time aggravated assault numbered under 40,551 was 1973. The last time the rate was lower? 1970.

Figure 7.4 **Aggravated assault: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD aggravated asssault rate was 1988 to 2002.

Figure 7.5 **Violent crime: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD violent crime rate was 1990 to 2002.

Record-setting drop in violent crime rate, 1990-2002. The overall number of violent crimes (a category that combines NYPD homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), and the violent crime rate, both fell 12 years in a row in New York City from 1990 to 2002 (figure 7.5, and appendix tables 7.1 and 7.2). The city's longest previous record for consecutive-year declines in recorded violence was the 3-year drop in the early 1980s. The drop 12 years in a row brought down the volume and rate (per 1,000 population) of violent crime in 2002 to 63,839 and 7.90, respectively. Government statisticians had to go to 1967 to find a time when police statistics recorded under 63,839, and even further to 1966 for a lower violent crime rate.

Record-setting drop in burglary rate, 1988-2002. Both the volume and the rate of this property crime fell 14 years in a row from 1988 to 2002 (figure 7.6, and Appendix tables 7.1 and 7.2). The previous record for the drop in the number and rate of burglaries was the 7-consecutive-year decline from 1980 to 1987. The record-setting 14-year decline brought the burglary total down to 30,102 in 2002. Going to the beginning of modern-day record keeping, 1960, government statisticians could not find a year with fewer burglaries and a lower burglary rate for New York City.

Figure 7.6 **Violent crime: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD burglary rate was 1988 to 2002.

Record-setting drop in larceny-theft rate, 1988-2002. Another type of property crime, larceny-theft, also had a record-setting 14-consecutive-year decline from 1988 to 2002 both in the number and in the rate (figure 7.7, and appendix tables 7.1 and 7.2). The city's previous record for consecutive-year declines in the number and rate was three back-to-back drops in 1971, 1972, and 1973. At the end of the 14-year decline in 2002, the NYPD recorded 129,655 larceny-thefts. The last time fewer were recorded was 1972, and 1965 was the last year the city had a larceny rate lower than the one in 2002.

Figure 7.7 **Larceny-theft: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD larceny-theft rate was 1988 to 2002.

Record-setting drop in motor vehicle theft rate, 1990-2002. From 1990 to 2002 New York City went 12 years in a row with drops in both the number and the rate of motor vehicle theft, easily breaking the city's previous record of 4 consecutive drops in the number from 1982 to 1986 and 3 consecutive drops in the rate from 1982 to 1985 (figure 7.8, and appendix tables 7.1 and 7.2). In the year of the 12th decline, 2002, 27,034 vehicles were recorded as stolen. The last time fewer were stolen was 1962, and that was also the last time the city had a rate below the 2002 rate.

Figure 7.8 **Vehicle theft: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD vehicle theft rate was 1990 to 2002.

Figure 7.9 **Property crime: police-recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD property crime rate was 1998 to 2002.

Record-setting drop in property crime rate, 1988-2002. According to police statistics, property crime (a category that combines burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) set a new modern-day record when its volume and rate fell 14 years in a row from 1988 to 2002 (figure 7.9, and appendix tables 7.1 and 7.2). The previous longest period of sustained falling property crime was from 1981 to 1985, when police recorded drops 4 years in a row. Property crime totaled 186,791 in 2002, the final year of the 14-year decline. The last time police recorded less property crime was 1963. That was also the last time there was a lower rate.

7.4 But did crime really drop in New York City?

Many of the year-to-year declines in crime in New York City occurred in the 1990s, a time when the NYPD was implementing numerous strategies to reduce crime, including in particular:

1. hiring more officers (figure 7.10 and appendix table 7.3)
2. re-directing police patrols to combat public disorder (called "broken-windows policing ")
3. developing closer relationships with the community ("community policing")
4. strictly enforcing gun laws to reduce firearm crimes
5. vigorously enforcing drug laws
6. practicing strict law enforcement generally ("zero-tolerance policing")
7. concentrating police sources on problem places and persons ("problem oriented policing"), and
8. introducing CompStat into the overall process of managing NYPD anti-crime strategies.

The latter - CompStat - is discussed at length here partly because some experts have wondered whether the NYPD's adoption of this particular anti-crime strategy might have triggered widespread manipulation of the city's crime statistics.

Figure 7.10 **Number of full-time law enforcement officers in the NYPD - 1960 - 2002**



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year decline s in the NYPD homicide rate was 1990 to1998.

7.5 How COMPSTAT might encourage manipulation of crime statistics

Managing a police force the size of New York City's - with over 30,000 officers scattered across 76 separate police precincts, each containing an average of a hundred thousand residents - is a formidable undertaking. “CompStat” is a technique for managing such a force, by holding precinct commanders accountable for crime in their area, by assuring that commanders are implementing the anti-crime strategies adopted by headquarters, and by developing strategies for reducing crime through the open exchange of ideas between headquarters and precinct officials.

Under CompStat, each precinct commander and members of his or her command come to the NYPD command center once a month to brief the department's highest ranking officials on crime in the precinct and efforts to combat it. As many as 200 people attend these three-hour meetings, including members of such governmental agencies as the District Attorney's Office, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Housing Authority, the Transit Authority, the Port Authority police, parole and probation agencies, and the public schools.

Much of the meeting centers on computer-generated statistics compiled by headquarters and prominently displayed on three 8-foot-by-8-foot computer monitor screens. Computer statistics - hence the name “CompStat” - play a key role at the meetings. The huge screens show such precinct statistics as the number of homicides, robberies, and domestic assaults the week before the meeting, and the number the same week the year before. Other statistics include those on crimes cleared by arrest, on warrant arrests, and on arrests for quality-of-life crimes (for example, such crimes as aggressive panhandling, turnstile jumping at subway stations, riding bicycles on sidewalks, graffiti, operating illegal after-hours establishments). Together, the New York City Police Commissioner, the chief, the deputy chief, and other high ranking officials - all sitting at the command table - then grill the precinct commander on the statistics. Some commanders come well prepared; some not.

As mentioned earlier, a purpose of CompStat meetings is to let precinct commanders know what headquarters expects from them. For example, at a CompStat meeting that one of the authors of this paper attended in January 1997, the precinct commander was shown certain arrest statistics that headquarters had compiled. The statistics showed how many officers in his precinct had made no arrests in the entire year, how many had made just 1, how many had made a total of 2, and so on. The police chief asked the commander whether he was satisfied that so many men and women under his command had made no arrests or had made only a few. From the way the question was asked, the chief apparently wanted to make it clear to the commander and to everyone else in the room that he wanted officers to be out in the community, solving crimes, making arrests, practicing community policing, and the like, rather than sitting behind a desk. The commander said “no”, he was not satisfied, and promised the chief that the statistics would be different next year.

Considerable controversy surrounds CompStat. Many experts largely attribute the decline in New York City crime to CompStat's introduction in 1994. Others find little evidence of that and even question whether NYPD statistics can be trusted since, in their opinion, CompStat “increases the possibility that reported crimes could be manipulated” (Eck and Maguire 2000: 231). It is certainly easy to see how. Commanders who come to their grilling unprepared to provide thoughtful answers to questions both

about rising crime in their precinct and about their efforts to combat it, risk more than public embarrassment at these highly attended gatherings; they also risk seeing their police careers come to an early end.

Given the pressure that CompStat places on precinct commanders to reduce crime, then, it is reasonable to ask whether crime really did fall in New York City. Bluntly put, did crime fall, or did precinct police officials falsify the numbers?

7.6 Putting NYPD statistics to the test

If manipulation existed, the ramifications are potentially far reaching. As news of the downturn in crime spread, thousands of police officials from around the world flocked to New York City to observe CompStat meetings firsthand. Many carried back what they had learned and adopted some form of CompStat policing. CompStat-like policing is now in place in much of the United States (Weisburd et al, 2003), based in part on the understanding that: 1) crime declined dramatically in the city, and 2) CompStat was a major reason. Yet scientific proof of CompStat's success is hard to find. Moreover, the recorded drop in crime has never been scientifically verified to rule out the possibility of statistical manipulation. The reason why such verification has not been done until now is simple. Crime data independent of the NYPD are needed to corroborate the official police statistics, but aside from independent homicide statistics kept by the New York City Medical Examiner, the only such data that exist - crime data on New York City from the National Crime Victimisation Survey - are not publicly available. (This is to protect the confidentiality of survey respondents.) Instead, these data are locked securely away at the U.S. Census Bureau, the agency that conducts the survey interviews.

For this paper, the authors obtained from the Census Bureau never-before-seen tabulations of New York City crime rates from the National Crime Victimisation Survey for the period 1980 to 1999. (Tabulations over a longer time span were unavailable because they would have been considerably more costly for the Census Bureau to produce.) These tabulations, along with homicide statistics compiled by the New York City Medical Examiner, provide independent measures for determining if crime

rates in New York City fell during the years in which NYPD statistics show record declines.

7.7 The national crime victimisation survey (NCVS)

The National Crime Victimisation Survey, or NCVS, compiles annual data on crime through interviews with scientifically drawn samples of the entire U.S. population age 12 and older.[3] Of the tens of thousands of people interviewed each year, a small fraction says they were a recent crime victim.

In any year, from 2.5 per cent to 3 per cent of all interviews conducted in the NCVS are with residents of New York City (table 7.1). In 1980, for example, about 246,000 NCVS interviews were conducted nationwide, and of them, about 3 per cent (7,378) were interviews with New York City residents. Similarly, the 4,535 NCVS interviews with the city's residents in 1995 comprised about 2.5 per cent of the total 179,800 interviews that year.

Survey respondents are asked whether they were victimized by certain types of crime and, if so, whether the crime was reported to police. The NCVS confirms that much serious crime goes unreported. Historically, the NCVS has shown that police are not notified of about half of all rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults. Besides questions about police reporting, survey respondents are asked numerous other questions about the crime, such as where it occurred and whether there was any injury.

For various reasons, the victimisation survey is an appropriate data source to use to test or corroborate NYPD numbers. First, the samples of New York City residents in the NCVS database are representative; that is, each of the five boroughs that collectively make up New York City is a primary sampling unit in the survey. Second, the victimisation survey is independent of the NYPD. And, third, the NCVS compiles data on both reported and unreported crimes. In that respect the NCVS provides a more complete measure of crime than police statistics since virtually the only crimes that get recorded in police statistics are the ones reported to police. Still, NCVS statistics have their own unique limitations, some of which are identified later.

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3 See Appendix IV “The Nation’s Two Crime Measures,” in Crime in the United States 2002 (FBI 2003) for more information on the NCVS and how it differs from police statistics.

Table 7.1 **New York City NCVS interviews as a percentage of all - 1980 -1999** (a)

YEARS	(A) Number of NCVS interviews nationwide	(B) Number of NCVS interviews of New York City residents	New York City NCVS interviews as percentage of NCVS interviews nationwide
1980	246.000	7.378	3,00
1981	252.000	7.072	2,81
1982	254.000	7.481	2,95
1983	254.000	7.551	2,97
1984	228.000	6.304	2,76
1985	204.000	5.845	2,87
1986	200.000	5.517	2,76
1987	200.000	5.233	2,62
1988	202.000	5.221	2,58
1989	194.000	5.395	2,78
1990	190.000	5.325	2,80
1991	167.000	5.485	3,28
1992	152.000	5.126	3,37
1993	186.840	4.844	2,59
1994	181.120	4.626	2,55
1995	179.800	4.535	2,52
1996	170.660	4.456	2,61
1997	158.940	4.341	2,73
1998	157.800	4.114	2,61
1999	155.500	3.937	2,53

Source of A: The annual publication “Criminal Victimization in the United States” (BJS) provided the number of NCVS interviews over a 6-month period, which were doubled to produce yearly totals

Source of B: Numbers are from an unpublished tabulation prepared by the Census Bureau from an NCVS database that distinguished between New York City respondents and other respondents (Watt 2003).

(a) NCVS statistics are for the “collection year,” not the “data year.” “Interviews,” not distinct persons interviewed, are counted in the table.

7.8 NYPD crime statistics compared to statistics from independent sources

New York City crime data compiled by a source independent of the NYPD are needed to corroborate the city's dramatic drops in crime. Two such sources are used in this paper: for independent homicide statistics, the source is the Office of the New York City Medical Examiner, the agency that keeps homicide records as part of its overall responsibility for investigating causes of death in the city (Appendix table 7.4); for other crimes, the source is the NCVS (appendix tables 7.5 and 7.6).

Table 7.2 **Correlations over the 1980-1999 period between two sources of statistics on crime trends in New York City: NYPD and non-NYPD sources** *(victimisation surveys and medical examiner records)* **- 1980-1999**

	Victim-Survey/Medical examiner rate of							
	Violent offence				Property offence			
	Total	Homicide	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Total	Burglary	Larceny theft	Motor vehicle theft
VIOLENT CRIMES	**.648****	.980**	.697**	.303	.856**	.673**	.851**	.685**
Homicide	.670**	**.993****	.718**	.320	.880**	.662**	.878**	.754**
Rape	.586**	.706**	.645**	.264	.667**	.861**	.568**	.176
Robbery	.771**	.965**	**.819****	.384	.920**	.847**	.872**	.632**
Aggravated assault	.102	.595**	.131	**-.003**	.353	-.007	.447*	.525*
PROPERTY CRIMES	.714**	.930**	.769**	.335	**.864****	.860**	.806**	.506*
Burglary	.748**	.740**	.770**	.435	.781**	**.965****	.667**	.291
Larceny- theft	.548*	.859**	.617**	.194	.729**	.718**	**.690****	.402
Motor vehicle theft	.632**	.951**	.691**	.269	.852**	.560*	.876**	**.806****

Source: correlations are based on data shown in appendix tables 7.2, 7.4 and 7.6

(a) Shown in bold are correlations for similarly-defined crimes across the sources.

(b) * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

(c) ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

(d) Violent crime rate from non-NYPD sources includes medical examiner homicide, plus victim-survey rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Correlations with victim-survey rape are not shown because victimization surveys are not based on enough interviews with New York City residents to provide reliable rape estimates for the city.

(e) Correlations shown in the table for all victim-survey crimes, except robbery and vehicle theft, are based on "adjusted" victim-survey rates. Adjustment generally improved correlation. To assess the effect of adjustment, correlations based on adjusted and unadjusted rates are compared as follows: violent crime, .648** versus .600**; aggravated assault, -.003 versus -.066; property crime, .864** versus .700**; burglary, .965** versus .936**; and larceny-theft, .690** versus .392.

(f) The correlation over the 1980-1999 period between NYPD and non-NYPD rates for all offenses was .855** (not shown in table).

(g) The victim-survey/medical examiner rates used in all correlations are per 1,000 population ages 12 or older, except the ".993" correlation that used medical examiner homicide rates per 1,000 population all ages.

In what follows, trends in NYPD crime rates are compared to trends from the independent sources. To the extent that the fall in NYPD homicide rates is mirrored in the city's medical examiner homicide statistics, and to the extent that drops in NYPD rates for other crimes are reflected in NCVS rates derived from interviews with New York City residents, confidence is enhanced that crime really did fall in the city.

Table 7.3 **Correlations over the record-setting period of falling crime between two sources of crime statistics in New York City: NYPD and non-NYPD sources** *(victimisation surveys and medical examiner records)*

POLICE RECORDED RATE OF	Victim-Survey/Medical examiner rate of							
	Violent offence				Property offence			
	1990-99 Total	1990-98 Homi-cide	1990-99 Rob-bery	1988-99 Aggra-vated as-sault	1988-99 Total	1988-99 Bur-glary	1988-99 Larce-ny-theft	1990-99 Motor vehicle theft
VIOLENT CRIMES	**.927****	.993**	.917**	.497	.983**	.876**	.982**	.940**
Homicide	.911**	**1.000****	.895**	.372	.979**	.861**	.974**	.929**
Rape	.937**	.993**	.946**	.875**	.929**	.929**	.902**	.824*
Robbery	.917**	.993**	**.907****	.484	.979**	.872**	.978**	.937**
Aggravated assault	.942**	.987**	.931**	**.287**	.932**	.905**	.924*	.939**
CRIMES	.921**	.987**	.923**	.232	**.926****	.910**	.914**	.944**
Burglary	.937**	.990**	.933**	.255	.927**	**.914****	.915**	.943**
Larceny- theft	.920**	.986**	.927**	.156	.868**	.897**	**.852****	.952**
Motor vehicle theft	.907**	.983**	.907**	.445	.973**	.868**	.971**	**.932****

Source: correlations are based on data shown in in appendix tables 2, 4 and 6

(a) * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

(b) **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

(c) Violent crime rate from non-NYPD sources includes medical examiner homicide, plus victim-survey rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Correlations with victim-survey rape are not shown because victimization surveys are not based on enough interviews with New York City residents to provide reliable rape estimates for the city.

(d) Correlations shown in the table for all victim-survey crimes, except robbery and vehicle theft, are based on “adjusted” victim-survey rates. Adjustment generally improved correlation. To assess the effect of adjustment, correlations based on adjusted and unadjusted rates are compared as follows: violent crime, .927** versus .875**; aggravated assault, .287 versus -.048; property crime, .926** versus .783**; burglary, .914** versus .824**; and arceny-theft, .852** versus .624*.

(e) The victim-survey/medical examiner rates used in all correlations are per 1,000 population ages 12 or older, except the “1.000” correlation that used medical examiner homicide rates per 1,000 population all ages.

The degree of correspondence between NYPD trends and trends from other sources was measured using Pearson's correlation coefficient (r). For each crime, the correlation between the two trends was computed for three separate periods: 1) correlation over the period 1980 to 1999 illustrates the general correspondence between the alternative sources of data on crime

rate trends; 2) correlation over the period when NYPD rates set new records for consecutive-year declines provides a test of whether crime fell when NYPD statistics indicated it did; and 3) correlation over the years 1993 to 1999 shows the correspondence between NYPD and non-NYPD crime trend statistics during the first six years of CompStat, thereby providing a test of the impact of CompStat on crime recording by New York police.

Correlations over the 1993-1999 CompStat-test period are not shown in tables; all other correlations are given in tables 7.2 and 7.3. None of the study's correlations used data beyond 1999 because, as explained earlier, NCVS crime rates for New York City beyond 1999 were not readily available.

Homicide. Trends in NYPD homicide rates and New York City Medical Examiner homicide rates are shown in figure 7.11 and appendix table 7.4. The correlation between the two over the entire period from 1980 to 1999 is +.993 (table 7.2); over the record - setting period 1990 to 1998, r = +1.0 (table 7.3); and over the CompStat-test period from 1993 to 1999, r = +1.0 ($p < .01$).

Figure 7.11 **Homicide: medical examiner recorded and police recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD homicide rate was 1990 to 1998. From 1990 to 1998, the drop in the NYPD homicide rate corresponded to the drop in the medical examiner rate (r = +1.0).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +1.0).

Rape. No rape trend comparisons are made between NYPD and NCVS statistics because the victimisation surveys are not based on enough interviews with New York City residents to produce reliable rape estimates for the city.

Robbery. Trends in NYPD robbery rates and rates derived from NCVS interviews with New York City residents are shown in figure 7.12 and appendix table 7.6. Over the period 1980 to 1999, the NYPD robbery rate and the victimisation-survey rate for New York City followed similar trends (r = +.819). Over the 1990-1999 portion of the record-setting period for consecutive-year declines in the NYPD robbery rate, the correlation between NYPD robbery rates and NCVS-derived rates is +.907. Over the CompStat-test period 1993 to 1999, the correlation is .985 ($p < .01$).

Figure 7.12 **Robbery: survey estimated and police recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD robbery rate was 1990 to 2002. From 1990 to 1999, the drop in the NYPD robbery rate corresponded to the drop in the survey rate (r = +.907).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +.985).

Aggravated assault. Trends in NYPD aggravated assault rates and NCVS rates derived from interviews with New York City residents are

shown in figure 7.13 and appendix table 7.6. Trends in one do not correspond at all with trends in the other over the 1980-1999 period (r = -.003). Over the 1988-1999 portion of the record-setting period for declines in the NYPD aggravated assault rate, the correspondence is, again, not close (r = +.287). But over the CompStat-test period from 1993 to 1999, there is a close correspondence in aggravated assault trends between NYPD statistics and those derived from NCVS interviews with New York City residents (r = +.855, p < .05).

Figure 7.13 **Aggravated assault: survey estimated and police recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD aggravated assault rate was 1988 to 2002.
From 1988 to 1999, the drop in the NYPD aggravated assault rate corresponded to the drop in the survey rate (r = +.287).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +.855).

Violent crime overall. Non-NYPD statistics for "violent crime overall" combine New York City Medical Examiner homicide statistics with New York City victimisation survey data for rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. NYPD and non-NYPD trends in violent crime rates for New York City are shown in figure 7.14 and appendix table 7.6. Over the period

1980 to 1999, the correlation between the two trends is fairly close: r = +.648. Over the 1990-1999 portion of the record-setting period of uninterrupted declines in NYPD violent crime rates, the correlation is comparatively high: r = +.927. Over the CompStat-test period 1993 to 1999, the correlation is quite high: r = +.979 ($p < .01$).

Figure 7.14 **Violent crime: survey estimated and police recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD aggravated assault rate was 1988 to 2002.
From 1988 to 1999, the drop in the NYPD aggravated assault rate corresponded to the drop in the survey rate (r = +.287).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +.855).

Burglary. Figure 7.15 and appendix table 7.6 show trends in the burglary rate from two sources: NYPD records and NCVS interviews with New York City residents. The trends correspond closely over the 1980-1999 period (r = +.965), over the 1988-1999 portion of the record-setting period of consecutive-year declines (r = +.914), and over the 1993-1999 CompStat-test period (r = +.921, $p < .01$).

Figure 7.15 **Burglary: survey estimated and police recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD burglary rate was 1988 to 2002.
From 1988 to 1999, the drop in the NYPD burglary rate corresponded to the drop in the survey rate (r = +.914).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +.921).

Larceny-theft. Figure 7.16 and appendix table 7.6 give trends in the burglary rate from two sources: NYPD records and NCVS interviews with New York City residents. The trends are similar over the period 1980-1999 (r = +.690). Over the 1988-1999 portion of the record-setting period of declining NYPD rates, correlation is fairly high: r = +.852. Over the 1993-1999 CompStat-test period, the correlation is quite high: r = +.970 ($p < .01$).

Figure 7.16 **Larceny theft: survey estimated and police recorded crime rate in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD larceny-theft rate was 1988 to 2002. From 1988 to 1999, the drop in the NYPD larceny-theft rate corresponded to the drop in the survey rate (r = +.852).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +.970).

Motor vehicle theft. Figure 7.17 and appendix table 7.6 show the correspondence between the two ways of measuring trends in the motor vehicle theft rate. The correlation between the two is +.806 over the period 1980-1999; r = +.932 over the 1990-1999 portion of the record-setting period for consecutive declines; and r = +.916 ($p < .01$) over the 1993-1999 CompStat-test period.

Figure 7.17 **Vehicle theft: survey estimated and police recorded crime in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD vehicle theft rate was 1990 to 2002. From 1990 to 1999, the drop in the NYPD vehicle theft rate corresponded to the drop in the survey rate (r = +.932).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +.916).

PROPERTY CRIME OVERALL. FIGURE 7.18 AND APPENDIX TABLE 7.6 GIVE TRENDS IN THE PROPERTY CRIME RATE AS MEASURED TWO DIFFERENT WAYS: ONE BASED ON NYPD RECORDS; THE OTHER BASED ON NCVS INTERVIEWS WITH SAMPLES OF NEW YORK CITY RESIDENTS. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE TWO OVER THE 1980-1999 PERIOD IS +.864; OVER THE 1988-1999 PORTION OF THE RECORD-SETTING PERIOD, +.926; AND OVER THE 1993-1999 COMPSTAT-TEST PERIOD, +.993 ($p < .01$).

Figure 7.18 **Property crime: survey estimated and police recorded crime in New York City - 1960 - 2002** *(per 1,000 population)* (a)



(a) The longest period of consecutive-year declines in the NYPD property crime rate was 1988 to 2002. From 1988 to 1999, the drop in the NYPD property crime rate corresponded to the drop in the survey rate (r = +.926).
There was also a close correspondence over the CompStat years 1993 to 1999 (r = +.993).

SUMMARY

Over each of the record-setting periods, year-to-year changes in NYPD- and non-NYPD crime rates were closely correlated with one another. The only exception was aggravated assault, which had only a +.287 correlation. Over the CompStat-test period 1993-1999, NYPD and non-NYPD rates for each crime including aggravated assault were also closely correlated with one another. Moreover, if correlations over the entire period 1980-1999 are taken as a measure of what is generally found when NYPD- and non-NYPD crime trends are compared, the CompStat correlations are closer than what is usually seen. The one minor exception is burglary: r = +.965 from 1980 to 1999, compared to +.921 over the CompStat-test period 1993 to 1999.

7.9 Discussion

According to crime statistics compiled by the NYPD (New York City Police Department), crime in the city took a downturn starting around 1990 that continued for many years, shattering all the city's old records for consecutive-year declines in crime rates. Rates for homicide fell a record-setting 8 years in a row from 1990 to 1998; for rape, 8 consecutive years from 1993 to 2001; for robbery and motor vehicle theft, 12 consecutive years from 1990 to 2002; and, for aggravated assault, burglary and larceny-theft, 14 years in a row from 1988 to 2002. Many of the rates may still be falling; this paper had no NYPD statistics beyond 2002. Over the record-setting period, rates had fallen so low that government statisticians had to go back to 1970 to find a lower rate for aggravated assault in the city, and even further back to the 1960s to find lower rates for homicide, rape, robbery, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. As for burglary, going all the way back to 1960, no year was found with a lower rate than the one the NYPD recorded in 2002.

In 1994, the NYPD pioneered an innovation in policing: CompStat. Crime had been falling before 1994, but because the police-recorded fall continued under CompStat, this highly publicized innovation has been credited with being a major contributor to the amelioration of the crime problem in New York City. Police officials around the world have flocked to New York to observe CompStat first-hand, and to carry back what they have learned. Versions of CompStat have now been widely adopted in the United States and have even been embraced by some police agencies abroad. Yet scientific proof of CompStat's success is hard to find. Moreover, the recorded drop in crime has never been scientifically verified.

This study put NYPD statistics to the test. Would non-NYPD crime data show crime falling in the city? Homicide statistics of the NYPD and the New York City Medical Examiner were compared over the period that NYPD statistics showed record-setting declines. The two were nearly a perfect match. For other crimes - robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft - NYPD statistics were compared to those derived from annual interviews with scientifically sampled residents of New York City, in which residents were asked whether they had recently been victimized by certain crimes. The interviews were all conducted as

part of the on-going National Crime Victimisation Survey, or NCVS. When these never-before-seen crime statistics from interviews with New York City residents were compared to NYPD statistics over the history-making period of falling police-recorded crime, results generally corroborated the NYPD.

We say “generally corroborated the NYPD” because NCVS statistics confirmed the drops in NYPD-recorded crime for all types of crime except one: aggravated assault. We have no explanation for the lack of correspondence for this one offense. A change in NYPD record-keeping might possibly account for it. That seems counterintuitive to us, though, since revised record-keeping might reasonably be expected to affect more than one crime. We explore some alternative explanations in the “Methodology” section.

CompStat. Besides attempting to verify the record-setting drops in crime, the study also looked for possible evidence of manipulation of crime statistics immediately following CompStat's 1994 introduction into the NYPD. If CompStat fostered manipulation, we reasoned, relatively low correspondence would be expected between NYPD and non-NYPD crime trends over a period when CompStat was in place. Results, however, did not show that to be true. That is, correlations measuring the correspondence between NYPD and non-NYPD crime trends in New York City were not lower during CompStat years than those normally found. If anything, they were higher. Violent crime, for example, had a +.970 correlation during the CompStat-test period from 1993 to 1999, but +.643 over the period 1980 to 1999. Aggravated assault had a +.855 correlation during these CompStat years, compared to the vastly lower -.003 that is generally found. In short, no evidence was found that the NYPD manipulated its statistics under CompStat. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that, on occasion, some of the 76 precincts in New York City may have downgraded or concealed crimes to make their statistics look better.

As for why crime fell in New York City, our study was not designed to answer that question. Instead, the aim was to learn whether independent crime data could corroborate official police data. We think our paper used a fair, unbiased test of the NYPD crime statistics. In our opinion, crime really did fall in New York City over the record-setting period that NYPD statistics said it did.

7.10 Methodology

Use of pre-1993 "adjusted" NCVS estimates. The history-making fall in NYPD-recorded crime starting around 1990 was corroborated by the corresponding drop in NCVS-measured crime. Since most pre-1993 NCVS rates were adjusted upward, the correspondence might conceivably be largely due to the adjustments. To rule out that possibility, correlations using adjusted and unadjusted rates were compared. As expected, results indicated that adjustments generally improved the magnitude of the correlation, but not by a great deal. For example, over the period 1990 to 1999, the correlation for violent crime based on adjusted rates and unadjusted rates was +.927 and +.871 respectively; for burglary, +.914 and +.824 respectively (table 7.3 note).[4]

Did NYPD-recorded crime fall because of growing reluctance to call the police? Drops in recorded crime can occur simply because victims and others, for whatever reason, grow less and less likely to report crime to police. To investigate whether that might help account for the record-setting declines in NYPD-recorded crime, the NCVS data from interviews with New York City crime victims were examined. In the interviews, victims were asked whether the crime committed against them was reported to police. Analysis of their responses revealed that, on average from 1980 to 1999, 49 per cent of non-commercial robberies were reported to police; 51 per cent of aggravated assaults; 55 per cent of non-commercial burglaries; 23 per cent of non-commercial larceny-thefts; and 70 per cent of non- commercial motor vehicle thefts (appendix table 7.7).[5] These percentages did not drop during the record-setting periods of falling NYPD crime rates, as indicated by the sign of the correlations between reporting percentage and year. The reporting percentage for non-commercial rob-

4 To be precise, absolute numbers of victimisations/incidents were directly adjusted, not rates. But since the rates were based on adjusted counts, the term "adjusted rates" is used. The study used unpublished adjustment ratios. These adjusted ratios are nearly identical to rate adjustment ratios published in Criminal Victimisation, 1973-1975 (Rand, Lynch and Cantor, 1997). The adjustment ratios applied to the New York City NCVS data are ones derived from national data, not New York City data. National adjustment ratios are the only ones that exist, and we felt that some adjustment was perhaps better than none.

5. Victims are not asked which police agency the crime was reported to, only whether it was reported. Crimes against city residents that were committed outside the legal boundaries of New York City would not be reported to the NYPD.

bery, for example, had a positive correlation (r = +0.30) with year over the period 1990 to 1999, suggesting that, if anything, the reporting percentage rose, not fell, over the period. The positive sign in the correlation for three other crimes - aggravated assault (r = +0.04), residential burglary (r = +0.65) and motor vehicle theft (r = +0.53) - suggest the same: if anything, a rising, not falling, willingness to call police. Only larceny-theft had a negative sign in its correlation (r = -0.37), which might indicate growing reluctance to call police. But that correlation (like most of the others) was not statistically significant at the .05 level. In short, crime fell in New York City probably for lots of reasons, but rising reticence to report crime to the NYPD was not one of them.

Reconciling discrepant trends for aggravated assault. The drop in NYPD-recorded crime was corroborated for every crime except aggravated assault. In searching for an explanation, we tried to think of ways in which aggravated assault is different, or might be different, from other crimes.

1. The discrepant finding for aggravated assault is not unique to New York City. Studies have compared police and NCVS statistics for the entire nation and have also found a close correspondence in national trends for every crime category except aggravated assault (Langan 2004, Langan and Farrington 1998).
2. New York City's NCVS data are more complete than its police statistics in that the NCVS compiles data on both reported and unreported crime, whereas the NYPD only keeps records of crimes that are reported to them or that, in rare instances, NYPD officers witness. On the other hand, the city's police records are more complete than its NCVS data to the extent that the NYPD keeps statistics on certain crimes that are not counted in the city's NCVS data: for example, commercial robberies and burglaries; robberies and aggravated assaults against persons under 12; and crimes against non-residents of New York City.

We wondered what we might find if we compared New York City NCVS counts to NYPD counts after we: 1) subtracted from New York City NCVS numbers any crimes that victims said were not reported to police, and 2) subtracted from NYPD counts any crimes against commercial establishments or against persons under 12. We also wanted to eliminate from NYPD totals all crimes against non-residents, but that wasn't possible

because we had no NYPD data distinguishing victims by their residency.

After the subtractions, the number of crimes that victims said were reported to police, was then compared to the number that the NYPD recorded. All other things being equal, we expected the NYPD-recorded number to exceed the NCVS reported number because the recorded number includes crimes against both residents and non-residents. Results were in line with our expectation except for the crime of non-commercial burglary. On average from 1980 to 1999, the NYPD-recorded number of non-residential burglaries was 86 per cent of all the NCVS-estimated number of reported residential burglaries (appendix table 7.8). The exception may have a simple explanation: non-residents of New York City contribute relatively little to the city's volume of burglary. Consequently, by limiting itself to interviews with New York City residents, the NCVS does not miss a great many of the city's burglaries.

By far, the biggest difference between NCVS-reported and comparable NYPD-recorded numbers was for aggravated assault. On average over the period 1980 to 1999, the number of NYPD-recorded aggravated assaults against persons 12 and older was nearly 2.5 times the number that New York City residents said were reported to police (appendix table 7.8). For non-commercial robbery, the NYPD-recorded number against persons 12 and older was about 1.5 times the NCVS-reported number; for non-commercial larceny, the NYPD figure was 1.1 times the NCVS-reported total; and for non-commercial motor vehicle theft, the NYPD-recorded volume was 1.3 times the NCVS-reported volume.

While not surprising that NYPD-recorded numbers are generally larger than NCVS-reported numbers, it is not clear why aggravated assault stands out among the different crimes. Perhaps relatively large numbers of the aggravated assault victims in NYPD statistics are types that, by design, go uncounted in the NCVS: commuters, visitors, tourists, the homeless, institutionalized populations, and persons in group living quarters like dormitories and barracks. Perhaps comparatively large numbers of the assault victims coming to police attention are ones that the NCVS simply does a poor job of capturing. They might be victims who belong to an economic stratum, gender, or social class that NCVS interviewers do not reach well. They might be victims who, for one reason or another, are reluctant to tell interviewers about their victimisation: 1) they were compli-

cit in the crime (bar fights, for example) but emergency room treatment for their injuries brought them to police attention, 2) they were victimized by a co-habitant (husband or boyfriend) who was present during the interview, or 3) they were too embarrassed to say that they had been victimized by a boyfriend, girlfriend, husband, wife or other relative.[6] One piece of evidence that assault is less well counted in the NCVS than other violent crimes is from a study that compared NCVS numbers to those based on hospital records (Rand 1997). Hospital records showed three times more people receiving hospital treatment for violent crime injuries than NCVS statistics. Differences were not as large for other crimes. Results from that study also suggested that the NCVS violent crime undercount was particularly severe for crimes between boyfriends and girlfriends, spouses and other relatives.

7.11 Acknowledgment

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[6] Persons interviewed in the NCVS are encouraged to tell their interviewers about any incidents of domestic violence they experienced in the recent past, but they often don't, according to the limited research on the topic (Panel for the Evaluation of Crime Surveys 1976: 32-48).

Appendix table 7.1 **Number of police-recorded crimes in New York City - 1960 - 2002**

YEARS	Population (all ages)	All offenses	Violent offense				
			Total	Homicide	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault
1960	7.781.984	164.125	18.831	390	841	6.579	11.021
1961	7.750.000	172.831	19.201	482	788	5.955	11.976
1962	7.825.000	179.488	20.441	507	882	6.634	12.418
1963	7.932.000	196.510	21.219	548	823	6.823	13.025
1964	7.989.000	214.632	24.509	636	1.054	7.988	14.831
1965	8.011.000	228.594	27.014	631	1.154	8.904	16.325
1966	8.019.100	378.658	49.158	653	1.761	23.539	23.205
1967	7.983.900	453.977	63.412	745	1.905	35.934	24.828
1968	7.964.200	552.916	85.664	904	1.840	54.405	28.515
1969	7.929.882	539.761	92.032	1.043	2.120	59.152	29.717
1970	7.895.563	578.149	108.615	1.117	2.141	74.102	31.255
1971	7.903.000	591.927	126.740	1.466	2.415	88.994	33.865
1972	7.835.500	478.869	120.294	1.691	3.271	78.202	37.130
1973	7.681.800	475.855	116.313	1.680	3.735	72.750	38.148
1974	7.597.800	519.825	124.616	1.554	4.054	77.940	41.068
1975	7.492.200	581.247	132.182	1.645	3.866	83.190	43.481
1976	7.427.800	658.147	134.153	1.622	3.400	86.183	42.948
1977	7.300.700	610.077	121.912	1.553	3.899	74.404	42.056
1978	7.178.900	570.354	122.685	1.503	3.882	74.029	43.271
1979	7.109.420	621.110	132.383	1.733	3.875	82.572	44.203
1980	7.035.348	710.151	149.549	1.812	3.711	100.550	43.476
1981	7.070.429	725.846	156.946	1.826	3.862	107.475	43.783
1982	7.096.559	688.567	143.943	1.668	3.547	95.944	42.784
1983	7.100.063	622.877	132.653	1.622	3.662	84.043	43.326
1984	7.167.121	600.216	132.292	1.450	3.829	79.541	47.472
1985	7.183.984	601.467	135.152	1.384	3.880	79.532	50.356
1986	7.179.609	635.199	143.251	1.582	3.536	80.827	57.306
1987	7.284.319	656.505	148.313	1.672	3.507	78.890	64.244
1988	7.346.352	718.483	162.916	1.896	3.412	86.578	71.030
1989	7.369.454	712.419	169.487	1.905	3.254	93.377	70.951
1990	7.322.564	710.222	174.542	2.245	3.126	100.280	68.891
1991	7.350.023	678.855	170.390	2.154	2.892	98.512	66.832
1992	7.375.097	626.182	159.578	1.995	2.815	91.239	63.529
1993	7.347.257	600.346	153.543	1.946	2.818	86.001	62.778
1994	7.336.224	530.120	136.522	1.561	2.666	72.540	59.755
1995	7.319.546	444.758	115.153	1.177	2.374	59.280	52.322
1996	7.339.594	382.555	98.659	983	2.332	49.670	45.674
1997	7.320.477	355.893	92.863	770	2.157	44.707	45.229
1998	7.357.745	323.150	85.891	633	2.046	39.359	43.853
1999	7.429.263	299.563	79.024	671	1.702	36.100	40.551
2000	7.746.511	288.368	75.745	673	1.630	32.562	40.880
2001	8.023.018	263.764	68.274	649	1.530	28.202	37.893
2002	8.084.693	250.630	63.839	587	1.530	27.229	34.334

Appendix table 7.1 continued **Number of police-recorded crimes in New York City - 1960 - 2002**

YEARS	Property offense			
	Total	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle
1960	145.294	36.049	88.176	21.069
1961	153.630	38.460	93.392	21.778
1962	159.047	41.478	94.832	22.737
1963	175.291	42.775	105.342	27.174
1964	190.123	45.693	111.574	32.856
1965	201.580	51.072	115.782	34.726
1966	329.500	120.903	163.683	44.914
1967	390.565	150.245	182.151	58.169
1968	467.252	173.559	216.245	77.448
1969	447.729	171.393	190.540	85.796
1970	469.534	181.694	193.005	94.835
1971	465.187	181.331	187.232	96.624
1972	358.575	148.046	134.664	75.865
1973	359.542	149.311	127.500	82.731
1974	395.209	158.321	163.157	73.731
1975	449.065	177.032	188.832	83.201
1976	523.994	195.243	232.069	96.682
1977	488.165	178.907	214.838	94.420
1978	447.669	164.447	200.110	83.112
1979	488.727	178.162	220.817	89.748
1980	560.602	210.703	249.421	100.478
1981	568.900	205.825	258.369	104.706
1982	544.624	172.794	264.400	107.430
1983	490.224	143.698	253.801	92.725
1984	467.924	128.687	250.759	88.478
1985	466.315	124.838	262.051	79.426
1986	491.948	124.382	281.713	85.853
1987	508.192	123.412	289.126	95.654
1988	555.567	127.148	308.479	119.940
1989	542.932	121.322	287.749	133.861
1990	535.680	119.937	268.620	147.123
1991	508.465	112.015	256.473	139.977
1992	466.604	103.476	236.169	126.959
1993	446.803	99.207	235.132	112.464
1994	393.598	88.370	209.808	95.420
1995	329.605	73.889	183.037	72.679
1996	283.896	61.270	162.246	60.380
1997	263.030	54.099	157.039	51.892
1998	237.259	46.185	147.018	44.056
1999	220.539	40.469	140.377	39.693
2000	212.623	37.112	139.664	35.847
2001	195.490	31.563	133.938	29.989
2002	186.791	30.102	129.655	27.034

Source: Annual publication “Crime in the United States” (FBI)
(a) “Homicide” is defined as murder and non-negligent manslaughter.
(b) The 649 homicides shown for 2001 excludes 2,823 persons killed at the World Trade Center on September 11. 3) For each offense, the new record for consecutive-year declines in New York City is double boxed, and the old record is single boxed.

Appendix table 7.2 Data for figures 7.1 through 7.9 - 1960 - 2002 (a)

YEARS	All offenses	Violent offense				
		Figure 1 Homicide	Figure 2 Rape	Figure 3 Robbery	Figure 4 Aggravated assault	Figure 5 Total violent
1960	21,09	0,05012	0,10807	0,85	1,42	2,42
1961	22,30	0,06219	0,10168	0,77	1,55	2,48
1962	22,94	0,06479	0,11272	0,85	1,59	2,61
1963	24,77	0,06909	0,10376	0,86	1,64	2,68
1964	26,87	0,07961	0,13193	1,00	1,86	3,07
1965	28,54	0,07877	0,14405	1,11	2,04	3,37
1966	47,22	0,08143	0,21960	2,94	2,89	6,13
1967	56,86	0,09331	0,23861	4,50	3,11	7,94
1968	69,43	0,11351	0,23103	6,83	3,58	10,76
1969	68,07	0,13153	0,26734	7,46	3,75	11,61
1970	73,22	0,14147	0,27116	9,39	3,96	13,76
1971	74,90	0,18550	0,30558	11,26	4,29	16,04
1972	61,12	0,21581	0,41746	9,98	4,74	15,35
1973	61,95	0,21870	0,48621	9,47	4,97	15,14
1974	68,42	0,20453	0,53358	10,26	5,41	16,40
1975	77,58	0,21956	0,51600	11,10	5,80	17,64
1976	88,61	0,21837	0,45774	11,60	5,78	18,06
1977	83,56	0,21272	0,53406	10,19	5,76	16,70
1978	79,45	0,20936	0,54075	10,31	6,03	17,09
1979	87,36	0,24376	0,54505	11,61	6,22	18,62
1980	100,94	0,25756	0,52748	14,29	6,18	21,26
1981	102,66	0,25826	0,54622	15,20	6,19	22,20
1982	97,03	0,23504	0,49982	13,52	6,03	20,28
1983	87,73	0,22845	0,51577	11,84	6,10	18,68
1984	83,75	0,20231	0,53425	11,10	6,62	18,46
1985	83,72	0,19265	0,54009	11,07	7,01	18,81
1986	88,47	0,22035	0,49251	11,26	7,98	19,95
1987	90,13	0,22953	0,48145	10,83	8,82	20,36
1988	97,80	0,25809	0,46445	11,79	9,67	22,18
1989	96,67	0,25850	0,44155	12,67	9,63	23,00
1990	96,99	0,30659	0,42690	13,69	9,41	23,84
1991	92,36	0,29306	0,39347	13,40	9,09	23,18
1992	84,90	0,27050	0,38169	12,37	8,61	21,64
1993	81,71	0,26486	0,38354	11,71	8,54	20,90
1994	72,26	0,21278	0,36340	9,89	8,15	18,61
1995	60,76	0,16080	0,32434	8,10	7,15	15,73
1996	52,12	0,13393	0,31773	6,77	6,22	13,44
1997	48,62	0,10518	0,29465	6,11	6,18	12,69
1998	43,92	0,08603	0,27807	5,35	5,96	11,67
1999	40,32	0,09032	0,22909	4,86	5,46	10,64
2000	37,23	0,08688	0,21042	4,20	5,28	9,78
2001	32,88	0,08089	0,19070	3,52	4,72	8,51
2002	31,00	0,07261	0,20891	3,37	4,25	7,90

Appendix table 7.2 continued **Data for figures 7.1 through 7.9 - 1960 - 2002** (a)

YEARS	Property offense			
	Figure 6 Burglary	Figure 7 Larceny-theft	Figure 8 Motor vehicle theft	Figure 9 Total property
1960	4,63	11,33	2,71	18,67
1961	4,96	12,05	2,81	19,82
1962	5,30	12,12	2,91	20,33
1963	5,39	13,28	3,43	22,10
1964	5,72	13,97	4,11	23,80
1965	6,38	14,45	4,33	25,16
1966	15,08	20,41	5,60	41,09
1967	18,82	22,81	7,29	48,92
1968	21,79	27,15	9,72	58,67
1969	21,61	24,03	10,82	56,46
1970	23,01	24,44	12,01	59,47
1971	22,94	23,69	12,23	58,86
1972	18,89	17,19	9,68	45,76
1973	19,44	16,60	10,77	46,80
1974	20,84	21,47	9,70	52,02
1975	23,63	25,20	11,11	59,94
1976	26,29	31,24	13,02	70,54
1977	24,51	29,43	12,93	66,87
1978	22,91	27,87	11,58	62,36
1979	25,06	31,06	12,62	68,74
1980	29,95	35,45	14,28	79,68
1981	29,11	36,54	14,81	80,46
1982	24,35	37,26	15,14	76,74
1983	20,24	35,75	13,06	69,05
1984	17,96	34,99	12,34	65,29
1985	17,38	36,48	11,06	64,91
1986	17,32	39,24	11,96	68,52
1987	16,94	39,69	13,13	69,77
1988	17,31	41,99	16,33	75,62
1989	16,46	39,05	18,16	73,67
1990	16,38	36,68	20,09	73,15
1991	15,24	34,89	19,04	69,18
1992	14,03	32,02	17,21	63,27
1993	13,50	32,00	15,31	60,81
1994	12,05	28,60	13,01	53,65
1995	10,09	25,01	9,93	45,03
1996	8,35	22,11	8,23	38,68
1997	7,39	21,45	7,09	35,93
1998	6,28	19,98	5,99	32,25
1999	5,45	18,90	5,34	29,69
2000	4,79	18,03	4,63	27,45
2001	3,93	16,69	3,74	24,37
2002	3,72	16,04	3,34	23,10

Source: Rates shown were calculated from data in appendix table 1
(a) For each offense, the new record for consecutive-year declines in New York City is double boxed, and the old record is single boxed.

Appendix table 7.3 **Data for figure 7.10 - 1980 - 2002** (a)

YEARS	Number of full-time law enforcement employees in the NYPD		
	Total	Officers (b)	Civilians
1980	26.939	22.590	4.349
1981	27.831	22.467	5.364
1982	28.731	22.855	5.876
1983	29.289	23.339	5.950
1984	33.014	25.044	7.970
1985	32.328	26.073	6.255
1986	33.853	27.425	6.428
1987	34.764	27.523	7.241
1988	36.027	26.723	9.304
1989	35.605	25.858	9.747
1990	36.407	26.844	9.563
1991	36.227	26.856	9.371
1992	37.922	28.249	9.673
1993	39.442	29.327	10.115
1994	39.953	30.135	9.818
1995	46.802	37.450	9.352
1996	48.441	37.090	11.351
1997	48.549	37.219	11.330
1998	50.417	39.149	11.268
1999	62.969	41.791	21.178
2000	55.408	39.779	15.629
2001	56.208	39.067	17.141
2002	53.774	37.240	16.534

Source: van Kesteren et al. (2000), Appendix 4, Table 1.

(a) DK (Denmark): 2000 only; FI (Finland): 1989,1992,1996, 2000; NO (Norway): 1989 only; SE (Sweden): 1992, 1996, 2000; EUR9: Austria, Belgium, England & Wales, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain/Catalonia and Switzerland. All countries are weighted equally.

Appendix table 7.4 Data for figure 7.11 - 1960 - 2002

YEARS	Population (all ages)	Homicides in New York City recorded by the -			
		NYPD (a)		Medical examiner (b)	
		Number	Rate per 1,000 population	Number	Rate per 1,000 population
1960	7.781.984	390	0,050		
1961	7.750.000	482	0,062		
1962	7.825.000	507	0,065		
1963	7.932.000	548	0,069		
1964	7.989.000	636	0,080		
1965	8.011.000	631	0,079		
1966	8.019.100	653	0,081		
1967	7.983.900	745	0,093		
1968	7.964.200	904	0,114		
1969	7.929.882	1.043	0,132		
1970	7.895.563	1.117	0,141		
1971	7.903.000	1.466	0,185		
1972	7.835.500	1.691	0,216		
1973	7.681.800	1.680	0,219		
1974	7.597.800	1.554	0,205		
1975	7.492.200	1.645	0,220		
1976	7.427.800	1.622	0,218		
1977	7.300.700	1.553	0,213		
1978	7.178.900	1.503	0,209		
1979	7.109.420	1.733	0,244		
1980	7.035.348	1.812	0,258	1.902	0,270
1981	7.070.429	1.826	0,258	1.977	0,280
1982	7.096.559	1.668	0,235	1.871	0,264
1983	7.100.063	1.622	0,228	1.778	0,250
1984	7.167.121	1.450	0,202	1.615	0,225
1985	7.183.984	1.384	0,193	1.509	0,210
1986	7.179.609	1.582	0,220	1.623	0,226
1987	7.284.319	1.672	0,230	1.681	0,231
1988	7.346.352	1.896	0,258	1.942	0,264
1989	7.369.454	1.905	0,258	1.963	0,266
1990	7.322.564	2.245	0,307	2.254	0,308
1991	7.350.023	2.154	0,293	2.197	0,299
1992	7.375.097	1.995	0,271	2.032	0,276
1993	7.347.257	1.946	0,265	2.001	0,272
1994	7.336.224	1.561	0,213	1.594	0,217
1995	7.319.546	1.177	0,161	1.200	0,164
1996	7.339.594	983	0,134	1.006	0,137
1997	7.320.477	770	0,105	786	0,107
1998	7.357.745	633	0,086	666	0,091
1999	7.429.263	671	0,090	690	0,093
2000	7.746.511	673	0,087		
2001 (c)	8.023.018	649	0,081		
2002	8.084.693	587	0,073		

Source: 1960 population is from table 21 of the Census Bureau's "1960 Census of Population. Vol 1: Characteristics of the Population. Part 34: New York"; 1961-1968 populations are from the Census Bureau's" Current Population Reports - Population Estimates - P-25"; 1969 population was derived by averaging the 1968 and 1970 populations; 1970-1978 populations are from the Census Bureau's "Preliminary Estimates of the Intercensal Population of Counties, 1970-1979" (Rolland 2003). 1979-2002 populations and "homicides recorded by police" are from the annual publication "Crime in the United States" (FBI). 1980-1999 "homicides recorded by medical examiners" are from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's annual publication "Summary of Vital Statistics" (López 2003)

(a) "Homicides recorded by police" includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter.

(b) Medical examiner-recorded homicides include some negligent manslaughters. Legal interventions were excluded from "homicides recorded by medical examiners" to make them more comparable to the police-recorded homicides.

(c) The 2001 homicide figures in this table exclude the 2,823 persons killed at the World Trade Center on September 11.

Appendix table 7.5 **Number of crimes in New York City based on medical examiner records** *(for homicide)* **and victimisation surveys** *(all other crimes)* **- 1980 - 1999** (a) (b)

YEARS	Poplulation age 12 or older	Violent offense			
		Total (c)	Homicide	Robbery	Aggravated assault
1980	5.930.190	176.799	1.902	112.950	54.188
1981	5.999.150	261.146	1.977	164.910	85.448
1982	6.017.660	262.049	1.871	186.180	61.479
1983	6.017.410	191.725	1.778	135.970	45.930
1984	6.099.730	156.510	1.615	106.870	48.025
1985	6.172.400	121.151	1.509	79.520	28.024
1986	6.108.840	91.284	1.623	68.620	14.992
1987	6.084.470	188.868	1.681	97.780	84.357
1988	6.150.640	146.838	1.942	96.710	37.324
1989	6.167.350	154.915	1.963	105.260	42.011
1990	6.474.860	212.777	2.254	164.690	42.098
1991	6.491.290	160.092	2.197	101.660	46.215
1992	6.260.030	184.560	2.032	105.820	60.586
1993	6.254.740	178.791	2.001	116.480	56.790
1994	6.095.780	177.234	1.594	104.620	64.610
1995	6.076.530	133.990	1.200	83.200	39.490
1996	6.118.380	111.686	1.006	62.230	45.230
1997	6.075.010	99.006	786	48.420	44.450
1998	6.162.420	87.686	666	49.310	35.110
1999	6.186.570	82.800	690	38.490	31.370

Appendix table 7.5 continued **Number of crimes in New York City based on medical examiner records** *(for homicide)* **and victimisation surveys** *(all other crimes)* **- 1980 - 1999** (a) (b)

YEARS	Property offense			
	Total	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft
1980	1.090.843	318.372	686.671	85.800
1981	1.222.277	318.660	820.927	82.690
1982	1.312.570	285.600	887.750	139.220
1983	1.104.214	252.540	759.944	91.730
1984	923.420	200.868	646.872	75.680
1985	859.845	192.576	608.309	58.960
1986	736.025	154.752	516.683	64.590
1987	994.327	190.380	731.157	72.790
1988	986.418	188.532	713.776	84.110
1989	1.042.908	188.208	746.450	108.250
1990	1.312.963	225.216	899.607	188.140
1991	1.203.832	167.544	894.608	141.680
1992	1.018.212	121.740	771.152	125.320
1993	1.118.440	189.890	774.880	153.670
1994	965.850	143.910	732.100	89.840
1995	803.720	85.500	614.920	103.300
1996	664.540	121.730	490.330	52.480
1997	644.570	80.350	505.550	58.670
1998	503.820	59.770	395.550	48.500
1999	533.230	50.160	436.310	46.760

Source: Homicide figures are from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's annual publication "Summary of Vital Statistics," which has homicide data compiled by the New York City Medical Examiner (López 2003). All other figures are directly from or derived from an unpublished Census Bureau tabulation of data on NCVS interviews with New York City residents (Watt 2003). Derived figures pertain to adjusted NCVS estimates (see note below)

(a) To make pre-1993 NCVS counts (not rates) compable to later-year counts, unadjusted pre-1993 counts were multiplied by an adjustment ratio. The crimes that were adjusted and the ratios are: rape (2.63), aggravated assault (1.24), household burglary (1.2), and household theft (1.27). Adjustment for 1992 counts was necessary because 90% of New York City interviews used a version of the NCVS questionnaire that became obsolete in 1993, when the questionnaire was redesigned.

(b) Rape, aggravated assault, and personal theft were person weighted; burglary, household theft, and vehicle theft, incident weighted for comparabaility with police data. 3) In this table, "larceny-theft" includes personal and household weighted; robbery was household theft for comparability with police data.

(c) Total violent offenses include rape (not shown separately). For 1993-1999, rape includes sexual assault. For all years, rape includes male and female victims.

Appendix table 7.6 **Data from 1980-1999 for figures 7.12 through 7.18 New York City crime rates based on victimisation surveys** *(per 1,000 population age 12 or older)* **and the NYPD** *(per 1,000 population all ages)*

YEARS	Violent offense					
	Figure 12 Robbery		Figure 13 Aggravated assault		Figure 14 Total violent	
	Victim-survey	NYPD	Victim-survey	NYPD	Victim-survey (a)	NYPD
1980	19,05	14,29	9,14	6,18	29,81	21,26
1981	27,49	15,20	14,24	6,19	43,53	22,20
1982	30,94	13,52	10,22	6,03	43,55	20,28
1983	22,60	11,84	7,63	6,10	31,86	18,68
1984	17,52	11,10	7,87	6,62	25,66	18,46
1985	12,88	11,07	4,54	7,01	19,63	18,81
1986	11,23	11,26	2,45	7,98	14,94	19,95
1987	16,07	10,83	13,86	8,82	31,04	20,36
1988	15,72	11,79	6,07	9,67	23,87	22,18
1989	17,07	12,67	6,81	9,63	25,12	23,00
1990	25,44	13,69	6,50	9,41	32,86	23,84
1991	15,66	13,40	7,12	9,09	24,66	23,18
1992	16,90	12,37	9,68	8,61	29,48	21,64
1993	18,62	11,71	9,08	8,54	28,58	20,90
1994	17,16	9,89	10,60	8,15	29,07	18,61
1995	13,69	8,10	6,50	7,15	22,05	15,73
1996	10,17	6,77	7,39	6,22	18,25	13,44
1997	7,97	6,11	7,32	6,18	16,30	12,69
1998	8,00	5,35	5,70	5,96	14,23	11,67
1999	6,22	4,86	5,07	5,46	13,38	10,64

Appendix table 7.6 continued **Data from 1980-1999 for figures 7.12 through 7.18 New York City crime rates based on victimisation surveys** *(per 1,000 population age 12 or older)* **and the NYPD** *(per 1,000 population all ages)*

	Property offense							
	Figure 15		Figure 16		Figure 17		Figure 18	
YEARS	Burglary		Larceny-theft		Motor vehicle theft		Total property	
	Victim-survey	NYPD	Victim-survey	NYPD	Victim-survey	NYPD	Victim-survey	NYPD
1980	53,69	29,95	115,79	35,45	14,47	14,28	183,95	79,68
1981	53,12	29,11	136,84	36,54	13,78	14,81	203,74	80,46
1982	47,46	24,35	147,52	37,26	23,14	15,14	218,12	76,74
1983	41,97	20,24	126,29	35,75	15,24	13,06	183,50	69,05
1984	32,93	17,96	106,05	34,99	12,41	12,34	151,39	65,29
1985	31,20	17,38	98,55	36,48	9,55	11,06	139,30	64,91
1986	25,33	17,32	84,58	39,24	10,57	11,96	120,49	68,52
1987	31,29	16,94	120,17	39,69	11,96	13,13	163,42	69,77
1988	30,65	17,31	116,05	41,99	13,67	16,33	160,38	75,62
1989	30,52	16,46	121,03	39,05	17,55	18,16	169,10	73,67
1990	34,78	16,38	138,94	36,68	29,06	20,09	202,78	73,15
1991	25,81	15,24	137,82	34,89	21,83	19,04	185,45	69,18
1992	19,45	14,03	123,19	32,02	20,02	17,21	162,65	63,27
1993	30,36	13,50	123,89	32,00	24,57	15,31	178,81	60,81
1994	23,61	12,05	120,10	28,60	14,74	13,01	158,45	53,65
1995	14,07	10,09	101,20	25,01	17,00	9,93	132,27	45,03
1996	19,90	8,35	80,14	22,11	8,58	8,23	108,61	38,68
1997	13,23	7,39	83,22	21,45	9,66	7,09	106,10	35,93
1998	9,70	6,28	64,19	19,98	7,87	5,99	81,76	32,25
1999	8,11	5,45	70,53	18,90	7,56	5,34	86,19	29,69

Source: Rates shown were calculated from data in appendix tables 7.1 and 7.5
(a) Includes homicides recorded by medical examiners and victim-survey rape.

Appendix table 7.7 **Crimes reported to the police as a percentage of criminal victimisations and incidents in New York City - 1980-1999**

YEARS	Non-commercial robbery	Aggravated assault	Residential burglary	Non-commercial larceny	Non-commercial vehicle theft
1980	48	58	54	25	79
1981	44	51	62	25	68
1982	48	47	51	24	66
1983	48	51	47	24	58
1984	56	58	50	22	80
1985	42	34	48	24	61
1986	51	76	66	31	66
1987	47	25	48	24	75
1988	61	56	56	26	59
1989	48	50	47	21	75
1990	34	41	39	23	64
1991	47	52	50	21	61
1992	37	70	48	20	75
1993	59	63	61	21	73
1994	40	35	56	22	78
1995	62	37	63	22	68
1996	41	47	46	21	66
1997	24	50	73	26	78
1998	95	61	63	19	84
1999	44	58	66	18	72
Average	49	51	55	23	70
Consecutive years of decline 1990-99	1990-99	1988-99	1988-99	1988-99	1990-99
Correlations between reporting percentage and year (a) (b)	0,30	0,04	0.65*	-0,37	0,53

Source: Percentages are based on an unpublished Census Bureau tabulation of data on NCVS interviews with New York City residents (Watt 2003)
(a) Correlations are between reporting percentage and consecutive years of falling crime rates.
(b) Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix table 7.8 NYPD-recorded crimes as a percentage of crimes reported to police - 1980 - 1999

YEARS	Non-commercial robbery	Aggravated assault	Residential burglary	Non-commercial larceny	Non-commercial vehicle theft
1980	155	132	89	105	122
1981	124	96	75	91	154
1982	91	140	83	90	97
1983	111	174	84	100	144
1984	116	163	88	127	121
1985	210	505	92	129	184
1986	204	477	82	123	168
1987	152	294	91	119	146
1988	129	324	78	121	201
1989	161	322	86	135	137
1990	153	378	89	92	101
1991	174	263	90	98	134
1992	194	143	122	109	112
1993	104	167	61	102	83
1994	146	250	79	85	112
1995	96	342	98	89	86
1996	162	204	78	104	145
1997	326	192	67	74	95
1998	70	195	91	117	89
1999	180	213	94	107	98
Average	152	248	85	105	126

Source: "Crimes reported to police" are from an unpublished Census Bureau tabulation of data on NCVS interviews with New York City residents (Watt 2003).+ "NYPD-recorded crimes" are from the annual publication "Crime in the United States" (FBI) .NYPD crime totals were reduced as explained in the note below

(a) NYPD crime totals were reduced to be comparable to victim-survey crimes reported to police.

b) Commercial robberies (from banks, gas stations, convenience stores, and commercial houses) were subtracted from NYPD-recorded robberies. NYPD-recorded robbery was further reduced by 2%, the estimated percentage of robbery victims under age 12."

(c) Commercial larcenies (shoplifting and theft from buildings or coin-operated machines) were excluded from NYPD-recorded larcenies.

(d) Commercial burglaries were subtracted from NYPD-recorded burglary totals.

(e) The New York State Division of Criminal Justice.

(f) NYPD-recorded Services provided the proportion of robberies, larcenies, and burglaries against businesses for New York City.vehicle theft was reduced by 17% to eliminate vehicle thefts involving businesses.

(g) NYPD-recorded aggravated assault was reduced by 5% to eliminate assault victims under age 12.

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EIGHT

SITUATION AND TENDENCY OF CRIME IN RUSSIAN METROPOLIS - MOSCOW AND ST. PETERSBURG

The criminological analysis of crime in region is an important theoretical and practical task. It is especially important for crime prognosis, crime prevention and arrangement of police force.We have the long-time experience of criminological analysis in Leningrad - St. Petersburg and some Russian regions (Avrutin, Gilinskiy, 1991; Gilinskiy, 2000; Gilinskiy et al, 2001; etc.).

There are some main questions of criminological regional analysis:

- What is the criminal situation in region (trend of crime)? Sources of information: criminal statistic data (police records), victimological survey, and expert's interrogation.
- Who are the criminals (gender, age, social and economic status, ethnic, etc.)? Sources: criminal statistic, forms of primary registration, interview.
- Territorial spreading (geography) of crimes. Sources: forms of primary registration, victimological survey.
- Time of crime. Sources: forms of primary registration, victimological survey.
- Which factors influence on crime, criminal situation? Sources: special criminological survey (economic, sociological, financial, and others).

But it is necessary in analyzing of the criminal statistical information to take as a starting point the high latency for crime not reflected in statistics for various reasons: natural, if the victims of crimes often refuse to report crimes to the police, for various reasons, including "ineffectiveness" (the

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police will not hunt for the criminals) and artificial - as a result of the mass concealment of crimes from the records.[1]

Among other things, the results of our surveys give evidence that there is high natural latency: thus in St. Petersburg in 1998 70.3 per cent of the victims of crime did not report the incidents to the police; the figure in 1999 - 69.2 per cent, in 2000 - 73.7 per cent, in 2001 - 73.5 per cent. The results of the survey of Muscovites in the mid-1990s gave evidence that suggests that this is not a unique situation (Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation) - more than 60 per cent of the victims of serious crimes did not turn to the law-enforcement bodies.

The high artificial latency, which continues to rise, seems to be reflected especially by the constantly growing total level of detection: in St. Petersburg from 44.4 per cent in 1993 to 75.7 per cent in 2001, and in Russia from 46.9 per cent in 1992 to 75.6 per cent in 2000 (61 in 2002). The latest figures are absolutely unreal (incidentally, as the case for all "detection" after 1993-1994): no police force in the world is able to achieve such "brilliant" figures other than by registering only the so called "obvious" crimes and concealing from the records a mass of the "not so obvious" (Gavrilov, 2001; Gilinskiy, 2000-a: 46-49; Luneyev, 1997: 127-133). Secondly, our victimology surveys show that quality of victims is not reduced (Gilinskiy et al., 2001: 49-51).

The level and structure of all types of crimes, so-called "deviance" (drug and alcohol addiction, prostitution, suicide, etc.) is wholly depend on the social, economic, political, cultural and demographic processes taking place in society.

It is clear that the communist regime was absolutely terrible. Gorbachev's "Perestroika" was a necessary attempt to save the power structures by way of reform. A similar attempt was by Khrushchev (the "Thaw"). However, every attempt finished with the political death of its propagators and was followed by "Stagnation" or "Reaction"

Gorbachev's reforms did not bring to the end. May be it was not guilt but it was a misfortune of Gorbachev. The disintegration of production and economy continuing; power was still returned to the ruling nomenclature (may be with new "oligarchs" and criminals); corruption, usual

[1] The natural latency reflects crimes that are not registered, since the agencies that register crimes did not know about them; the artificial latency is crime that have become known to these agencies but were not recorded by them.

to Russia, has taken on a monumental, total scale in all organs of power, establishment and law-enforcement bodies; crisis of the health, education, transport and other social services, crises of spirituality and morality continuing; the militarization of economics and politics continues. We show now the growth of the role (importance) of the so-called “power structures”: FSB (former KGB), MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and other. The criminal war in Chechnya is a terrifying evidence of the neo-totalitarianism. The country permits also human rights abuses on a massive scale. Particularly in the army and those penal institutions, where tyranny and torture dominate. Nationalist, anti-Semitic and neo-fascist groups have activity and meet no resistance. Attacks against Mass Media in opposition began since 1999-2000 and intensified in 2001-2003. The ever-growing economic polarization of the population - visible in the stark contrast between the poverty majority and the nouveau rich minority (the “New Russian”) - is a guaranteed source of continuing social conflict. Technological backwardness and the non-competition of the domestic production and service sectors have manifested themselves in the course of the reforms. A consequence of this is the inferiority complex of employees, their de-qualification, marginalization and lumpenization. The lots of exclusive are social basis for differently deviance including crime.

Moscow and St. Petersburg are two the most large cities in Russia. The population is more than 10.3 million citizens in Moscow and more than 4.6 million citizens in St. Petersburg in 2002. Both cities are political, industrial, cultural and tourist Russian centres.

The comparative analyses of the trends of registered crime in Russia, Moscow and St. Petersburg from 1985 up to 2001 (tables 8.1-8.5, figures 8.1-8.9) shows:

- The rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of crime in St. Petersburg is some higher than average in Russia; the rate of crime in Moscow is considerable lower than average in Russia and in St. Petersburg. But we must know for really picture following: the really number and rate of crime is much higher than the official statistical data (in all countries);
- Rate of the homicide and grievous bodily harm in Moscow and St. Petersburg is lower than in Russia. But this rate is very high in Russia. The official rate of the homicide increased from 6.6 in 1987 up to 23.2

in 2001. It is the third rank in the world after Columbia and South Africa. For example, the rate of homicide (average per 1999-2001 years) is 1.6 in England & Wales, 1.7 in France, 1.1 in Germany, 1.5 in Italy, 0.9 in Norway, 1.1 in Sweden, 1.1 in Switzerland, 55.9 in South Africa, 5.6 in USA (Barclay, Tavares, et al. 2003: 10).

- Rate of the robbery ("grabesh") and the robbery with violence ("razboi") in St. Petersburg is considerable higher than in Moscow and average in Russia. Street crime including "grabesh" and "razboi" is "horror" of St. Petersburg. Moreover the latency of street crime is very high.
- Rate of drug related crimes is high in St. Petersburg too.
- Low rate of taking of bribes in Russia (2.2 in 1988, 6.8 in 2001) and particular in Moscow (1.4 - 9.8) and St. Petersburg (2.6 - 4.7) is result of mass criminal cover-up crimes from registration.

The causes of real situation and tendency of crime in Russian metropolises are double: on the one hand, Moscow and St. Petersburg concentrate to finances, national riches, tourist objects, rich shops and other "temptations" for criminals; moreover there is "anonymous mode of life" in the large city with poor social control. On the other hand, there is powerful police force, different means of defence, including metallic doors, electronic control, bodyguards, etc.

Why criminal situation in St. Petersburg is worse that in Moscow? There are many causes. Moscow is richer than St. Petersburg and Moscow's infrastructure (transport, lighting, guard, and so on) is better than St. Petersburg's, and Muscovites have possibility to pay for expensive means of security (safe-signalization, video-observation, concierge, and so on). Moreover Moscow's police force is more and richer than St. Petersburg's and has better transport, techniques, etc.

There are some changes of demographical structure of criminals: the share of women increased (from 11 per cent in 1987 to 18 per cent in 2002 in Russia, from 14 per cent in 1994 to 23 per cent in 2002 in St. Petersburg); the share of persons without permanent incomes increased (from 12 per cent in 1987 to 52 per cent in 2002 in Russia, from 11 per cent in 1987 to 56 per cent in 2000 in St. Petersburg); the share of teens (14-17 years) decreased (from 17.7 per cent in 1989 to 9.1 per cent in 2002 in Russia, from 12.8 per cent in 1994 to 6.4 per cent in 2002 in St. Petersburg).

Table 8.1 **Dynamic of the rates of general crime in Russia, St. Petersburg and Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*

YEARS	Russia	St. Petersburg	Moscow
1985	989,8	981,9	
1986	929,2	975,1	
1987	816,9	880,5	418,0
1988	833,9	894,8	438,9
1989	1098,5	1080,3	607,5
1990	1242,5	1144,1	668,9
1991	1463,2	1376,8	716,7
1992	1856,5	2112,4	882,8
1993	1887,8	2542,5	939,2
1994	1778,9	2219,4	999,2
1995	1862,7	2110,2	1074,4
1996	1778,4	1763,5	1016,8
1997	1629,3	1657,8	825,3
1998	1759,5	1907,4	815,1
1999	2051,4	2188,1	909,8
2000	2028,3	2096,3	1282,7
2001	2039,2	1952,2	1475,3

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Moscow, Annual (from 1991)

Prognosis is pessimistic. There are criminalized state and society as a result of very long terrible Russian history, very long terrible authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. There is a wide social basis for crime and organized crime, because, firstly, many idle hands are available among the youth, and, secondly, a legal business activity in contemporary Russia is impossible due to corruption, high taxes, criminal mentality and social anomy (E. Durkheim). Corruption is a main “evil” in Russia, because it is not the single of social problems could be solved, if everything is sale and buying.

Figure 8.1 **Dynamic of the rates of general crime in Russia, St. Petersburg and Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Figure 8.2 **Rate of homicide (including attempted homicide) Russia, St. Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Table 8,2 **Rate of serious violent crimes in Russia, St. Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*

YEARS	Homicide (including attempted homicide)		
	Russia	St. Petersburg	Moscow
1985	8,5	5,1	
1986	6,6	3,9	
1987	6,3	3,4	2,3
1988	7,2	4,9	2,7
1989	9,2	4,9	4,7
1990	10,5	5,8	4,9
1991	10,9	7,7	5,6
1992	15,5	11,2	10,3
1993	19,6	17,7	15,9
1994	21,8	20,4	20,9
1995	21,4	19,5	19,7
1996	19,9	17,5	18,0
1997	19,9	16,2	17,3
1998	20,1	19,3	13,8
1999	21,3	19,2	14,1
2000	21,9	18,5	13,2
2001	23,2	20,7	14,8

YEARS	Grievous bodily harm (up to 1998), premeditated causing of serious bodily injury		
	Russia	St. Petersburg	Moscow
1985	19,9	12,4	
1986	14,7	10,4	
1987	13,9	8,2	3,9
1988	18,2	12,6	6,0
1989	25,0	16,7	10,5
1990	27,7	17,7	11,0
1991	27,8	20,2	11,0
1992	36,2	34,4	16,1
1993	45,1	43,5	22,0
1994	45,7	40,8	22,7
1995	41,7	36,0	19,3
1996	36,2	26,4	15,7
1997	31,4	24,0	12,0
1998	30,8	23,3	12,4
1999	32,6	22,5	12,2
2000	34,2	21,4	15,0
2001	38,5	21,2	19,6

Figure 8.3 **Rate grievous bodily harm premeditated causing of serious bodily injury - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Table 8,3 **Rate of crimes against property in Russia, St. Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*

YEARS	Russia	St. Petersburg	Moscow
	THEFT		
1985	324,7		
1986	264,4		
1987	251,1	285,9	146,6
1988	327,2	310,9	183,2
1989	512,1	413,2	286,3
1990	616,8	575,5	321,1
1991	837,3	801,3	379,1
1992	1110,2	1227,7	465,9
1993	1065,2	1037,1	467,1
1994	888,4	771,8	404,6
1995	924,6	727,5	393,5
1996	818,0	540,8	308,8
1997	716,3	574	222,4
1998	779,2	743,7	216,4
1999	961,8	795,5	259,8
2000	896,7	714,4	384,2
2001	879,2	590,3	527,4
	ROBBERY		
1985	29,9	34,9	
1986	21,8	29,2	
1987	21,0	26,1	12,2
1988	29,9	34,4	16,7
1989	51,0	61,1	32,6
1990	56,3	65,6	30,4
1991	68,8	87,5	33,2
1992	110,9	213,6	50,9
1993	124,3	285,3	63,6
1994	100,4	243,1	54,2
1995	95,0	219,8	49,4
1996	82,2	137,6	40,4
1997	76,2	160,5	33,9
1998	83,4	165,8	34,2
1999	95,0	155,5	37,1
2000	91,0	134,3	57,0
2001	102,8	128,5	93,8
	ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE		
1985	5,8	11,0	
1986	4,2	8,3	
1987	3,9	6,4	3,5
1988	5,5	9,6	6,1
1989	9,9	15,3	12,8
1990	11,2	19,0	12,0
1991	12,4	22,0	13,4
1992	20,4	47,3	25,5
1993	27,0	64,5	37,2
1994	25,6	53,8	35,0
1995	25,5	53,4	33,3
1996	24,3	38,7	25,2
1997	23,3	49,1	19,4
1998	26,2	57,0	18,3
1999	28,1	52,8	18,7
2000	27,1	43,2	23,4
2001	30,9	47,2	30,3

Figure 8.4 **Rate of theft in Russia, Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Table 8,4 **Rate of drug-related crimes in Russia, St. Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*

YEARS	Russia	St. Petersburg	Moscow
1990	10,9	15,4	7,6
1991	13,0	17,5	10,0
1992	20,0	23,9	16,9
1993	35,8	30,3	24,8
1994	50,5	47,6	27,7
1995	54,0	62,4	34,8
1996	65,5	118,6	54,0
1997	126,3	257,6	102,0
1998	129,6	233,2	114,1
1999	147,9	312,9	149,1
2000	167,3	301,4	171,3
2001	166,0	288,7	153,8

Figure 8.5 **Rate of robbery in Russia, Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Table 8,5 **Rate of taking of bribes in Russia, St. Petersburg and Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants from 16 years)*

YEARS	Russia	St.Petersburg	Moscow
1988	2,2	2,6	1,4
1989	2,0	2,8	1,6
1990	2,4	2,8	3,0
1991	2,3	2,0	3,1
1992	2,9	2,2	3,8
1993	3,9	2,6	4,4
1994	4,3	2,5	5,3
1995	4,3	3,1	4,8
1996	4,8	3,2	5,6
1997	4,9	3,2	4,6
1998	5,0	3,1	6,2
1999	5,9	4,1	7,0
2000	6,0	3,4	10,2
2001	6,8	4,7	9,8

Figure 8.6 **Rate of robbery with violence in Russia, Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Figure 8.7 **Rate of drug-related crimes in Russia, Petersburg, Moscow - 1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Figure 8.8 **Rate of taking of bribes in Russia, St.Petersburg and Moscow -1985 - 2001** *(per 100,000 inhabitants from 16 years)*



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NINE

CRIME IN PARIS. AN OVERALL TENDENCY TOWARDS AN INCREASE SINCE 1998

Firstly, just to put you in the picture, the city of Paris, the capital of France, has a population of 2 million inhabitants, not counting its suburbs.

9.1 General presentation of delinquency within the central area of Paris (France)

The only figures available in France that are of sufficient and regular quality to enable a longitudinal analysis of crime in Paris are those kept by the police who record the number of offences and of suspected criminals. These figures therefore depend both on police activity and criminal activity. The interpretation will concern essentially the variations in these figures in the long term and in comparison with national variations.

Criminal activity is 2.5 times higher in Paris than in the rest of the country. The evolution in the number of offences recorded for 1,000 inhabitants, which is apparently cyclical, is approximately the same in both cases: with an increase from 1988 to 1992, then a stabilisation of the situation, followed by a decline from 1994 to 1997, and a new increase since that time. However, a disruption in the similarity in 2002 is to be noted: the number of offences recorded for 1,000 inhabitants in Paris declined. This decline seems to have continued into 2003. The simplest and probably the best case is that of the real decline in crime in Paris. But three other hypotheses may be put forward to explain this decline: new

Lorraine Tournyol du Clos, Ined, France.

Figure 9.1 **Comparative trends of recorded delinquency offences - Paris and France - 1988 - 2002** *(per 1,000 inhabitants)*



Source: French Ministry of the Interior (number of criminal offences recorded by the Police) and Population Censuses of 1982, 1990 and 1999

organization of police activity (for example, increased investigation work to the detriment of the work of surveillance and recording of offences), a decline only in repeated criminality (for the same number of criminals)[1] or lastly, the development of criminality in networks, which is more discreet and better organised.

9.1.1 Trends of recorded crime by population: male, female, juvenile and foreign criminality

A case concerning an offence is considered as solved by the police when they have succeeded in identifying the supposed culprit(s) (not yet judged). The latter are referred to, at that moment of the police procedure, people "placed under suspicion". It is at this stage of police procedure

[1] To facilitate the understanding of this paper, we often use the term " criminal " instead of "suspected criminal ". In this paper, however, this term refers exclusively to persons "placed under suspicion" by the Police. The status of criminal is in principle conferred on an individual by the courts.

Figure 9.2 **Trends of recorded delinquency by population. Proportion of people placed under suspicion by the police - 1985 - 2002** *(for 1,000 persons)*



Source: French Ministry of the Interior (number of criminal offences recorded by the Police) and Population Censuses of 1982, 1990 and 1999

that information such as age, sex, and nationality of the persons placed under suspicion are published alongside the recorded offences.

From 1985 to 2002, the mean proportion of persons placed under suspicion in Paris shifted slightly between 20 and 34 for 1,000 inhabitants, declining from 1985 to 1998, but this figure has increased since then.

However, a detailed study of these figures by population type (men, women, minors and foreigners) reveals a certain number of disparities. Although the proportions of male and foreign suspects have a similar profile, the proportion of female suspects is, on the contrary much lower, and remains relatively constant; moreover the proportion of underage suspects increased much more than average (more than +200 per cent from 1993 to 2002), in spite of a slight decline during the last two years.

The proportion of suspects among foreigners is 2.5 times higher than the Parisian average and until 1997 it represented the highest proportion of suspects. The rate of male suspects has followed the same trend as that of foreign suspects. Crime in Paris, seen from the perspective of the number of persons placed under suspicion, is therefore almost exclusively male, and is characterised by intense activity on the part of foreigners and minors since at least 1998.

The recent combined increase in the number of suspects and the general decline in the number of recorded offences further contributes to the assumption that the police have invested more in investigating and solving recorded offences. In such a context, the remarkable decline in the number of suspected minors may be due to a real decline in juvenile criminality in Paris and explain the reason for the new decline in the number of recorded offences. In fact, according to French self-reported surveys conducted by S. Rochè, juvenile criminality is essentially caused by repeat offenders. These repeat offenders are more active and their offences are more often recorded by the police.

9.1.2 Structure of criminal population

Male participation in crime is massive and has increased almost constantly since 1985: men represented approximately 80 per cent of suspects in 1985, and almost 90 per cent in 2002.

In addition the participation of foreigners in crime in Paris has remained almost constant since 1985, at around 40 per cent, apart from an increase in 1990 and 1991, which was resorbed in 1996. The proportion of offences committed by foreigners is 4 times higher than French citizens and this proportion is the same in the country as a whole.

Lastly, compared with the high increase in the number of suspected minors their proportion among the total number of suspects remains rather small, and after an almost constant increase between 1985 and 2000 it started to decline. In 2002 it reached 14 per cent of the overall number of suspects, which is significantly less than in the rest of the country (23 per cent).

Figure 9.3 **Percentage of participation in the total recorded delinquency by population type - 1985 - 2002** *(per cent)*



Source: French Ministry of the Interior (number of people placed under suspicion by the Police) and Population Censuses of 1982, 1990 and 1999

9.2 Male criminality is more often violent and drug related

The proportion of males placed under suspicion declined relatively regularly from 1985 to 1998, in spite of a slight increase from 1993 to 1995 (from 42 to 15 per 1,000 men); but since 1998, this proportion has constantly progressed, reaching 51 for 1,000 in 2002 (+34 per cent in 4 years). Moreover, the nature of the criminality has also changed. Between 1993 (the end of the period of decline in the proportion of male suspects) and 1998 (beginning of the period of increase), male criminality has become substantially less acquisitive (-43 per cent), more destructive (+66 per cent) and violent (crime against the person, robbery and assault mainly, +22 per cent). This new distribution was confirmed in 2002; with in addition a renewed increase in drug related criminality which had declined between 1993 and 1998.

Figure 9.4a **Distribution of males placed under suspicion by the police - 1993**



Figure 9.4b **Distribution of males placed under suspicion by the police - 1998**



Figure 9.4c **Distribution of males placed under suspicion by the police -2002**



9.3 Violent crimes : few homicides, mostly assaults and robbery

In France, violent crimes are in fact primarily composed of robbery and assaults. The rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants reaches the value of 2.2 in 2002, which is relatively high in comparison with its European neighbours, however, 3.4 less than in the USA. Concerning Paris, the

Figure 9.5 **Comparative trends of recorded homicides and attempted of homicides - 1990 - 2002** *(per 100,000 inhabitants)*



homicide rate (including homicide attempts) is about 4.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002, that is not that high, for example, if we compare this figure with that of NY city (6.6 not counting homicide attempts).

9.4 Thefts committed by juvenile criminals (aged 13-17) become more violent and increasingly drug related

The number of juvenile criminals placed under suspicion in France by the police has experienced unprecedented growth since 1993, which has also affected the capital: the proportion of underage criminals increased by 3 in 7 years (from 1993 to 2000). A record number of 85 suspects for 1,000 teenagers was reached in 2000, but since then the city of Paris seems to have benefited from a decline in juvenile criminality. From 1993 to 2002, juvenile criminality remained appreciably of the same type: more than half juvenile criminals committed thefts without violence (shoplifting, burglary, car thefts…); and more than one third committed violent offences or damage to property. The only notable changes were: a substantial increase in drug related criminality (+100 per cent), and a small decline in non-violent crimes to the benefit of violent crimes.

Figure 9.6a **Distribution of teenagers *(aged 13-17)* placed under suspicion by the police - 1993**



Figure 9.6b **Distribution of teenagers** *(aged 13-17)* **placed under suspicion by the police - 2002**



9.5 Foreigners and acquisitive criminality

The overall proportion of foreigners placed under suspicion by the police declined substantially from 1995 to 1998. Since then, it has increased as much and has once again reached its peak of 1987 (81 for 1,000 foreigners).

Thefts without violence clearly constitute the majority of criminal offences committed by foreigners in 1995 (35 per cent) and the smallest proportion of destructive criminality (6 per cent). These proportions were also measured for 1998 and 2002. Criminal acts committed by foreigners is also, in approximately 50 per cent of cases, acquisitive and non-violent.

From 1995 to 1998, a period of sharp decline in criminality by foreigners (-25 per cent), there was a decline in drug related criminality (-30 per cent) and a slight increase in violent crimes and non-violent thefts (+1 per cent in both cases). From 1998 to 2002, a period of sharp increase (+55 per cent), the composition of foreign criminality remained the same.

Figure 9.7a **Distribution of foreigners placed under suspicion - 1995**



Figure 9.7b **Distribution of foreigners placed under suspicion - 1998**



Figure 9.7c **Distribution of foreigners placed under suspicion - 2002**



9.6 Drugs and violence

The curves for the number of violent offences and drug related offences are extremely similar for both juvenile criminals and male criminals respectively. It is possible to interpret this as establishing a real link between violent crimes and drug related criminality; a link proved in the case of New York by B.D. Johnson et al [2000].

However, for 2001, there is a complete divergence between these curves in the case of underage criminals. Whereas crimes declines substantially following juvenile criminality as a whole, drug related crimes continue to grow although it is not accelerating. This divergence may also be found but to a much lesser degree in the curves for male criminality.

This observation has also been made in the case of New York when cannabis gradually replaced crack (from 1990). In France the consumption of crack or cocaine is marginal and has even declined since 2000. However, cannabis, often associated with a non-violent subculture, has become extremely widespread among young people in recent years.

Figure 9.8 **Comparative trends of violent and drug related delinquency for teenagers and males - 1993 - 2002** *(base 100)*



Source: French Ministry of the Interior (number of people placed under suspicion by the Police) and Population Censuses of 1982, 1990 and 1999

9.7 Conclusion

Criminality recorded in Paris is much higher than the French average, as in most of the large cities in the world; offences are mainly committed by males, and is characterises by intense activity of foreigners and teenagers. It has increased generally and constantly since 1998, except for the last year (2002) which may mark the beginning of a longer decline.

This general increase in criminality is composed of:

- a real increase in juvenile criminality (both in terms of the proportion of criminals among minors and of minors among the total criminal population);
- a change in the nature of criminality, increasingly drug related, increasingly violent, and less and less acquisitive (except among foreigners).

What could be the explanatory factors responsible for this increase, also observed in the whole France? Unfortunately, only recently a new wave of researchers in France, to which I belong, has tried quantitative experi-

ments on criminality. An empirical and economic analysis focused exclusively on juvenile criminality in France, which I have just made based on panel data from 242 cities observed from 1995 to 1999, shows that police presence on the streets, the size of the family, and the context of surrounding criminality are the most important factors. Other predictors such as single-parent families, foreign parents, unemployed parents, average income of the families, the impact of moral values resulting from Police efficiency, and the practice of sports in sports clubs also intervene but their impact is weaker or more focused on a specific form of criminality.

CITIZENS AND FEAR OF CRIME

TEN

FEAR OF CRIME IN ITALY

10.1 The subjective dimension of safety

The perception of safety is a particularly interesting subject due to its different implications and different aspects it encloses.

It is interesting to study it for many reasons. It allows reflecting on its causes, and on its manifestations. In this work, we will attempt, on the one hand, to illustrate the situation regarding the fear of crime in Italy, its level, the different aspects it involves, the anxiety for crimes, its impact in everyday life, in terms of reactions and precautions citizens take in relation to its manifestation. On the other hand, we will try to highlight the causes behind the fear of crime, the aspects linked to it in terms of causes, that is, the role a victimisation experience has on fear, the social and environmental decay of the area in which one lives or the relation with the police.

Fear of crime is a theme much debated over, from the media to the politics, but it is also often much exploited. While some appropriate it in electoral programmes, others demonise it as inexistent or irrational. Not everybody recognizes the legitimacy of such theme, fear and worry and, for a long time, this phenomenon was not taken into account in Italy.

To speak about perception of safety is not easy. It cannot be traced back only to the real criminality, but rather, it is determined by many causes. Thus, it is not easy to analyse its meaning nor should it be taken for granted.

Some researchers have underlined the psychological dimension

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Maria Giuseppina Muratore, Istat, Italy

(Gabriel and Greve, 2003) of the safety perception category, even giving an essential role to the predisposition of fear among the many components that contribute in constructing it. According to some authors, the predisposition to fear is the result of a long-term process developed on the influence of personal conditions and traits, such as shyness or courage, and other individual experiences due to having lived serious fear situations. The personal resources include also health and local support, together with previous victimisation experiences and the worry of becoming victim of a crime (cognitive perception of the crime). Predisposition to fear results indeed from the combination of emotional (being afraid of), cognitive (worrying of), and behavioural aspect (avoiding to).

The psychological component and the importance given to personal characteristics can also be found in the socio-psychological model of fear explanation of Van der Wurff (1989), who defines fear as being linked to four components: attractivity of the victim, that is, the victim looks as an interesting object to the perpetrator of crimes; the evil intent, the power that a victim gives the perpetrator, in terms of criminal intents; power, the power the victim may or may not attribute to oneself in order to deal with potential risk situations and at the same time, the power given to a possible offender; criminalizable space, all space-time elements that favour a criminal deed. Farral (2000) also based his work on such model but gave attention to the importance of other socio-demographic variables, linked to the victimisation experiences and to the social context in which one lives, the neighbourhood relations, health and life style. The proposals added, together with the previous variables, have led to a socio-demographic and socio-psychological model with higher explicative capacities as regards the theme of fear. Moreover, the introduction of the gender viewpoint in the model allows Farral to highlight the specific different aspects that could frighten men and women. As regards men, the most important component of fear would be the evil intent, that is, the attention in reading the behaviours of other (men) in terms of possible criminals. As regards women, the idea of insecurity is more closely linked to the insecurity some places cause, the perception of oneself as possible victim and the poor capacity of reacting or, vice versa, the power of the potential aggressor.

Though Farral gives a certain importance to the social context in which

one lives, this aspect is even more developed in the literature of Taylor (1987), Skogan (1990) and Roché (1998, 2002, 2003). In addition to the vulnerability of the victim and his or her exposition to risk, these authors also interestingly introduce the aspect relative to the place in which one lives. The place, its external aspect, its care are all aspects closely linked to the perception of safety and life quality of the citizens. In particular, much attention is given to the impact that the break-up of the social order has on its citizens, including, though, in the reflection, also the idea of the different acceptability of breaking the laws in relation to the historical context culturally and politically determined.

Fear of crime is higher when threat of criminality is higher and when the capacity of dealing with it or of controlling the situation is lower. Thus, there are two main factors: exposition and vulnerability. The first aspect, attraction of the victim, of the place and of the occasion, recalls the concepts of direct and indirect victimisation. The other aspect, vulnerability, pays attention not only to the personal characteristics but also to the resources, the capacity of reacting before a probable damage. Exposition depends partly on the individual risk evaluation by the potential victim. One can live in a risk environment and yet, protect oneself very well or not go out too much or, if possible, change neighbourhood. Often, the person who remains, despite condemning the criminal acts, is discouraged with the institutions to the point of not succeeding even to report such acts, perceived as something unavoidable that must be put up with. This leads to feelings of loss, defeat and social alienation. This has an impact on both social worry and fear, with consequences stronger and stronger on social alienation and segregation of some neighbourhoods.

10.2 Fear of crime

Fear of crime is a feeling of distress and anxiety one feels when being afraid of being the victim of a crime, of a robbery or of an assault (Barbagli, 1998).

Nevertheless, it is fundamental to ask oneself whether this is irrational or whether it is linked to victimisation experiences and social decay of the area, in which one lives.

Fear in Italy is an important phenomenon: 27.6 per cent do not feel safe when walking alone in the dark (more than one fourth of the population), 12.2 per cent when being home alone, 25.5 per cent decide not to go out alone because of fear and 46.3 per cent feel somehow influenced by crime in their habits.

10.2.1 Perception of safety and differences of gender, age and social status

There are some important differences of gender in personal fears. Twice as many women than men are afraid of going out alone in the evening and six times as many women than men declare they sometimes do not go out in the evening out of fear.

Fear varies with age, though this variable must be analysed separately for men and women since the trends they present are different. In the case of women, fear reaches its peak among young girls before decreasing until 35-40 years of age and growing again until 55-64 years of age. Subsequently, it decreases among the elderly women especially for the modality “I never go out of the house”.

The situation is different for men. The trend substantially increases with the age. Gender difference is higher among young (figure 10.1).

Figure 10.1 **Persons aged 14 and over who do not feel safe or just a little bit when going out alone in the dark, per age classes and gender - 2002** *(per 100 persons)*



If we analyse the fear one feels when being home alone in the evening, we can find some differences of gender. In this case, the distribution structure between males and females is the same, while only the levels change. After the age of fourteen, fear decreases until reaching its minimum among women aged between 35-44 and men aged 25-34 before increasing again until the older ages.

Figure 10.2 **Persons aged 14 and over who do not feel safe or just a little bit when being home alone in the evening, per age classes and gender - 2002** *(per 100 persons)*



Just as in the Anglo-Saxon countries, Italy presents some social differences in personal fear too: the lower social strata fear more compared to the others, even though, as we can see from the analyses conducted on the 1997-98 (Barbagli 1998, Istat, 1999) and 2002 (Istat, 2004) data, the higher social strata suffer more crimes.[1] This relation can also be seen from the results of the applied logistic models where the importance of this variable is clearly outlined: under the same conditions, managers and professional men fear less than workers and unemployed persons. The same can be said for all the indicators considered.

[1] The relation between the social classes and the risk of being object of a crime is not the same in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the United States and in Great Britain the risk is higher for more disadvantaged social classes. Such situation could be explained by the different factors partly related to the endogenous type of crimes. The space limits are stronger, and the segregation of residential neighbourhoods does prevent them exporting criminality, thus making it easier for the crimes to develop in the same social strata in which street criminality originates. In Italy too, besides the more well off classes, households whose head of family house is either unemployed or seeking a job will more likely be the target of house burglaries.

Table 10.1 **Persons aged 14 and over per perception of safety in the evening, in the street or at home, influence of fear of crime, per age classes - 2002** *(per 100 persons)*

	Age class							Total
	14-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75 and over	
PERCEPTION OF SAFETY WHEN WALKING IN THE DARK								
Very safe	21,3	26	23,6	20,9	17,8	14,4	10,2	20,2
Safe enough	49,6	48,1	49,4	47,1	42,1	35,5	28,7	44,4
Not very safe	21,7	17,4	17,6	19,1	21,3	20,8	16,7	19,2
Not at all safe	6,3	6,9	7,1	8,4	10,4	10,9	10,4	8,4
Never goes out alone	0,9	1,2	1,8	3,2	4,8	9,4	15,4	4,3
Never goes out	0,2	0,3	0,6	1,3	3,5	9	18,6	3,5
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
PERCEPTION OF SAFETY WHEN BEING HOME ALONE IN THE EVENING								
Very safe	45,8	46,2	45,7	42,6	41	40,3	37,2	43,3
Safe enough	42,8	43,6	44,4	46	45,2	44	46,1	44,5
Not very safe	9,6	8,6	8,1	9,5	10,9	12,5	13,8	10
Not at all safe	1,8	1,6	1,7	1,9	2,9	3,2	2,9	2,2
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
DOES NOT GO OUT ALONE IN THE EVENING OUT OF FEAR								
No	72,9	80,8	79,5	77,2	72,4	67,5	62,8	74,6
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
INFLUENCE OF CRIME ON THE HABITS								
A lot	10,4	10,5	13,1	15,4	18,1	17,1	14,8	14
Enough	30,4	30,2	32,4	32,3	33,3	35,4	33,6	32,3
Not much	41,7	40,8	38,5	36,2	32,1	29,6	31,2	36,4
Not at all	17,4	18,4	16	16,1	16,5	17,8	20,4	17,3
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Table 10.2 **Persons aged 14 and over per perception of safety in the evening, in the street or at home, influence of fear of crime, per professional condition/position - 2002** *(per 100 persons)*

	Managers, entrepreneurs, professional men	Workers	Seeking a new job	Housewives
Does not feel safe when walking alone in the dark	19,2	23,6	29,1	37,9
Does not feel safe when staying home alone	6,2	10,4	10,9	19,0
Sometimes, does not go out alone in the evening out of fear	7,5	14,6	21,7	46,6
Influenced by the criminality in life habits	33,2	43,8	46	62,6

These data confirm the thesis, which was already strengthened in 1997-98 (Barbagli, 1998), that fear is not “irrational”. It is not a case that women are more afraid than men; it derives from the fact that, unlike men, they risk more of being target of sexual assaults and harassment. It is not a case that the elderly, the women and the disadvantaged social classes are more afraid, since they are more vulnerable both economically (due to the lesser capacity of protecting oneself against crime and to the higher negative consequences), than physically and socially.

10.2.2 Perception of safety and the territorial context

Some territorial differences can be observed as regards fear. The share of persons, who do not feel safe when going out in the evening alone, grows when going from the small municipalities to the large metropolitan areas. On the other hand, fear at home does not change in relation to the dimension and type of municipality.

If we consider the distribution by italan regions, we notice that the southern population feels less safe. However, expecially regarding “going out alone at dark”. Considering that the large municipalities show the same kind of unsafetyness it can be said that fear is linked more to the street predatory crime. There are, though, some strong differences between the regions: Campania, Lazio and Puglia are the regions where fear of going

Table 10.3 **Persons aged 14 and over who do not feel safe at all or not very safe when walking alone in the streets at dark in the area of residence, or when at home alone in the evening, per type of residence municipality - 2002** *(per 100 persons of the same area)*

	Municipality centre of a metropolitan area	Suburbs of a metropolitan area	Up to 2,000 inhabitants	Between 2,001 and 10,000 inhabitants	Between 10,001 and 50,000 inhabitants	50,001 inhabitants and over	Italy
PERCEPTION OF SAFETY WHEN WALKING IN THE DARK							
Very safe	13,2	16,5	31,0	24,9	20,3	18,6	20,2
Safe enough	41,9	43,9	43,9	45,3	45,8	43,8	44,4
Not very safe	24,7	21,9	11,9	15,7	18,8	20,7	19,2
Not at all safe	12,3	10,9	4,8	6,3	7,5	8,6	8,4
Never goes out	4,6	3,9	4,1	4,0	4,3	4,6	4,3
Never goes out	3,3	3,0	4,3	3,8	3,4	3,7	3,5
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
PERCEPTION OF SAFETY WHEN BEING HOME ALONE IN THE EVENING							
Very safe	46,8	41,1	46,3	42,2	41,6	44,6	43,3
Safe enough	43,6	47,1	41,2	43,6	45,3	44,7	44,5
Not very safe	7,6	9,5	10,4	11,8	10,8	8,9	10,0
Not at all safe	2,1	2,3	2,1	2,3	2,3	1,8	2,2
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

out alone is at its highest, followed by Lombardy and Veneto. Such fear, on the other hand, is at its lowest in Val D'Aosta, Trentino, Basilicata, Molise, Friuli.

These differences hide other ones, which recall the different level of predatory crimes in these regions and the type of municipality characterising them. Who has been victim of a theft in the past three years is more afraid of going out alone in the evening; and, who has been victim of a house burglary feels unsafe when at home. Both these crimes are more frequent in the metropolitan areas, and are practically inexistent in the regions that present the lowest levels of feeling unsafe.

Table 10.4 **Persons aged 14 and over per perception of safety in the evening, in the street or at home, influence of fear of crime and region - 2002** *(per 100 persons from the same region)*

REGIONS	Does not feel safe or just a little bit safe when walking alone in the street at dark	Does not feel safe or just a little bit safe when being at home alone in the evening	Does not go out alone out of fear	Criminality influences a lot or enough the life habits
Piedmont	26,2	10,8	23,3	47,0
Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste	12,8	7,5	14,7	33,1
Lombardy	28,7	12,1	26,2	46,3
Trentino - Alto Adige	15,4	7,4	19,0	32,3
Bolzano/Bozen	*14,8*	*6,1*	*18,5*	*28,4*
Trento	*15,9*	*8,4*	*19,4*	*35,5*
Veneto	28,1	15,4	25,2	45,4
Fruli-Venezia Giulia	19,8	10,9	20,7	37,3
Liguria	24,4	9,2	24,4	42,3
Emilia -Romagna	25,6	12,7	22,6	43,2
Tuscany	23,3	11,3	19,7	38,1
Umbria	26,3	14,2	24,4	42,9
Marche	21,1	13,0	20,4	38,7
Lazio	30,8	11,9	25,0	46,1
Abruzzo	24,3	13,2	23,6	45,0
Molise	19,7	11,5	23,9	40,2
Campania	38,9	15,3	34,5	57,6
Puglia	30,1	13,9	29,4	56,0
Basilicata	18,2	11,4	25,3	45,2
Calabria	25,2	11,4	26,1	46,7
Sicily	26,7	9,4	26,9	47,3
Sardinia	20,2	9,6	19,2	39,6
Italy	**27,6**	**12,2**	**25,4**	**46,3**

10.2.3 Perception of safety and the experience of victimisation

Fear may also depend on whether one has personally suffered from victimisation experiences. The analysis on the data has indeed confirmed the effective influence of having been the victim of a crime.

Those who have suffered a victimisation experience feel less safe more often than the others when walking alone in the evening in the neighbourhood. Such feeling is even stronger when the crime one has suffered from is more violent. Over 39.0 per cent of persons who have

suffered at least one crime against the person, 38.4 per cent of those who have suffered a crime against property and 42.4 per cent of those who have suffered a violent crime declare not to feel safe. These differences are rather significant given the average data of those who do not feel safe at all or just a little bit safe, which amount to 27.6 per cent.

Applied logistic models allow us to see how fear depends on the perception people have of a crime's seriousness: the fact of having been the target of a theft in the past three years contributes in being more afraid of going out alone in the evening; the same can be said in the case of burglaries and assaults.[2] The feeling of being afraid when at home is more linked to an experience of house burglary.

Table 10.5 **Persons aged 14 and over, per type of crime against the person suffered in the past twelve moths and perception of safety when going out in the evening - 2002** *(per 100 persons)*

FEELING OF SAFETY	At least one crime against property		At least one violent crime		At least one crime against the person	
	Did not experience it	Experienced it	Did not experience it	Experienced it	Did not experience it	Experienced it
Very safe	20,4	16,4	20,2	20,5	20,4	17,2
Safe enough	44,5	41,4	44,5	34,3	44,6	40,2
Not very safe, not safe	27,1	38,4	27,5	42,4	27,0	39,0
Never goes out	8,0	3,7	7,8	2,8	8,0	3,7
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

10.2.4 Perception of safety and social decay

Finally, there is a strong relation between personal fear and social decay. Fear is stronger when, in the area in which one lives, there is a repetition of events perceived as signs that the moral order of the com-

[2] The influence of bqag-snatching crimes is higher than the other crimes, though robberies and assaults are more serious. This incongruency can partially be explained by the higher diffusion of purse snatching compared to the others, and, since it is more common, it becomes a more probable crime closer to the persons. On the other hand, the nature of this crime is what really frightens people most: it is, indeed, strongly linked to the presence of drug-users on the territory. The analyses conducted in the past show how, by introducing some indicators of disorder in the model, such as “do you see in your neighbourhood people taking drugs and selling drugs” leads to this crime losing some significance.

munity has collapsed. Social and physical decay indeed leads to residents feeling demoralised and impotent.

We have used various indicators that confirm these hypotheses: how frequently do you see, in the area in which you live, drug-users, drug-pushers, prostitutes, vandalism acts, abandoned houses, homeless people.

The data point out to a correlation between social disorder and fear of crime. The results of the logistic model show that, when there are many different types of disorder, more probably the person will feel less safe. Their impact on feeling fear is even stronger than the experience of victimisation itself.

However, disordes levels by the indicators in Italy are not very high and widespread, except for vandalism acts and frequency of vagabonds and homeless people, which have, though, been decreasing in the past years. In particular, the more serious soft-crimes, inherent to drugs and prostitution, are those less noted (table 10.4), together with the decayed areas and the poorly lit streets as only 22-24 per cent of the population aged 13 and over have complained about it. Compared to the previous survey (1997-98), all the main indicators have registered a decrease. Although as regards those inherent to drug trafficking and drug use, it is not possible to define whether such decrease is due to a change in the drug market, currently targeted to the selling and use of “less visible” drugs, or to a real decrease in the number of drug-users and drug-dealers. When analysing their contribution in relation to the impact on the environment and on the perception of safety, it is their lesser visibility that counts.

Table 10.6 **Persons aged 14 and over per presence of some indicators of disorders in the area in which they live - 1997 and 2002** *(per 100 persons aged 14 and over with the same characteristics)*

	Sees drugusers		Sees drugdealers		Sees prostitutes looking for clients		Sees acts of vandalism		Sees vagabonds, homeless people	
	1997	2002	1997	2002	1997	2002	1997	2002	1997	2002
Often	7,9	5,6	4,1	2,9	7,5	5,5	13,5	8,8	-	10,4
Sometimes	10,9	8,1	5,7	4,3	5,9	4,9	20,8	18,5	-	17,2
Rarely	11,3	12,9	6,2	6,7	4,3	5,1	12,1	17,1	-	17,6
Never	69,9	73,4	84,0	86,1	82,3	84,6	53,6	55,7	-	54,8

The descriptive analysis also reveals disorder indicators levels' relationship with fear: persons living in an area at high or enough risk of criminality declare to be highly or averagely unsafe in 21.9 and 51.7 per cent of the cases respectively (figure 10.3 a). They are very afraid of being victim of a crime in 32.0 per cent of the cases. Persons living in quieter areas, or who consider the areas in which they live as such, feel very safe in 46.4 per cent of the cases and averagely safe in 42.9 per cent (figure 10.3 b). A good 26.5 per cent declare not to be very afraid of being victim of a crime.

Figure 10.3 **Perception of safety of those who declare to live in an area at high or average risk of criminality** (a) **and in an area not at all at risk or just slightly** (b) **- 2002** *(for 100 persons aged 14 and over)*



10.2.5 Trend of the safety perception over time

What has happened in the past five years? The share of persons who feel safe has increased from 62.7 per cent to 64.6 per cent; though among the persons who feel safe, those feeling “rather” safe have increased and those feeling “very” safe have decreased. This means that the number of people who feel safe has increased but the degree of safety they feel has decreased. The same can be said as regards the feeling of safety when being at home. This trend is not the same for all the segments of the population. The feeling of insecurity is slightly increasing in the case of men even when staying alone at home (from 45 to 74 years of age), while it is decreasing in the case of women. Feelings of insecurity are increasing in the Northeast of Italy both when staying at home and when going out, and are decreasing in the South of Italy and on the Islands. They are also decreasing in the metropolitan areas.

This means that the feelings of fear of those who said they felt unsafe already in 1997-98 are decreasing, that is, the same segments of population (women, elderly people, disadvantaged social classes, people living in the South and in the centre of metropolitan areas) that, already 5 years ago, showed some critical points and still today feel as such though to a lesser extent.

Table 10.7 **Persons aged 14 and over per perception of safety in the evening, in the streets or at home - 1997-98 and 2002** *(per 100 persons)*

	Feeling safe when walking in the dark		Feeling safe when being alone at home in the evening	
	2002	1997-98	2002	1997-98
A lot	43,3	52,7	20,2	24,3
Enough	44,5	35,6	44,4	38,4
A little bit	10,0	9,6	19,2	19,3
Not at all	2,2	2,2	8,4	9,5

10.3 Worry of crimes

As previously said, fear depends on the perception people have of the seriousness of a crime and of the probabilities they could occur. To this

purpose, we have analysed how worry of certain types of crime varies according to gender and age. Worry of house burglary is very high for both men and women, the trend per age is similar and the difference of gender is low. Such worry is at its highest in the age band 35-44 years of age and 25-34 years of age. The situation is the same in the case of car theft though such worry drops in the older ages: older people are indeed less affected by such problem, as most of them do not have a car. Some stronger differences by gender but not per age can be seen in the case of bag snatching and pick pocketing, which are mostly feared by young girls. On the other hand, women are, more often than men, victim of bag snatching and pick-pocketing. Finally, despite the fact that men are more often victim of assaults and robberies, women are more afraid of these crimes. Such worry follows a decreasing trend with the age.

As regards the worry of being victim of a sexual assault referred to the interviewer or one of his/her family, the difference by gender is very high, especially as regards young persons. In the case of the women, such worry decreases with the age, in the case of men, no. The data are also remarkable as regards the young people, as they declare to be first more worry of house burglary and then of sexual assaults.

Fear and worry of being victim of a crime could lead to assume stronger positions as regards, for example, the sanctions for the perpetrators of a crime. For the first time, we have added a question on what type of sentence would be right to give to a young thief found guilty, for the second time, of house burglary and, for the first time, of having stolen a colour television. Over 25.8 per cent of the population have indicated prison, 54.9 per cent have indicated the obligation of providing services to the community or house arrests. Prison was indicated more often by the persons living in the South, in particular Campania and Puglia, by the lower social strata and, rather interestingly, by the young people up to 34 years of age and the older persons aged over 75.

The older and the younger persons present rather similar positions; from the data inherent to division and social class, it seems that who is more afraid indicates prison more often. Nevertheless, the position of the women is quite different since, despite the fact that they are usually more afraid, they indicate prison less often, and that both by the younger and the older women.

Table 10.8 **Persons aged 14 and over very afraid or rather afraid of being victim of some types of crime, per age class and gender - 2002 (***per 100 persons with the same characteristics)*

AGE CLASSES	Very/rather worried of car theft	Very/rather worried of house burglary	Very/rather worried of purse-snatching/ pick-pocketing	Very/rather worried of assault/ robbery	Very/rather worried of sexual assault
		MALES			
14-24	52,4	55,3	39,5	41,0	31,0
25-34	49,2	57,7	36,6	36,4	26,5
35-44	46,6	61,3	36,8	36,5	32,9
45-54	46,2	58,5	35,8	34,4	32,2
55-64	47,4	56,4	35,8	31,8	24,0
65-74	37,5	51,0	32,0	30,6	17,1
75 and over	24,4	42,0	29,9	27,2	12,1
Total	**45,5**	**56,2**	**35,9**	**34,9**	**26,9**
		FEMALES			
14-24	50,5	66,2	57,2	60,0	63,2
25-34	53,3	69,7	51,1	52,7	55,0
35-44	51,5	68,3	51,8	51,6	55,2
65-74	35,5	59,2	50,2	46,5	26,5
75 and over	22,9	52,9	45,5	41,3	19,0
Total	**46,8**	**64,8**	**51,9**	**50,4**	**45,0**
		MALES AND FEMALES			
14-24	51,5	60,6	48,2	50,3	46,8
25-34	51,3	63,7	43,7	44,5	40,6
35-44	49,0	64,8	44,2	44,0	44,0
45-54	49,9	62,6	44,1	41,2	38,8
55-64	48,6	60,8	45,0	41,2	31,5
65-74	36,4	55,7	42,5	39,7	22,5
75 and over	23,5	48,6	39,4	35,7	16,3
Total	**46,2**	**60,7**	**44,2**	**43,0**	**36,3**

10.4 The social worry

Social fear or fear regarding the order is a feeling linked to a person's system of values, which, just as in 1997, was measured by means of two variables characterising the area of residence: “how would you define the area in which your family lives, in relation to the risk of criminality” and “all things considered, do you believe that the police succeed in controlling well the area in which you live”.

According to the data, the citizens, in the five years between one survey and the other, perceive less risk of criminality in the area in which they live (from 23.2 per cent to 21.0 per cent) and less social decay (see par. 10.2.4). This means that the aspect of social fear has partially decreased.

From the following regional map, we can see that the more critical areas have improved, and the less critical ones, such as Veneto, Umbria, Emilia Romagna and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia have worsened. The worst situation is that experienced in Campaniat, followed by Lazio. Campania occupies indeed the first place as regards the percentage of persons who do not feel safe, as previously seen.

Figure 10.4 **Families who declare to live in an area at high risk or at average risk of criminality per region - 1997/98 and 2002** *(per 100 families)*



The second question on social fear regards the police: do you believe that the police succeed in controlling well the territory in which you live? Over 64 per cent of the population said yes.

Figure 10.5 **Judgement expressed regarding the police's job on the territory - 2002** *(per 100 persons aged 14 and over with the same characteristics)*



The relationship with the police and the extent of their control is very important for one's own perception of safety, as can be seen from the data.

The following table shows some indicators on the presence of the police on the territory; the data point out their clear impact on containing the fear of crime in the streets.

Table 10.9 **Persons aged 14 and over per presence of the police in the area where one lives, judgement expressed on what they have done and on the degree of safety - 2001 - 2002** *(per 100 persons)*

DEGREE OF SAFETY	The police almost never comes, never comes	The police does not control a lot/at all the area	Has never been held for control
Very safe	22,2	27,9	53,6
Rather safe	22,5	40,6	66,8
Not very safe	26,7	48,5	79,8
Total	**23,0**	**36,3**	**63,0**

From 1997-98 to 2002, the number of persons feeling satisfied with the police has increased from 57 per cent to 64 per cent, especially as regards those living in the metropolitan areas and in the South of Italy. In Bolzano, the percentage of persons satisfied with the police has dropped while, in Trento, it has remained unchanged.

Overall, the territorial differences have decreased - Calabria has reached the levels registered in Piedmont and Sicily has reached those registered in Veneto. Nevertheless, the criticality of Campania emerges in this case too: in 51.2 per cent of the cases, the police force does not control or only sufficiently the territory. The situation has improved here too but not like in Puglia does where the percentage of citizens expressing positive judgments has increased from 48.6 per cent to 60.1 per cent.

While younger people are less satisfied with the control of the police (57.6 per cent), the feelings of satisfaction increase according to the age increasing, and rich the maximum for people of 75 years of age and over (78.5 per cent). No differences of gender have been registered, except among the younger ones. Young girls feel less protected by the police force (44.7 per cent compared to the 40.2 per cent registered in the case of the young men -14-24 years of age-males).

10.5 The answers of the citizens

How do citizens deal with criminality? And, especially, how do they deal with fear and worry of crime? They deal with such problems adopting individual and family behaviours and strategies: avoiding places and persons in the evening, renouncing to go out in the evening and taking protective measures to try to reduce the risk of criminality in their own house.

When going from one place to another, many persons adopt behaviours or strategies that help protect them from any unpleasant victimisation risks. A good 38.1 per cent of people in Italy, when walking in the evening in their own area, try to avoid, for safety reasons, certain streets, places or certain persons. Generally, women declare to avoid some places or some people, for fear of crime, more than men (47.2 per cent compared 28.4 per cent for men). Such defence behaviours, nevertheless, characterise even more the younger ones, objectively more exposed to dan-

gerous situations, and elderly women: 50.6 per cent of young people between 14 and 24 years of age declare to avoid certain places or persons believed to be socially dangerous and about 35 per cent of women over 75 years of age never go out in the evening. Moreover, 35.7 per cent of who uses the car to go from one place to another usually inserts the safety lock to the car door, a share that even increases to 40.7 per cent among women and to almost 60 per cent among young women aged between 25 and 34.

As regards their own house, citizens resort to both home-made protective measures, such as resorting to the neighbours when they are not at home (40 per cent), keeping the lights on in the evening (22.3 per cent) or keeping a watchdog (11.8 per cent), and to more efficient ones, such as using reinforced doors (40.8 per cent), bars and railings (21.4 per cent), window blockings (26,4 per cent) and alarm systems (16 per cent).

Table 10.10 **Families using defensive strategies and systems in their house - 1997, 1998 and 2002** *(per 100 families)*

	1997-1998	2002
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES		
Keeps the lights on when going out	20,6	22,3
Asks the neighbours to control the house	43,2	40,0
Has a watchdog	14,3	11,8
Is linked to a private surveillance system	4,8	4,1
Has guns	12,4	13,3
Has an insurance against burglaries	16,1	15,6
Lives in a condominium with a porter/guardian	8,9	7,1
SECURITY SYSTEMS		
Has reinforced doors	36,6	40,8
Has a window blocking system	21,9	26,4
Has bars to windows/doors	20,0	21,4
Has an alarm system	13,4	16,0
Has a safe	10,6	13,5

Generally, as regards the five years that have passed between one survey and the other (1997-98/2002), more people are leaving the lights on, are using reinforced doors, window blocking systems, bars, alarms and saves. On the other hand, less people are resorting to the neighbours, watchdogs and porters.

Table 10.11 **Families per use of defence strategies and safety system in their house, per region and type of municipality - 2002** *(per 100 families of the same area)*

	Defence strategies					
	Leaves the lights on when going out	Asks the neighbours to control the house	Has a watchdog	Is linked to a private surveillance	Has guns	Has an insurance against burglaries
REGIONS						
Piedmont	21,3	44,4	16,1	4,4	9,9	23,0
Valle d'Aosta/ Vallée d'Aoste	14,3	36,4	16,6	4,0	10,7	20,9
Lombardy	19,3	40,0	11,4	5,0	8,8	27,7
Trentino -Alto Adige	17,6	41,8	12,6	3,4	8,7	22,7
Bolzano/Bozen	*17,8*	*44,0*	*11,9*	*4,4*	*8,0*	*20,9*
Trento	*17,5*	*39,9*	*13,1*	*2,7*	*9,2*	*24,1*
Veneto	31,8	42,9	14,5	4,7	11,9	20,2
Fruli-Venezia Giulia	25,9	40,1	14,4	4,0	9,2	23,2
Liguria	17,1	38,9	10,3	4,1	11,1	15,6
Emilia -Romagna	23,3	38,7	12,7	3,8	13,3	22,8
Tuscany	20,2	39,3	10,8	4,6	19,1	19,1
Umbria	23,0	41,6	17,9	3,4	25,5	13,6
Marche	18,8	35,2	15,0	3,1	18,4	11,1
Lazio	19,9	38,7	10,8	3,4	11,2	8,7
Abruzzo	26,2	42,0	14,5	3,0	11,7	7,9
Molise	22,6	38,8	12,6	3,4	13,0	4,5
Campania	27,7	43,3	11,6	3,4	10,5	4,1
Puglia	24,4	40,9	7,4	6,6	8,6	5,9
Basilicata	22,5	43,2	10,9	3,2	13,6	4,7
Calabria	22,8	37,5	9,8	3,2	15,3	4,8
Sicily	18,3	34,3	7,2	2,9	9,9	6,2
Sardinia	22,7	36,5	13,9	2,5	18,1	8,5
Italy	**22,3**	**40,0**	**11,8**	**4,1**	**11,8**	**15,6**
TYPES OF MUNICIPALITY						
Centre of a metropolitan area	16,7	35,5	5,6	3,3	6,3	12,9
Periphery of a metropolitan area	21,8	42,9	10,7	4,5	9,4	14,4
Up to 2.000 inhabitants	23,2	42,0	21,0	3,7	19,5	17,4
From 2.001 to 10.000 inhabitants	24,8	40,9	16,8	4,4	15,4	17,4
From 10.001 to 50.000 inhabitants	25,2	41,1	12,2	4,6	12,9	16,1
50.001 inhabitants and over	20,5	39,0	8,0	3,8	9,5	15,2
Italy	**22,3**	**40,0**	**11,8**	**4,1**	**11,8**	**15,6**

Table 10.11 continued **Families per use of defence strategies and safety system in their house, per region and type of municipality - 2002** *(per 100 families of the same area)*

	Home security system					
	Has reinforced doors	Has window blockings	Has window and door bars	Makes use of condo-minium porter/ guardian	Has an alarm system	Has a safe box
REGIONS						
Piedmont	42,7	30,2	24,3	4,9	23,2	11,2
Valle d'Aosta / Vallée d'Aoste	26,5	18,6	16,8	2,4	14,3	12,7
Lombardy	51,9	35,1	24,0	13,4	20,2	14,5
Trentino -Alto Adige	38,4	20,1	14,1	2,2	10,7	14,5
Bolzano/Bozen	*41,1*	*21,4*	*16,1*	*3,2*	*9,4*	*14,1*
Trento	*36,1*	*19,1*	*12,5*	*1,3*	*11,8*	*14,7*
Veneto	31,8	30,1	19,9	2,5	18,8	12,1
Fruli-Venezia Giulia	27,9	18,3	15,3	2,7	13,1	9,3
Liguria	42,4	27,5	17,8	5,2	15,7	13,5
Emilia -Romagna	42,5	29,0	30,2	2,9	11,7	16,3
Tuscany	36,8	25,1	19,3	2,8	15,6	19,7
Umbria	30,2	21,8	15,8	1,9	12,7	18,3
Marche	31,2	20,0	13,8	2,5	9,1	17,9
Lazio	53,2	27,9	28,9	16,9	15,6	13,4
Abruzzo	32,1	17,9	13,3	1,9	10,8	15,7
Molise	25,2	14,6	11,7	2,0	7,8	10,3
Campania	45,7	26,1	25,7	11,0	15,9	12,0
Puglia	39,0	23,2	19,3	3,3	19,0	10,8
Basilicata	27,0	16,2	14,5	2,6	8,1	11,0
Calabria	28,4	16,3	13,3	2,4	8,1	16,1
Sicily	32,3	17,8	14,8	6,4	12,6	9,4
Sardinia	22,8	18,1	11,0	2,2	10,0	13,9
Italy	**40,8**	**26,4**	**21,4**	**7,1**	**16,0**	**13,5**
TYPES OF MUNICIPALITY						
Centre of a metropolitan area	61,5	30,0	25,5	24,3	15,0	11,8
Periphery of a metropolitan area	53,3	33,0	26,3	8,0	21,0	12,6
Up to 2.000 inhabitants	18,2	19,1	21,1	1,3	12,1	11,2
From 2.001 to 10.000 inhabitants	25,6	23,5	20,3	1,5	15,3	13,4
From 10.001 to 50.000 inhabitants	35,8	25,8	19,3	2,8	16,7	14,6
50.001 inhabitants and over	47,5	25,7	18,6	4,8	15,0	15,6
Italy	**40,8**	**26,4**	**21,4**	**7,1**	**16,0**	**13,5**

The methods for dealing with criminality greatly vary according to the type of municipality. When going from the smaller municipalities to the larger ones, an increase has been registered as regards the use of reinforced doors, blocking and bars to windows and doors, and guardians.

The use of reinforced doors and window blocking systems is on the increase in those areas where they were less used and where the sense of insecurity has increased: Trento, Bolzano and Friuli.

Window blockings are also on the increase in Emilia (from 22.1 per cent to 29.0 per cent), Veneto (from 24.0 per cent to 30.1 per cent), and Tuscany (from 19.7 per cent to 25.1 per cent).

The highest percentages of reinforced doors have been registered in Lazio (53.2 per cent), Lombardy (51.9 per cent), Campania (45.7 per cent), metropolitans (61.5 per cent) and around the metropolitan areas (53.3 per cent).

10.6 THE SAFETY PROFILES

The multi-varied analysis we have conducted on the data and which considers all the variables described until now, has allowed identifying 11 interesting typological groups: three characterised by the profiles of elder persons, 3 of women and the remaining ones of men.

Table 10.12 The composition of the groups in the multi-varied analysis

GROUPS' IDENTIFICATION FEATURES	%
The vulnerability of the elderly women	7,5
Non-afraid elderly women living in small municipalities	7,1
Elderly women aged 75 and over who never go out in the evening	5,0
Young women from the South who are very afraid of sexual assaults	10,1
Women from the degraded areas of the South, feeling not at all safe and very worried	4,2
Adult women from small municipalities located in the North-east and on the Islands who feel safe	15,9
Young men feeling very safe from small centres	14,0
Adult men coming from the Centre-north feeling rather safe	14,2
Men who show off as feeling very safe despite living in degraded areas of large centres	4,3
Young persons feeling rather safe in areas not at risk of criminality	8,5
Fear of adults in the large centres of the Centre-north	9,3

10.6.1 The profiles of the elderly women

We called the first group "Vulnerability of the elderly women" (7.5 per cent) gathers elderly women who are very afraid of all crimes and are much influenced by criminality in their habits. They do not go out in the evening and do not feel safe at home, though they have been living for over twenty years in a non-degraded area and have never been victim of a crime. Thus, they are not conditioned by the variables that, generally, weight on the feeling of being safe or not, as previously seen. Their fear is more linked to their being elderly women and to their being part of a low social class, with a low education title and who are, professionally speaking, homemaker or retired from work.

The second group (7.1 per cent) includes elderly women from small municipalities. They are not afraid of being victim of a crime and have never suffered from a crime either. They have been living for some time in an area that is not at all at risk of criminality and which shows no signs of social and environmental decay. They rarely go out in the evening and those who do go out, feel safe. They also feel safe at home, as can be seen from the fact that they do not need any protection system.

Finally, the third group relative to the elderly women (5.0 per cent) regards the older women, aged 75 and over, who usually stay home, even though the reason why they stay home lays in their older age and in their poor health conditions. They have been living for at least 20 years in the same house and in an area they define as not degraded and not at risk of criminality. They are not afraid of being victim of a crime, they do not know whether criminality has increased or not and they do feel protected by the police force.

10.6.2 The female profiles

The first very important group regards young girls coming from the South who are very afraid of sexual violence (10.1 per cent). These girls adopt strategies, such as avoiding isolated areas and strange people when going out in the evening, asking help to the neighbours and leaving the lights on when going out. At the same time, they greatly demand the police to carry out more controls. These girls, who feel rather safe when

being at home, are afraid when going out alone in the evening, and they are limited in their rights to movement. Sometimes, they avoid going out, out of fear. Such problem has been encountered more often in Campania and in Puglia, and, more generally, in the whole South and Islands.

The second group of women regards women coming from the South (4.2 per cent) who are very afraid and who do not feel safe at all. They live in degraded areas (they often see persons who take drugs and sell drugs, vandalism acts, homeless persons) and areas at risk of criminality. They feel abandoned by the police and without any protection. They have suffered a victimisation experience in the last three years (purse-snatching and pick pocketing) and resort as much as possible to protection system. Their fear of crime exercises an influence on their habits.

Finally, the strong characteristic of the third group (15.9 per cent) is a stronger feeling of safety. It includes adult women (35-54 years of age), married, who feel safe when going out alone in the evening and who live in small municipalities located in the North-east and on the Islands. Just as the other women, they too are afraid of being victim of a crime, especially a sexual assault, but this does not weight upon their fear of going out. The area, in which they live, is not degraded, they never see people taking drugs, drug-dealers, vandalism and have not been the target of a crime in the last 3 years.

The fact that they feel safer than the first group can be explained by their living in a different territory condition, by their age and by the fact that they are married. Being married, indeed, increases the feeling of female safety, as highlighted by a regressive analysis conducted on the data survey Aspects of daily life (Rosina A. 2001), unlike men who, when married, suffer the opposite effect as regards their feeling of safety.

10.6.3 The male profiles

The male profiles greatly vary but they are all characterised by a high level of safety.

The first group includes young men who feel very safe, who live in small centres (14 per cent); the context and the fact of being men and young all contribute in their feeling safe. Men living in risky degraded areas and who

have been victim of a crime, still feel very safe (4.3 per cent). The differences between these two groups are very interesting.

The first group, thus, regards young men who feel very safe both at home and when going out. They, objectively, live in quiet areas not at all at risk of criminality and which show no signs of decay. They have not been victim of a crime in the last three years. They often go out in the evening, they are single, work and, when going out, they do not ask the neighbours help in controlling the house, but, rather, have reinforced doors.

The second group, on the contrary, includes men who live in the degraded areas of the large urban centres, where they often see drug-users and drug-dealers and vandalism acts, and who define their area as at risk of criminality. They have been victim of a crime, but still feel very safe when at home and when going out. They take no precaution measures. Remarkably, they have been held several times by the police. Such aspect puts them in a particular position, which the available data do not allow to examine in-depth. The hypotheses we could make could consider, on the one hand, their desire to show off security and, on the other hand, make us ponder on the theory according to which, very often, some types of crime, especially among young men, are done intra-class: This indicates that the victim and the perpetrators present the same characteristic, they are persons living on the border of the law and live in a degraded environment they, themselves, contribute in constructing and thus, of which they are not afraid.

The other groups of men involve an average level of safety feelings, that is, they feel “rather safe”. One group is characterised by the adults and the other by the young men.

The group of adults who feel partially safe (14.2 per cent) lives in the central and northern areas of Italy. They are not much influence by the fear of crime and are not very afraid of being victim of a crime, but they do not show off feelings of safety: they feel very safe at home and rather safe outdoors, though they use protection systems to protect their house. In the past 3 years, they have been victim of a crime, but probably outside their neighbourhood, which they define not much at risk of crime and well controlled by the police. They are between 35-54 years of age, are married and work.

The group of young men too (8.5 per cent), between 14-34 years of

age, appears to feel rather safe; they live in partially degraded areas in the Centre and in the South. They only partially suffer of the territorial condition but not to the point of feeling unsafe or limited in their habit of going out in the evening. They claim not to be much influenced by the fear of crime and often go out in the evening. They define their area as not much at risk of criminality, they rarely see prostitutes looking for clients, drug-users and drug-dealers, vandalisms, homeless people, but still use protection systems.

The last group is made up of adult men who are afraid of being victim of a crime and who live in the large centres of the Centre and North West of Italy (9.3 per cent). The gender discriminant does not seem as particularly important as the fact of living in an objectively critical area: they sometimes see drug-users and drug-dealers, prostitutes looking for clients, vandalism acts and homeless people. They believe that crime has increased in the past year; they have been object of house burglary and car theft, a crime that, usually, takes place in the area around the house. They define as low the police's capacity in controlling the territory.

They personally feel not very safe when going out alone in the evening and rather safe at home. Criminality does influence their habits and, to protect themselves, they use home protection systems. Most of them are married and have a high education title.

10.7 In brief: positive but not univocal signals

The analysis conducted on the different profiles to be found in Italy as regards feelings of safety has allowed highlighting the different features of this wide context.

Strong feelings of insecurity have been registered and, undoubtedly, they are sometimes linked to the socio-demographic characteristics of the person, being a man or a woman, on an elder belonging to low social classes or living in a certain territorial context: the South or the metropolitan area. Sometimes, they are linked to a victimisation experience, to having been victim of a bag snatching or robberies, to the type of area in which the person lives and the risk of crime, or to the control and effective or preceived presence of the police on the territory.

Sometimes, they are linked to a cause, to several causes, or to no cause at all. We must bear in mind some of the criticisms made on the measurement of the safety concept. According to some, (Farral et al, 1997) such measurement should be done according to more strict instruments that aim at surveying more closely the fear of crime and not one of its wider dimension, that is, there is the risk, in most victimisation surveys, of including a wide nucleus of psychological meanings outside crime itself when measuring the perception of insecurity.

Following the examination of the Italian data, we can say that fear of crime is a rather rational course both in the real causes and in the hypothesised and planned consequences. Thus, ignoring it would mean to take for granted the life quality of the citizens themselves.

In diachronic terms, the situation has partially improved, especially as regards those persons who felt unsafe (the sense of insecurity has decreased in the case of the southern inhabitants and inhabitants of large centres) to the detriment of some areas and some persons (men and people living in the North-east). The territory too appears more liveable; the area in which one lives, is seen as less at risk of criminality and people seem more satisfied with the control of the police, though people are also using more individual protection systems.

Despite the improvements, there are still some strong critical points in the South, in particular, in Campania, in the centres of the large urbanization areas and among the disadvantaged social classes, the women, especially the young women from the South, and the elderly women.

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ELEVEN

FEAR OF CRIME AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE

11.1 Introduction

What are the causes of fear among adolescents residing in cities? The explanations for adults are numerous and include factors such as personal experience of crimes, impact of disorders, exposure to risk, vulnerability, inclusion in a personal community. A representative survey was conducted in two French metropolis on 2300 French adolescents in 1999. The data presented confirm the influence of personal victimisation on fear of being assaulted, of personal vulnerability but not social vulnerability (low Socio Economic Status - SES - is correlated with less fear), but also of being a perpetrator of crime. Finally, it is underlined that perpetrators of serious crimes feel insecure than the rest of the young population.

11.2 Why is fear among young people overlooked?

Fear of crime in the western countries has been acknowledged as a important social issue, deserving attention from the politician in the US since the end of the sixties (President's Commission, 1967) and in Europe a decade later as in France whit the report of Alain Peyrefitte, minister of Justice (Peyrefitte's Commission, 1977). In his report, Alain Peyrefitted considered the “feeling of insecurity” (which is the French expression commonly used to designate what is referred to in English as “fear of

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crime") as the 'central thread' of any political analysis on the causes and responses to violence. Two elements were crucial in the political understanding of fear: the importance in the consequences of fear for society, the possible autonomy of fear vis-à-vis crime.

The interest in this notion raised also among academics. Earliest empirical papers were published in the US, probably because violent crime was a major political issue well before Europe. The largest surveys were then carried out in the UK, notamment as part of the British Crime Survey. In France, academics were reluctant to pay attention to fear of crime, as is it would legitimate the notion and the idea that crime was really growing in the country. The non-empirical and non-quantitative literature published during the eighties considered "fear" as a mix of imagination and pathology among alienated working class workers or reactionary shopkeepers. Empirical research results were released in the nineties.

In the empirical studies, the elderly were initially given the largest attention, and the adult population was the object of most investigations. The personal fear among adult was studied in various settings and conditions, but most often limited to egoistic fear as Warr and Ellison noted (2000:552), omitting what they called "altruistic fear".

While fear among the elderly and to a lesser extent altruistic fear among couples of adults (Warr, Ellison, 2000) has deserved numerous works, fear among young people has not. Fear of crime among young people has been, overlooked. It is very much the case in France, and I suspect, as far as I am aware, in many other countries.

One possible explanation for this is that the elderly are probably perceived as more vulnerable, because personal fear has been more intensively studied. Altruistic fear that is, by definition, to be found in other age groups (parents being worried for their kids) although it is possible to a lesser extent to study altruistic fear among young people (in the sense of having fear for a girl or boy friend, or even siblings). This lack of interest is not very satisfactory for the young people are also physically vulnerable, at least until a certain age.

It is also true that adolescent will not make the decision to flee to another neighborhood because of crime pressure (their parents are in charge, even if they care for their offspring). Therefore, no direct link between geographical segregation and fear as the cause of moving out was to be found.

And, despite the fact that they don't choose the location of their homes, assault is one of the violence that they have to confront. As criminologists know, young people are very often victims of crime on the streets.

One other explanation for not studying fear among young people is that they are often portrayed as predator more than victims or frightened persons. Young people can be violent on the street. And, even if over victimized they still spent a large proportion of the day and even nights in public places. Therefore, fear of crime did not appear to be a major problem to be investigated.

And, finally, most young people and all minors don't have a right to vote. Attention paid to the feeling of insecurity in Europe is largely related to the political debate and its possible impact on voting.

In sum, young people do not vote, decide where to live, are perceived as muggers more than vulnerable preys and this might explain why their fear of crime attracted little attention.

11.3 Fear of crime: available explanations and data

Using a self-reported delinquency survey conducted in 1999 in St-Etienne and Grenoble, two metropolitan areas in France of about 450 000 inhabitants each, we examine the importance of various variables in predicting individual fear. The SRD questionnaire encompassed questions about personal fear and personal experience of victimisation, perceived disorders in the neighborhood, the young people life-style, and detailed aspects of socioeconomic status of the parents.

11.3.1 Available explanations

There still is both a debate about the rationality and irrationality of fear and a discussion regarding the explanations of fear. Of course, the way we consider fear, rational or irrational, have an implication on the kind of theories we need to mobilize for explaining the phenomenon. We don not intend to discuss here the question of the rationality of fear, but simply to look at the correlates for fear in young people.

The simplest way might be to have a closer look at fear in adolescents

is to start from hypotheses that were tested in number of studies relating to adults.

Fear has been explained by a number of theories. The major ones have insisted on:

A: social relations: because people lack links with other individuals (neighbors, friends etc…) or with society (trough work for example), they tend to "exaggerate" or "minimize", in sum to be more or less sensible to what they perceive as various threats for themselves;

B: vulnerability, physical or social: because individuals lack the capability to withdraw from perilous situations or deal with these situations, or because the consequence of various violence (e.g. assault for girls) they are more afraid then others, (passive + active vulnerability: sex, age versus life style choices: going out with somebody, practice sport etc…)

C: exposure to crime pressure, experience of crime: people that have been victim is the recent pas are more prone to regard crime a likely threat, or people that live in a more risky neighborhood have consistent information that make them aware of the higher risks that they run and therefore are more afraid,

D: perceptions of crime and disorders : if people perceive more signs of decay that they interpret as early proxies of threat in their environment, or if they are exposed to media coverage of violence, they are more afraid,

E: confidence in public authorities: because people don't expect the police be reliable and to protect them, they are dissatisfied with the them and they believe that they cannot be protected and are more at risk.

11.3.2 Identification of relevant co-factors of fear of crime

For each explanation, our study has a series of proxies (although not all):

STRUCTURE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire is structured in seven blocks of items:

Block 1 = personal characteristics (sex, age, class, SES, type of neighborhood etc…);

Block 2 = School (interest in, self-evaluation, objective position, school truancy etc…);

Block 3 = family and peers environment (family structure, social climate at home, supervision, number of siblings, activities with friends, peers and the police);

Block 4 = estimated seriousness of various crimes and estimated risk of being caught;

Block 5 = perception of physical disorders around home;

Block 6 = deviant or delinquent acts (vandalism, theft, assault, drug use, carrying a weapon, trafficking). (number of acts during the last 2 years, with detailed description of last act of each type (location, size of group, social and penal reaction etc…);

Block 7= victimisation (the period of reference is of 2 years).

The questionnaire allows us to test the relevance of 5 possible dimensions of fear.

1. SOCIAL RELATIONS / CONVENTIONAL INTEGRATION:

It is acknowledged that people more integrated in their community are less fearful (Hunter and Baumer, 1982); it could be identical for young people with :

- positive links at home and ,
- feeling well at school,
- and with belief (versus disbelief) in being protected by the police

2. TRAITS OF VULNERABILITY:

It is well known that various aspects of vulnerability are correlated with fear, and this surveys has a measurement for some dimensions :

- Social: Family characteristics: Socioeconomic status;
- Physical: Personal features: gender, age; physical fitness
- Nature of social group when going out :

3. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF CRIME; DISORDERS IN THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT:

Being of victim of crime or being expose to signs of disorders is usually a factor for being fearful (Taylor, 1999, Skogan, 1990, Roché, 2000, Crenner 1998, Conklin, 1975). In this survey it is measured by:

- The experience of crime (personal victimisation),
- The nature of crime (prevalence and seriousness),
- The environmental clues of crime (perceived disorders or incivilities),

4. EXPOSURE TO RISK :

- type of neighborhood (affluent, ethnically segregated); urban centre versus rural periphery;
- life-style (time spent outside without parents / school truancy).

Some other possible factors of fear are not available from our data: the ecological pressure of crime (other than type of habitat and rural/urban cleavage), anticipation of serious consequences (other than gender derived anticipations).

One possible innovation, as far as I am aware, is using the self-reported delinquency measures as dependent variables in order to predict fear of crime.

5. SOCIAL SKILLS: SELF-PROTECTION AND FIGHTING

The number of crimes committed, and the nature of these crimes, could be a good proxy of fear. But the mutual protection through the selection of peers when out on the streets also is a potential factor correlated with fear. We have made some items available:

- Number and types of self-reported crimes (that can be dissociated from physical fitness),
- Going out with boys (mutual protection 1),
- Contact with delinquents peers (mutual protection 2).

11.4 Identification of fear

Because homicide is very rare in Europe and even more among adolescents in France (where it is the least frequent cause of death), fear on the streets if focused on being mugged. This is what we propose to explore.

FEAR OF CRIME IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE MULTIDIMENSIONAL:

1) Academics would draw a clear distinction between personal, altruistic and social fear.
2) Additionally, there are various types characterization of personal fear (fear as a situational response, anxiety as a more attitudinal characteristics),

3) but also variations in the contexts of fear (at home on the bus, on the street, at school etc.).

Even personal fear tends to be more often described as offense specific (mainly: assault vs. theft without violence) and location specific (for example: home vs. streets) and time specific (for example: day vs. night).

We have restricted to one aspect of fear, i.e. fear of mugging, but in three types of locations. In the common use of French language, the term mugging would encompass assault for various reasons: sexual assaults, theft with violence or threat, use of physical violence for other motives (quarrel, vengeance etc…).

Table 11.a **Independent variables available in the survey**

	Valide answhs 2,288
H1A T'arrive-t-il de te sentir en insécurité à ton domicile... ?	2.284
H1B T'arrive-t-il d'avoir peur de te faire agresser, autour de chez toi...?	2.265
H1C T'arrive-t-il d'avoir peur de sortir seul(e) le soir dans ton quartier...?	2.091
H1D T'arrive-t-il d'avoir peur de te faire agresser, au centre ville...?	2.239
H1E T'arrive-t-il d'avoir peur de te faire agresser, dans ton école ou à proximité... ?	2.276

11.4.1 Fear of mugging, fear of being assaulted

We have focused the measurements of fear on being assaulted in three types of places: the neighborhood, the school and its immediate surroundings.

The relevant variables are:

- are you afraid being mugged around your home?
- are you afraid being mugged in the city center?
- are you afraid being mugged at your school or nearby?

(possible responses vary from never to sometimes, always).

An index of fear was computed with all three variables. Alpha is reaching .53 among the fears of assaults. The correlations are higher among fears of assaults than between fears of assaults and other personal fears.

Table 11.b **Reliability analysis, scale (Alpha)**

	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1B (Around your home)	34.499	0,877	2.225
1D (City centre)	30.571	0,9986	2.225
1E (Nearby school)	35.447	0,775	2.225
Statistics for SCALE			
Mean	Variance	Std Dev	Variables
100.517	36.534	19.114	3
Reliability Coefficients	N of Cases = 2,225	N of Items = 3	Alpha = .5282

11.4.2 Data set and survey design

The participants to the survey is representative of young people from 13 to 19 that are in an educational establishment, either a regular one (that leads to the baccalaureat, or give a professional diploma), or pupils in a vocational school.

2,300 young people were interviewed in 1999. They belonged to an age group of 13-19 years old. The sample was drawn in two cities: Grenoble and Saint-Étienne that represent 39 municipalities.

105 high schools and junior high schools (private or public run) were surveyed. This encompass general, technical and vocational, including programs for students with school failure. Random sampling (after a list of students) was used at a rate = 5 per cent (in a population of approximately 45,000 students).

The questionnaire is based on the international self report delinquency questionnaire (J Junger-Tas, G J Terlouw and M W Klein) with additional questions on fear and other aspects. It is a very detailed process and its duration was 45 to 90 minutes.

We have done some adjunction and suppression. New questions are related to “riots”, i.e. burning a building or a car. Questions relating to perception of disorders were also added. Each interviewee had to describe his neighborhood and give a frequency of vandalism (letter box, entrance hall, surrounding plantations, presence of garbage). As well as victimisation questions on the same reference period.

We also asked more questions about unemployment of the parents, part time jobs, type of residence (and a proxy of what we call the “ban-

lieues", i.e. the outskirts of large cites) as variation in the spatial organization of poverty might influence fear as well as crime.

11.5 Main results

The objectives of the this paper are:

- to determine what the main cofactors of fear are among adolescents,
- to test the addition of personal crimes committed and mutual protection as a cofactor of fear, and to determine what kinds of committed crimes are associated with fear.

11.5.1 Social relations / Conventional integration

Social disorganization theory emphasized that areas with low SES, high residential mobility and racial heterogeneity suffer more crime. How a community supervises the teenagers is a critical indicator of social disorganization. More unsupervised kids means more fear of crime for the general population in a neighborhood (Taylor and Covington), but does it imply that unsupervised kids themselves are more frightened, or on the contrary that supervised are more fearful?

It is also acknowledged that people more integrated in their community are less fearful. Can we verify the reality of such a hypothesis at the individual level among adolescents? The integration of young people to society relies on the family, the school, the social activities (mostly with peers), the affective relationships (having a girl/boy friend). Studying conventional integration implies to take these aspects into account.

THE FAMILY

One of the essential primary group is the family. If it is hypothesized that fear derives essentially from the quality of social bonds (and not from the experience of crime for example), that a more united family could bring reassurance to children: not only can the parent supervise the children and reduce the risks of being assaulted, but also will they discuss after any victimisation and help to suffer less painful consequences

(anxieties, feeling of personal responsibility for what happened). Parents might have played the role of “buffer” relatively to incidents experienced by adolescents. More generally, having within the family a relationship made of confidence and trust as well as positive exchanges could be seen as protective for the kid.

It is possible to analyze the relations with fear of both the structure of the family and the nature of some interactions within the family. We do not find any correlation between the family structure and fear of being assaulted. A household is composed of the two biological parents, of two parents (one of which is biological), of one parent only (the mother in most cases) present no relation with the individual level of fear on the streets (R=.03/p=ns). No difference appears when separating girls and boys.

The high supervision of kids is associated with more fear on the streets (R=.05/p<.03), but the correlation appears to be only valid for boys (34,6 per cent with no fear against 43,8 per cent, R=.07/p<.03) and not girls. We find an effect of the social climate at home on fearfulness (table 11.2). Using an index of quality of relationships with the two parents (as depicted by the children),[1] we discover that the adolescents with “no fear” are 35 per cent when they get on very well with their parents and 22,8 per cent when very bad on a five item scale (R=.10/p<000), the correlation remaining valid for boys (R=.09/p<.003) and girls (.07/p<.03).

In sum, the correlation with family structure or social climate are very modest.

It is only for the “never victim” or the frequent victim that a small effect can be seen.

THE SCHOOL

Among the settings where adolescents spent most of their time and forge their social relations (with adults, with peers), the school is central. Therefore, one could expect positive attachment to school to be a source of feeling of safety.

For school, we used questions relating to being a good pupil (school truancy, the number of times the adolescent didn’t attend school without

[1] The wording of the questions are: "in general, how do you get on with your mother; how do you get on with your father (very well, quite well, not very well, not well at all).

any valid excuse, the fact a child doubled a class, time given to homework) and the relationship of the child with the teachers (estimated by the respondent).

Positive relations to school teacher's doesn't favor a clear limitation of fear of crime (table 11.3). On the contrary, for girls a small significant effect is found: 46,3 per cent of the girls with "no fear" are more to be found among those that perceive that "the teachers never paid attention" to them as opposed to only 13,7 per cent "very often paid attention" (r=.07/p<.01). An identical association is found with the interest in what is taught at school: girls that declare to be very interested are only 21,1 per cent to feel insecure on the streets as opposed to 45 per cent when not interested at all (R=.07/p=.03).

School truancy has a weak correlation with fear on the streets, the most truants being less frightened (R=.05/p<.01). Time spent each day for doing the home works informs better about fear: the less studious pupils (less than 15 minutes) have "no fear" for 48,9 per cent of them and those working the most (more than one hour) are 27,2 per cent (R=.13/p<.000). When controlling for gender, the correlation remains significant for boys only (R=.11/p<.000) but not for girls (R=.05/p<.07).

When two class or more have been doubled, the child feels less insecure on the streets (38,1 per cent against 26,1 per cent for those who never did so) (R=.08/p<.000). However, the boys are responsible for the correlation (R=.10/p>.000) and not the girls (R=.02/p>.59 ns).

And, the more often the adolescent has been punished, the less he feels insecure. When the number of sanctions at school is 5 or more, the young people with "no fear" are 46,7 per cent against 25 per cent when no sanction was received (R=.16/p<.000). The effect is similar for boys (R=.11/p<.000) and girls (R=.09/p<.006).

LEISURE ACTIVITIES AND FRIENDS

Involvement in a community can be assessed with the number of leisure activities. Those are mostly organized between peers. We find that the total number of types of activities (the list includes: sport, music, dance, etc…) shows no correlation with fear. When isolating the sport activities from the rest display no different result appears: practicing sport makes no difference as far as fear is involved.

However, girls that have the more leisure activities are more fearful: 28,8 per cent declare “no fear” if no activity a t all against 18,5 per cent if 3 or more are realized (R=.08/p<.005). The correlation is identical when sport activities are not included in the total number of activities performed.

Having a stable girl or boyfriend is also a potential factor of integration into a peer group. The notion of stability is relative to adolescence and we have here draw a distinction between having no girl/boyfriend, one but during less than 6 month, or 6 month and over. More than half of the sample declares having no girl/boyfriend (n=1463), and they experience no more fear that those whit a recent friend. The difference is with longer relationship, but is only significant for girls: they are more fearful when they had their boyfriend for more than 6 month (R=.06/p<.04)

SOCIAL RELATIONS SUMMARY

In conclusion, the data provide no evidence of any strong link between on the one end fear and on the other end family structure or social climate, school involvement or activities of leisure and having a close friend. When found the correlations are low. Moreover, they mostly apply for girls only. Far among boys is not determined in any way by the relationships they develop in the primary groups.

Finally, it must be noted that the correlation are counter intuitive in the sense that the general hypothesis of a better social integration as protective of fear is not proven. Although girls and boys differ depending on which indicator is used, more “positive” attachment to family, school or peers is slightly but significantly associated with higher fear, not lower. Adult hypothesis seem not to be valid for adolescents, may be because the most deviant children are the ones that are more reassured when on the streets. When they have less relation with “positive” role models at school they are probably more involved in various deviances and more aware about the dangers of the streets, when not personally involved in assaulting other young people on the very same places.

11.5.2 Socio economic status and place of residence of the family

Among adults, fear is correlated with SES. As parents SES determine

the children conditions of life, it could be hypothesized that high or low SES for the parents can have an impact on children's fear. We do not find any clue that a lower status could enhanced fear. On the contrary, the children from workers and employees declare more often "no fear" (35,1 per cent) than those of executive and businessmen (25,5 per cent) (R=.09/p<.000). This difference only holds true for boys (from 31,8 per cent to 44 per cent, R=.11/p<.000) and is not significant for girls (from 19,3 to 26 per cent, R=.05/p<.09).

With a measure of employment/ unemployment in the household, we find convergent results in the sense that a family with no or little income from labor is not a context that favors fear among kids. Among households with two adults working fulltime (n=890), the kids express "no fear" for 30 per cent of them, if one adult is full time and the other part time (n=445) it is 22,5 per cent, when only one adult is working full time or the 2 of them part time (n=687) the percentage is 34,6 and it climbs to 41,3 per cent when nobody works at home or when one adult is working part time (n=201) (R=.07;p<.001). Less fear in young kids is to be found within the most precarious households.

Figure 11.1 **Fear and victimisation and status of occupancy - 1999**



An other indirect measure of wealth is given by the type of neighborhood. The social sector of housing, largely subsidized by the central State, has the lowest cost for rental and has a mission publicly heralded to host the most deprived. It is therefore no surprise to find the most deprived families in these places. One could imagine that living in these deprived neighborhoods could mean more fear of crime for the kids, because these places have the stigma of insecurity by European standard: high building (towers), or long buildings (bars) and low quality espaces verts. It could also be so because more disorders or less police are to be seen in those places. In fact, young residents are less afraid in housing estates than in the rest of the city (R=.08/p<.000).

We find little influence of social status on fear of crime, and contrary to expectations slightly less worry for the children of the less well off. Lower status is correlated with less fear on the streets.

11.5.3 Perceived disorders in the physical environment

Physical clues can be interpreted as signs of the presence of unsupervised kids on the streets and therefore as the possibility to be confronted to groups or even gangs. It has been found in many cities that physical disorders are correlated with fear among adults. But, among young people, signs of lack of maintenance or even the presence of tags on the walls could be interpreted differently because minor vandalism is a very frequent behavior among minors (even the most frequent in our data) and also because these acts are not perceived as serious crimes.

Therefore, it is important to verify the potential association of incivilities and fear in the adolescent age. The 13-19 years old are sensitive to disorders as far as fear of assault is concerned. More incivilities around their home is a co-factor of fearfulness. We find a small positive correlation (R=.07;p<.000): more disorders are slightly correlated with more fear. The correlation is significant only for girls (R=.12/p=<.000).

In conclusion, personal experience of crime and disorders in the environment can be combined to explain a part of fear of assault.

11.5.4 Personal experiences of crime

Personal experience of one type of crime is correlated with fear of this specific crime. Here, fear of assault is associated with having being a victim of assault (whatever its motivation is). As it is found in numbers of surveys that experience and fear have a linkage, and also that physical threat or injury is a predictor of fear, this result is no surprise (R=.23; p<.000).

However, it should be noted that this results hold true for boys as well as girls and young adolescent as well as more aged ones.

The correlation between fear and victimisation is stronger for boys (N=1120 R=.32;p<.000) than for girls (N=1097; R=.23;p<.000). This is coherent with girls being not only afraid because of their past experience of crime, but because they anticipate more serious consequences (related to sexual assault).

Figure 11.2 **Fear and number of victimisations broken down by gender - 1999**



Residing in public housing estate is not a good predictor of being more frequently assaulted (no significant difference is found about victimisation among kids).

11.5.5 Lifestyle and exposure to risk

As exposed, we have no external measurement of crime pressure (for example: crime statistics at the neighborhood level) and the data do not allow for a reliable calculation by aggregating individual responses to the survey.

Exposure to risk can be derived after the place young people live in (deprived social housing neighborhoods versus the rest of a metropolis, urban center versus rural periphery) and also after their individual life-style.

Ecological indirect measures of risk are not correlated with fear of crime. We find no correlation between municipality size and fear (and also no difference in victimisation rates; it must be recalled that all municipalities, even the small ones are part of a metropolitan area). Residing in the center municipality or in a semi-rural setting (under 6000 inhabitants) implies no difference in terms of fear or victimisation.

Using a different proxy, the opposition between police or gendarmerie zone doesn't give different outcomes. In our sample, some of the adolescents come from the main municipality or the important suburbs that constitute a metropolis, and some other come from the rural periphery. The urban setting is in the hand of the national police and the rural of the national gendarmerie. Fear of being mugged is not related to the rural versus urban nature of the place of residence (R=ns).

Life-style related exposure to risk is correlated with personal victimisation. After computing an index of exposure in the streets, and splitting the population into 3 categories (low exposure n=760, medium exposure n=739, high exposure n=770), the results display a difference in the victimisation rate but only for those that are the most exposed. In effect, 68,6 per cent of the less exposed have suffered no victimisation, 69,8 per cent of the intermediate category but 53 per cent of the most exposed. Victims of 3 or more types of crimes are 7,8 per cent of the most exposed against 3,2 and 2,8 of the less exposed and intermediate.

Figure 11.3 **Fear and number of victimisations broken down by age -1999**



Figure 11.4 **Number of victimisations broken down by gender - 1999**



Because exposure grows with aging (between 13 and 18/19), we find that victimisation tends to extent as adolescents reach the age of 15 or 16. The percentage with 2 victimisations rises from 6,5 to 15 per cent between 13 and 18/19.

As seen in figure 11.4, girls are substantially less victimized (except for sexual assaults) than boys (R=.21;p<.000).

No simple interpretation can be derived from these results. In fact, fear of crime does not seem to evolve in parallel with the risk of becoming a victim as we will see when observing vulnerability.

PERSONAL VULNERABILITY

We have at least two facets of personal vulnerability:

- one that is more physical in the sense that it is depending on given personal features: gender, age;
- one that is dependent of personal activity, for example physical fitness or the selection of the peers as friends or as mates to go out on the streets.

PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY

Physical vulnerability can depend on the capability to resist or escape an offender (older adolescent run faster), but also to the potential damages that one could suffer when subject to an assault (women run the risk of sexual assault).

Age could be a good predictor of fear: aren't younger adolescents easy to prey on than more robust kids? It doesn't appear that age is a strong proxy for vulnerability. It is very weakly associated with fear of mugging, the young people with "no fear" being a lesser percentage at 18 than at 13 (R=.07;p<.002).

There might be several conflicting explanations for this. One the one hand, as they grow older and become more exposed, they are less physically and perhaps less mentally vulnerable. On the other hand, at a younger age, the freedom of movement is more limited and parental control stricter and because their have less risks they experience less fear.

It is also possible that young offenders tend to assault kids of their own age (probably because they own objects that are valued among the age group: clothes, cd player, mobile phone etc…).

Figure 11.5 **Fear and number of victimisations broken down by age - 1999**



Figure 11.6 **Fear and number of victimisations broken down by gender -1999**



Gender remains a pertinent proxy of fear among 13-19 years old, as it is in the general population when it comes to personal fear. Girls that express "no fear" are 38,5 per cent when boys are only 23,4 per cent (R=.22; p<.000). Girls are less often victim of violence on the streets, mainly because they don't participate often to fighting and are very reluctant to use force or threats in general. However, because girls feel more vulnerable, and also because the parents perceive them so, they tend to adjust their exposure by limiting the time they spend out, especially at night.

Perhaps the gap between risk of victimisation and fear is due to the relative victimisation, i.e. victimisation against exposition (going out alone), at least as far as age is concerned. As can be seen in figure 11.7, relative victimisation is declining when boys and girls grow older. The declining fear could be linked with this evolution.

Figure 11.7 **Exposure and victimisations broken down by gender and age - 1999** *(number of types of victimisation / number of times out at night without parents)*



Physical fitness could also play a role. Doing more sport means at least the capability to resist to some sort of unarmed assault (the majority in our study) or to run to fly away from the perpetrator. This might reassure the kids about their competence in escaping severe consequences if assault would occur. But, we find no correlation between physical fitness and fear, even controlling for gender and age (13-14/15-16/17-19).

Finally, regarding vulnerability, Physical aspects of vulnerability measured as the potential to resist or escape are not conclusive. But, gender remains a good predictor of fear: girls are more afraid than boys.

For French adolescents, except the influence of gender that is confirmed, vulnerability seems not to constitute a key set of variables for the explanation of fear of being assaulted in their city.

11.4.6. Social skills: self-protection and fighting

One of the social skills that might have been overlooked in explaining fear of crime is the capability to assault somebody else. Why shall I feel insecure if I know that I am the mugger?

COMMITTING SERIOUS CRIMES AND FEAR

Declaring serious crime as a perpetrator is slightly linked with a lower fear of being assaulted (R= .11, p<.000). We find a substantial difference in the percentage of fear expressed by respondents (29 per cent that declared no serious offense with no fear as opposed to 67,7 of “no fear” for repeat offenders). One technical problem with taking the capability and actuality of fighting or assaulting somebody else is that repeat offenders are not very common. Looking at cross tabulations, we find only a small proportion of repeat serious offenders. Out of 2225 valid individuals, we find only 31 young people that declared having committed 3 or more types of serious acts, 47 2 types, 216 1 type and 1931 no type at all.

It is noteworthy that we can find a negative correlation between committing crimes and fear of crime because committing crimes is itself positively associated with victimisation. Among the victims of 3 or more types of crimes 29,2 per cent are a perpetrator of one or more serious crime, the victims of 1 type of crime are a perpetrator for 18,6 per cent and when they are not victim of any crime the young persons are only a perpetrator for 8,1 per cent of them (R=.19;p<.000).

Figure 11.8 **Fear and being the author of serious crimes - 1999**



Controlling the correlation between victimisation and fear by offending brings into light that the 2 dimensions (victimisation and fear) are both valid for explaining fear. Moreover, the correlation is highest for those who have committed 2 serious offenses or more. When no serious offense is declared, R=.24/p<.000, when 1 is declared it is R=.21/p<.001, but when 2 types of crimes or more are declared R=.41/p<.000. The young population most sensitive to being a victim is made the individuals that commit more crimes.

Being a perpetrator of serious crime is slightly correlated with practicing sports, as found in our survey as well as others. How far are these two aspects intertwined in protecting against fear of crime? The correlation between fear and being a perpetrator of crimes is very similar among young people practicing (R=.11;p<.000) and not practicing sport (R=.09;p<.000). But the percentage of kids with “no fear” is the highest when they do not practice sport and commit 2 or 3 or more types of serious crimes.

The fact of doing sport (outside school) doesn’t provide more sense of safety on the streets.

Table 11.1 **Sport, crimes and fear - 1999** *(per cent of "no fear")*

	No serious crime declared	1	2	3 types of serious crimes	R
Sport	29,0	39,9	47,4	63,6	(n= 1,389) .11;p<.000
No Sport	29,4	34,9	66,7	77,8	(n=830) .09;p<.000

Other measures that might provide mutual protection, that is relationships with delinquents peers and to be on the street with a group made of boys have no correlation with personal fear.

VULNERABILITY WHILE OUT OF HOME : MUTUAL PROTECTION

One way of managing fear of assault is organizing the group of peer when going out. The gender composition of the group does not affect the fear of boys. But it does for girls: 16,7 per cent have “no fear” when the group is mainly made of boys and 31,3 per cent when mainly made of girls (r=.11/p=<.000). The girls probably feel protected when they are on the streets in the company of boys.

The ethnic composition of the group is also influencing fear, but especially for boys: when it is mainly made of peers with French origins, adolescents express “no fear” for 27,3 per cent of them and when it is with foreign origins for 61,5 per cent (R=.22/p<.000). Among girls, the difference is only form 19,9 per cent to 24,6 per cent (R=.07/p<.02). The correlation hold true even when controlling for ethnic origins of the respondent. The perception of being safer when in the company of adolescents with foreign origins is probably to be related to the public image they have in the general public have being often involved in street violence and their over-representation in juvenile justice for such crimes. Being with members of an ethnic minorities is a sauve-conduit in French cities.

Because ethnic minority youth could be confused with delinquent peers, we also have computed the correlation between the number of delinquents peers and fear that have proved to be void. It is likely that it is not the presence of delinquents in the group that is perceived as protection, but the availability of ethnic minority adolescent that could mediate in the event of a fight or an assault on the streets.

In sum, vulnerability is not only a matter of personal capability to fight or escape, but also a matter of whom you are on the streets with.

Mutual protection seems therefore to be less important than the potential aggression to be released by an individual.

11.5.6 The perception of public authorities

Finally, we can observe the perception of the police and the judiciary. We used and index made with six questions on perceptions (negative and positive phrasing: are violent with young people versus protect young people). Fear of mugging is lowest for those who have a very negative image of the police and the judiciary. We find that 40 per cent of those who detest most the police and the judiciary express “no fear” against 31 per cent on average (with no difference among the 3 quartiles) (R=.08/p<.000). Controlling for age (in 3 groups), we find that a the young age of 13-14, there is no correlation. It is only valid for the 15-16 (R=.12/p<.002) and the 17-19 (R=.09/p<.009).

Finally, we find very little influence of conventional perceptions on fear of crime. And it seems that distance with the public authorities has a small effect on fear in the sense of increasing the feeling of safety. This is contradictory with previous findings on the adult population.

11.6 Regressions

In order to clarify the respective contribution of all the above variables, we have processed a regression analysis on boys and girls, and then separately on boys and on girls as we have seen that not all effects were valid for both genders.

The variables relating to exposure were omitted because of lack of explanatory power at the individual (versus age group) level.

The variables explain only 18 per cent of the total variance, which is a modest contribution as opposed to the variety and scope of the independents variables included in the regression. Results for the entire sample are that the best predictor of crime among young people is the number of victimisations and then gender (possibly a proxy of vulnerability : the

sexual consequences of assault being more probable for girls). Perceptions of disorders also tend to increase fear among teenagers.

Table 11.2 **Random sample, two metropolitan areas (Grenoble, St Etienne), France - 1999**

Boys+Girls (N=1 991)	Partial R.	R / p	standardized ß	t	Significance p
Constant	-	-		18.027	0
Relations parents = bad	0,07	.12***	-7	3.203	0,001
Relations teachers = bad	-0,03	-.04*	0,03	-1.288	0,198
Sanctions at school (+)	-0,1	-.18***	0,1	-4.376	0
SES (3 ladders) (low)	-0,02	-.06**	-0,02	-0,901	0,368
Nb full time jobs family (0)	-0,01	-.06**	-0,01	-0,395	0,693
Housing type (bad)	-0,05	-.08***	-0,05	-2.029	0,043
Disorders in neighb. (+)	0,11	.08***	0,11	4.785	0
Victims serious acts (+)	0,27	.21***	0,27	12.447	0
Gender % in peer gp (Boy)	-0,07	-0,03	-0,07	-3.111	0,002
Ethnic % in peer gp (Mino)	-0,08	-.14***	-0,09	-3.635	0
Ethnic Origins (Minority)	-0,09	-.18***	-0,09	-3.913	0
Nb types serious crime (+)	-0,08	-.13***	-0,09	-3.464	0,001
Gender (boy)	-21	-.22***	-0,24	-9.750	0
Police Image (positive)	3	.08***	0,03	1.388	0,165
Adjustment Quality F=32,758	R=0.43 Df=(14)	R 2=.19	(0.000)	R 2 ajusted= 0,18	

p=<.05/*=.00/***=.000

Some of the variables have a moderate but significant correlation with fear of assault: quality of relations with parents or sanctions at school (as

well as residing in a deprived area) are converse correlations. While bad relations with parents means more fear, more sanctions at school (as well as residing in a deprived area) means less fear.

Finally, the variables relating to self or mutual protection have a contribution on fearfulness. Even taking all other variables into account, the effect of these variables remains significant. When adolescents are the author of serious crimes, when they go out with other boys and member of minority groups (and when they are members of minority groups) they tend to experience less fear on the streets.

The comparison of the two other regressions only display small variations between boys and girls. For boys as well as girls, personal victimisation is the most important factor of fear of assault. For boys, the type of housing has an influence on fear, but not for girls. For girls, the gender composition of the peer group when they go out is associated with fear, but not for boys. Girls only are sensitive to the possible protection of young male. But they give less importance to the ethnic composition of the peer group than boys. Ethnicity of respondent and number of serious crimes committed only play of role for boys. This might be explained by

Table 11.3 **Random sample, two metropolitan areas (Grenoble, St Etienne), France - 1999**

Boys (N=1,003)	Partial R.	R / p	Standardized ß	Significance p
Constant	-	-		0
Relations parents = bad	0,06	.09**	-6	0,05
Relations teachers = bad	-0,01	-0,01	-0,01	0,837
Sanctions at school (+)	-0,1	-.14***	-0,1	0,001
SES (3 ladders) (low)	-0,02	-.09**	-0,02	0,546
Nb full time jobs family (0)	-0,01	-.09**	-0,01	0,809
Housing type (bad)	-0,08	-.15***	-0,08	0,01
Disorders in neighb. (+)	0,08	0	0,08	0,009
Victims serious acts (+)	0,31	.31***	0,31	0
Gender % in peer gp (Boy)	0,05	0	0,04	0,146
Ethnic % in peer gp (Mino)	-0,1	-.22***	-0,11	0,001
Ethnic Origins (Minority)	-0,12	-.24***	-0,12	0
Nb types serious crime (+)	-0,09	-.12***	-0,1	0,004
Police Image (positive)	0,04	.12***	0,05	0,162
Adjustment Quality	R=0.45	R 2=.20 R 2 ajusted=	0,19	
F=18,892	Df=(13)		(0.000)	

p=<.05/*=.00/***=.000

Table 11.4 **Random smple, two metropolitan areas (Grenoble, St Etienne), France - 1999**

N=988 (Girls)	Partial R.	R / p	Standardized ß	t	Significance p
Constant	-	-		7.874	0
Relations parents (= bad)	0,07	.09**	7	2.282	0,023
Relations teachers (= bad)	-0,06	-0.06*	-0,05	-1.760	0,079
Sanctions at school (+)	-0,11	-0.10**	-0,11	-3.357	0,001
SES (3 ladders) (low)	-0,02	-0,03	-0,02	-0,595	0,552
Nb full Jobs family (0)	-0,01	-.05 (06)	-0,01	-0,341	0,733
Housing type (bad)	-0,02	-0,03	-0,02	-0,457	0,648
Disorders in neighb. (+)	0,13	0.14***	0,13	3.954	0
Victims serious acts (+)	0,22	0.23***	0,22	6.885	0
Gender % in peer gp (Boy)	-0,09	-0.13***	-0,08	-2.662	0,008
Ethnic % in peer gp (Mino)	-0,06	-0.09***	-0,07	-1.968	0,05
Ethnic Origins (Minority)	-0,06	-0.12***	-0,06	-1.820	0,07
Nb types serious crime (+)	-0,04	-0,03	-0,05	-1.388	0,166
Police Image (positive)	0,02	0,03	0,02	0,567	0,571
Adjustment Quality	R=0. 34	R 2=0.12	R 2 ajusted=	0,11	
F=9.934	Df=(13)		(0.000)		

p=<0.05/*=0.00/***=0.000

the much lower contribution of girls to violent crimes, be they of French or foreign origins. For boys both ethnicity and ethnic composition are more important than for girls: the ethnic dimension of the explanation is linked to gender. Finally, neither for boys nor for girls does the perception of the police affect their fear of assault. Peer groups bring more reassurance when out on the streets than the idea the adolescents have about police action.

11.7 Conclusion

There do not appear to be a single strong variable to be used as an independent variable in a model, but rather a number of variables with modest correlations to fear of crime.

Fear of crime among adolescents is only partly explained by the large set of variable encompassing large aspects of their social life. Fear among boys is way better explained (R2=20) then among girls (R2=12). There are aspects intrinsic to girls (whatever their sources) that need to be studied carefully.

Personal victimisation and gender remain the two best predictor of fear. Some correlation are counter intuitive in the sense that the general hypothesis of a better social integration as protective of fear is not proven. On the contrary, some of the "positive" attachment to family, school or peers is not correlated with fear of assault or is slightly but significantly associated with higher fear, not lower.

The addition of self and mutual protection variables appears to be conclusive and although modestly contributing to explaining fear among adolescents all things equal.

In total, children from the "bad" neighborhood, members of minority groups, sanctioned at school that also tend to be the most deviant children in terms of committing serious crimes are the ones that are more reassured when on the streets.

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TWELVE

FEAR TODAY, GONE TOMORROW: DO SURVEYS OVERSTATE FEAR LEVELS?

12.1 Introduction

Research exploring emotional responses to crime in European and North American countries has suggested that a significant proportion of western populations live in 'fear' of crime. However, recent reviews of the methodologies employed by these surveys (especially with regards to the questions used to measure fear) have suggested that the fear of crime is routinely over-estimated. This article reports on the design of alternative measures of the fear of crime which are not subject to the imperfections of the earlier questions. The questions, when piloted in a survey of 1,000 people living in England, Wales and Scotland, produce much lower rates of fear than did the old crime survey questions.

"An epidemic terror seized upon the nations; no man thought himself secure, either in his person or possessions, from the machinations of

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the devil and his agents. Every calamity that befel him he attributed to a witch. If a storm arose and blew down his barn, it was witchcraft; if his cattle died of a murrain - if disease fastened upon his limbs, or death suddenly entered and snatched a beloved face from his hearth - they were not visitations of Providence, but the works of some neighbouring hag, whose wretchedness or insanity caused the ignorant to raise their finger and point at her as a witch. The word was upon everybody's tongue. France, Italy, Germany, England, Scotland, and the far North successively ran mad upon this subject, and for a long series of years furnished their tribunals with so many trials for witchcraft, that other crimes were seldom or never spoken of. Thousands upon thousands of unhappy persons fell victims to this cruel and absurd delusion. In many cities of Germany […] the average number of executions for this pretended crime was six hundred annually, or two every day, if we leave out the Sundays, when it is to be supposed that even this madness refrained from its work."

Charles MacKay, discussing the 'witch manias' which gripped Europe between the 12th and 15th Centuries, from his Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, 1993 [1841], pages 462-463.

12.2 Fear of crime

The fear of crime is a creature of the last 30 years of the twentieth century. The corpus of work surrounding terms like the 'fear of crime', 'emotional reactions to crime', 'anxieties about crime' is truly vast. Ten years ago, in 1992, Chris Hale reviewed the literature for the London Metropolitan Police (UK) and noted that there were 200 published articles on the subject (Hale, 1996). In 2000, Ditton and Farrall (2000:xxi) revised this to over 800. In sum, this body of work sugests that the fear of crime is wide-spread amongst members of many contemporary westernised societies. It is our own 20th Century 'epidemic terror' - "it is upon everybody's tongue". Social scientists, the media and policy-makers have all been swept up in attempts to measure it, explain it, discuss it and tackle it.

The numbers of individuals and groups affected by such fears is quite

staggering. For example, the 1994 British Crime Survey[3] reported that a quarter of the population were 'very worried' about burglary and rape (Hough 1995:9). The same report suggested that of a range of contemporary life worries, burglary and rape headed the list (1995:15), out-stripping job loss, road accidents, illnesses and debt. Later sweeps of the BCS suggested that the 1994 figures represent something of a 'blip', and that for the period between 1984 and 2000 around 20 per cent of the population were 'very worried' about burglary (2000:45). The same survey reported that the proportion of respondents feeling 'very worried' about street crimes (muggings and robberies) similarly hovered around the 20 per cent mark. Crime surveys of rural areas (see Koffman, 1996:89-95) have suggested similar rates of fear of crime. The Aberystwyth Crime Survey (Koffman, 1996) found that a quarter of the sample reported feeling 'a bit/very unsafe' (1996:98) It would appear that we are fearful of victimisation at almost every turn. Questions relating to the fear of crime were one of the only consistent elements of the 1982-1994 BCS sweeps (Mayhew, 1996:48).[4]

So great have been public and policy concerns in the UK, that the Dept. of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) requested that the various local authorities with a community safety remit start asking resident citizens about their fear of crime from 2002/03, and that questions relating to this topic be asked every three years to monitor fluctuations in fear of crime rates (DTLR, 2002, Chapter 11 and Annex A). More recently, the Audit Commission adopted questions about the fear of crime

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3 Several studies undertaken in the USA, Australia and in mainland Europe also testify to high rates of anxiety. For example, studies in Holland (van der Wurff et al, 1989), Slovenia (Mesko and Farrall, 2000), Switzerland (Killias and Clerci, 2000:439-40) as well as those studies undertaken in the UK and referred to above, have frequently demonstrated the fear of crime to be a common experience amongst those surveyed. In the USA, the spiritual home of the crime survey (Block, 1993:183), numerous studies dating back to the surveys organised following 1965 Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Biderman et al, 1967, Ennis, 1967 and Reiss, 1967) have suggested that a significant proportion of the population experiences crime-related fears on a regular basis. See Hale, 1996, and Ditton and Farrall, 2000a for reviews of this literature. Numerous countries, it would appear, have "successively run mad upon this subject" (MacKay, 1841 [1993]).

4 Of course, criminologists have for some time now debated the 'meaning' of such figures (a point which we are grateful to Mike Hough and Rachel Pain for alerting us to). Respondents' answers to standard survey questions about the fear of crime appear to be a mix of recalls of past events, fears for others' safety, disapproval of criminal behaviour, attempts to generalise one's feelings to 'fit' the perceived focus of the interview and the such like (Farrall et al, 1997). In this respect, current measures of the fear of crime may have little objective meaning other than as a diagnostic tool for comparing group A with group B. In this respect, finding that group A has x per cent fear level is of little intrinsic value. However, finding that group A's fear level is significantly greater than group B's is interesting. A point we shall return to later.

as its quality of life indicators (Audit Commission, 2002). In the space of 20 years in the UK, the fear of crime has gone from a marginal topic of research to a Best Value Performance Indicator. The aim of the article is to review the current methodologies and to suggest possible improvements to these. In so doing we will also cast a critical eye over the uses to which this knowledge as been put.

12.3 Taking stock

Do we find the findings about fear -and by implication 'anger', 'worry' etc.- credible? That is, do we, as a community of scholars, believe the data we have been producing for the last thirty or so years? Are we really prepared to unquestioningly accept that between a third to two-thirds of the western society are 'fearful', 'angry', or 'worried' about crime 'some' or 'a lot' of the time (Ditton et al, 1999)? Is the fear of crime merely a 20th Century equivalent to MacKay's "cruel and absurd delusion"?

Several commentators have raised doubts surrounding the validity of the instruments used to generate these findings (see, inter alia, Bernard, 1992; Bowling, 1993; Fattah, 1993; Schneider, 1981; Skogan, 1981; Farrall, et al, 1997 and Zauberman, 1985). A range of methodological problems have been identified which cumulatively raise the possibility that the fear of crime has been significantly misrepresented. Many commentators suspect that the incidence of the fear of crime has been exaggerated via survey research. Certainly there is some supporting evidence of this in both the specific literature on fear of crime (Fattah, 1993:53-54, Yin, 1982:242, Bernard, 1992: 66, Farrall et al, 1997:665-666, and Schuman and Presser, 1996:85) and that which relates to survey research more generally (Schuman and Presser, 1996, Belson, 1986, and Bishop et al, 1986).

The earliest types of questions used to measure the fear of crime asked about how safe an individual felt in their local area and included the following variants: How safe do you, or would you, feel walking alone in this area after dark?; How safe would you feel being out alone in your neighbourhood after dark? and Is there any place around here where you feel unsafe walking at night?. These types of questions have been criticised for:

- starting with the word 'How' (generally believed to be leading, Moser & Kalton, 1971:325),
- failing to mention crime at all, (Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987:76),
- referring to an imprecise geographical area (the 'neighbourhood', Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987:76),
- asking about an activity ('walking alone after dark') which many people may do rarely or never, (Ferraro & LaGrange, 1987:76-77),
- mixing fears and risk assessments (Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987:77),
- mixing the real ('do you') and the imagined ('would you'), and
- failing to refer to a specific time period (Farrall and Ditton, 1999).

To this list we can also add the point raised above in footnote 2: that the answers respondents give to the current fear questions have no intrinsic meaning and that (by implication) their use should be limited to comparisons between sub-groups. An individual or group's expressed level of fear only becomes meaningful in any sense when compared against another individual's or sub-group's fear level. Yet fear-provoking events, we contend, are memorable, 'recallable' and as such it should be possible to record these with some degree of accuracy.[5] As such the current questions prevent a complete and thorough exploration of the fear of crime through a design fault which limits their usage to inter-group comparisons.

Some of the more recent developments in this field have addressed some of the issues referred to in the list above. It is now quite common to find surveys that rely upon questions not dissimilar to the following: How worried are you that someone might break into your home? Whilst this type of questioning is undoubtedly an improvement upon the previous efforts, even this question starts with the word 'How' and fails to refer to a specific time period for which respondents should provide answers. This point is crucially important, for as Farrall and Ditton (1999:61) demonstrated, there can be (and frequently are) very wide variation in the time periods for which respondents provide answers. Some of those re-interviewed in their study reported that their answers referred to "just how I felt now", whilst others reported that their answers covered periods of many years. As such, the current questions used to assess changes in fear levels are unsuitable for the job as the questions are not sufficiently well drafted to allow for changes in fear over specific

5 Although, of course, some events may be forgotten, suppressed or become distorted with time.

periods of time (e.g. 'the past year', 'since the street lighting was introduced' etc.) to be assessed. Perhaps this is why it has proved so difficult to demonstrate changes in fear levels pre- and post-interventions (Nair et al 1993, Ditton and Farrall, 2000:xxi). Clearly, if people are providing answers which refer to an extended period of time, it is hard to talk about changes in fear levels over time in any meaningful sense, be it year on year changes or pre-/post-intervention data.

Collectively, these criticisms and critiques raise the distinct possibility that the very act of being surveyed about their feelings concerning crime, if not 'creating' these feelings, certainly appears to be exaggerating[6] them (Schuman and Presser, 1996:85, Bishop et al, 1986).[7] If this is the case, quite why the majority of people should exaggerate the extent of their fears 'upwards' towards the more fearful end of the scale rather than 'downwards' to the less fearful end is unclear.[8] However, if crime is a rare (and trivial)[9] event for many, and surveys suggest that it might well be, then the estimations produced using the current survey items may be subject to various biases (Tourangeau et al, 2000:86). As such, the evaluated outcomes of many policy initiatives hinge on the use of a suspect measurement tool. We need to find a way around these problems if we are to produce an accurate portrayal of the extent of people's fears - this article takes some initial, teetering steps towards a better measure of the fear of crime.

12.4 The proposed new measure

In an earlier article (Farrall 2003), a number of solutions to the problems outlined above were suggested. The solution to the variable time periods

6 The questions might exaggerate the fear of crime in three ways. They could exaggerate the number of people who are reported to fear crime, and they could also exaggerate both the frequency and intensity of these feelings.

7 Farrall 2003 reports the case of one man who reported that he had not thought about burglary until interviewed about it. A similar event occurred during the fieldwork for this project. A man who when interviewed reported no fear, later called the lead author to report that ever since the interview he had been extremely fearful.

8 Of course, there may be some groups who under-report their extent of their fears. We suspect that the chief under-reporters might be young men. Goodey (1997:65-66) suggests that boys report greater levels of fear than girls, but that this changes as they age and become 'men'.

9 For example, less than half of all crimes reported in the 1992 British Crime Survey were reported to the police, with the most common explanation for failing to report being that the event was 'too trivial', Mayhew et al, 1993:viii and 25).

for which respondents appear to report fear, anger, thinking and the such like is fairly straightforward. Respondents should be asked to direct their answers to the past year only. Of course, there may also be very good reasons for collecting data which relates to periods outside of this time-frame, and there is little problem, that we can anticipate, in asking people two questions - fear in the last year and fear 'in general'. This makes sense within the logic of national and local crime surveys, as other experiences are also recorded for the past year (most notably victimisation, but also perceptions of the crime rate and contacts with the police).

As for the problems with assessing the severity or extent of these feelings, Farrall (2003) proposed 'grounding' people's answers in their actual experiences. In so doing, survey researchers ought to mimic the questions which people are asked about their victimisation. Respondents should be asked if they can recall, in the past year, any occasions during which they actually felt fearful about crime. Those who cannot, are, in line with common survey assumptions, surmised probably not to have experienced intense feelings (because, if these feelings had been intense they would, presumably, have remembered them). Those who do report experiencing such feelings, can then be asked a series of questions relating to the intensity and frequency of these feelings. This is exactly what the British Crime Survey and other similar crime surveys have been doing for years when recording victimisation experiences. This entails accepting that crime surveys cannot capture the full experience of 'fear', 'anger' and so on, and instead using surveys for what they do very well: auditing. We are still able to conceptualise fear etc. as being emotional responses which ebb and flow over the course of people's lives (à la all of the qualitative data which has ever been collected on this subject), but instead of attempting to measure these feelings by asking vaguely worded questions which evoke images of classically fearful scenarios and allow respondents to interpret them variously, we count the frequency with which these emotions are felt.

On the basis of the above observations and reasoning, Farrall (2003) proposed that rather than ask questions about emotional responses to crime in the ways hitherto used, that the following questioning structure be employed:

Q1: "In the past year, have you ever actually felt fearful about the possibility of becoming a victim of crime?"

This question-wording builds upon the observations, made by Moser and Kalton (1971:325) and Sterngold et al (1994) that filter questions reduce the likelihood of survey questions leading respondents towards giving attitudinal responses about issues which they have no attitude. Those who report no fearful experiences in the previous year are routed to the next survey topic, whilst those who report having felt fearful in the past year are asked:

Q2: "How frequently have you felt like this in the last year?"

This question wording is aimed at capturing absolute frequency rather than relative frequency (Schaeffer, 1991). Finally, those who replied yes at Q1 will be asked:

Q3: "On the last occasion, how fearful did you feel?"

[0 = cannot remember, 1 = not very fearful, 2 = a little bit fearful, 3 = quite fearful, 4 = very fearful].

Of course, 'fearful' can be replaced with 'worried', 'angry', 'anxious', etc., and similarly 'victim of crime' changed to 'victim of assault', 'victim of burglary', 'victim of car crime' and so on. The time periods can equally easily be altered ('before the introduction of street-lighting in this area'/'following the introduction of street-lighting in this area', or 'in the past six months' etc.).

After an initial piloting exercise (a report of which is available from the authors upon request), the questions were modified to the following:

"I'd now like to ask you some questions about only the previous year."

NQ1: "In the past year, have you ever felt fearful about becoming a victim of crime?"

1= yes

2 = no

NQ2: "How frequently have you felt like this in the past year?"

Write in number of times….

NQ3: "And on the last occasion, how fearful did you feel?"

1 = not very fearful

2 = a little bit fearful

3 = quite fearful

4 = very fearful

9 = cannot remember

These questions were asked of 977 respondents in an Omnibus survey run by Taylor-Nelson SOFRES. A further sample of 995 were asked "How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?"[10] If the respondent said that they never went out alone at night, the interviewer was told to probe how safe the respondent would feel if they did go out. The codes used were: 1 = Very safe, 2 = Fairly safe, 3 = A bit unsafe, and 4 = Very unsafe. In addition, TNS provided data pertaining to each respondent's age, gender, social class, household size, the number of children in the household and the region of the UK in which the interviews were conducted.

The surveys were conducted between the 16th and 20th of October 2002 and gathered responses from a range of sampling points across the UK. The questions were preceded by a variety of subjects, including awareness and usage of cigar brands, awareness of electrical retailers and their advertising, awareness of supermarket advertising, awareness of clothing ranges and whether or not the respondent had athletes foot (!). The fear questions appeared in the same position in both surveys. TNS provided a weighting variable which ensured that the achieved samples were representative of the wider UK population along age, gender, social class and regional dimensions. Tables providing details of the characteristics of the samples can be found in the Appendix.

12.5 Results

Let us start with the old question, given to the sample of 995 respondents in order to establish a 'baseline' level of the fear of crime. Table 12.1 summarises the respondents answers when asked the question "How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?":

These answers are very similar to those found when similar (or identical) questions have been asked. For example, the British Crime Survey 2001 reported that 20 per cent of respondents said they felt "a bit unsafe" and 13 per cent "very unsafe" when walking alone after dark (Kershaw et al 2001: 39). Similarly, the Scottish Crime Survey 2000 reported that 28

[10] This question was used as our comparator as this is the question which both the DTLR and the Audit Commission are proposing is used to evaluate fear of crime, see DTLR (2002) and Audit Commission (2002).

Table 12.1 **OLDQ1 "How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?"**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
Very safe	270	27,0	294	29,0
Fairly safe	353	36,0	354	35,0
Subtotal safe	***623***	***63,0***	***648***	***64,0***
A bit unsafe	168	17,0	163	16,0
Very unsafe	190	19,0	174	17,0
Subtotal unsafe	***358***	***36,0***	***337***	***33,0***
Don't know	14	1,0	14	1,0
Total	**995**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

per cent of respondents felt unsafe when out alone at night (Scottish Executive, 2000, Research Findings 51). When Jason Ditton and his colleagues conducted a similar survey, again of Scottish respondents, they found that 26 per cent of respondents reported feeling unsafe. Thus it would appear that the levels of fear as described by the current research mirrors that uncovered by previous efforts - in other words our 'baseline' is consistent with the findings of other crime surveys. Let us now turn to the new questions: how did they fare?

Those respondents who received the new questions gave the following answers:

Table 12.2 **NEWQ1 "In the past year, have you ever felt fearful about becoming a victim of crime?"**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
Yes	365	37,0	357	36,0
No	602	62,0	634	63,0
Don't know	10	1,0	10	1,0
Total	**977**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

Around one third of the sample who received the new questions appeared to have felt fearful in the previous year. Respondents who were asked the new questions were also asked how fearful they had felt on the last time that they had felt fearful. If we take the commonly used dichotomy of

"quite" or "very" as indicating high levels of fear, we find that around 15 per cent of the sample experienced a relatively high level of fear on the previous occasion they were fearful. This contrasts with the 33 per cent as found amongst the old style of question (table 12.1). It would appear therefore that the new questions significantly reduce the proportions of people reporting high levels of the 'fear of crime'.

Table 12.3 **Fear levels in the past year (NEWQ1 and NEWQ3 combined)**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
Not fearful last year	602	62,0	634	63,0
Not very fearful	23	2,0	20	2,0
little bit fearful	180	18,0	181	18,0
Subtotal low or not fearful	***805***	***82,0***	***835***	***83,0***
Quite fearful	110	11,0	102	10,0
Very fearful	51	5,0	52	5,0
Subtotal fearful	***161***	16,0	154	***15,0***
Can't remember how fearful	1	-	1	-
Can't remembe	10	1,0	10	-
Total	**977**	**100,0**	**1000**	**100,0**

HOW OFTEN WERE FEAR-PROVOKING SITUATIONS ENCOUNTERED?

When those who had said that they had felt fearful in the past year were asked how often they had felt fearful (at Q2), they gave the following replies.[11]

Table 12.4 demonstrates the relative rarity of fearful experiences. Twenty per cent of the sample who had felt fearful in the past year, had only experienced one such episode, and half of the sample (49 per cent) had only experienced between one and four episodes - less than one fearful episode every three months. Given that the true incidence of fear-provoking episodes must also include those who did not experience any fear in the previous year, the figures look even starker: in the UK last year, only around 18 per cent of residents experienced between one and four

[11] The raw answers have been grouped into categories, see Table A9 in the Appendix for the raw answers.

fear-provoking episodes, and most of these experienced only one such episode.

Table 12.4 **NEWQ2 "How frequently have you felt like this in the past year?"*(a)**

	Unweighted			Weighted		
	N	Raw %	Cumulative %	N	Raw %	Cumulative %
Once	70	19,0	19,0	71	20,0	20,0
Twice	61	17,0	36,0	61	17,0	37,0
Three times	27	7,0	43,0	26	7,0	44,0
Four times	20	6,0	49,0	20	6,0	50,0
Over five times	145	39,0	88,0	138	39,0	89,0
Don't know	42	12,0	100,0	40	11,0	100,0
Total	**365**	**100,0**		**357**	**100,0**	

(a) Asked only of those who reported feeling fearful in the past year.

WHAT WAS FEAR ASSOCIATED WITH?

We turn now to consider the various socio-demographic variables which were associated with the two versions of questions about the fear of crime. As we shall see, some interesting findings emerged.

Gender (that is, biological sex) has for a long time been cited as one of the variables most consistently found to be related to fear (Hale, 1996:96), a finding replicated by the current study for both the old question (table 12.5) and the new question (table 12.6):

Table 12.5 **Gender and feelings of unsafety (OLD Q1)** (a)

		Males	Females
Safe (b)	N	341	282
	%	79	51
Unsafe (c)	N	91	267
	%	21	49
Total		**432**	**549**

(a) Pearson Chi-Square: = 79.29, p = .000 with df = 1.
(b) 'Safe' includes the responses 'fairly' and 'very'.
(c) 'Unsafe' includes the responses 'a bit' and 'very unsafe'.

Table 12.6 **Gender and feelings of fear (NEWQ1 and NEWQ3 combined)** (a)

		Males	Females
Not fearful (b)	N	402	403
	%	90	77
Fearful (c)	N	43	118
	%	10	23
Total		**445**	**521**

(a) Pearson Chi-Square: = 29.14, p = .000 with df = 1.
(b) 'Fearful' includes the responses 'quite' and 'very'.
(c) 'Not fearful' includes the responses 'not in the past year', 'not very fearful' and 'a little bit'.

Although the new questions still produce the same finding for gender as the old question, it is interesting to note that the proportions of each gender feeling unsafe/fear has narrowed. In the old question, 79 per cent of males felt safe compared to just 51 per cent of females (28 percentage points difference). For the new questions, whilst 90 per cent of males had not felt fearful in the past year, neither had 77 per cent of females (13 percentage points difference). Whilst gender would still appear to be associated with variations in fear levels, the old question would have appeared to have exaggerated the extent of fear amongst females.

Another of the variables most often cited by criminologists as being associated with higher levels of fear is age (Hale, 1996: 101-103). This is a reasonable assumption to make. As people age they may feel increasingly vulnerable - vulnerable to crime, vulnerable to negative consequences following a crime and unable to recover either health or material losses after victimisation.

Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) of the responses to the old question for age suggested that there was a significant variation in means by age groups. The F-Statistic of 2.849 was significant at the .05 level (p = .015, with df = 5). Levels of fear appeared to be lowest amongst the young (those in age groups 16-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54) and highest amongst those in the older age bands (55-69 and over 70s) - confirming current findings on age and fear (Hale, 1996:100-103). However, when comparable analyses were undertaken for the new questions, there were no statistically different variations (F = .652, p =

.660, df = 5). It would appear then that the finding that age and fear levels increase hand-in-hand is an artefact of question design.[12]

The size of the household in which the respondent was living has also been cited as being related to fear levels. This was confirmed by the old questions, the F Statistic was 2.924, p = .033, df = 3, suggesting that the size of the household was related to levels of feeling unsafe. However there appeared to be no direct link between household size and feelings of unsafety: those living alone, with one other person or with three or more people felt most unsafe, whilst those living with two other people felt least unsafe. When the new questions were considered, a relationship between fear and household size also emerged (F Statistic = 3.807, p = .010, df = 3). There was again no clear pattern to the relationships however. Those living alone and those living with two other people reporting most fear. This is probably statistical 'noise', however, as there is no linear household size-fear relationship.[13] (Whether or not children lived at the house or not was also found to be unrelated to expressions of 'fear of crime' regardless of whether the new or the old questions were used).

The region of the UK in which the respondent was living was found to be related to feelings of unsafety (i.e. the old question), F Statistics = 11.694, p = .000, df = 10. Those living in the West & East Midlands, the North, the North-West and London expressing greatest feelings of unsafety, and those in Scotland, Wales, the South-West, the South-East, East Anglia and Yorkshire & Humberside reporting lowest feelings of unsafety. However, no such findings emerged when the new questions were analysed.[14] These findings remained when the unit of analyses was country of the UK instead of region. The old questions suggested that feelings of

[12] For both the ANOVA tests, the Levene Statistic was significant when untransformed variables were used. This suggested that the data violated one of the key assumptions of ANOVA, viz that variances between groups should be homogenous. For both the new and old questions the log of the variables were used instead (creating homogeneity of variance). The data reported herein used the transformed data. Just to confirm, all ANOVAs were performed on continuous data, rather than the recoded binary data.

[13] For both ANOVAs, the Levene Statistic was significant when untransformed variables were used. For the new questions the log of the variable was used instead, whilst for the old question the square root of the variable was used instead (in both instances this created homogeneity of variance). The data reported herein used the transformed data.

[14] For both ANOVAs, the Levene Statistic was significant when untransformed variables were used. For the new questions the log of the variable was used instead, whilst for the old question the square root of the variable was used instead (in both instances this created homogeneity of variance). The data reported herein used the transformed data.

unsafety were higher in England than in Wales or Scotland (F Statistic = 16.723, p = .000, df = 2). However, no such relationship emerged when the new questions were examined.[15]

Finally, the data was also examined along these same lines for different social classes (Again see Hale, 1996). It was impossible to sufficiently transform the social class variable for its reliable use with the old questions[16] (the Levene Statistic was 3.492, p = .015, df = 3), but the analyses suggested a significant difference in levels of unsafety by social class (F Statistic = 8.353, p = .000, df = 3), such that higher social classes felt less unsafe than lower social classes. The new questions (which were again transformed by taking the log of the values for class) also produced a significant F Statistic (of 8.359, p = .000, df = 3) which suggested that those in social classes D and E felt significantly more fearful than those in classes A-C2.

SUMMARY

To summarise, it would appear that the new questions throw into doubt some of the general findings as they relate to the 'fear of crime'. The new questions produce lower estimations of fear in the population than the old questions. The finding that age and fear were closely related appears to be an artefact of question design, as do the findings that household size and the presence of children in the household effect fear levels. Geographical variations (either by region or by country) also appear to be the result of having relied upon old measures of the fear of crime. Fear, as measured by the new questions, would appear to vary by social class and gender.

12.6 Discussion and conclusion

Our main finding is that self-reported fear hinges on the questions asked. In other words, the fear of crime is a phenomenon highly suscep-

15 For both ANOVAs, the Levene Statistic was significant when untransformed variables were used. For the new questions the log of the variable was used instead, whilst for the old question the square root of the variable was used instead (in both instances this created homogeneity of variance). The data reported herein used the transformed data.

16 And as such this finding must be treated with caution.

tible to methodological manipulation. In the high of this, we wish now to reflect on four questions which this research raises.

DO THE OLD QUESTIONS OVERSTATE 'FEAR' LEVELS?

Our answer to this question is a qualified 'yes'. We qualify our answer because we believe that the questions will need to be asked again and again of different populations and in different surveys. Too often researchers are overly keen to announce that their findings have radically changed the world, and we do not wish to join the ranks of those researchers who have metaphorically cried "wolf!". The questions were asked as part of an omnibus survey (see above) - we do not know how they will fare when asked as part of a crime survey and as such we cannot rule out context effects.

However, there is some evidence that the new questions are heading in the 'right direction': in a recent contribution to this field, one research team reported on a series of question which asked about crime worries in the past three months (Semmens et al, 2002). They found lower rates of reported fear for the burglary and mugging items when respondents were asked about the past three months than the BCS 2000 did for the same items without referring to a time period (compare table Four, page 801 with table Nine, page 805, Semmens et al, 2002). This is in line with the findings reported herein, and lends support to our belief that the fear of crime is measurable for specific time periods, and that when one does so, fear levels drop considerably.

WHY WAS IT THAT THE OLD QUESTIONS EXAGGERATED FEAR LEVELS?

Without further research it is impossible to answer this question fully, however, we have suspicions which we air here in the hope that others will one day be able to contribute to our understanding of this matter. First of all, there is the host of issues that we have reviewed above on the tendency of some question designs to exaggerate estimations of fear (and other subject matters). These alone could account for exaggerated estimations of the fear of crime. There is also the possibility that the old question evoked a classically fear-provoking scenario which taps into a cultural message about when one is safe and when one is unsafe (Hollway and

Jefferson, 2000:9). The new questions, by asking directly about 'moments' of fear arguably leave themselves less subject to these sorts of influences.

Finally there is the observation that the old measures of the fear of crime have no 'intrinsic meaning' and should merely be used to compare group A with group B. This could account for much of the exaggeration we believe we have found. Questions used for comparing A with B need to discriminate between the individuals being observed. It therefore follows that one employs questions which produce a well distributed profile of individuals. It is no use, for example, to use a question which produces a 'bunching' of respondents at one end of the scale with few at the other end of the scale. Thus there is an inherent requirement for respondents to be distributed from one end of the scale to the other in order for there to be sufficient variance for the variable to be either 'explainable' or used to explain variances in another variable. The result is that respondents have been 'stretched out' along this continuum in an artificial way which no longer represents their actual experiences. Thus, when, as we have done, one asks about actual experiences, one finds that respondents' answers suggest a very different profile of the issue at hand (in this case, the fear of crime). The choice is between measuring the fear of crime 'as is' (as we would like to think we have done) or measuring it in a way which makes it amenable to scalar analyses like regression, correlation and T-tests which require normally distributed variables with a reasonable degree of variance.

WHAT DOES THIS DO TO OUR THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FEAR OF CRIME?

Finally we come to what we feel is the most critical issue. We are less cautious here: let us assume, for the moment, that these questions are sound, reliable, valid, etc., etc.. Then these findings utterly change almost everything we know (or rather thought we knew) about the fear of crime. The fear of crime, far from effecting one third of the population, effects around half of this number (15 per cent), and of these people, around half less than once a quarter. As such, the fear of crime would not appear to be a major societal concern, nor a major source of public anxiety. It would not appear to be an issue that very many people have to face very often. It is perhaps, to requote Charles MacKay, our own "cruel and absurd delu-

sion". How has this situation come to pass? The Australian criminologist Murray Lee (2001: 480-481) has suggested that fear of crime exhibits a 'feed-back loop' which has contributed to the raising of fear levels:

"By 'fear of crime' feed-back loop, I mean, inter alia, that the constituent elements I have listed above operate symbiotically to produce and intensify crime fear and the research related to it; that research into victims produces and maintains[17] the criminological concept of 'fear of crime' quantitatively and discursively; that this information operates to identify fear as a legitimate object of governance or governmental regulation; that the techniques of regulation imagine particular types of citizens - fearing subjects; that these attempts to govern 'fear of crime' actually inform the citizenry that they are indeed fearful; that this sensitises the citizenry to 'fear of crime'; that the law and and order lobby and populist politicians use this supposed fearing population to justify a tougher approach on crime, a point on which they grandstand, and in doing so sensitise citizens to fear once again; and that this spurs more research into 'fear of crime' and so on".

This suggests to us that, far from designing theories to explain the fear of crime which uncritically accept the widespread existence of the fear of crime and then place an emphasis on explaining why 'so many' people fear crime using variables X, Y and Z, what we should be doing (à la Lee) is trying to figure out why the fear of crime has become just such a hot topic, and included in this, the contours of its usage as a vehicle for the introduction of a raft of criminal justice policies such as tagging, extra police officers, tougher sentences etc. (Garland, 2001). Like Lee (2001:482) we are not suggesting that people are never fearful, angry, worried etc.. Rather, these emotions are fleeting events in otherwise mundane (read 'fear of crime-free') lives, (Farrall, 2003). We therefore have no difficulty in accepting that some people fear crime, nor that these are unpleasant feelings that ought to be addressed. Our argument is merely with those proponents (academics, policy-makers, politicians and pressure-groups alike) who promote what we feel are exaggerated estimates of both the prevalence and extent of crime-fears.

[17] In the light of the data reported herein, one may wish to think of this in terms of 'exaggerating' rather than 'maintaining'.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EVALUATION RESEARCH?

Let as state again our belief that there are some people who do experience crime-related fears. We know from current reviews of work in this area that there is an uneven distribution of crime (Tricket et al, 1995) and we suspect also an uneven distribution in fear too. Some people are at increased risk of crime, and some people experience both fear more intensely and more frequently than do others. As such, we firmly support the ideal of attempting to continue to tackle both crime and the fear of crime as social problems that can cause harm to both individuals and communities. However, no matter how good such efforts are, efforts to evaluate such attempts are hampered by the reliance upon poorly designed survey questions. In this respect we urge those undertaking evaluations of those interventions which may impact upon the fear of crime to consider the following:

1 research not just the fear of crime, but its frequency and its intensity;

2 do not rely upon ambiguous survey questions which may, through poor design, exaggerate fear levels;

3 do not rely upon the use of survey questions which may, through their wording and reference to cultural norms, provoke further exaggerations in estimates of fear.

We hope that the survey questions discussed herein may offer solutions to these problems.

12.7 Appendix: socio-demographic variables for the two samples

AGE

Appendix Table 12.A1 **New questions sample demographics: age**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
16-24	129	13,0	137	14,0
25-34	162	17,0	181	18,0
35-44	167	17,0	197	20,0
45-54	145	15,0	139	14,0
>54	374	38,0	345	35,0
Total	**977**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

Appendix Table 12.A2 **Old questions sample demographics: age**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
16-24	145	15,0	137	14,0
25-34	180	18,0	187	19,0
35-44	187	19,0	191	19,0
45-54	151	15,0	161	16,0
>54	332	33,0	323	32,0
Total	**995**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

GENDER

Appendix Table 12.A3 **New questions sample demographics: gender**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
Males	450	46,0	487	49,0
Females	527	54,0	513	51,0
Total	**977**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

Appendix Table 12.A4 **Old questions sample demographics: gender**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
Males	435	44,0	488	49,0
Females	560	56,0	513	51,0
Total	**995**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

SOCIAL CLASS

Appendix Table 12.A5 **New questions sample demographics: social class**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
AB	200	21,0	201	20,0
C1	259	27,0	268	27,0
C2	200	21,0	222	22,0
DE	318	33,0	310	31,0
Total	**977**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

Appendix Table 12.A6 **Old New questions sample demographics: social class** (a)

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
AB	168	17,0	186	19,0
C1	256	26,0	285	29,0
C2	193	19,0	218	22,0
DE	378	38,0	312	31,0
Total	**995**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

(a) Figures may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

HOUSEHOLD SIZE

Appendix Table 12.A7 **New questions sample demographics: household size** (a)

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
1	183	19,0	185	19,0
2	341	35,0	325	33,0
3	193	20,0	201	20,0
>4	260	27,0	289	29,0
Total	**977**	**101,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

(a) Figures may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

Appendix Table 12.A8 Old questions sample demographics: household size

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
1	187	19,0	181	18,0
2	351	35,0	351	35,0
3	175	18,0	179	18,0
>4	282	28,0	289	29,0
Total	**995**	**100,0**	**1.000**	**100,0**

Appendix Table 12.A9 NEWQ2 Raw values for "How frequently have you felt like this in the past year ?"(a)

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	N	%	N	%
Once	70	19,0	71	20,0
Twice	61	17,0	61	17,0
Three times	27	7,0	26	7,0
Four times	20	6,0	20	6,0
Five times	17	5,0	14	4,0
Six times	28	8,0	26	7,0
Seven times	1	-	1	-
Nine times	1	-	1	-
Ten times	20	6,0	22	6,0
Twelve times	9	3,0	8	2,0
Fifteen times	4	1,0	3	1,0
Twenty times	12	3,0	12	3,0
Twenty-four times	1	-	1	-
Twenty-five times	1	-	1	-
Thirty times	1	-	1	-
Fifty times	8	2,0	8	2,0
Fifty-two times	8	2,0	7	2,0
Sixty times	1	-	1	-
One Hundred times	8	2,0	7	2,0
One hundred & Fifty times	2	-	2	-
One hundred & Fifty-six times	1	-	1	-
One hundred & Eighty times	1	-	1	-
Two Hundred times	4	1,0	5	1,0
Three Hundred times	4	1,0	4	1,0
Three Hundred & Fifty-six times	1	-	1	-
Three Hundred & Sixty-five times	12	3,0	11	3,0
Don't know	42	12,0	40	11,0
Total	**365**	**100,0**	**357**	**100,0**

(a) Asked only of those who reported feeling fearful in the past year.

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TREND OF CRIMES IN LARGE CITIES

THIRTEEN

COMPARING CRIME TRENDS ON THE BASIS OF SURVEY DATA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

13.1 On comparing crime trends: why and how

The international comparison of crime statistics has always been considered a difficult - if not impossible - task. Over time, many attempts at developing international statistics of crime have been undertaken, but direct comparisons of administrative crime data from different countries are still very difficult and require extreme caution in order to avoid serious mistakes.

The main issue resides in the accuracy of available statistics. For many years the only available quantitative information on crime was that relevant to crimes recorded by the police and persons brought into initial formal contact with the police and/or the criminal justice system. However, such statistics only reflect a) a portion of all crimes that occur, namely those being discovered by the police or reported by victims or witnesses and b) the efficiency of law enforcement and the criminal justice system.

For a number of reasons, quite a few crimes are not reported and therefore not included in crime statistics (dark figure). For example, lack of insurance may lead to non-reporting of property crime, while fear of reprisal may play a crucial role in preventing victims from reporting assault or extortion. Furthermore, it is likely that more crimes will be recorded where the system is more efficient: there are economical, political and cultural differences among countries as well as different levels of development,

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education, and urbanisation, which may produce different levels of performance of public administration (including the police).

As a result, accuracy in crime statistics is very difficult to obtain. The limitations of comparing police statistics have always been well known, however, "too many criminologists felt that they could secure licence to use police statistics to measure crime simply by making a ritual incantation about their limitations" (Mayhew and Hough, 1991).

Several attempts at producing internationally comparable datasets have provided some important results. For example, since 1950 Interpol compiles crime statistics from a large number of countries.[1] The data collection form includes broad categories of crime departing from legal definitions envisaged by criminal codes. Interpol warns that such statistics are not meant for international comparisons, because of different definitions, reporting and recording methods. Despite the major difficulties and gaps, Interpol statistics represent a valuable source of information and are very frequently mentioned in comparative literature.

The United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN Crime Survey) since 1976 provides comparable information on recorded crimes from responding Member States. Standard definitions of crimes include homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, corruption and drug-related crimes. Government agencies in each responding country provide official data adjusted to standard definitions. Data are available on the Internet.[2] Efforts are currently being made in order to enhance the quality of the data being published, also in conjunction with some regional initiatives - mostly in Europe and North America - aimed at data analysis.[3]

Official data may however be integrated with surveys on population (victim surveys) that may provide additional information on crime, crime victims and their attitudes toward the police, reporting rates and reasons for not reporting, fear of crime and crime prevention measures. From their initiation, victim surveys were mainly confined to the developed countries,

[1] Statistics used to be electronically available to the public on Internet. Recently Interpol has changed its publication policy and data are only available to authorised police users.

[2] Data from the first seven surveys are available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_surveys.html. The eighth survey, covering the years 2001 and 2002, will be published early in 2005.

[3] In particular, see Aromaa et al., 2003.

where their diffusion was relatively rapid, becoming more focused and regular, while their presence in the developing world was very meagre. Several countries are regularly collecting information through such surveys (e.g., the British Crime Survey and the National Crime Victimisation Survey in the USA).

Surveys on victims of crime - and to a great extent police statistics -, however, primarily deal with the so-called ordinary crime, as opposed to organised crime, crimes against the environment, trafficking in persons, money laundering and corruption, which not only are notoriously underreported offences, but also show considerable differences the way they are recorded in statistics from different countries. Organised crime remains vaguely defined and to a large degree subjective, and there is little uniformity across countries in the relevant statistical categories.

Such phenomena are becoming more and more important and require suitable instruments to assess their scope. The development of new research methods applicable to “non-conventional” crime will bring further information on the extent and impact of crime on citizens and may assist in revealing trends in transnational crime. Integration of data sources may be considered one of the most promising areas in research on crime statistics (Jehle e Lewis, 1995; Alvazzi del Frate et al., 2000; Aebi et al., 2003; Barclay and Tavares, 2003).

13.2 International crime victim survey

Since victim surveys provide useful indicators of experiences of crime among citizens, it is possible to standardize the data collection instrument and assemble such information at the international level. In 1989 a group of European researchers launched an international standardised survey on crime, called at the time the International Crime Survey, which covered 15 developed/industrialised countries, Poland and the city of Surabaya in Indonesia (Van Dijk, Mayhew and Killias, 1990). Findings revealed the great potential of the tool, especially for the countries where for a number of reasons it was more difficult to collect official statistics, in particular developing countries.

The ICVS shares with national crime/victim surveys the objective of

measuring crime beyond the information provided by police statistics. Indeed, one of the most important findings of the ICVS deals with the possibility of respondents to consistently explain reasons for non-reporting crimes, thus to provide comparative information on why police statistics often do not contain sufficient information to describe the crime picture. Furthermore, respondents are asked to assess the performance of the police in preventing and controlling crime in their areas.

In order to reflect the needs of face-to-face interviewing in developing countries the questionnaire was slightly modified in its layout and the list of crimes was expanded to include questions on consumer fraud and corruption by public officials. The question on consumer fraud was also included in the CATI questionnaire administered in the industrialized countries.

Starting from the second (1992) survey, a growing number of countries joined the project, including twenty developing, to reach the current total of seventy-two. The ICVS database contains a wealth of information that has no precedents in the developing world, with more than 220,000 cases.[4]

Four rounds of the ICVS have been done (in 1989, 1992, 1996 and 2000) and a fifth is planned for 2004. At the moment the questionnaire includes sections on thirteen types of crime, or rather experiences of victimisation, for each of which a standard definition is provided.[5] Furthermore, the questionnaire explores whether crimes were reported to the police, reasons for not reporting, attitudes toward the police, fear of crime and crime prevention measures.

Between 1500 and 2000 households are interviewed in each country/city either by telephone (CATI) or face-to-face and asked about incidents that occurred over the past five years but with a particular focus on the past calendar year.

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[4] The database containing data from the first four International Surveys can be downloaded from the UNICRI website at www.unicri.it/icvs.

[5] Theft of car, theft from car/of parts of car, car vandalism, burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, theft of personal property, sexual offences, assault/threat, consumer fraud (cheating) and corruption/bribery.

Table 13.1 **Countries / cities that have participated in the ICVS at least once - 1989 - 2003**

AFRICA *(cities)*	EUROPE *(countries)*	EUROPE
		(continued)
Gaborone (Botswana)	Austria	Bucharest (Romania)
Cairo (Egypt)	Belgium	Budapest (Hungary)
Maseru (Lesotho)	Denmark	Kiev (Ukraine)
Windhoek (Namibia)	England & Wales	Ljubljana (Slovenia)
Lagos (Nigeria)	Finland	Minsk (Belarus)
Johannesburg (South Africa)	France	Moscow (Russia)
Mbabane (Swaziland)	Germany (West 1989)	Prague (Czech Republic)
Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania)	Italy	Riga (Latvia)
Tunis (Tunisia)	Malta	Skopje (Macedonia)
Kampala (Uganda)	Netherlands	Sofia (Bulgaria)
Lusaka (Zambia)	Northern Ireland	Tallinn (Estonia)
Harare (Zimbabwe)	Norway	Tbilisi (Georgia)
	Poland	Tirana (Albania)
ASIA *(cities)*	Portugal	Vilnius (Lithuania)
Beijing (China)	Scotland	Warsaw (Poland)
Bombay (India)	Spain	Zagreb (Croatia)
Jakarta (Indonesia)	Sweden	
Japan (national survey)	Switzerland	NORTH AMERICA
Seoul (Korea)	EUROPE	Canada
Ulaan Baatar (Mongolia)	*cities*	United States
Manila (the Philippines)	Barcelona (Spain)	
Pt Moresby (Papua New Guinea)	Belgrade (Yugoslavia)	OCEANIA
	Bishkek (Kyrgystan)	Australia
	Bratislava (Slovak Republic)	New Zealand

13.3 Some findings from the ICVS

On average, approximately 28 per cent of citizens suffered at least one form of victimisation[6] over the twelve months preceding the interview. Overall victimisation around 27 per cent was observed in five out of seven regions of the world (Western Europe, Eastern-Central Europe, North America, Australia and Asia), while in Africa and Latin America much higher levels of victimisation were observed (35 and 46 per cent respectively).

6 The ICVS overall measure of victimisation refers to incidents occurred in the previous year by any of the eleven "conventional" crimes included in the questionnaire (thus excluding consumer fraud and corruption).

Figure 13.1 shows prevalence rates for burglaries, robberies and assaults and threats as observed in the ICVS. The ICVS defines burglary as house-breaking for stealing purposes. It is a crime against the household that may equally occur against very secure or poorly protected residences. While in the industrialised world burglars frequently steal objects of a very high value, such as jewellery or hi-fi equipment, burglary in developing countries is often aimed at stealing food, house appliances, linen or cutlery. In the regions where households are more protected against burglary, such incidents involve more damage to doors, locks or windows. This happened more frequently in Western Europe, in Africa and North America and Australia.

The consequences of burglary in terms of monetary value may be very different in different contexts, although its seriousness is generally considered very high since it is a violation of the domestic sphere. It is therefore a crime that is well remembered by survey respondents and provides a reliable indicator of property crime.

Robbery is defined as theft from the person by use of force, thus involving direct contact between victim and offender ("contact" crime). The crime category of assault and threat is instead defined in the ICVS as personal aggression, either by a stranger or a relative or friend, without the

Figure 13.1 **Victimisation rates by burglary, robbery, assault and threat one year, by regions (ICVS)**



purpose of stealing. It is another "contact" crime which physical consequences may be minor in most cases, but likely to bear emotional repercussions to victims.

The differences among the regions were bigger for the two crimes involving property, which were highest in Africa and Latin America. Burglary in Africa was four times more frequent than in Western Europe. Robbery in Latin America was six times higher than in North America and Australia. Property crime is therefore more frequent in developing countries than in the rest of the world.

Different patterns of reporting to the police were observed in the various regions, as presented in figure 13.2. Crimes are more frequently reported to the police in Western Europe, North America and Australia than in the other regions, thus showing an opposite trend with respect to the frequency of victimisation. In practice, in the regions where more crime occurs, the police know less about it.

Figure 13.2 **Crimes reported to the police, by regions**



Theft of car is generally reported to the police because of car registration and for insurance reasons. Data show that on average 90 per cent of car thefts were indeed reported to the police thus representing a compa-

rable benchmark for reporting rates of other crimes. In the case of burglary, it appears that in Western Europe, North America and Australia reporting rates for burglary are only slightly lower than those observed for car theft (more than 80 per cent). Much lower rates were observed in the other regions, being lowest in Asia with 40 per cent approximately.

Robbery and assault were the least reported types of crime, especially in the developing regions. Robbery was frequently reported in Western Europe (67 per cent), but much less in the remaining regions, with a minimum in Latin America, where only 1 victim of robbery out of 5 reported to the police. It appears that the more widespread is crime, the less citizens are willing to approach the police. Actually more than 50 per cent of the Latin American victims of robbery who did not report to the police said they did so because “the police would not do anything” and approximately 25 per cent said that they feared or disliked the police.

The analysis of citizens' perception of the police overall performance versus reporting rates for the various types of crime shows that there is a direct correlation between the two. The correlation is stronger for reporting assault/threat, which is the least reported type of crime (r 0.473, N=47). It appears therefore that a good perception of the police may increase public co-operation with the police.

Figure 13.3 **Percentage satisfied with police performance, 2000** *(per cent saying that the police do a very good job and a fairly good job)*



Figure 13.3 shows that respondents from North America and Australia, Western Europe and Asia have quite a good opinion of the police performance in preventing and controlling crime in their area, while the majority of interviewed citizens in the other regions were dissatisfied with the police. In Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe respondents showed indeed poor appreciation of the police efforts in preventing and controlling crime. Percentages of respondents satisfied with the police job were much lower in these regions. Data suggest that in many countries there is much to be done by police forces in the direction of gaining public confidence.

13.4 Trends 1996 - 2000

The analysis of the regional trends is made possible by comparing victimisation rates in the countries that took part in the 1996 and 2000 sweeps of the ICVS. Such a comparison reveals that victimisation rates are consistent in most regions and modest variations have been registered, with an overall trend downwards for the three types of crime considered.

Figure 13.4 **Trends in burglary, robbery and assault with force, 1996 - 2000**



Data refer to burglary, robbery and assault with force, i.e. only the portion of incidents in the assault/threat category that involved the use of force. Possible inconsistencies in sampling procedure suggest some caution in reading trends, especially as regards developing countries. Considerable changes, both upwards and downwards, were observed in Latin America and Africa, where robbery noticeably increased (contrary to the other regions) and burglary decreased more sharply than in the other regions.

As regards assault with force, aside from a stable situation observed in Western Europe and North America and a slight decrease in Eastern-Central Europe, developing countries show big variations that do not allow for a unique interpretation. While Asia and Latin America showed a trend downwards, assaults increased in Africa.

13.5 Feelings of safety

The ICVS measures feelings of safety and (in)security of respondents in two ways. A general question deals with feeling safe in the street after dark. Another question is aimed at assessing likelihood of burglary in the next twelve months and indicates fear of a specific crime (burglary).

Table 13.2 **Feelings of safety: percentage of respondents feeling very safe or fairly safe after dark and percentage saying that burglary is not likely in the next twelve months - 1996 - 2000** *(percentage)*

	Fear of crime		Likelihood of burglary	
	1996	2000	1996	2000
Western Europe	75	71	58	63
Asia	67	69	45	51
North America and Australia	69	68	65	60
Central-Eastern Europe	40	53	29	38
Latin America	52	38	37	43
Africa	47	38	26	23
Average	60	58	43	47

The overall trend shows that between 1996 and 2000 fear of crime decreased in four regions (Western Europe, North America and Australia, Latin America and Africa), but in Western Europe and Latin America the

respondents felt that burglary was more likely to occur than in 1996. Only in Africa both fears indicators went down over the period. It can be observed that there is no direct relationship between crime trends and fear of crime.1996

13.6 Discussion: comparing crime trends through surveys, advantages and disadvantages[7]

Discussion on the use of victim surveys for comparing crime trends may include a number of different issues. First of all, it should be specified that surveys should be standardised in order to be comparable. Differences in sampling (size and method), structure and content of the questionnaire may represent major obstacles to comparability of the results.

Standardised surveys undoubtedly offer advantages for crime measurement. They allow to overcome the definition problem that is at the basis of comparability problems with police data. Survey definitions may contain simple wording that clearly explain to citizens the characteristics of the incident that may have occurred to them. It is certainly easier to convert into different languages and cultures a question like “Over the past five years has anyone taken something from you, by using force, or threatening you?” rather than translating the concept of robbery.

Standardized surveys also offer the possibility to control the sampling procedure, thus focussing on comparable universes, such as capital cities or urban areas. Furthermore, surveys may provide information on how the public sees the functioning of criminal justice agencies. This may include an assessment of the overall performance and a specific evaluation of the services obtained once approached (such as satisfaction with the police upon reporting). This information is particularly valuable to balance the statistics that are provided by the organizations themselves.

There are however some disadvantages. Fist of all, only a limited range of crimes can be included in victim surveys. Having to deal with the direct experience of the respondents, survey questionnaires traditionally cover “conventional” crimes such as theft, robbery and assault. Furthermore,

7 The structure of this section follows the one presented in G. Newman (2000), p. 57.

there may be cultural variations in sensitivity to crimes and preparedness to speak out. Some events that may not represent a problem for discussion in some cultures, may be taboo in other cultures. Differences across countries may also refer to the frequency of surveys: in some countries where surveys are very frequent, citizens may show different levels of compliance (they may be either “trained” / more compliant - or annoyed / less compliant).

Other major technical problems encountered by surveys are the age limits (normally respondents are not younger than 16, thus no victimisation of children is included), the eagerness to respond (the respondent may tend to refer also to incidents that occurred to relatives and close friends, thus inflating the results), the “telescoping” (the respondent may “throw in” incidents that occurred before the time period covered by the survey) and possible interviewer bias (due to a number o possible reasons, that may increase with the increasing of the international/multicultural scope of the survey).

Finally, it should be taken into account that surveys are very expensive and their cost may prevent their regular implementation, especially in developing countries.

Figure 13.5 **Police and survey trends, five countries 1988 - 1999**



Although it is not possible to compare levels between police statistics and victim surveys, figure 13.5 shows that it is possible to compare trends. The chart presents the trends of police statistics and ICVS results in five countries between 1998 and 1999. With the exception of one country in which police data were stable and survey data showed a steady decrease, in the other countries crime went up between 1988 and 1991, stabilised or decreased in 1995, then decreased more in 1999. The "spider" figure obtained shows the parallel pattern of trends in survey and police data.

13.7 Conclusions

In conclusion it can be said that official records of crime (police statistics) do not provide the entire crime picture. The ICVS shows that less than 50 per cent of crimes are reported to the police in the developing world and only a few more in developed countries. It is therefore necessary to integrate police records of crime with survey data in order to obtain a better picture of the crime situation and a more accurate monitoring of crime trends. Surveys may also assist in assessing the performance of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies and in the measurement of the impact of crime prevention strategies.

It appears that at the basis of improved knowledge on the crime situation there is a service approach to the public on behalf of the police. Crime policies aimed at improving police performance may - on the other hand - lead to more reporting, thus apparently higher crime rates. This is one more reason to complement monitoring of crime trends through surveys that may capture changes in reporting patterns and at the same time assess if increased confidence in the police has to do with that.

The ICVS brings comparative information on the experience of crime and crime prevention through standard methodology across the world. Survey findings assist policy makers in the development of crime prevention policies and strategies.

By disclosing aspects of crime and victimisation at the international level, the ICVS has become an indispensable source of information for researchers, policy makers, and the international community. It is expected that in the future the ICVS will become even a more solid source of

data, due to the fact that a greater number of countries will be included and that those who have already participated will continue to do so, thus reinforcing the longitudinal series.

It would be desirable to collect similar information targeted on specific groups of population such as women, elderly, migrants, workers, businesses. The International Crime Business Survey (ICBS) and the International Violence Against Women Survey (IVAWS), both currently at their initial stage, may play an important role in complementing the ICVS in the areas of crimes against businesses and violence against women respectively.

The ICVS may not be (alone) the best tool to measure crime, but its contribution to research represents a very important advancement in comparative criminology.

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FOURTEEN

EVIDENCE FOR ELITE CONVERGENCE IN CROSS-NATIONAL HOMICIDE. VICTIMISATION TRENDS, 1956 TO 2000[1] [2]

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14.1 Introduction

More than four decades ago, Kerr et al. (1960) posited the emergence of a global industrial man signaling that all societies were gradually converging on the same point. Inkeles (1981:5) argued that the pace of convergence greatly accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s and predicted that congruent change would be just as great in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, proponents of globalization (Strange 1996; Sklair 1991; Castells 1996) have claimed that changes in communication and transportation, increasingly internationalized financial flows and commodity trade, and the transition from national to world markets are transforming the world into a single global culture. But not everyone shares these views. Skeptics (Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Weiss 1998) argue that globalization claims about the convergence of basic social institutions across national boundaries are greatly overdrawn and seriously underestimate the continuing autonomy of national governments. At most, there may be a heightened internationalization of the world as interaction

[1] This study was funded in part by a grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

[2] I would like to thank the World Health Organization for supplying the homicide victimisation data and Gwen Hunnicutt and Nancy Morris for assistance with data collection. The original project upon which this research is based included my friend and colleague, Kriss Drass.

increases between national economies. Other skeptics (Gilpin 1987; Hirst 1997) claim that globalization is often used by the United States as an excuse to implement its own economic agenda.

In recent years, researchers and policy experts have examine d evidence for cross- national convergence in a variety of areas, including economic transactions and processes (Ohmae 1995; Cox 1997; Hoogvelt 1997; Held et al. 1999), technologies of communication and transportation (Held et al. 1999), regulatory systems (Nierop 1994; Sassen 1996; Hoogvelt 1997; Goodman 1997), systems of popular attitudes and behavior (Hoogvelt 1997; Held et al. 1999), income distributions (Raffalovich 1999), and fertility and mortality rates (Goode 1963; Inkeles 1981). However, I could identify no study to date that has explicitly tested for cross-national convergence in crime rates. The absence of research on crime convergence is surprising because the two dominant perspecti ves in comparative criminology (modernization and conflict), provide competing predictions about the convergence of crime trends between nations over time. While modernization perspectives (Krohn 1978; Shelley 1981; Messner 1982) predict global convergence in national crime rates, conflict perspectives (Chambliss 1976; Beirne and Quinney 1982) instead predict growing divergence between the crime rates of rich industrial and poor industrializing nations.

In this paper, I use econometric time- series methods to examine the extent to which national homicide victimisation rates for a group of 23 high and 11 low income nations have been converging from 1956 to 2000. I begin by considering modernization and conflict perspectives, which have dominated prior cross- national criminology research. To these I add an elite convergence model that predicts crime convergence will be limited to wealthy, highly industrialized nations.

14.2 Perspectives on crime convergence among nations

14.2.1 Modernization perspective

The modernization perspective on crime (Clinard and Abbott 1973; Shelley 1981; Neumann and Berger 1988; LaFree and Drass 2002) can

be traced directly to Durkheims ([1893] 1947) assessment of the transition from traditional to modern society. According to this view, crime results when modern values and norms come into contact with and disrupt older, established systems of role allocation. The emergence of new roles not yet fully institutionalized and integrated into society, make normative guidelines ambiguous and weaken traditional support mechanisms. These basic processes have been linked to rising crime rates and other forms of deviance through a range of distinct, yet closely related concepts, including anomie (Merton 1938; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997), social disorganization (Davies 1962; Smelser 1962), breakdown (Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Useem 1985), tension (Lodhi and Tilly 1973) and strain (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Agnew 1992).

An important underlying assumption of contemporary modernization theorists (Shelley 1981; Inkeles 1983; Neuman and Berger 1988) is that nations evolve through similar developmental stages, as lesser-developed nations gradually adopt the characteristics of more developed nations.[3] Changes in developing nations occur as a more complex division of labor weakens the collective conscience (Liska 1981:29), creates a "growing differentiation among people" (Clinard and Abott 1973:8) and enables individuals to "challenge cultural values and social rules" (Toby 1979:388). But despite the temporary dislocations caused by these changes, the modernization perspective predicts gradual convergence in crime rates because all countries are undergoing the same developmental transformations. Industrialized countries experience crime convergence as modernization increases their similarities. But because developing countries are on the same traditional-modern continuum, modernization also encourage s their crime rates to converge gradually with those of more developed nations. Thus, Shelley (1981:xiii) concludes that

[3] Although very different in specific emphasis, recent globalization perspectives resemble modernization perspectives with regard to their implications for cross- national convergence in crime. Thus, the "hyperglobalists" identified by Held et al. (1999:2) argue that human history is entering a truly new epoch in which the traditional nation state is being replaced both structurally and culturally by transnational institutions (Wriston 1992; Ohmae 1995; Strange 1996). These theorists emphasize the emergence of a single market, or "borderless" economy, rooted in burgeoning networks of production, trade and finance. Like modernization theorists, the hyperglobalists see world changes in cultural as well as structural terms (Albrow 1996; Burki and Perry 1998). As global institutions replace national ones, they set the stage for increasing communication across borders, for greater transnational cooperation among people, and for worldwide awareness of common problems.

"modernization has a …generally consistent effect upon both rates and forms of criminal behavior."

The main longitudinal support for an effect of modernization on crime convergence is found in studies that examine long term changes in crime trends. In his early history of crime, Elias (1939) argued that as the states monopoly on the use of violence increased in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, individual use of violence in the form of crime declined. Historical analysis of long-term crime trends is generally supportive of the conclusion that rates of personal violent crime among industrialized western nations declined from the early middle ages until the second half of the twentieth century (Osterberg 1996; Spierenburg 1996). Johnson and Monkkonen (1996:13) claim that as disputes were increasingly resolved in courts rather than on street corners and in bars, violent crime rates declined. This civilizing process could be interpreted as promoting a gradual convergence in violent crime rates at least among West European nations. The most comprehensive study of the long term dynamics of homicide trends to date is Eisner's (2001) analysis of homicide data from England, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. Based on a reanalysis of several previous quantitative studies of homicide, Eisner concludes that homicide rates have substantially declined for these European nations over several centuries.

There is also support for the idea that the long term declines in violent crime rates observed among western nations for much of the past several hundred years have at times reversed. Eisner (2001) concludes that the general downward trend in European homicide rates was interrupted by homicide increases during the last decades of the sixteenth century, during the period just before and just after 1800, and during the period after the early 1960s. The last of these three counter trends is the best documented. In their study of crime trends in four cities for 150 years, Gurr, Grabosky and Hula (1977:169) conclude that Asome common social and political dynamics created public order over the course of a century in western societies, then went crazily unsprung in a single generation. More recently, Fukuyama (1999:4) claims that there was "a great disruption" among western industrialized societies beginning in the 1960s that created large increases in crime and social disorder among most develo-

ped nations of the world. Thus, while crime rates may have converged in earlier periods as the result of growing crime declines, to the extent that Fukuyama and others are right, convergence in the second half of the twentieth century might be the result of rapidly rising crime rates. But such conclusions must be tempered by the fact that all studies to date have focused on wealthy, industrialized nations and no study to date has provided formal statistical tests of convergence in crime trends.

14.2.2 Conflict perspective

In contrast to the modernization perspective, those who support a conflict perspective argue that the uneven advance of global capitalism is increasingly separating a relatively small group of highly industrialized nations from a larger group of poor, economically dependent nations. Conflict perspectives in criminology (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973; Greenberg 1980; Bohm 1982) suggest that these cross-national patterns of unequal development, economic inequality, and unemployment account for growing crime differences between highly industrialized core nations and developing peripheral nations. Core nations prosper in this system by extracting raw materials and exploiting low cost labor from peripheral nations (Wallerstein 1979; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981; Chirot and Hall 1982). As the economic gap between the industrial “haves” and the developing “have nots” widens, poverty, slums and unemployment become more commonplace among the latter. The growing expansion of global markets creates a fluctuating surplus population of unemployed and underemployed workers (Spitzer 1975; Applebaum 1978). The global system also constrains urban development in peripheral nations, which suffer increasingly from a shortage of decent housing, an absence of basic social services and a lack of living wages, all of which drive crime rates up. Hence, a conflict perspective predicts growing divergence in crime rates between high income, industrialized nations and poorer, industrializing nations.

I could find no studies that have directly examined whether crime rates of high income and low income nations have been diverging over time. However, there is evidence that many low income, industrializing nations

have been experiencing rapid increases in violent crime rates in recent years. Although they provide no trend data, Reza, Mercy and Krug (2000), in a comprehensive comparison of WHO homicide victimisation rates for major world regions, conclude that Latin American homicide rates in 1990 were nearly two and one-half times the world average.[4] Relatedly, Fajnzylber et al. (1998) use United Nations survey data to conclude that after a period of relative stability through the 1980s, homicide rates in Latin American nations rose sharply in the 1990s. In a study of crime trends in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, Cebulak (1996:77) concludes that there have been "unprecedented and dramatic increases in crime". Similarly, Stamatel et al. (1998:243) warn that democratization and economic liberalization in the Central Eastern European countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary) are leading to an "Americanization" which is producing rapid crime increases. However, most of these studies are based on case studies or a small number of nations and none have specifically tested for divergence in the crime rates of rich and poor nations over time.

14.2.3 Elite convergence

A third theoretical possibility can be seen as a hybrid combination of modernization and conflict perspectives. Perhaps modernization theorists are correct in arguing that crime convergence is indeed happening over time, but conflict theorists are correct in arguing that these changes are limited mostly to members of the industrial elite. The result could be what I call elite convergence : growing similarity in the crime rates of high income industrial nations but little change between the crime rates of high and low income nations over time. There is in fact some indirect empirical support for this prediction. Because most prior research on cross- national trends in violent crime has been limited to highly industrialized nations (Gurr 1981; Eisner 2001; see LaFree 1999 for a review), evidence that these national trends are converging through either their long-term declines over several centuries, or their rapid increases since the early 1960s,

[4] Rates for the Sub-Saharan region were even higher; more than four times the world average.

is in fact more of a test of elite convergence than convergence in general.

To summarize, modernization and conflict perspectives make competing predictions about the crime trends of wealthy industrialized nations and poorer industrializing nations over time. While the modernization perspective predicts convergence in crime rates between high and low income groups over time, the conflict perspective predicts increasing divergence. This analysis also allows me to test an alternate possibility that I identify here as elite convergence. An elite convergence model suggests that crime rates are indeed converging over time, but only in the high income nations of the industrial elite. In the analysis that follows, I use homicide victimisation data from 1956 to 2000 to test for convergence and divergence in the homicide trends of 23 high income industrialized nations and 11 low poorer industrializing nations. The results provide no support for modernization or conflict perspectives, but substantial support for an elite convergence model.

14.3 Data and methods

The three major sources of longitudinal, cross-national crime data are the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the United Nations (UN), and the World Health Organization (WHO). The strengths and weaknesses of these three data sources are reviewed elsewhere (Neapolitan 1997; LaFree 1999; Aebi, Killias and Tavares 2003) and hence, I only summarize major conclusions here. Substantial variation across countries in legal definitions has increasingly lead researchers (Archer and Gartner 1984; Huang and Wellford 1989; Lynch 1995) to rely on homicide data in cross-national comparative research. Both Interpol and the UN survey collect homicide data from criminal justice agencies in member na tions. WHO homicide data are based instead on cause of death reports submitted by participating nations. There is now substantial agreement (Kalish 1988; Neapolitan 1997; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997) that among the three major cross- national homicide data sources, WHO data are the most valid and reliable.

I assembled annual time- series data from WHO on homicide victimisation rates per 100,000 residents for 34 countries from 1956 to 2000.

The length of the series and the countries included were determined by data availability--the sample and time frame maximized the number of countries and years available for analysis. I did not extrapolate values to the beginning or the end of an individual series. Because data were missing for Puerto Rico after 1992, Bulgaria before 1960, and Hungary for 1956, comparisons involving these countries were truncated accordingly. I excluded nations that had missing data for more than three consecutive years.[5] Because Iceland had no homicides for several years, it was impossible to compute a meaningful measure of relative difference between Iceland and other countries and I excluded it. Rates for Israel are reported only for the Jewish population. I interpolated three years for Israel that included deaths from the Sinai campaign (1956, 1957) and the Six-Day War (1967).

Several political changes affected the geographical boundaries and hence the homicide rates of the nations included. I limit the analysis of Czechoslovakia to the years before the political breakup of 1992. I limit the analysis of the Federal Republic of Germany to the years before unification with the German Democratic Republic in 1991. And finally, because French statistics include Algeria until 1962, I limit the analysis of France to the years since Algerian independence.

As is universally true in this type of research, the sample is heavily dominated by North American and West European nations, which comprise 18 countries (52.9 per cent) in the sample. In addition the sample includes six Latin American/Caribbean countries, four East European countries, four countries from the Western Pacific, one from Africa, and one from the Middle East.[6] In 1990 these 34 nations accounted for less than 18 per cent of the total world population and an estimated 9 per cent of total world homicides (Reza, Mercy and Krug 2001).

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5 Based on these procedures, we interpolated missing values for Mexico (1956-1957, 1984); New Zealand (1959); Poland (1980-1982); Puerto Rico (1967-1968, 1978); Trinidad/Tobago (1965-1966, 1969); and Venezuela (1984, 1991). Also, for England and Wales, we use homicide victimisation rates supplied directly by the British Home Office.

6 In this analysis I treat Puerto Rico as a country.

14.3.1 Testing for convergence and divergence

I use a constant multiplicative relationship between two series over time as a standard for measuring convergence and divergence between countries and groups of countries. I compute the multiplicative relationship between two rates as the yearly difference of the log of each rate (O=Brien 1999; LaFree and Drass 2002). For example, in testing for convergence between the industrialized nation homicide rate and the rate for Bulgaria, I compute the yearly logged difference as:

LOG (INDUSTRIALIZED NATION HOMICIDE RATE)T - LOG(BULGARIAN HOMICIDE RATE)T (1)

Applying this formula to all comparisons produces a separate series of logged and differenced scores for each. I compute these scores by subtracting the smaller from the larger of the two rates at the beginning of the time series.[7] I tested each series of logged and differenced scores for evidence of convergence, divergence, or stability. For simplicity, I refer to these logged and differenced scores as convergence scores."

I first classify each series of convergence scores as stationary, trend stationary, or difference stationary (Nelson and Plosser 1982; Hamilton 1994). A stationary time series has a mean, variance, and autocovariance that are constant over time (Enders 1995:69). Scores vary by year, but they never move far away from their mean. If a series of convergence scores is stationary, the relative difference between the two component homicide rates does not change significantly over time. A stationary series therefore represents the null hypothesis of neither convergence nor divergence between two homicide rates.

Two fundamentally different processes may generate non-stationary series. A trend -stationary process consists of a deterministic trend plus a stationary process with a zero mean (Nelson and Plosser 1982; Cromwell, Labys and Terraza 1994):

$$yt = a + ßt + et \qquad (2)$$

[7] This is equivalent to placing the smaller rate in the denominator of the fraction and computing the relative difference between rates.

where yt is a series of convergence scores and t is a linear time trend. If a series is trend stationary, its mean level changes in a deterministic way over time (given by the value of ß). Fluctuations are short-term and always return to a linear trend line. If a series of convergence scores is stationary around a negative trend (ß is negative), the relative difference between the component homicide rates is declining. I interpret this as evidence of convergence between the two rates. And if a series of convergence scores is stationary around a positive trend (ß is positive), the component homicide rates are growing farther apart over time, indicating that they are diverging.[8]

The second major form of a non-stationary process is one in which the trend is stochastic. This type of process is also referred to as difference stationary because the first or higher order differences of the series are stationary (Nelson and Plosser, 1982):

$$y\,t = y\,t\text{-}1 + et \qquad (3)$$

$$y\,t = a + y\,t\text{-}1 + et \qquad (4)$$

As these equations indicate, the current value of the series (yt) is a function of the previous value (y t-1), a random innovation (et), and a constant (a). Rather than varying around a constant mean (stationary) or a constant trend (trend stationary), a difference stationary series Awanders from a mean level with no tendency to return to that level once it has moved away. These series are described as random walks with (equation 4), or without (equation 3), drift. Yearly fluctuations have a long- term impact on difference-stationary series, sending them in new and different directions. In contrast, yearly fluctuations have only a transitory effect on

8 The interpretation of slope coefficients in the models assumes that I have subtracted smaller from larger rates. In most cases, the results of this subtraction are positive. If these positive differences grow over time (positive slope) then the rates are moving away from each other (divergence), and if they decline over time (negative slope), they are moving toward each other (convergence). Negative differences occur when the rates have crossed: the rate that was smaller at the outset of the series is now larger. Negative differences can affect the interpretation of slopes. For example, two rates may initially grow closer to one another (declining positive differences), but then cross over and move away from each other (declining negative differences). If this occurs, then the rates have both converged and diverged at different times in the series. To avoid any misclassifications due to these processes, I first examined individual plots to determine if any cross-over occurred, and if it did, whether it changed our classification. Cross- over was not a problem in any of the classifications I report.

stationary and trend- stationary series, which always return to a constant mean or deterministic trend.

In order to classify each series of convergence scores as stationary, trend stationary, or difference stationary, I used the augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure to test for the presence of a unit root (Enders 1995:212-215; O'Brien 1999:105-107). This test involves estimating the following equation[9] for each series of convergence scores:

$$y\,t = a + ßt + ?y\,t\text{-}1 + ?? \; i \; ? \; y\,t\text{-}i + et \qquad (5)$$

If ?=1, the null hypothesis, then the series contains a unit root and is difference stationary, although the order of differencing is unknown. If ? is significantly different from 1, then the series does not contain a unit root, and standard hypothesis tests can be used to determine whether the series contains a significant linear trend (trend-stationary series) or not (stationary series).[10] Note that these tests require adding lagged differences of the series (? y t-i) to the model until the residuals are uncorrelated.[11] For stationary and trend- stationary series, I report coefficients and significance tests for the slopes of the linear trend terms. A significant negative slope indicates that the component homicide rates are converging while a significant positive slope indicates that the component homicide rates are diverging.

If a series contains a unit root, it is difference stationary or stochastic and I cannot test for convergence (or divergence) using the coefficient for the trend term. Instead, I apply a procedure developed by O=Brien (1999) that tests for convergence/divergence for difference stationary series based on the regression of first differences of the convergence scores on an intercept and sufficient lags to remove autocorrelation among the residuals:

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9 It is also possible to estimate this equation without the intercept and trend, or with the intercept but without the trend. I estimate the equation with an intercept and a trend because the coefficient for the trend term provides a direct way of testing for convergence and divergence.

10 Hypothesis testing for the augmented Dickey- Fuller test requires non- standard critical values for the t distribution. I performed these tests using values supplied by the eViews (2000) econometrics package.

11 I added lag terms one at a time until no additional terms were statistically significant ($p < .05$).

?y t = a + ?? I ? y t-i + e (6)

If the intercept is significant and negative, I conclude that the relative difference between the two component homicide rates has been declining on average (i.e., converging) during the time period, and if it is significant and positive, I conclude that the relative difference between the two rates has been increasing on average (i.e., diverging). Thus, for difference- stationary series, I report coefficients and significance tests for the intercepts of the regressions using first differences. This amounts to determining whether the mean yearly increase or decrease in a series is statistically significant over a period of years.[12]

14.3.2Distinguishing high and low income nations

I use the World Development Report (World Bank 2000) to distinguish between high income and low income nations. The World Bank defines high income nations as those with per capita income of $9,266 or more. I code the 23 nations in the sample with per capita incomes over this amount as “high income” nations and the 11 nations in the sample with per capita incomes under this amount as “low income” nations. Because the main test of the modernization and conflict perspectives is based on determining whether individual nations are converging or diverging with the rate for the high income nations, it was critical that the sample analyzed include most of the world's wealthiest nations. In fact with the exception of Luxembourg, the sample includes every nation classified as high income by the World Bank that was also a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2000. Moreover, with some notable exceptions (Taiwan, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates) most of the non-OECD high income nations missing from the data are relatively small, island nations (e.g., New Caledonia, Aruba).

[12]However, the method used here has two important advantages over simply calculating a mean and comparing it to its standard error. First, I use the Dickey-Fuller test to make sure that the differences themselves do not have a unit root-which would require second differencing. And second, I correct the differenced series for autocorrelation before conducting significance tests. Without such corrections, the significance tests are biased (O'Brien 1999:106).

14.4 National homicide trends

Table 14.1 shows descriptive statistics for the nations in the sample. I compute group homicide victimisation rates as an average of national rates. Perhaps the most striking feature of table 14.1 is the considerable difference in homicide rates between the high and low income nations. The mean rates for the low income nations is three and one half times the high income nation mean and only one of the 11 low income nations (Czechoslovakia) has a mean homicide rates that is lower than the mean for the high income nations. While only three of the low income nations have average homicide rates below 2 per 100,000 (27.3 per cent), 21 (91.3 per cent) of the high income nations have mean homicide rates under this level. Among the high income nations, the United States and to a lesser extent, Finland are the main outliers. The U. S. homicide average is 13 times higher than the average rate for Ireland, the high income nation with the lowest average homicide rate. Finland's mean is 4.6 times higher than that of Ireland.

There are also obvious regional differences. All eight countries with average homicide rates that are less than one per 100,000 are West European: Denmark, England/Wales, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. Another 17 countries (48.6 per cent) have homicide victimisation rates between one and two per 100,000 over the time period examined. This group includes the rest of the West European countries (with the exception of Finland), all four of the Western Pacific countries, two of the four countries from Eastern Europe, and Israel and Mauritius. Three countries have mean homicide victimisation rates between two and three per 100,000: Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary. All seven of the countries with homicide rates over three per 100,000 are in the western hemisphere: the six Latin American/Caribbean countries and the United States. The three parts of figure 14.1 shows annual homicide trends for the high and low income nations and for both groups combined. The trends for the high and low income nations are only weakly correlated ($r = .05$). While the high income nations experience a modest decline in homicide rates from 1956 until reaching a series low point in 1963, the decline for the low income nations is much steeper and doesn't reach a series low point until 1972. Once homicide rates start increasing

Table 14.1 **Descriptive Statistics, National Homicide Victimisation Rates - 1956 - 2000**

DEVIATIONS	Years	Mean	Standard	Minimum	Maximum (a)
LOW-INCOME NATIONS					
Bulgaria	1960-2000	2,76	1,13	0,80	5,07
Chile	1956-1999	3,30	1,22	1,75	6,60
Costa Rica	1956-2000	4,19	0,98	2,39	6,00
Czechoslovakia (b)	1956-2000	1,34	0,33	0,88	2,27
Hungary	1957-2000	2,56	0,69	1,56	4,09
Mauritius	1956-2000	1,93	1,01	0,57	6,10
Mexico	1956-2000	19,33	5,35	10,85	33,37
Poland	1956-2000	1,58	0,65	0,83	2,94
Puerto Rico	1956-1992	12,24	5,09	5,04	23,70
Trinidad/Tobago	1956-1995	6,45	2,55	2,10	11,43
Venezuela	1956-2000	10,42	3,71	5,02	26,35
HIGH-INCOME NATIONS					
Australia	1956-2000	1,74	0,24	1,28	2,39
Austria	1956-1996	1,23	0,24	0,84	1,77
Belgium	1956-1998	1,24	0,48	0,57	2,15
Canada	1956-1998	1,88	0,50	1,02	2,70
Denmark	1956-1998	0,88	0,32	0,38	1,45
England and Wales	1956-2000	0,89	0,21	0,57	1,22
Finland	1963-1999	2,76	0,42	1,82	3,63
France	1956-1990	0,97	0,17	0,70	1,32
Germany (FRG)	1956-1999	1,14	0,12	0,86	1,39
Greece	1956-1999	1,08	0,45	0,51	2,74
Ireland	1956-1999	0,60	0,25	0,18	1,13
Israel	1956-1998	1,24	0,58	0,20	2,43
Italy	1956-1999	1,46	0,47	0,81	2,84
Japan	1956-1999	1,15	0,46	0,55	2,17
Netherlands	1956-1999	0,75	0,33	0,21	1,36
New Zealand	1956-1999	1,36	0,51	0,46	2,40
Norway	1956-1999	0,84	0,32	0,38	1,56
Portugal	1956-2000	1,29	0,30	0,73	1,88
Singapore	1956-2000	1,77	0,51	0,57	3,02
Spain	1956-1999	0,64	0,35	0,06	1,18
Sweden	1956-1999	1,06	0,26	0,56	1,50
Switzerland	1956-1999	0,98	0,29	0,54	1,60
United States	1956-1999	7,88	2,00	4,50	10,56
Low-income Nations (N=11)	1956-1998	5,35	0,75	4,18	6,78
High-income Nations (N=23)	1956-1998	1,54	0,26	1,09	1,93
Total (N=34)	**1956-1998**	**2,70**	**0,30**	**2,21**	**3,32**

(a) Defined as less than $9,226 in per capita income in 2000 (WorldBank2000).
(b) Czech Republic only after 1991.

for the high income nations, they trend upward until reaching a series high point in 1991. For the low income nations, the increases are at first more gradual, but then gather momentum in the 1990s, reaching a series peak in 1994, three years after the high income nation's peak. Finally, the drop in homicide rates since the early 1990s has been considerably larger for the high than the low income nations.

Figure 14.1a **Homicide victimisation rates for high income 1956 to 1998** *(homicides/100,000)*



Figure 14.1b **Homicide victimisation rates for low income, 1956 to 1998** *(homicides/100,000)*



Figure 14.1c **Homicide victimisation rates for both groups, 1956 to 1998** *(homicides/100,000)*



14.4.1 The convergence and divergence tests

In table 14.2 I present the results of the convergence/divergence tests. The top half of table 14.2 shows results of convergence tests between the individual low income nations and the high income nation mean and the bottom half shows results of convergence tests between the individual high income nations and the high income nation mean.[13] For each comparison, I first determine whether the series is stationary, trend stationary, or difference stationary and then report the appropriate coefficient. I report

[13] I exclude individual countries from the composite trends with which they are being compared. For example, Australia is excluded from the total rate in the comparison of Australia and the high income nation sample.

Table 14.2 **Convergence/divergence tests for low - income and high- income Nations, trends or intercepts** *[in brackets]* **- 1956 to 2000**

	Intercept or trend coefficient (b)
LOW-INCOME NATIONS	
Bulgaria	[0,036]
Chile	[-0,0162]
Costa Rica	0,0039
Czechoslovakia	[0,0041]
Hungary	[-0,0058]
Mauritius	-0,0015
Mexico	[-0,216]
Poland	[-0,009]
Puerto Rico	[0,284]
Trinidad/Tobago	[0,0112]
Venezuela	[0,0197]
HIGH-INCOME NATIONS	
Australia	-0,0046*(a)
Austria	0,0075*
Belgium	-0,198*
Canada	[-0,0003]
Denmark	-0,013
England and Wales	-0,0015
Finland	-0,0039*
France	-0,0012
Germany (FRG)	[0,0081]
Greece	[0,0099]
Ireland	-0,0178*
Israel	-0,0033
Italy	[0,0081]
Japan	[0,0285]*
Netherlands	-0,258*
New Zealand	-0,0147*
Norway	-0,0138*
Portugal	-0,0017
Singapore	-0,0175*
Spain	[-0,0094]
Sweden	-0,0054*
Switzerland	-0,0062*
United states	[0,0058]

	Converging		Diverging	
	N	%	N	%
Low-income Nations (N=11)	0	0	0	0
High-income Nations (N=23)	11	47,8	2	8,7

(a)* p<.05, two - tailed test. (b) Czech Republic only after 1991.
(b) Based on regressions of first differences for unit roots and size of slopes for stationary trends.

slope coefficients for the stationary and trend -stationary series and intercept coefficients for the difference-stationary series. Negative coefficients in table 14.2 indicate convergence; positive coefficients indicate divergence. Recall that the modernization perspective predicts convergence between these nations over the past four decades while the conflict perspective predicts divergence.

In general, the results provide no support for either modernization or conflict predictions about convergence and divergence. According to the top half of table 14.2, not a single one of the 11 low income nations has homicide rates that are either significantly converging or diverging with the homicide rates of the high income nations during the years included in the analysis. Thus, contrary to the modernization perspective, there is no evidence that homicide rates in any of these low income nations significantly converged with homicide rates in the high income nations from 1956 to 1998. Likewise, contrary to the conflict perspective , there is also no evidence that homicide rates in any of these low income nations significantly diverged with homicide rates in the high income nations from 1956 to 1998. Even the direction of the coefficients for these 11 nations show little clear pattern; five nations have negative coefficients while six have positive coefficients.

In order to get a better idea of how time dependent these results are, I also estimated a second set of models measuring convergence between each nation and the high income group mean separately for the two halves of the series: 1956 to 1972 and 1973 to 2000. The results (available on request) show that for the earlier period, Mexico significantly converged with the high income nations while Poland significantly diverged. While for the more recent period Poland significantly converged with the high income nations while Hungary significantly diverged. Thus, I found just one case of convergence and one case of divergence in both separate analyses, again providing little consistent support for either modernization or conflict predictions about long-term crime trends for high and low income nations.

The bottom half of table 14.2 shows results of convergence and divergence tests for the high income nations. I introduced the concept of elite convergence to capture the possibility that convergence in crime rates is in fact limited to wealthy, highly industrialized nations. In support of this

concept, table 14.2 shows that 11 of the 23 high income nations (47.8 per cent) are significantly converging with the high income nation mean during this period while two nations (8.7 per cent) are significantly diverging from the mean. More generally, 17 of the 23 high income nations (73.9 per cent) have negative (i.e., converging) coefficients. Hence, there is considerable support for an elite convergence argument that homicide rates of many of the wealthiest nations did significantly converge during the second half of the twentieth century.

Of the eleven converging nations, eight are from Western Europe; two are from the Western Pacific (Australia, New Zealand) and one from Asia (Singapore). Interestingly, all four Scandinavian nations (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are among the convergers. Eight of the converging nations begin the period with lower homicide rates than the high income nation average and three begin with higher rates than the

Figure 14.2a **Homicide victimisation rates for eight "low Convergers" and three "High Convergers" - 1956 - 1998**



average. The two parts of figure 14.2 show how convergence in trends for the se two groups differs.

Figure 14.2b **Homicide victimisation rates for eight "low Convergers" and three "High Convergers" - 1956 - 1998**



According to figure 14.2a, the eight "low convergers" (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) converge during this period because their homicide rates rise more rapidly than the high income group rate. By 1998, the range of homicide rates for these eight nations is extremely narrow, from a low of 0.82 (Switzerland) to a high of 1.50 (New Zealand)-a difference of only 0.68. By contrast, the "high convergers" (Australia, Finland, and Singapore) shown in figure 2b converge because their homicide rates either drop (in the case of Singapore) or are relatively flat (in the case of Australia and Finland) while the high income group average increases. Finland is the clear outlier among the convergers with an average homicide rate (2.76) that is 36.9 per cent higher tha n Australia, the converging nation with the next highest average rate (1.74).

According to table 14.2, the only two significantly diverging high income nations are Austria and Japan. Homicide trends for both nations and the high income average are shown in the two parts of figure14.3. According to figure 14.3a, Austria diverges from the high income average by remaining relatively flat while the high income average increases in the 1960s and 1970s and then by falling faster than the high income average in the 1980s and 1990s. By contrast, Japan converges because of the remarkable declines in homicide victimisation it has experienced throughout much of the second half of the twentieth century. While Japanese homicide rates were somewhat higher than the average for high income nations at the start of the series, they become lower than the average for the first time in 1970 and continue to drop until reaching a series low point of .54 homicides per 100,000 in 1996.

Figure 14.3a **Homicide victimisation rates for Austria and Japan - 1956 - 1998**



Figure 14.3b **Homicide victimisation rates for Austria and Japan - 1956 - 1998**



14.5 Discussion and conclusions

Modernization theorists have long maintained that nations evolve through similar developmental stages, as lesser- developed nations gradually adopt the characteristics of wealthy, industrialized nations. But because industrializing nations are on the same traditional- modern cont inuum as industrialized nations, crime rates of industrializing nations will gradually converge with those of highly industrialized nations. By contrast, conflict theorists argue that the uneven advance of global capitalism is increasingly separating a relatively small group of highly industrialized, rich nations from a larger group of poor, economically dependent nations. As the gap between the wealthy elite and the rest of the world widens, crime differences between the two groups of nations will also increase.

The results presented here provide little support for either perspective. In the key test of the rival perspectives, I found no statistically significant evidence that the 11 nations identified as low income in this study either significantly converged or diverged from the high income group average between 1956 and 1998. In fact, even the direction of long- term change was evenly divided among the 11 nations with five negative coefficients (indicating convergence) and six positive coefficients (indicating divergence). The four East European nations in the sample did indeed experience rapid increases in homicide victimisation following the break- up of the Soviet Union in 1990, but these increases peaked in the early 1990s and had substantially declined by 2000. Several of the Latin American nations had substantial homicide increases after the mid- 1970s (especially Costa Rica, Trinidad/Tobago and Venezuela), however, none of these increases were statistically significant. Moreover, other Latin American nations (Chile, Mexico) moved instead in the direction of convergence with the high income nations.

Of course these conclusions about modernization and conflict perspectives need to be balanced against the fact that my analysis is based on a non random sample that seriously under represents low income nations. Thus, while the WHO data includes all but one of the world's high income OECD nations, my sample of 11 low- income nations represents only eight per cent of the 133 nations ranked as less than high income by the World Bank (2000). And even these 11 nations strongly represent the upper- end of the income distribution. Apart from the high income category, the World Bank in 2000 classified the rest of the nations in the world as either upper middle income ($2,996-9,265 per capita), lower middle income ($756-2,995) or low income (less than $755). Of the 38 nations classified by the World Bank as upper middle income, the WHO data includes nine nations (23.7 per cent). By contrast, of the 54 nations classified as lower middle income, the WHO data includes only two nations (3.7 per cent) and it does not include a single one of the 64 nations classified by the World Bank as low income. Thus, it is quite possible and even likely that if I had data on all of the world's nations, there would be additional cases that support either modernization or conflict perspectives.

Modernization and conflict perspectives about crime convergence/divergence are also vague when it comes to specific pre-

dictions about change over time. Thus, the modernization perspective predicts short-term increases in crime within industrializing nations as the transition to modern society raises levels of social disorganization and strain. In the longer term, these increases should dissipate because industrializing nations are on the same traditional- modern continuum as more fully industrialized nations. However, the perspective does not tell us exactly how long this process should take. Similarly, the conflict perspective predicts rapidly rising crime rates in poor nations as the gap between wealthy core nations and industrializing peripheral nations widens, but again, offers no specific time table for these developments. Data for this analysis was limited to a maximum of 45 years. It could of course be the case that this was not enough time for the social processes predicted by modernization and conflict perspectives to fully develop.

In fact, considerations such as these suggest that it might be helpful to rethink our use of modernization and conflict perspectives when it comes to their rival predictions about convergence and divergence. Instead of looking for the single perspective that best describes cross-national crime trends, it might be more useful to instead remain alert to individual cases that fit either model. For example, if homicide trends in Hungary and Poland continue on their current trajectories, they may well be classified as converging nations at some point in the near future. By contrast, if Costa Rica, Trinidad/Tobago and Venezuela continue on their current paths, they may soon provide examples of homicide divergence.

While I found little evidence of convergence or divergence between low and high income nations I found much stronger support for elite convergence. Nearly half of the 23 high income nations included in the analysis showed statistically significant evidence of converging with the high income group mean during the period spanned by the data. Of the 11 converging nations, eight began with homicide rates under the mean and gradually increased toward the average and three began with rates above the mean and either decreased or remained relatively flat as the group mean increased. By the end of the twenty-first century, homicide rates for these 11 nations had become increasingly similar.

The analysis of high income nations also produced two significant cases of divergence: Austria and Japan. Japan's post- World War II declines in violent crime are especially unique and have generated seve-

ral case studies in recent years (Finch 2001; Roberts and LaFree 2004). The Austrian case is less dramatic but might also be a useful case study.

Modernization and conflict perspectives have long dominated cross-national comparative criminology. Yet longitudinal tests of these models have been rare. This research provides little support for the modernization prediction that the crime rates of low income industrializing nations gradually converged with the crime rates of wealthy, highly industrialized nations during the second half of the twentieth century. Likewise, I find little evidence here in support of the conflict prediction that the crime rates of low income nations diverged from the crime rates of high income nations during the 45 years spanned by the data. In the case of homicide trends at least, the “industrial man” predicted by Kerr et al. (1960) appears to be living mostly in a small group of wealthy industrialized nations.

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FIFTEEN

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF RECORDED CRIME: THE ROLE OF STATISTICAL COUNTING RULES[1] [2]

15.1 Introduction

Cross-national comparisons of recorded crime rates developed as soon as crime statistics were available for a few countries and, at the same time, the first doubts about the validity of those comparisons were expressed (de Candolle, 1830/1987). Nevertheless the interest in such comparisons remained and even grew with the beginnings of empirical criminology at the end of the 19th Century. Thus, Ferri (1895) compiled a whole book of data on homicide in Italy and in Europe that he called an Atlas and constitutes probably the first European sourcebook of crime.

Nowadays, research on cross-national comparisons of recorded crime rates usually start with a statement like the following: "Crime rates from country to country are difficult to compare because of differences in criminal justice systems, in definitions of crime, in crime reporting practices and recordkeeping" (Kalish, 1988/1997). Systematizing the difficulties

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[2] The author would like to thank Rosemary Barberet, Gordon Barclay, Hanns von Hofer, Jörg-Martin Jehle and Martin Killias for comments on an earlier draft of it.

inherent to those comparisons, von Hofer (2000) identifies three types of factors that determine the outcome of crime statistics: statistical factors, legal factors and substantive factors. These factors affect the national crime statistics of each country in a different way, hence complicating cross-national comparisons.

Substantive factors refer to the propensity to report offences by the population of each country, to the propensity to record offences by the police or other recording authorities, and to the actual crime levels. Legal factors refer to the influence of the legal definitions of offences adopted in each country and to the characteristics of the legal process such as the delays for prescription or the possibility for the prosecuting authorities of bringing to court personal offences such as rape on their own initiative. From that point of view, the use of the legality principle or the opportunity (or expediency) principle by the prosecuting authorities has a strong influence on the number of offences dealt with by courts.

Finally, statistical factors refer to the way in which crime statistics are elaborated. In that context we define the statistical counting rules as the rules applied in each country to count the offences that will be included in crime statistics. Such rules vary from country to country, hence introducing differences in recorded crime rates that do not reflect actual differences in the levels of crime.

Using data on offences known to the police taken from the European *Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 2003* (Killias et al., 2003), in this presentation we analyze the influence of statistical counting rules on cross-national comparisons of recorded crime. The choice of the European Sourcebook is due to the fact that it was produced by a group of experts including the author of this presentation that paid special attention to the way in which data were collected for statistics in each country. Thus, the questionnaire that was sent to all Council of Europe member States in order to collect the information needed for the *European Sourcebook* included the six following questions on that issue:

1. Are there written rules regulating the way in which data is recorded?
2. When is the data collected for the statistics?
3. What is the counting unit used in the statistics?
4. Is a principal offence rule applied?
5. How are multiple offences counted?

6. How is an offence committed by more than one person counted?

In the following chapter, we will discuss the importance of the preceding questions and the answers given to them by thirty-seven countries with a total population of at least half a million people.

15.2 Statistical counting rules in thirty-seven european countries

15.2.1 Are there written rules regulating the way in which data is recorded?

The presence of written rules guarantees some level of homogeneity in the recording practices of different police officers or different police forces within the same country. As can be seen in table 15.1, only two European countries do not have written rules regulating the way in which data is recorded. Apart from that, in Switzerland there are no rules at the federal level, but most cantons have more or less similar written rules.

15.2.2When is the data collected for the statistics?

According to the answer given to this question, countries can be classified in three different groups: those with input statistics, those with output statistics and those with intermediate statistics. In countries using input statistics, data are recorded for statistical purposes when the offence is reported to the police. In contrast, in countries using output statistics, data are recorded when the police have completed the investigation. In between these extremes, some countries record data at an intermediate stage of the process, i.e. at some point in time between the input and the output.

Knowing that the number of offences registered by official measures of crime decreases as the criminal process advances (Sellin, 1951; President's Commission, 1967), one should expect that, all other things being equal including, for example, the definition of the offences, the actual level of crime, the propensity to report and to record offences as well as all other statistical, legal and substantive factors , countries using input statistics will present higher rates of recorded crime than countries using output statistics.

For example, in countries with input statistics, if a person reports a theft to the police, the offence is automatically included in police statistics; in contrast, in countries with output statistics, the report is received but the offence is not included in the statistics until the police investigation is complete. Thus, the offence will not appear in police statistics if the investigation reveals that it never happened. Moreover, if the police discover that it was a case of false reporting, this new offence will appear both in countries with input and in countries with output statistics. As a result, the first ones will record two offences in their statistics but the second ones will only record one.

Indeed, this problem is related to the validity and reliability of police statistics. In countries with input statistics, the police officers arriving at the scene of a crime or receiving a report from a victim usually do not have enough information about the circumstances of the offence, and this may lead them to classify it inadequately. For example, the evidence collected during the investigation may show that what seemed to be an attempted homicide was in fact a case of aggravated assault. Output statistics could thus be seen as more reliable than input statistics, but they could be less valid as some offences may disappear from the statistics only because the police were unable to find evidence of them.

As can be seen in table 15.1, fifteen European countries use input statistics, fourteen countries use intermediate statistics and eight countries use output statistics.[3]

15.2.3 What is the counting unit used in the statistics?

Table 15.1 shows that in thirty European countries, the counting unit used in the statistics is the offence, in three countries it is the case, in one

[3] In the European Sourcebook questionnaire, the questions regarding counting rules were asked for each type of offence included in the questionnaire. As the questionnaire included questions on total offences, intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, theft of a motor vehicle, burglary, domestic burglary, and drug offences, each country answered ten times the same questions. Nevertheless, the answers were almost the same from one offence to another. Therefore, while preparing the printed version of the European Sourcebook, the answers were synthesized in only one table (European Sourcebook, 2003: 74-75, Table 1.3.1). Unfortunately, Slovakia is presented in that table as having given no answer to that question while in fact the country answered nine times that it used output statistics and only once in the case of the total number of offences the answer was left blank. That mistake was corrected in the comments (European Sourcebook 2003: 24, point 17) where it is mentioned that eight countries use output statistics, and it has also been corrected for this presentation where Slovakia is presented as having output statistics (see Tables 1 and 2).

it is the decision, and, finally, three countries use other counting units. The difficulty comes from the fact that, according to the counting unit used in the statistics, figures may differ from one country to another. For example, a case may include several offences, or a decision may refer to more than one offence.

15.2.4 Is a principal offence rule applied?

The way in which simultaneous offences are recorded introduces differences in the level of recorded crime. Thus, in countries using a principal offence rule, the most serious offence will be recorded, while in countries without such a rule, each offence will be recorded independently.

Let us take as an example a case of an offender who, in the course of theft, also causes damage to the property and kills one person. In countries that apply a principal offence rule, statistics will show only one offence (i.e. homicide); but in countries where there is no such rule, each offence (homicide, damages to the property and theft) will be counted separately.

Table 15.1 shows that nineteen European countries apply a principal offence rule and eighteen do not apply such a rule.

Table 15.1 **Description of data recording methods for offences known to the police in 37 European countries**

POSSIBLE ANSWERS	Are there written rules regulating the way in which this data is recorded? (a)	When is the data collected for the statistics? (b)	What is the counting unit used in this table? (c)	Is a principal offence rule applied? (a)	How are multiple offences counted? (d)	How is an offence committed by more than one person counted?(e)
Albania	1	2	1	1	1	1
Armenia	1	2	1	2	1	1
Austria	1	3	1	2	2	1
Belgium	1	2	1	2	3	1
Bulgaria	1	1	1	1	2	1
Croatia	1	2	1	2	2	1
Cyprus	1	1	2	1	2	1
Czech Republic	1	1	1	2	3	1
Denmark	2	1	1	2	2	1
Estonia	1	1	1	2	3	1
Finland	1	1	1	2	2	1
France	1	2	4	2	3	1
Georgia	1	1	1	1	2	1
Germany	1	3	1	1	3	1
Greece	1	1	1	1	3	1
Hungary	1	3	1	1	3	2
Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1
Italy	1	3	1	2	2	1
Latvia	1	2	3	1	2	1
Lithuania	1	2	1	1	2	1
Moldova	1	1	1	2	1	1
Netherlands	1	2	1	1	1	1
Norway	1	2	1	2	2	1
Poland	1	3	1	1	1	1
Portugal	1	2	2	1	1	1
Romania	1	3	1	2	2	1
Russia	1	2	1	2	2	1
Slovakia	1	3	1	1	1	1
Slovenia	1	3	1	1	2	1
Spain	1	1	1	2	1	1
Sweden	1	1	1	2	2	1/2
Switzerland	...	2	4	2	3	1/2
Turkey	2	1	2	1	3	1
Ukraine	1	2	1	2	2	1
UK: England & Wales	1	1	1	1	3	1
UK: Northern Ireland	1	1	1	1	3	1
UK: Scotland	1	2	4	1	2	1

Source: adapted from the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (2003: 74-75)
(a) 1: Yes; 2: No.
(b) 1: When the offence is reported to the police; 2: Subsequently; 3:After investigation.
(c) 1: Offence; 2: Case; 3: Decision; 4: Other.
(d) 1: As one offence; 2: As two or more offences; 3: Uncertain.
(e) 1: As one offence; 2: As two or more offences.

15.2.5 How are multiple offences counted?

This question refers to offences of the same kind, which are often called serial offences. For example, if a woman reports to the police that her husband has beaten her ten times during the last six months, it is crucial to know whether the police will record one or ten offences. Table 15.1 shows that, in such cases, nine countries count only one offence and seventeen count two or more offences. In eleven countries the situation is uncertain, either because there are no strict rules on that issue (e.g. Estonia) or because the rule depends on the number of victims (e.g. Germany) or on the type of offence (e.g. Finland). For example, in Germany, multiple offences against the same victim or without a victim are counted as one offence but multiple offences against different victims are counted as two or more offences, while in Finland only multiple drug offences are counted as one offence (European Sourcebook, 2003: 76-77).

15.2.6 How is an offence committed by more than one person counted?

As can be seen in table 15.1, when more than one person commits an offence for example, when a gang of ten members robs a bank most countries (34 out of 37) count one offence, but Hungary counts one offence for each offender, and in Sweden and Switzerland the situation varies according to the offence.[4]

15.2.7 Crime rates according to statistical counting rules

To complicate the picture, all the statistical factors mentioned before combine themselves in each country and are not stable across time.[5] Thus, all other things being equal, one should expect that countries with input statistics, using offences as counting units, not applying a principal offence rule, counting multiple offences as two or more offences, and

[4] In the case of drug offences, Sweden and Switzerland count one offence per offender, and Sweden applies the same rule in the case of rape.

[5] Indeed, eleven out of the thirty-seven European countries studied in this presentation reported that their data recording methods were substantially modified between 1995 and 2000.

offences committed by more than one person as two or more offences, would present the highest rates of recorded crime.

But that hypothesis cannot be tested like that because we cannot control all legal and substantial factors i.e. all other things in order to be sure that the differences in recorded crimes are only due to statistical factors. In particular, as we do not know the actual levels of crime in each country, we cannot simulate a situation where these levels are identical across countries.

Nevertheless, we can still compare recorded crime rates across nations according to their statistical counting rules. In that context, if nations whose counting rules tend to record more offences have higher levels of recorded crime than nations whose counting rules tend to record fewer offences, we could conjecture that the differences in recorded crime may be partially due to the statistical counting rules applied.

In order to make that comparison, we can classify countries in different groups according to their counting rules. However, it must be kept in mind that we are studying only thirty-seven countries. Thus, if we create too many groups and the combination of all the statistical factors presented above would allow us to create several groups the number of

Table 15.2 **Classification of 37 European countries according to their statistical counting rules regarding the moment when data is collected for the statistics**

Input statistics	Intermediate statistics	Output statistics
Bulgaria	Albania	Austria
Cyprus	Armenia	Germany
Czech Republic	Belgium	Hungary
Denmark	Croatia	Italy
Estonia	France	Poland
Finland	Latvia	Romania
Georgia	Lithuania	Slovakia
Greece	Netherlands	Slovenia
Ireland	Norway	
Moldova	Portugal	
Spain	Russia	
Sweden	Switzerland	
Turkey	Ukraine	
England & Wales	Scotland	
Northern Ireland		

Source: adapted from the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (2003: 74 -75)

countries in some groups would be too small to produce valid results. At the same time, the influence of each statistical factor is not identical. For example, the way in which multiple offences are counted affects only multiple offences, and the use of a principal offence rule affects only cases where more than one offence has been committed. The only factor that affects the way in which each offence is recorded is the moment when the data are collected for statistics. That is therefore the factor that will be used in our analysis.

As we have seen before, according to the moment when data are collected for statistics, countries can be divided in three groups. The first one includes countries using input statistics, the second one includes countries using intermediate statistics, and the last one includes countries using output statistics (table 15.2).

Once the groups were created, we have calculated the average number of different offences traffic offences, rape, theft, theft of a motor vehicle, burglary, domestic burglary, robbery, assault and intentional homicide, as well as the total number of offences per 100,000 population recorded in each group.[6] By making that calculation we are placing our analysis at a sort of macro-level because we are comparing groups of countries instead of countries individually. This is because the crime rate of a particular country is explained by a combination of statistical, legal and substantial factors. For example, an extremely high rate for an offence such as the rates for completed intentional homicide in Estonia and Lithuania cannot be explained by only one statistical factor. At the same time, it can be seen that we have chosen offences whose definitions are more or less standard across European countries.[7] The results of our analysis are presented in figures 15.1 to 15.9. As some countries did not provide data for every offence and every year, there are analyses that include less than thirty-seven countries. When there

6 In order to control the influence of the different size of the populations, we have used the offence rates per 100,000 population recorded in each country (European Sourcebook, 2003: 33-44) to calculate the average for each group.

7 Drug offences were not included because their treatment is so different in each European country that any valid comparison is impossible. For example, in 1999, there were more than 900 drug offences per 100,000 population in Norway, while in Switzerland and in Scotland there were more than 600, and in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey there were 10 or less than 10. In particular, the rate for Norway was more than 300 times higher than the rate for Romania where only 2,9 drug offences were known to the police. Even inside the United Kingdom, the rate for Scotland is usually six times higher than the rate for Northern Ireland and used to be ten times higher than the rate for England and Wales before the latter changed their statistical counting rules in 1998 (European Sourcebook 2003: 45).

was a missing value concerning one year, the figure was interpolated using the figures for the previous and the subsequent year. If the missing value was the figure for 1995 i.e. the first year of our series we used the figure for 1996; if it was the figure for 2000 i.e. the last year of our series we used the figure for 1999. The number of countries included in each analysis is specified in the title of the respective figure.

Figure 15.1 **Average number of total criminal offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 37 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.2 **Average number of traffic offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 25 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.3 **Average number of rape offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 37 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.4 **Average number of theft offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 37 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.5 **Average number of theft of a motor vehicle offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 37 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.6 **Average number of domestic burglary offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 26 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.7 **Average number of robbery offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 37 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.8 **Average number of assault offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 36 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



Figure 15.9 **Average number of burglary offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 30 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995-2000**



As can be seen in figures 15.1 to 15.6 covering the total number of offences recorded by the police per 100,000 population, traffic offences, rape, theft, theft of a motor vehicle and domestic burglary the group of countries using input statistics systematically presents higher rates of recorded crime than the group of countries recording offences for their statistics at an intermediate stage of the process, and the latter presents higher rates than the group of countries using output statistics. In figures 15.7 to 15.9 covering robbery, assault and burglary , the group of countries with input statistics has higher rates of recorded crime than the group of countries with output statistics, but sometimes the group of countries with intermediate statistics has higher rates than the one with input statistics.

Thus, our analysis generally supports the hypothesis suggesting that the statistical counting rules regarding the moment when data is collected for the statistics play a major role in the explanation of the crime rates recorded in each country. Of course, there are some minor exceptions when one compares countries with input statistics and countries with intermediate statistics, but these exceptions may be explained by other statistical, legal or substantial factors.

For example, in the case of robbery (figure 15.7), countries with intermediate statistics surpassed countries with input statistics in 1999 and 2000. In that context, the figures provided by the European Sourcebook (2003: 40) show that between 1995 and 2000 there was an increase in

recorded robbery in most European countries, but the evolution of that offence was not identical in every country. For example, in Greece and Spain there was an increase of less than 10 per cent, in Croatia and Norway there was an 80 per cent increase, and in Latvia the increase was of 266 per cent. What happened was that, in 1999 and 2000, the increase in countries with intermediate statistics such as Latvia was more important than in countries with input statistics.

Something similar can be said about assault (figure 15.8) where the group of countries with input statistics always has higher crime rates than the one with output statistics, but from 1995 to 1997 the group of countries with intermediate statistics has higher crime rates than the group of countries with input statistics. Interestingly, the main increase between 1995 and 2000 occurs in countries with input statistics. In that context, it should be kept in mind that research on the Netherlands (Wittebrood & Junger, 2002), England, and the Scandinavian countries (von Hofer, unpublished) has shown that, during the last quarter of the 20th Century, victimisation surveys indicated a slight increase of violent offences, while according to police statistics there was a huge increase of that kind of offences. Therefore, it seems that the increase displayed in police statistics is mainly due to an increase in the reporting and the recording of violent offences.[8] If the same pattern holds true for the shorter period studied here, and taking into account that the clearance rate for assault is usually not too high, it seems logical to observe a more substantial increase in countries with input statistics than in countries with output statistics.

For intentional homicide we have made a more detailed analysis because it is an offence that proves to be particularly problematic for cross-national comparisons. Thus, in figure 15.10 we present the rates of recorded intentional homicide -including attempts- per 100,000 population in 29 countries in 1995.[9] As can be seen, the Western country with the

[8] In the case of Spain a country using input statistics the increase in assault is mainly due to an increase of more than 100 per cent in the reporting of domestic violence. Indeed, in 1997 there were 3492 domestic violence offences known to the Spanish police forces, while in 2000 there were 7122. Thus, in 1997, domestic violence offences represented 27 per cent of the total number of assault offences, while in 2000 they represented 41 per cent. Although in Spain there are no regular victimisation surveys that would give an alternative measure of that offence, it seems difficult to imagine an actual increase of more than 100 per cent in domestic violence taking place in only three years.

[9] Data for Georgia are for 1996 because the country did not provide data for 1995.

highest rate is the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the picture changes when one considers only completed intentional homicide, as we have done in figure 15.11. The Netherlands is now in the lower half of the scale. In figure 15.12 we have combined both measures in order to show the proportion of completed and attempted homicides included in the total number of intentional homicides recorded in each country. The figure shows that there is a wide variation across countries. For example, in the Netherlands, completed homicide represented 10 per cent of the total number of intentional homicides known to the police in 1995, in Switzerland it represented 51 per cent and in Ireland it represented 96 per cent of the total.

Figure 15.10 **Average number of intentional homicide offences (including attempts) per 100,000 population known to the police in 29 European countries - 1995**



Figure 15.11 **Average number of completed intentional homicide offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 29 European countries 1995**



Figure 15.12 **Average number of intentional homicide offences including proportion of attempted and completed homicide per 100,000 population known to the police in 29 European countries - 1995**



There is little doubt that the explanation of such differences is to be found mainly in the statistical counting rules applied in each country. Nevertheless, in this particular case it is not the moment when data are collected for statistics that is determinant, but the rules applied to determine whether a situation is to be labeled as homicide or not. For example, the total number of intentional homicides will be high in countries that instruct their police officers to record as homicide each case where the possibility of a homicide cannot be excluded, even if the crime scene suggests another offence such as a suicide as more probable. On the contrary, if such a rule is not applied, the total number of homicides will be less important. In the same perspective, police forces of different countries may label the same offence as either serious assault or as attempted homicide. Regarding the Netherlands, Smit et al. (unpublished) suggest that many attempted homicides are not failed homicides but very serious accidents caused by reckless driving or driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Figure 15.13 **Average number of completed intentional homicide offences per 100,000 population known to the police in 29 European countries grouped according to their counting rules - 1995 - 2000**



From a methodological point of view, our analyses (figures 15.10 to 15.12) suggest that cross-national comparisons of intentional homicide rates should only be made using the rates for completed homicide. This

is what we have done in figure 15.13 where, once more, countries using input and intermediate statistics show higher crime rates than countries using output statistics.[10] It can also be seen that as in the case of burglary (figure 15.9) countries with intermediate statistics usually present higher crime rates than countries with input statistics. In fact, intermediate statistics pose the problem that, with the information available to date, it is impossible to assess the exact moment of the process between input and output when they are collected in each country. For example, if data were recorded for statistics at a moment in time close to the input instead of the output, it would seem logical to have a pattern similar to the one shown in figure 15.13, where there are no big differences between countries with input statistics and countries with intermediate statistics.

15.3 Conclusion

By comparing the crime rates of thirty-seven European countries between 1995 and 2000 according to their counting rules, we have seen that:

- For every kind of offence, countries using input statistics have higher crime rates than countries using output statistics.For every kind of offence, countries using intermediate statistics have higher crime rates than countries using output statistics.
- For almost all offences, countries using input statistics have higher crime rates than countries using intermediate statistics.

Therefore we can conclude that European crime rates seem to follow the following pattern: Countries using input statistics reveal higher crime rates than countries using intermediate statistics, and countries using intermediate statistics show higher crime rates than countries using output statistics (figure 15.14). This pattern reflects the structure of the criminal process, which has often been compared to a funnel (President's Commission, 1967: 8-9).

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[10] Albania was excluded from this comparison because its rates were extremely inconsistent: 6.5 completed homicides for 100,000 population in 1995, 7.6 in 1996, 46.5 (!) in 1997, 17 in 1998, 14.4 in 1999 and 7.9 in 2000 (European Sourcebook, 2003: 36). The inclusion of Albania would not have changed the general pattern because the country uses intermediate statistics (i.e. the relationship between countries with input and output statistics would have been the same), but the group of countries with intermediate statistics would always have had the highest crime rates.

Figure 15.14 **Statistical counting rules and their influence on the volume of recorded crime**



Although our analysis does not prove that cross-national differences in recorded crime are due to the statistical counting rules apply in each country, it strongly suggests that these rules play a major role in the explanation of those differences.

The analysis has also shown that the statistical counting rules have a strong influence on the total number of intentional homicides (i.e. including attempts) recorded in each country, although in that case it is not the moment when data are recorded for statistics that is determinant, but the rules applied to decide whether an offence is to be labeled as homicide or not. These rules vary widely across nations. Thus, in some countries, attempted homicide may represent more than 90 per cent of the total intentional homicides recorded, while in others it may represent less than 10 per cent. Therefore, cross-national comparisons of homicide rates should only be made with data for completed intentional homicide (i.e. excluding attempts). Besides, as completed intentional homicide is not a very common offence, has a high clearance rate and is clearly defined and verifiable by the presence of a dead body, one can expect that the influence of the statistical counting rules applied will be less important than for other offences.

In sum, our findings are not encouraging for researchers engaged in comparative criminology. They confirm that crime statistics are social constructs, that each society has its own special way of constructing them,

and that cross-national comparisons of crime rates are therefore extremely difficult to realize. Obviously, the question that arises is how to deal with these facts or, to put it more simply, how to perform cross-national comparisons of crime rates.

We can imagine five possible answers to that question. The first one, and the most radical, would simply be to avoid making cross-national comparisons on the basis of crime statistics. In that context, victimisation surveys and self-reported delinquency studies conducted with the same questionnaire and the same methodology constitute alternative measures of crime that can be used for such comparisons. The second one would be to combine different crime measures. For example, national crime statistics can be combined with victimisation surveys by weighting data according to the percentage of offences reported to the police (Aebi et al., 2002), or different crime measures can be combined in an index as the one developed by HEUNI[11] (Aromaa & Joutsen, 2003). Nevertheless, the validity of such kind of indexes has not been established yet. In particular, the combination of collections of international crime statistics such as the European Sourcebook, Interpol's International Crime Statistics or the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems presents the problem that all these collections are based on the same national crime statistics, which explains why their crime rates are usually correlated (see the correlations found by Bennett & Lynch, 1990, and by Howard & Smith, 2003). However, the process of data validation introduced in the European Sourcebook (2003: 16-18) has improved the quality of the data included in that collection and explains why the correlations are not perfect (Aebi et al., 2002). The third alternative would be to restrict the use of crime statistics to comparisons of crime trends only, although in this case the researcher must check for eventual modifications of the counting rules applied during the period studied (see note 3; von Hofer, 2000; Killias & Aebi, 2000). The fourth one would be to restrict comparisons to countries applying similar statistical counting rules. The fifth one would be to weight crime rates according to the statistical counting rules of each country. The problem with this fifth possibility is that it implies going back from the macro to the micro level, i.e. from groups of countries

[11] European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations.

applying similar counting rules to each country in particular. Alas, this is not possible yet because all we know is that countries with input statistics present higher crime rates than countries with output statistics. For example, in countries with input statistics the rate for rape is more or less 50 per cent higher than the rate in countries with output statistics. A part of that 50 per cent difference seems to be explained by the statistical counting rules applied. But we (still) cannot establish precisely that part of the percentage and which is even more important we can be sure that it varies from country to country. Therefore we cannot establish the weights to be applied to each country according to its statistical counting rules. The real solution would be to introduce more detailed crime statistics such as the ones used in Sweden (von Hofer, 2000) in every country. Until that moment arrives, our analysis suggests that any cross-national comparison of recorded crime rates should pay special attention to the issue of the statistical counting rules applied in each country.

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SIXTEEN

CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS OF SELF-REPORTED DELINQUENCY DATA: METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

16.1 Introduction

My presentation consists of three parts. First, I provide a simple inventory of types of self-reported (SR) delinquency survey studies - viewed from a cross-national perspective. The second part of the presentation uses an example of a cross-national SR delinquency study (ISRD-1) (Junger-Tas, Terlouw & Klein, 1994; Junger-Tas, Haen Marshall & Ribeaud, 2003) to illustrate several methodological problems involved in cross-national SR delinquency research. The final part of the presentation consists of a rather optimistic assessment of the contributions - both achieved and potential - of SR delinquency research to our understanding of cross-national differences and similarities in the nature and extent of (the correlates of) delinquency.

16.2 Types of SR delinquency studies - viewed from a cross-national perspective

The self-report method has now gained widespread use among researchers, both in the United States and abroad (Klein, 1989, 1994;

IIneke Haen Marshall, Northeastern University, Boston, USA.

Junger-Tas and Marshall, 1999; Thornberry and Krohn, 2000). Self-report surveys of delinquency have three different (often overlapping) purposes:

1 To measure the prevalence and incidence of offending. Self-reports are viewed as a useful supplement or alternative to official police statistics. See, for example, Elliott's (1994) presidential address in Criminology about the use of self-report data from the National Youth Survey (NYS) to estimate violent crime.
2 To evaluate the correlates of offending. Many self-report surveys include questions about social background variables (age, gender, ethnicity, social class), as well as theoretical concepts (self control, life-style, social bonding, and so on) to allow theory testing. The best-known example is Hirschi's 1969 Causes of Delinquency.
3 To describe the trajectories of delinquent careers. The dimensions of delinquent careers (age of onset, intermittency, seriousness, versatility, chronicity, and so on) may be estimated from official data, but also from self-report surveys (see Blumstein et al., 1986). Exemplary of this approach are a number of longitudinal studies which focus on increasing knowledge about the epidemiology of delinquency and crime, risk and protective factors, etiological theories and life-course consequences of adolescent deviance (See, Thornberry et al., 2003).

Depending on their primary purpose, self-report surveys of juvenile offending may be cross-sectional (one time measurement only); repeated cross-sectional (measurements of different samples over time in order to simulate a longitudinal design, a popular method to estimate trends in offending; or longitudinal (repeated measurements of the same sample, for example the Denver Youth Survey, the Pittsburgh Youth Study, the Seattle Social Development Project, or the National Youth Survey).

The self-report method has long outgrown its infancy and by now appears a powerful and reliable research tool (Junger-Tas and Marshall, 1999; Thornberry and Krohn, 2000). Over the last several decades a large volume of self-report studies of offending has accumulated, mostly in the US, but also in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Europe, Japan, India, and South Africa. Unlike in the past, when most researchers limited their interest to their own country, researchers are now beginning to use these self-report data to draw comparative conclusions. Comparative analysis of self-report data has not only practical and policy implications (i.e. we

can learn from the experiences in other countries), but they also provide an opportunity to test the universality of hypotheses in a situation of maximum differences (Kohn, 1989). Typically, comparative research is primarily interested in testing the assumption that no national differences exist in, for example, youth violence. If differences are found, then comparative researchers ordinarily identify the source of these differences as social, legal, or criminal justice processes (Farrington and Wikstrom, 1994). National differences in observations are interpreted in terms of meaningful concomitant variations between the countries compared (Marsh, 1967: 158).

Comparative research literature using self-report delinquency data varies in the degree to which they use explicit international standardization in the study design (see appendix 1 for schematic overview). The bulk of the analyses that draws upon survey data from multiple countries are not explicitly comparative by design. They often only provide an after-the-fact comparative interpretation of the data. Only few current studies actually follow the most preferred method, that of an explicit comparative design.

The weakest design - from a comparative perspective - draws conclusions about similarities and differences in findings in a number of disparate self-report studies done in different countries, using (somewhat or very) different instruments, and (somewhat or very) different samples (Type 1 in Appendix 16.1). This approach is typically used in review articles which make conclusions about cross-national differences and similarities in prevalence and incidence of offending, as well as about the correlates of offending. A more solid approach - because of greater comparability in research design - explores cross-national similarities and differences in national longitudinal studies (Type 2 on Appendix 16.1). In a recent publication, Taking Stock of Delinquency: An Overview of Findings from Contemporary Longitudinal Studies (Thornberry, Krohn & Lizotte, 2003), seven contemporary longitudinal studies of delinquency are discussed which represent three nations (UK, USA and Canada). The studies are the Denver Youth Survey, the Pittsburgh Youth Study, and the Rochester Youth Development Study (all from the USA), the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development (UK), the Houston longitudinal Study (USA), the Montreal Longitudinal and Experimental Study (Canada), and the Seattle Social Development Project (USA). Such panel studies of

crime and delinquency share a core set of design features, including repeated measurements and interviews with the focal group. There is not, however, explicit standardization of either the measurement instruments used or of the sample selection.

Beginning to approximate an explicit comparative design using self-report data is the International Dating Violence Study led by Murray Straus at the University of New Hampshire. (Type 3 in Appendix 16.1). In this study, sampling is not standardized (convenience samples of college students in different countries), but the same self-report instrument is used. A consortium of researchers in all major world regions conducts the study. Each member of the consortium uses a core questionnaire that is translated and then back translated to maintain 'conceptual equivalence' (Straus, 1969) across the sites. A detailed description of the study, including the questionnaire and all other key documents, is available on the website http://pubpages.unh.edu/ mas2. There are a total of 33 universities (17 of which are from North America) from 17 countries.

The most robust comparative survey research design requires international collaboration on the construction of a common self-report instrument, as well as on the use of standardized sampling procedures and data collection (Type 4 in Appendix 16.1). There are a growing number of such examples, on a range of topics (e.g., World Values Survey). Focusing on juveniles, the best examples may be the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) study, testing school achievement in national samples of schools in Europe. Recently, the study is expanded to include an increasing number of non-European nations (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Peru, and Thailand) (OECD, 2003). The best-known example within the field of criminology is the International Crime Victimisation Survey (ICVS), which administers the same core questionnaire on victimisation to a number of national and city-samples in a large number of countries (Mayhew and van Dijk, 1997). The International Self-Report Delinquency study (ISRD-1) - initiated a few years after the first ICVS data collection sweep - represents the first large-scale international effort to collect data on youthful offending and its correlates using common sampling and common instruments and joint analysis. This study is the focus of the second part of my presentation.

16.3 The international self-report delinquency study (ISRD-1)

The International Self Report Delinquency Study (ISRD-1) was launched in 1990 by a working group of researchers representing six government-linked centers and seven universities from 11 - mainly European - countries. This working group created a common survey questionnaire, consisting of questions about offending (prevalence and frequency), circumstances of offending, social reactions to offending, socio-demographic variables, as well as some theoretical variables related to social control theory. In as far as practically and logistically possible, a common approach to data collection, and data coding was used. A total of 10,842 youth between the ages of 14 and 21 were interviewed in five country samples (England & Wales, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal) and six city samples (Mannheim, Germany; Belfast, North Ireland; Liege, Belgium; Helsinki, Finland; Turin, Messina & Siena, Italy; Omaha, USA). The data analysis proceeded in two steps. First, each country analyzed its own data; the results were presented on a country-by-country basis (Junger-Tas, Terlouw & Klein, 1994). Thereafter, the country data files were merged and analyzed simultaneously (Junger-Tas, Haen Marshall and Ribeaud, 2003)

The main objective of the ISRD-1 design was to obtain cross-national standardization and comparability in selection of samples, in content and administration of questionnaires, in coding of data. The ideal standards set in the original planning stages for this project were not always met, of course. The original objective of following similar sampling techniques in the 11 participating countries was only partially realized. Consequently, there are in essence 11 country samples that are sometimes quite dissimilar in their method of respondent selection, with varying claims to representativeness. Because of the nature of the sampling methods used (school-based and population-based), the samples are not directly comparable. The population-based samples tend to have a wider age-range, and show more variation in living situation (i.e. alone or with parents), and in likelihood of school enrollment. Importantly, these variables (i.e. age, school enrollment and living situation) have also been shown to be very important correlates of youthful misbehavior. Because of the crucial importance of age, school enrollment and living situation, it was decided

to conduct part of the analysis on samples, which are at least comparable with regard to these three variables. For the multivariate analysis, only those cases were included that met the following criteria: maximal age of 18, attending school and living with both parents or at least with the mother. This had as a consequence a considerable loss of cases, but now the samples are much more comparable.

The ISRD questionnaire is the core instrument for data collection (see appendix of Junger-Tas et al. for a complete copy of the ISRD questionnaire). Although in principle the participating countries were to use the same basic core questionnaire, some of the researchers deviated from the original format at some point. Between-country comparability of the data was hindered by questions that were omitted, questions that were formulated differently, and questions which used non-comparable response categories. Although the ISRD project was not completely successful in obtaining perfect standardization of questionnaire structure and content, the data provided sufficient common and comparable information to allow simultaneous analysis.

The administration of the ISRD questionnaire varied between countries, although the most common method was the personal interview. The majority of the interviews were conducted by females; the mean age of the interviewers ranged from a low of 25 years (Portugal), to a high of 38 years (Switzerland). The most common place for the interview was the home of the respondent, but a number of interviews were also conducted in the street, café or bar, classrooms or some other school based-location.

A significant part of the analysis made direct comparisons between the 11 individual countries. These cross-national comparisons are made both with regard to (a) the estimates of the prevalence of delinquency; and (b) the correlates of delinquency.

Descriptive information on the life-time prevalence and last-year prevalence of delinquency among the 5 national samples and the 6 city samples may be found in tables 16.1 and 16.2.

Table 16.1 **Lifetime prevalence of delinquent behavior** *(per cent)*

	N	Property	Violence	Vandalism	Drug use	Serious delinquency	Overall delinquency
NATIONAL SAMPLES							
England & Wales	1.222	30,3	31,4	22,8	34,0	23,4	59,8
Netherlands	914	60,5	37,6	46,2	21,3	23,9	84,0
Portugal	1.000	43,4	33,1	38,7	18,7	24,3	79,9
Spain	2.100	50,1	39,6	55,3	24,5	30,8	81,9
Switzerland	970	68,8	26,2	49,1	26,0	16,5	90,0
CITY SAMPLES							
Mannheim	300	55,0	18,7	36,7	14,3	13,3	81,7
Belfast	938	57,0	28,0	50,8	28,1	27,6	76,4
Liège	618	65,6	36,0	52,6	14,6	33,8	89,0
Helsinki (a)	1.232	75,1	40,2	56,0	17,0	27,9	94,4
3 Italian cities(a)	1.009	29,7	19,2	25,5	8,9	6,3	84,7
Omaha (USA)(a)	539	70,9	47,7	55,8	25,0	34,8	86,8

(a) School samples.

Table 16.2 **Last-year prevalence of delinquent behavior** *(per cent)*

	N	Property	Violence	Vandalism	Drug use	Serious delinquency	Overall delinquency
NATIONAL SAMPLES							
England & Wales	1.222	16,4	13,5	5,2	23,0	13,6	35,1
Netherlands	914	28,0	21,2	13,5	14,7	9,1	56,3
Portugal	1.000	21,4	18,1	16,3	11,0	9,9	54,3
Spain	2.100	19,7	21,8	20,4	17,6	10,4	54,2
Switzerland	970	29,5	16,4	18,2	19,8	6,1	65,4
CITY SAMPLES							
Mannheim	300	20,7	11,7	7,3	6,7	3,7	45,3
Belfast	938	29,1	13,1	19,7	21,7	13,4	45,0
Liège	618	27,1	16,8	21,0	7,4	11,1	59,8
Helsinki (a)	1.232	32,9	14,7	16,3	8,5	9,0	67,7
3 Italian cities (a)	1.009	3,8	12,4	14,3	5,9	2,6	62,3
Omaha (USA) (a)	539	37,6	27,1	15,0	16,0	15,3	59,2

(a) School samples.

The tables show six delinquency scales, both for life-time (“ever”) and 12-month (“last year”) prevalence. The overall delinquency scale is the most general measure of any delinquent involvement. This scale consists of a total of 28 items; excluded are “problem behaviors” (truancy, running away and alcohol use), as well as (soft and hard) drug use. The life-time prevalence rates for the overall delinquency scale range from a low of 59.8 .

(England and Wales) to a high of 94.4 (Helsinki). [It should be noted that the comparatively low rate found in England and Wales is a method artifact and does not indicate that delinquency is particularly low in that country. The English and Welsh research team simply used stricter definitions for the various offenses. For instance, thefts were only accounted for if the value of the stolen goods was above 5 pounds.] The pooled life-time prevalence rate is 82 per cent. The range of values for the 12-month prevalence rate for overall delinquency is considerably smaller: between a low of 35.1 (England and Wales), to a high of 67.7 (Helsinki). Since the 'overall delinquency' measure is a very broad measure, we also used

offense-specific scales (i.e. violence scale, property scale, vandalism scale, drug use scale, serious offenses scale). [Interested readers are suggested to go to the ISRD-related publications for more detailed information about these scales.] Figures 16.1, 16.2 and 16.3 present the lifetime and last-year prevalence for 'overall delinquency', serious delinquency, and violence in bargraph format.

Figure 16.1 **Lifetime and last-year overall delinquency prevalence in all samples, age 14-18**



Because of issues related to problematic comparability of individual country samples, direct cross-national comparisons with regard to estimates of delinquency involvement should be made with the greatest caution. Analysis of the 11 country samples separately has several drawbacks. First, sampling error and other distorting influences may bias the individual country estimates. Second, the macro-level differences between the 11 individual countries are too many to enumerate, which makes interpretation of international differences in delinquency variables.

Figure 16.2 **Lifetime and last-year prevalence of serious offenses, all samples, age 14-18**



In order to adjust for these problems, part of the analysis adopted a 'middle course' strategy, as a way of increasing the between-group variability and minimizing the within-group variability. An important intuitive way to cluster individual countries is on some sort of “regional” basis, i.e. adjacent countries tend to have more in common with one another than those that are geographically separated. Regional clusters tend to share cultural, political and economic characteristics. By grouping countries together that share particular macro-level characteristics, the national differences (which otherwise may have been obscured or gone unnoticed) are magnified (assuming that there is a 'regional' effect), thus increasing the likelihood of observing significant patterns. We employed three country clu-

Figure 16.3 **Lifetime and last-year prevalence of violent behavior by 11 samples**



sters: (1) Anglo-Saxon cluster (England and Wales, Nebraska (USA), and Northern Ireland), (2) Northwestern European cluster (Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland), and (3) Southern European cluster (Portugal, Spain, Italy). In order to work with these country clusters, the unequal country sample sizes were standardized by a weighing procedure. Figure 16.4 illustrates the differences in last-year prevalence of delinquent and problem behavior for the different country clusters.

Figure 16.4 **Last-year prevalence of delinquent and problem behavior by sample clusters**



Several comparisons may be made between the different country clusters. For example, self-reported property offending was lowest in Southern Europe (17.3 per cent), and highest in North-West Europe (31.5 per cent). On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon youth samples reported the highest levels of serious offending (14.0 per cent), and the Northwestern European samples the lowest levels (8.5 per cent). However, comparing levels of prevalence may be done only with the utmost caution (because of the already discussed methodological shortcomings of the study). Furthermore, prevalence rates present only a limited part of the overall delinquency picture. There are many additional comparisons which may be made. One example is table 16.3, which shows how the country clusters differ with regard to the mean age of onset by offense type.

This table shows that there are no country differences in age of first serious offense (between 13.2 and 13.3 for all three country clusters), but that, for example, Anglo-Saxon youth start using drugs at a slightly earlier age (14.4) than Northwestern European youth (15.2).

Finally, for parts of our analysis, we also pooled the country data toge-

Table 16.3 **Mean age of onset by country cluster and offense type, age 14-18** (a)

	Northwest Europe	Anglo-Saxon	South Europe
Vandalism	12,4	12,0	11,6
Property	11,6	11,9	12,5
Violence	13,6	13,2	13,5
Drugs	15,2	14,4	15,0
Serious offenses	13,3	13,2	13,3

(a) t-test: Northwest Europe – Anglo-Saxon: all differences are significant except for serious offenses. South Europe – Anglo-Saxon: idem. Northwest Europe – South Europe: only vandalism and property differences are significant.

ther and treated them as one big sample (n = 10,842). The pooled sample is viewed as representing - more or less- young people in industrialized western countries. This may be done only with great caution.

16.4 Concluding remarks

Above, I briefly highlighted how decisions made with regard to the selection of samples, construction and administration of the questionnaire, and analytic strategies may deviate from the ideal design because of the realities of the logistic and practical problems confronted by a cross-national study. These realities mean that the ideal standardization of the ISRD-1 design was only partially realized. Still, interesting substantive insights into youthful misbehavior have been produced by the ISRD-1 study, and, most importantly, these substantive insights are consistent with current theoretical knowledge and empirical research on delinquency. For example, serious delinquents were found to start their offending at an earlier age than their less seriously-involved counterparts; Female prevalence and frequency of involvement is found to be much lower than that of males; Level of parental control had an effect on serious offending and drug use; Truancy and disliking schools were related to all types of delinquency in all country clusters. It was also found that not all variables operate in similar ways in different national settings. These very reasonable findings provide a certain degree of validation of the methodology employed.

Our experience with the ISRD-1 shows that even (explicit) standardi-

Appendix table 16.1 Explicit international standardization in study design

Low → High			
Type 1	Type 2	Type 3	Type 4
Review of different national S-R studies on youth violence (Junger-Tas 1996)	Synthesis of national longitudinal studies (Thornberry, Krohn & Lizotte, 2003)	International dating violence study (Douglas and Strauss, 2003	International crime victim survey (ICVS)
			International self-report delinquency study (ISRD-1)

zed cross-national design with flawed execution may produce very useful results. Caution needs to be used in the interpretation of this type of cross-national data, however. In the first part of my presentation I listed the three different purposes of self-report research of delinquency. The first purpose, to estimate the prevalence and incidence of delinquency should not be the primary purpose of cross-national studies. And if we do make cross-national comparisons of prevalence, it should be done with utmost caution. Instead, the self-report method is a much more useful to address the second and third purpose of delinquency research, that is to evaluate the correlates of offending and to describe the trajectories of delinquent involvement.

Finally, our experiences with ISRD-1 are used as the foundation for a series of 'new and improved' self-report studies in some 30 countries, using a core instrument, standardized sampling methods and administration methods. The data collection for ISRD-2 will start in the fall of 2005.

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CRIME PREVISION

SEVENTEEN

THE PREVENTION STRATEGIES IN THE ITALIAN CITIES

17.1 Introduction

Thanks to the changes that have taken place in the crime policy field, the concepts and procedures for producing safety and prevention have greatly evolved too. Today, numerous western countries are not only working on their scientific production and analyses but are also developing programmes, ideas, debates, strategies, all with the purpose of approaching differently the practices of crime prevention, placing these under the various existing definitions ("safety policies", "new prevention", "safety of the communities", etc.). A common feature to all these general changes is undoubtedly the "need to shift resources and focus towards crime prevention, rather than focusing on more reactive and coercive forms of policing and criminal justice" (Stenson and Edwards, 2004, 209).

Prevention, often placed next to the adjective "new,"[1] has become a concept that characterises the development of new forms for controlling criminality and producing safety. This document will not analyse the transformations and the elements of the "new prevention" nor its importance within the safety policies. Rather, it will provide a synthetic description of the prevention strategies adopted in Italy in the past decade, when safety

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[1] The concept of "new" prevention and the main aspects characterising it have been fully analysed and diffused, in the European continent context, especially by P. Robert (1991). For the first Italian transpositions of the concept, see Pavarini (1994).

policies based on crime prevention and social reassurance interventions were initially issued at a local level and directly managed by the municipalities (Selmini, 2003).

Most of the information presented in this work is drawn from a very exhaustive research conducted on the prevention measures taken in the Italian capital cities between 1995 and 1999, and with some updated data relative to some particular cities. This document will attempt to provide elements for further reflection on how some traditional aspects of the prevention itself and of the safety management at a local level are evolving from these general processes. It will not be just a criminological analysis but rather one based on a perspective of analysis of the public policies. I will clarify this detail when describing the results of the research.

17.2 What prevention are we talking about?

The term “prevention” is much less used and studied in Italy than in Anglo-American countries. In particular, for decades, this concept has been anchored to a strictly penal context where prevention was considered as the purpose of the sentence and the prevention measures were only those defined as such by the penal code.

Nonetheless, this concept did develop thanks to the attention that the social policies gave it; they indeed considered, and still consider, preventive activities - for reducing conditions of disadvantage, inequalities, etc in family contexts, at school, at work... - as fundamental for preventing the development of criminal behaviours. Because of this tradition and of the fact that criminological research is still lagging behind, the term “safety policies” is still preferred in Italy. This term refers to a very wide container that now includes the concept of prevention and both the measures aimed at reducing or diminishing criminality and the social reassurance activities.

The concept of prevention, thus, developed until becoming, on the one hand, an activity that affects many subjects and on the other, an integrating and inseparable component of the urban safety policies. Today, such urban safety policies offer an articulated range of measures and activities

for reducing not only the crime phenomena in the strict sense of the word (as well as disorder and decay) but also the perception of insecurity. Because of all these practices, strategies, and activities, the concept of prevention has become, though, very vague. At the same time, despite or maybe thanks to it being so vague, it has pervaded various sectors of the public policies, and has definitively imposed itself in political and administrative issues.

Despite the vagueness of its definition and breadth of contents, this new word has rapidly spread, without even any rigorous analyses being carried out or scientific definitions being provided, and has proven to be very efficient in politics and in administrative procedures.

Such importance at a prevention policy level, viewed as component of the safety policies, introduces nowadays another very important aspect. When taken out from the exclusive penal context and inserted in a political action of which various subjects are responsible (local institutions, communities, "experts"), the prevention becomes a container that comprises different measures and activities, defined as such by the various actors, and in particular by the political actors.

The prevention strategies hereafter described are those realised locally by direct initiative of the municipalities, and thus by the city governments, within their so-called urban safety policies and defined as such by the political and institutional actors. Thus, they do not include the prevention measures that have not been defined as such by these actors, nor those implemented by the penal system agencies and national polices (subjects that were not included in the research).

In the next pages, because of the difficulty in classifying the prevention we refer to, we considered it more useful to simplify and distinguish the various types only from the priority objectives of the measure: do they act on an effect, a symptom, a defined context or do they aim at a more general objective that could influence, even indirectly, the structural aspects of the crime problems or reduce the conditions of decay, suffering or marginality. We have, thus, adopted here a traditional and rather simple type of classification, one based on two large categories: situational prevention and social prevention.

17.3 The situational prevention

The idea that acting on the context, even by means of expedients, could produce a reductive effect on the crime phenomena or on the victimisation is at the basis of the situational prevention. The principle behind it is that criminality is not so much the result of a personal inclination than it is of factors that create or favour crime opportunities (life styles and habits of potential victims, physical characteristics of the environment, absence of control etc.) and of rationally motivated authors.[2]

Crime (and disorders) is evidently seen more as a normal event that requires no special "inclination" from the author, rather than as an exceptional break up of the daily life. Since crime is redefined as such, the measure focuses on the "criminal situation", the risk context that must be controlled and manipulated to preserve the normal routine of the city's economic and social life. While traditional control activities are recovered, different kinds of preventive strategies are implemented to "govern" the critical situation, but without serving the purpose of resolving or acting on the structural causes [Garland, 1997, 386-387].

Despite the lack of a theoretic background on which such approach to criminality could be based, in Italy, the situational prevention has considerably developed in the local crime governing programmes.

The municipal administrations encountered no difficulties in identifying, within their own competences, the spaces and instruments for making possible these techniques to control the phenomena. The municipal police, for example, represent a priority resource thanks to its knowledge of the territory and to its habit of working on the problems of the city daily life. In addition, the administrative decrees aimed at governing emergency or contingent situations are also very important instruments.

Let us examine in detail the types of situational crime prevention that have developed between 1995 and the end of the 1990s in the capital cities of Italy.

The important measures taken include the various forms of territory surveillance (three types emerged from the research: areas surveillances

2 An extensive bibliography, mainly Anglo-American, exists relatively to this matter, but particular reference regarding situational crime prevention must be done to Clarke (1995).

of the city, of the schools and of the public property). Such measures appear to have been, during the five years taken into consideration, the most frequently used measures, by means of the different distribution and re-organization of the municipal polices in space and over time (night patrolling, mobile detachments, concentration on specific areas of the city, etc.). In many cases, the surveillance is carried out in collaboration with the state police or with the military police (the carabinieri), thereby showing that in everyday life, the collaboration among different state institutions is much more frequent and problem-less than what occurs in the institutional competition.

The research results point out to the growing specialisation of the municipal police on the prevention issues, here viewed as prevention aimed at increasing the surveillance for deterrent purposes.

Another instrument frequently indicated is that of the video-surveillance, which, nevertheless, became much more widespread only in the years immediately following the conclusion of this research. Even though there are no sure data regarding the use of this situational crime prevention technique, it is without any doubt much more used now than a few years ago.

Though still not very common today, the surveillance measures (defined in the following table as “surveillance entrusted to other subjects”) carried out by subjects that, thanks to the activities they carry out daily, can contribute in crime prevention, are on the increase. Examples of such measure include the collaboration with the concessionaires of bathing establishments in controlling the beaches, with the drivers of public transport means, with the voluntary ecological guards, in city parks, as preventive measure, or yet the collaboration with pensioners in controlling the outgoings from schools, etc.

Even the so-called “natural” surveillance (Clarke, 1995, 109) is stimulated, especially through the intensifying of street lightings, a measure adopted by many municipalities for preventive purposes, even to the point that a resort to this measure is considered as one of the most widespread ones among all the types considered.

No forms of informal surveillance have been registered, such as those entrusted to citizen groups, based on the model of “neighbourhood surveillance programmes” widely common in the Anglo-American context. This does not mean that more or less organized groups of citizens are not

involved with a certain frequency in the prevention activities but the purpose of the rare surveillance is the priority one: these forms of community prevention will be discussed further down.

The most common measures for situational crime prevention include also measures that control the movements and behaviours of persons through the use of architectonic barriers, park fences, anti-graffiti measures, removals of benches, etc. summarised under the term “dissuasive street furniture” measures, as well as all the measures taken through the “administrative controls”, whose importance we will discuss in the next paragraphs.

17.3.1 The use of administrative decrees as instrument of the situational prevention

The administrative decrees seem to represent an important instrument for realising new practices of crime control at a local level.

Among all the instruments that the municipal administration has, they indeed are the most appropriate ones for dissuading and imposing determinate behaviours and for managing and regulating trouble social behaviours, which, despite their various nature and characteristics, more or less refer to the urban disorder area. These administrative measures focus on the effects of a phenomenon, physical and social disorders or the so-called soft crimes [Barbagli, 1999, 32 ss.], to reduce the impact on the urban context and on the social fear of crime, by means of activities that contain, contrast, and deter the phenomenon. They allow answering the “crime situations” that we have previously spoken about [Garland, 1997, 386] without trying to act on the causes of the phenomena. The purpose is indeed to manage and make such situations compatible with the ordinary urban daily life and to offer a quick visible answer to the requests and fear of the citizens. As we will see hereafter, they are “managed” by means of various modalities: moving the phenomenon, prohibiting certain behaviours, imposing other behaviours, etc.

They represent the instrument most similar to the traditional penal ones (they impose restraints to the behaviours and restrictions to freedom of movements of certain objects) but are more elastic, adaptable, and suita-

ble for governing both the emergency and the routine situations. Often, they start by being only a “city emergency” but tend to repeat themselves until become stable over time, such as the case of the famous anti-prostitution regulations, issued in numerous Italian cities since 1998 and still in force in many of these cities.

Among all the 33 forms of administrative controls surveyed during the research (table 17.1), most of these decrees regarded urgency regulations issued in the field of prostitution. Other decrees were taken to remove the “persons washing other people's windscreens” at traffic lights, to close public establishments and to control their opening hours, to control the violent football supporters, and to clear cottages or any other buildings occupied.

The implementation of the decree, usually entrusted to the municipal polices, enables to manage the phenomena that cannot be immediately qualified as crimes, but to which much importance is given in the safety policies. These measures can thus be added to the state police traditional activities of territory control and crime repression as they help create a new infrastructure to govern crime, urban disorder and insecurity where penal and administrative instruments go together and support each other in managing small and large risks of the urban life.

17.3.2 The distribution of the situational crime prevention according to the different government coalitions of the cities

Table 17.1 reports the situational prevention measures that have been surveyed during the research, based on the division per government coalition.

This table provides us two fundamental pieces of information: 1) a list of all the situational prevention measures indicated by the administrators as such in their projects for community safety and 2) a confirmation that these measures are commonly used and can be adapted to different contexts from an ideological point of view. In table 17.1, the measures are indeed presented according to a division based on the government coalition of the city; we can see that both centre-right and centre-left administrations use in a not very different way these instruments. According to

Table 17.1 **Type of situational prevention measures adopted in the cities, by government coalition** (a)

MEASURES	Centre-left coalition		Centre-right coalition		Lega Nord (Northern League)		Total	
	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index
Surveillance of city areas	38	0,63	22	0,61	2	0,33	62	0,61
Surveillance of schools	29	0,48	23	0,64	2	0,33	54	0,53
Surveillance of public property	30	0,5	19	0,53	2	0,33	51	0,5
Surveillance entrusted to other subjects	6	0,1	1	0,03	1	0,17	8	0,08
Street lighting	24	0,4	7	0,19	3	0,5	34	0,33
Video-surveillance	9	0,15	2	0,06	2	0,33	13	0,13
Dissuasive street furniture	9	0,15	1	0,03	1	0,17	11	0,11
Administrative control	21	0,35	10	0,28	2	0,33	33	0,32
Total measures	**166**	**-**	**85**	**-**	**15**	**-**	**266**	**-**
Number of cities	*60*	-	*36*	-	*6*	-	*102*	-

(a) The index is obtained, relating the number of measures to the number of cities involved by government coalition. The total number of cities amounts to 102 as one city resulted governed by a commissioner during the survey

their principles and philosophy though, the right-wing government should privilege situational prevention measures centred on the effects while the left-wing governments should deal with the safety issues by putting the emphasis on the social prevention elements. In the case of the situational prevention measures, this difference is only partially confirmed. Table 17.2 indicates the distribution of the situational prevention measures by geographical area of Italy, showing a higher presence of these measures in the Centre-northern areas.

Table 17.2 **Type of situational prevention measures adopted in the cities, by geographical area** (a)

MEASURES	North-west		North-east		Centre		South and Islands		Total	
	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index
Surveillance of city areas	12	0,5	11	0,5	20	0,95	19	0,53	62	0,6
Surveillance of schools	13	0,54	2	0,09	20	0,95	19	0,53	54	0,52
Surveillance of public property	10	0,42	9	0,41	17	0,81	15	0,42	51	0,5
Surveillance entrusted to other subjects	4	0,17	3	0,14	1	0,05	0	0	8	0,08
Street lighting	11	0,46	9	0,41	7	0,33	7	0,19	34	0,33
Video-surveillance	10	0,42	2	0,09	1	0,05	0	0	13	0,13
Dissuasive street furniture	3	0,13	5	0,23	3	0,14	0	0	11	0,11
Administrative control	15	0,63	14	0,64	4	0,19	0	0	33	0,32
Total measures	**78**		**55**		**73**		**60**		**266**	
Number of cities	*24*		*22*		*21*		*36*		*103*	

(a) The index is obtained, relating the number of measures to the number of cities involved by government coalition. The total number of cities amounts to 102 as one city resulted governed by a commissioner during the survey.

17.4 The social prevention measures between continuity and change

The social crime prevention includes measures that aim at eliminating or at reducing the structural or social kind of crime factors. This intervention, based on an aetiological theory of criminality, aims at acting on its causes through general social intervention programmes (Robert, 1991, 16), able to intervene or modify the motives that induce to crime when they are based on conditions of social disadvantage (Gilling, 1997, 5). Unlike the situational prevention, this strategy puts the focus back on the author of the crime and its inclination to crime, considered not so much as

the result of pathological individual conditions than as a deficit deriving from the personal, social and economical conditions of the person.

According to some, social prevention is not a specific measure nor one of the many prevention modalities, but rather a global policy for social well being that crosses all sectors of the administrative policies (Walgrave and de Cauter, 1986; Peyre, 1986). Other authors put the accent on the social development considered as the basis of these policies; their purpose would be that of studying the origin and reproduction of inequalities responsible for the "disadvantaged contexts" in order to overcome them (Hastings, 1998, 117). Tonry and Farrington (1995) perceive social prevention as the combination of an individual measure towards the potential authors (the so-called developmental prevention) with measures based on the transformation of the community social conditions, the so-called community crime prevention. Others, yet, consider social prevention as a range of collective-type measures, or as a range of measures external to the penal justice system.

This form of prevention mainly addresses the author of the crime, who is considered not from an individual perspective but in a general context. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish conceptually these approaches from the traditional assistance and social policies adopted in western countries.

The fields of intervention of the social prevention, according to the authors of one of the most recent review of programmes on the interventions (Graham and Bennet, 1995), are: the urban policy (recover of the urban decay, lodging policy, etc.); the health policies; the policies for the families; the education policies; the work policies; the social integration policies in general.

Thus, the social prevention includes a wide range of measures that mainly address young people or groups considered as marginal or vulnerable, in Europe and North America.

The most problematic aspect of social prevention regards the fact that, in its local dimension, it cannot act on the deep causes of the phenomena and conflicts that do occur, though, in the same territorial context. The fact of intervening on the structural causes presupposes an extensive knowledge of the matter, such as work, social support, family policies, and, especially immigration policies, which, in Italy, do not fall under the local administration's responsibilities, except for some aspects. This aspect is today funda-

mental to understand the difficulties that local institutions encounter when introducing extensive social measures in their safety programmes, even though they are used with this kind of social work.

Consequently, it is necessary to understand what is social prevention from the point of view of a city's competences (or of a region). Social prevention is a range of activities less general and wide than what has previously been described, but is part of the important policies that include numerous socio-assistance type of instruments, and which express a traditional culture of the local government, that is, a culture of "making oneself responsible for it".

In our research, we have attempted to classify the social measures, distinguishing those aimed at subjects who, for various reasons, are considered in conditions of disadvantage or vulnerability, from those aimed at the environment.

Some new elements emerge: the collective dimension compared to the traditional strongly individualist prevention addressed to the individual deviant or to the person at risk; the identification of new addressees (victims of a crime as new vulnerable subjects); the objective of social pacification among different groups (such as mediation of conflicts); the intervention on the contingent suffering together with the attempt of tackling the structural causes - though, as previously said, in a definitively indirect manner.

The latter aspect seems to indicate that the social prevention somehow also becomes "contingent": for example, the reduction of the damage and all the interventions that do not aim at becoming a social reform.

The instruments for implementing these measures are also different. In addition to the intervention of specialised operators, they also include urban re-qualification, street furniture, administrative decrees and the evermore-frequent possibility that non-specialised operators adopt preventive measures too, such as the participation of common citizens. Thus, the implementation measures tend not to differ much from those used in the case of the situational crime prevention, even though they serve other purposes.

The resort to urban re-qualification and street furniture does not assume here a dissuasive function but, rather, serves the purpose of improving the quality of the physical environment and of the perception citizens have of it. The administrative decrees, though commonly used for dissuasive, deviation, control purposes, etc. too, become instruments for

promoting integration.[3] Table 17.3 shows the diffusion of the social prevention measures based on the geographical areas of Italy.

Table 17.3 **Social prevention measures addressed to subjects and measures for the environment and the community, per geographical area** (a)

MEASURES	North-west		North-east		Centre		South and Islands		Total	
	A.v.	Ind.	A.v.	Ind.	A.v.	Ind.	A.v.	Ind.	A.v.	Ind.
Social prevention addressed to subjects										
Reduction of damage for drug addiction and prostitution	5	0,21	8	0,36	5	0,24	5	0,14	23	0,22
General social assistance	9	0,38	7	0,32	9	0,43	10	0,28	35	0,34
Services for integration	1	0,04	1	0,05	3	0,14	4	0,11	9	0,09
Services to the victims	14	0,58	18	0,82	12	0,57	17	0,47	61	0,59
Total measures	**29**		**34**		**29**		**36**		**128**	
Number of cities	*24*		*22*		*21*		*36*		*103*	
Social prevention for the physical environment and the community										
Mediation of conflicts	4	0,17	4	0,18	2	0,1	0	0	10	0,1
Animation of the public space	3	0,13	9	0,41	4	0,19	3	0,08	19	0,18
Urban re-qualification	4	0,17	2	0,09	5	0,24	7	0,19	18	0,17
Street furniture	3	0,13	3	0,14	1	0,05	3	0,08	10	0,1
Total measures	**14**		**18**		**12**		**13**		**57**	
Number of cities	*24*		*22*		*21*		*36*		*103*	

(a) The index is obtained relating the number of measures to the number of cities involved per geographical area.

[3] Such as in the case of a decree aimed at regulating the abusive employment of immigrants in public parking lots.

In the category defined as “Social prevention addressed to subjects”, the first position goes to the measures aimed at reducing the damage. In the case of drug addiction and prostitution, these measures have become greatly popular in many Italian cities. Nevertheless, the numbers reported in the next tables do not fully render the extension of its diffusion, probably because not all the interviewees deemed these measures as safety measures. What has changed, in some cases, is the fact that these measures do not aim anymore only at safeguarding the deviant person and preventing criminality, but aim also at reassuring the collectivity and at helping integrate the persons responsible for the “disturb” (drug addicts, prostitutes, etc.) with the rest of the community.

We have also surveyed a series of measures - defined in the next tables as “general social assistance” - which include, among others, activities that the administrations have indicated as safety measures but which can be traced back to traditional social prevention activities: intervention on youth discomforts, rehabilitation measures for ex-convicts, etc. The measures defined as “services for integration” include all the actions aimed at favouring the integration of foreign citizens.

Finally, the most common measures include those addressed to the victims, whether real or potential, of a crime. The addresses can be the whole citizen community when the measure is a general one (such as the guides or brochures sent to citizens containing advices on how to defend oneself from some crimes), but are even more the categories identified as potentially more exposed to victimisation.[4] In this field, the most frequent measures are: accompanying assistance (for women alone, for the elderly); direct or telephone psychological assistance (for women victim of a sexual offence, for victims of house burglaries); first intervention services following a crime to provide material and organization assistance; informative assemblies or, as previously mentioned, brochures and guides for citizens, advertisement campaigns for self-defence, etc.

The second large part of the social prevention, as we have re-interpreted it in our research, includes all the interventions for rehabilitating the community cohesion and physical environment, in order to improve the quality

[4] The researchers decided to classify these measures as social prevention, because of their priority objective of safeguarding the vulnerable subjects, objective that emerged from the descriptions given of these measures, even though it could be object of discussion.

of life, of the environment and in particular, of the social relations, included, in the following tables, under the item “Social prevention for the physical environment and the community”. The basic idea, here, is that criminality, deviance, disorder are mainly the result of the decline of the environment, of the conflicts between heterogeneous social groups, of the abandonment of the public space, and of the deterioration of the community relations. Consequently, these interventions must act on these phenomena, using different strategies overall definable as “community crime prevention”.

In the research, no autonomous importance has been given to this preventive strategy, on which exist numerous reflections in the theoretic field,[5] as well as the emphasis and the rhetoric in the political-administrative debate. The low frequency of this kind of interventions - which have become more intense in the past years[6] - and the intrinsic limits of the research carried out do not allow delineating more clearly the characteristics of this strategy within the safety policies.

The tendency of implicating the local communities in the prevention programmes includes strategies for making the citizen responsible (Garland, 1996, 452 ss.), based on an idea of a defensive community able to defend itself against external threats and dangers, and attempts to develop community participation through new association models and new solidarity forms that start from “the citizen” (Hughes and Edwards, 2003). The Italian model of community prevention that emerges, though not in a very clear form, from this and other researches (Selmini, 1997) (della Porta and Andretta, 2000) seems oriented towards the second perspective, rather than to the idea of a community to be strengthened in defending its own interests and to be protected against external threats.

As can be seen from the tables, we have identified four types of measures: the first two focus on rehabilitating social relations while the other two measures mainly act on the improvement of the physical context. The first ones include - with all the perplexities of the case - the interventions of conflict mediation and those defined as “animation of the public space”.

5 Among the many works on community crime prevention, see, in particular, Hope [1995].

6 A fact that we can draw from other researches conducted on preventive policies at a local level, such as in the Region Marche [Giovannetti and Maluccelli, 2001] and in the Region Emilia - Romagna [Selmini and Arsani, 2002], as well as from preventive programmes reviews, such as that of the FISU [2002] and of the Region Toscana [2002].

The latter measures are the activities that animate and revitalise the community life (systematic assemblies and meetings of citizens, cultural initiatives, maintenance of parks, social animation, etc.), either managed by the local administration or entrusted, as it is always the case, to groups of citizens or volunteering associations.

The second group of actions includes measures addressed more directly to the physical space, such as interventions of urban re-qualification or, more simply, the improvement of the street furniture. More than performing a dissuasive function, they aim at promoting public enjoyment opportunities. According to the intentions declared by the administrators, the two types of interventions present, nevertheless, common finalities: to reanimate the territory, to reconstruct the social cohesion, to favour the economic and social activities, to avoid critical situation of degrading further down.

Table 17.4 **Social prevention measures addressed to subjects and measures for the environment and the community, per government coalition** (a)

MEASURES	Centre-left		Centre-right		Lega Nord (Northern League)		Total	
	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index	A.v.	Index
Social prevention addressed to subjects								
Reduction of damage for drug addiction and prostitution	21	0,35	2	0,06	0	0	23	0,23
General social assistance	24	0,4	11	0,31	0	0	35	0,34
Services for integration	8	0,13	1	0,03	0	0	9	0,09
Services to the victims	44	0,73	14	0,39	3	1,0	61	0,6
Total measures	**97**		**28**		**3**		**128**	
Number of cities	*60*		*36*		*6*		*102*	
Social prevention for the physical environment and the community								
Mediation of conflicts	8	0,13	2	0,06	0	0	10	0,1
Animation of the public space	16	0,27	3	0,08	0	0	19	0,19
Urban re-qualification	13	0,22	5	0,14	0	0	18	0,18
Street furniture	8	0,13	2	0,06	0	0	10	0,1
Total measures	**45**		**12**		**0**		**57**	
Number of cities	*60*		*36*		*6*		*102*	

(a) The index is obtained, relating the number of measures to the number of cities involved by government coalition. The total number of cities amounts to 102 as one city resulted governed by a commissioner during the survey.

The distribution of the measures according to the cities' coalition appears more interesting. The following table reveals how centre-left administrations favour the measures for the disadvantaged subjects, especially in the cases of damage reduction for prostitution, services for the integration and services to the victims. This aspect confirms the preference given by centre-left administrations to safety policies based on elements of social action. As regards the second type of social prevention measures, once again, the scarcity of the numbers indicates the need of caution when evaluating; nevertheless, once again, there is a higher concentration of these activities in the cities governed by centre-left administrations.

17.5 A "mixed" model of prevention?

In conclusion, the following table briefly synthesises the measures overall adopted on a social and situational level, once again based on the two variables we have taken as reference. In this case, as the numbers are more consistent compared to the previously presented tables, it also indicates the percentage values.

Table 17.5 **Situational prevention measures and social prevention measures, per geographical area (percentage values)**

MEASURES	North-west	North-east	Centre	South and Islands	Total
Situational prevention	64,5	50,9	64,1	55,4	59,0
Social prevention	35,5	49,1	35,9	44,6	41,0
Total (%)	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**
Total of measures (absolute values)	**121**	**106**	**114**	**110**	**451**

The situational prevention measures result more present in the cities located in the North-west and in the Centre of Italy compared to the North-east, to the South and to the Islands, where the percentage differences between the two types are very low.

Table 17.6 **Situational prevention measures and social prevention measures, per government coalition (percentage values)**

MEASURES	Centre-left	Centre-right	Lega Nord (Northern League)	Total
Situational prevention	54,1	67,8	83,4	59,0
Social prevention	45,9	32,2	16,6	41,0
Total (%)	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**
(absolute values)	**309**	**124**	**18**	**451**

The table shows that centre-left administrations tend to balance, in their projects, the situational prevention measures with the social prevention ones, though with a certain prevalence of the first ones. The centre-right administrations clearly prefer the situational interventions compared to the social ones; this difference is even stronger in the programmes for the safety of the cities governed by the Lega Nord. This and all the previous tables show that, although all the administrations tend to adopt in a considerable measure the situational prevention, the centre-left governed cities endeavour at balancing this tendency with a more frequent use of the social prevention, compared to the centre-right or the Lega administrations.

Overall, the model that emerged in the second half of the 1990s appeared as a substantially “mixed” model. Despite certain prevalence being given to the situational prevention, this model does not point out to definite orientations towards one or the other intervention modality. Moreover, the local institutions- in the case of the centre-left governed administrations - also experimented a range of diversified measures. Some more recent recognitions, but relative only to some regions (Giovannetti and Maluccelli, 2001); (Region Tuscany, 2002; Selmini and Arsani, 2002), confirm this tendency.

Other data introduce some elements of perplexity and seems to confirm once again the preference that the centre-left coalition administrations give to adopting a social approach to the problems of criminality.

17.6 Conclusions

A new structure of crime control or of its "prevention" undoubtedly emerged in the past years in the Italian cities, but the overall framework still appears contradictory, fragmentary and changeable. In this confused context, some conclusive elements do give an idea of the choices adopted and of the future perspective, even though not defining a real "model" for governing the safety.

As regards the content of the safety policies, a substantially "mixed" model of prevention emerged, in which the prevalence of a more contingent intervention or a containment intervention compared with more structural choices depended on many factors. In addition to the general philosophy of the administration and its political government, which, as previously seen, is very important, these factors included also the administrative constraints, the pressures of the public opinion, the cultural training of the administrators, etc. The first factor - the political factor- appears, though, rather weak: local centre-left and centre-right governments speak more or less the same language as regards the issue of safety and adopt measures that are only partially different, especially in the case of the large cities. This fact leads us to think that the situational prevention becomes particularly appealing when it is a task falling under the responsibility of the politicians and local administrators. It, indeed, is more visible and more able, at least apparently, to offer results in the short term and is, thus, politically more exploitable. Nevertheless, since, in the Italian cities, no strict evaluations have been carried out on the effects produced by such measures and on their real efficiency in reducing the phenomena, they condition our possibility of analysing and, especially, of expressing an opinion.

In this local mixed model, the social prevention, though present in the safety projects, does not appear able to renew itself in relation to the new dimensions and characteristics of the problems to be dealt with, let alone of the individual and specialised prevention, which definitively disappears.

The social type of measures, thus, tends more often to assume a "contingent" nature and to highlight the difficulty of acting on the processes of social exclusions with the local government instruments.

Another aspect that clearly emerges is the fact that, at least up until

now, community resources are only moderately used, such as making citizens more responsible, or providing the community with some control functions.

Numerous variables help regulate the combination of these interventions and balance the situational prevention with the social one: the ideological options, which are not determinant but still important as previously seen, the media pressure, pressure of the public opinion, balance of the powers or conflicts between the institutional actors involved, the available resources, the administrative constraints, the need of legitimising the different institutions involved.

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EIGHTEEN

OFFENDER DECISIONS AND SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION

18.1 Introduction

Situational crime prevention is a growing field of study and application. It is founded on basic crime theory, including that of Cesare Beccaria in Italy and Jeremy Bentham in British Isles. It is essential to understand how offenders make decisions. We know that they respond to stimuli. But their decisions are not always easy to study. Certain principles principles to help understand what they do, when, and why. That can help us to get them not to commit a crime.

Whether you agree with it or not, Bentham worked out the most comprehensive and consistent theory of society and crime, taking into account decisions by society and by individuals. Society at large should decide to minimize costs and maximize benefits or gains. Individuals will of course minimize pains and maximize pleasures. And so it goes for potential and actual criminals. But pleasure and pain is less dependent on the criminal justice system than many citizens believe.

18.2 Pain and pleasure for offenders

Modern researchers and theorists have increasingly realized that

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[1] For a start in the field of situational crime prevention, check www.popcenter.org as well as crimeprevention.rutgers.edu. See also Marcus Felson. 2002. Crime and Everyday Life. Third Edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

human beings do not consider all information when they make decisions. Nor do they look far into the future in considering costs and benefits. This point is especially true of offenders, who respond mainly to immediate enticements and dangers. For example, a burglar is unlikely to consider the risk of imprisonment for many years for he tends to think he will not get caught. He is, however, concerned that the owner may return home or that someone may report him. He also considers practical matters, such as the ease of illegal entry, nobody around to report him, and acting quickly to find the loot and exit the scene. To modify Bentham slightly, in light of current information,

The crime decision rule: The offender seeks to gain quick pleasure and to avoid imminent pain.

The above principle tells us that imprisonment plays a smaller role in affecting offender decisions and reducing crime than Bentham thought. On the other hand, security measures by individuals and businesses, assistance of neighbors, and situational crime prevention can lead someone away from a criminal act.

Bentham's basic insight remains correct: offenders make decisions, taking into account their pleasures and pains. But Bentham did not know everything we know today about human decisions or about offenders in particular. He carried the utilitarian principle in not quite the right direction, and some of his followers today ignored the research and went farther.

The problem is that offenders look to the short run and immediate concerns. Of course their main consideration is the quick pleasure they can get from getting something for virtually nothing. Whatever the case, most people decide to commit crimes without thinking long and hard.

Moreover, evidence is growing that emotional offenses still have decision components. An angry punch in the nose is a quick decision. Offenders generally will not punch someone twice their size - further proof that emotions and decisions are compatible. On the other hand, people do mess up their futures with violent acts. They think rather clearly about who can punch them back now; but their minds are hazy about what the prosecutor will do a month from now.

18.3 Casual choices

Most of what we know about offenders indicates that they think some but not a lot about what they are doing. If they did not think, crime would not follow so many practical patterns. If they thought a lot about where it would eventually lead them, they would not commit crime. Most criminal acts are not highly daring, but involve moderate risks. Offenders go for the easy takings. If they see a great reward, they might take much greater risks. Hence their decision will be based on some assessment of costs and benefits. But such assessment is made casually. For example, only 3 of 112 California bank robbers studied by Feeney (1986) planned what they had done. Some had done minor planning or had a general pattern or modus operandi. Most had done no planning, and many walked into a bank not even knowing they were going to spot the opportunity. This casual pattern was confirmed by other studies.

However, the care or carelessness of crime decisions varies. Not all offenders are deeply involved in drugs, and not all drugs are highly addicted. But when these conditions attain, offenders go through cycles affecting their decision processes. When they are more comfortable, they will probably take less risk in carrying out an illegal act. But an offender can also become frantic and reckless, especially if he is drug dependent and the last dose is wearing off. The easy crime targets are not always there when he needs them. But we should still realize that most crime involves casual, opportunistic decisions with a good chance to succeed.

18.4 Fewer considerations

In recent decades, decision sciences have come to realize that human decisions do not take everything into account. Decisions generally consider only five to seven features or less. Decisions are not deep or long-term. Indeed, one cannot accept the full utilitarian model, where citizens take into account all costs and benefits. If that is so with average citizens, offenders can hardly be expected to consider fully the costs and benefits of crime. Instead, they would likely focus on a smaller set of choices.

Psychological research on reinforcement also finds repeatedly that

behavior responds mainly to more proximate stimuli. That means that remote risks and punishments distant in time are unlikely to guide the decisions to commit illegal acts. This is not to reject decisions entirely; it merely cautions us that crime decisions do not take everything into account.

18.5 What offenders consider to be costs

It is very difficult for modern society to deliver punishment, and very easy for offenders to avoid detection. In the meantime, modern society provides many easy targets for crime and hence offsets these punishments. Moreover, most of the rewards of crime are quick, while most of its costs come slowly. Offenders decide mostly with the short run in mind. The punishments in the long run include eventual apprehension and punishment by the criminal justice system. But that's not really where the action is. Very active offenders are likely to suffer most not from the justice system but rather their own health and harm inflicted by other offenders.

When active offenders respond to costs of the justice system at all, they worry more about the short-run problems from police and low-level courts than from long term punishments of incarceration. Policies of heavy incarceration tend to fail because they add costs that get little attention from normal offenders. Most such offenders are young, think they will not be caught and are somewhat immune to policy instruments commonly proposed. On the other hand, these threats can be effective with many casual offenders or the general public. Thus they serve some purpose in keeping the criminally-active population limited to smaller numbers.

Ronald Clarke (in collaboration with Derek Cornish) offers us clarifications of offender decision patterns.[2] He states that offenders respond most to whether a criminal act would be

- Difficult
- Risky, or
- Unrewarding[3]

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[2] Derek Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke. 1986. The Reasoning Criminal. Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending. New York: Springer-Verlag.

[3] Clarke later added a fourth element based on offender neutralizations or excuses for their actions. Another tool for crime prevention is therefore to deny excuses.

For example, some criminal acts are physically difficult or impossible to carry out. For example, bolting computers to heavy tables renders them unsuitable for theft. The potential offender can recognize the difficulty and that encourages a decision to give up the attempt. Other acts of malfeasance are highly risky. Many stores count their money on the second floor so a robber would find it very risky to enter, commit a robbery, and leave with the loot. Many retail stores attach ink tags to their merchandise; when removed, these tags ruin the garment, rendering it worthless to the thief.

Clarke has provided many details about how offenders make decisions and shown us that it is possible to change environments and products in order to guide people away from criminal acts. Thus understanding offender decisions generated the entire field of "situational crime prevention." That field draws from Bentham, but pays less attention to punishment than to removing situational inducements to crime.

18.6 Crime decisions in larger perspective

Crime decisions are made in response to conditions that link them to the larger society. For example, many decisions respond to physical conditions such as the proximity of easy targets. Traveling a long way to find a target can be analyzed geographically, but it can also be studied as a cost of doing crime. If that cost gets too large, a potential offender might decide not to commit a crime. If something is too heavy to cart away it becomes difficult to steal, posing an immediate problem for the offender. Most offenders decide not to commit difficult crimes, so they are very responsive to the laws of scarcity. Thus crime economics is a valuable way to analyze crime and its prevention, providing we keep in mind the specific features of crime, how it might be carried out, and how offenders think about it.

18.6.1Does crime pay?

The evidence indicates that crime in a modern society often pays in the short-run, but not in the long-run. In the short run an active offender needs little skill to gain benefits at few costs. Even in the course of one to three

years, an offender can live a moderate lifestyle at someone else's cost. He will probably spend the money as quickly as he makes it, enjoying the parties, saving little, getting drunk and high. As time goes on, the impact of costs mentioned earlier begin to set in and luck begins to run out. At that point, many offenders decide to call it quits. Sometimes they can find a way out and sometimes not.

18.6.2The volume of decisions

Most of the decisions relevant to crime are decisions to commit or not commit a particular offense - not a general decision to be bad or good all the time. Based on studies of burglars, it appears that offenders casually decide to forego many more crime opportunities than they decide to take. Indeed, we might think about crime decisions as far outstripping the population of most active offenders, even the general population. Research on burglars shows that they quickly reject many homes as unsuitable targets, at least at they times they pass.

What about the general population? Do most people consider and reject most crime opportunities, thus participating little in crime? Or do they never even consider such opportunities? I have heard people proclaim the latter to me, but I am not so sure they are entirely honest with themselves. Most of our empirical work focuses on criminal acts and common offenders, not on rejected crime opportunities, scanning for those opportunities out of the corner of the eye, or casual awareness of illicit chances. On the other hand, laboratory research on deception has shown that it is very easy to get a majority of people to lie, steal or cheat simply by setting up strong temptations and easy methods to transgress.

18.6.3Commence and desist

I do not believe that most people make a decision to commence a life of crime. It appears instead that people ease into criminal acts, with some of them increasing their involvement.

On the other hand, some people may make a decision to desist from criminal involvement. That decision occurs after they have suffered

various costs of such an active life of crime. Others decide to pick new associates or stay away from old ones; to find a new sex partner; or otherwise shift style of life. Not all who make such a decision carry it out. Some carry it out for a while, then slip back into old ways. However, some degree of calculation appears to occur and to affect crime rates. Such calculation provides some policy instruments, providing that those who make policy do not overestimate or misunderstand where their power is likely to be the least.

18.6.4 Choice vs. constraint

Economists tend to emphasize individual decisions; sociologists tend to deny the decision process. But this debate is a false one. Individuals make decisions faced with constraints. The words are tricky here, for choices are the opposite of constraints, but make the same point. Usually economists emphasize those constraints that come in the form of prices or costs of buying or doing something. Sociologists emphasize other constraints, such as institutions making something unavailable. An example might be denial of beef in India because cattle are sacred. In either case we are back to the same point: economy and society affect the ease and availability of choices. Then a person chooses.

To borrow liberally from John Stuart Mill, there is a circle around each individual. Some societies and economies make that circle smaller and others larger; but within the circle the individual acts. To understand individual choices related to crime, we must consider both crime constraints (limiting the choices available) and how a person decides among these choices. I reject the extreme viewpoint of some social scientists who virtually deny individuals choose anything. Debating degree of choice is fair; denying existence of choice denies life itself.

The relative importance of constraints and choices is largely an empirical question. Sometimes an offender will have a lot of choices and other times few. For example, at an early stage a person can choose quite freely whether to use an illegal substance. But after developing dependency, freedom of choice declines greatly, leaving someone with a very difficult escape route. At an early point in the evening, one can decide whether or

not to get drunk with the boys. But as the evening wears on, it becomes more difficult to escape them and to avoid any trouble that emerges. To understand constraints and choices, timing is of the essence.

If you don't like circles (see above), try thinking of a funnel to understand how choices and constraints relate.[4] This model presents the Crime Choice Funnel, with (1) many possible crime choices dangling around. These choices then enter the funnel depicting (2) the constraints of life. These constraints can include the socio-physical features of crime opportunity that I favor as well as cultural factors emphasized by other students of crime. After passing through the constraints of life, (3) a smaller number of crime choices are available to the offender. These “remaining feasible crime choices” then become the basis for an offender's choosing.

The Crime Choice Funnel is not a perfect picture of what happens, for many of the infeasible crime choices remain possible and could be selected by reckless offenders reaching up through the neck of the funnel. Other choices become totally impossible. I reject the supposed dichotomy between classical and positivist theories of crime. As we study crime processes, the dichotomy becomes largely a distraction. In the first and third stages of this model classical theories are most appropriate. In the second stage, positivist theories are most useful, because external forces cull the number of choices available to individuals. In any case, the picture helps make this point: that life brings constraints upon individual choice without removing that choice.

18.6.5 Is crime an occupational choice?

A leading economist treated “crime as an occupational choice.” That statement misstates how criminal acts fit into the economy, for two reasons: First, many offenders are too young to be in the labor force anyway. Many people begin to steal at very young ages and to be considered offenders at 11 or 12 years old. Substance abuse usually commences during pre-occupational ages, too. Illegal activity accelerates through adolescence. The peak age for burglary is about 16 to 17, and even younger

[4] I have briefly violated my own rule against using analogies to talk about crime. But this is a clear quantitative depiction: Many choices are narrowed into fewer choices.

for some offenses. These are for most pre-labor force ages, so any economists who treat crime as a career alternative are missing the point.

Second, a good deal of crime is committed at work. Consider that

- Most retail losses are to employee theft, not shoplifting.
- Many employees steal from factories.
- Many employees steal from expense accounts.
- Crime in white-collar occupations is an immense problem.

It makes no sense to assume that crime is an "occupational choice," when occupations themselves provide opportunities to carry out crimes that those outside the workforce cannot readily do. On the other hand, some important types of crime operate within a market structure and other crimes respond to decision processes even outside a market structure.

18.7 Are violent crimes irrational

A distinction is commonly made between instrumental and expressive violence. This conventional distinction usually considers robbery to be instrumental violence, while fights and many other types of violence seem to be so irrational and harmful to the offender himself that they are interpreted as instrumental of other forces or strains in society.

In recent years, James Tedeschi and Richard Felson have attacked this position empirically and theoretically. They argue that all violence is in some sense instrumental, that expressive violence does not really exist. That is, the offender hopes to gain something from violence, even if he proves later to be wrong in his calculation. Tedeschi and R. Felson point out that offenders not only use violence for material gain but also for gains in self esteem and to punish others whom they believe deserve it. By diversifying the types of considerations that violent offenders take into account, Tedeschi and Felson have shown how violence can be instrumental even if the offender makes no financial gain or gets the worst of the situation. Indeed, violent offenders are decision makers, even if they only spend a split second on their decision.

Unfortunately, though, we lack a good vocabulary for describing how people make decisions that are quick and in the face of anger. The term"rational" is unfortunate, since it implies a degree of sagaciousness and deliberation that is not necessary for decisions to commit a violent act.

We are also hampered by the very common assumption that reasoning

and emotion are necessary opposites. In fact, a case can be made, consistent with Tedeschi and R. Felson, that those who are angry still consider quickly the cost they might pay and benefits they might gain from carrying forth with their emotions.

18.8 Summary

As we survey the extant evidence, we find it necessary to reject the extreme positions sometimes found in the literature on criminal decisions. One extreme gives offenders (and perhaps all human beings) credit for comprehensive and careful decisions, inconsistent with the decision literature on both active offenders and the larger population. The other extreme denies offender decisions and relies on irrationality that is also a poor fit to evidence. The reality is that offenders make decisions, taking into account the more proximate concerns, and subject to environmental factors.

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NINETEEN

THE ORIGINS OF YOUTH VIOLENCE

19.1 Introduction

Youth violence is a major public concern in all modern societies. To prevent this violence we need to understand how innocent young children grow into violent adolescents. Longitudinal studies of large samples of children from infancy to adulthood indicate that the peak age for physical aggression is the third year after birth. Fortunately, because of their size, physical aggression from two-year-olds does not constitute a major threat to the public. It is also providential that most children learn to control these socially disruptive behaviours before they enter school. This natural course of development suggests that the preschool years are the best window of opportunity to prevent the development of cases of chronic physical aggression. Safe streets could thus start with quality early education.

The most brilliant and least reasoned hopes had preceded the Savage of Aveyron to Paris...

many people, otherwise commendable for their enlightenment,

forgetting that our organs are much less flexible and imitation is much more difficult when one is distant from society and from early childhood,

believed that the education of this individual would require only a few months..... *Jean Itard (1801, pp. 130-131)*

Richard Tremblay, University of Montreal, Canada.

19.2 Violence during adolescence

The risk of committing a violent offence is highest during middle adolescence. Because adult violence is generally linked to a history of youth violence[1] and because all adults are former youth, one would expect that reducing youth violence would also reduce adult violence. Thus, the reduction of youth violence should in the long run have a very large impact on total violence in a given society.

Most criminological studies of youth violence have focused on 12- to 18-year-old youth. During this period they become stronger physically, their cognitive competence increases (e.g., they are better at hiding their intentions), they become sexually mature, they ask and obtain a greater freedom to use their time without adult supervision, and they have access to more resources such as money and transportation, which increases their capacity to satisfy their needs.

This rapid bio-psycho-social development might be sufficient to explain why adolescence is a period of life when there are more opportunities and motives for antisocial behaviour. Adolescents lack experience and feel pressured to choose a career, or to perform in school, within their peer groups, or with possible sexual partners. These factors may explain why proportionally more adolescents than adults resort to violent behaviour.

Although a majority of adolescents will commit some delinquent acts, most of these are minor legal infractions.[2] Population-based surveys have systematically shown that a small proportion of adolescents (approximately six percent) account for the majority of violent acts and arrests. Of the total number of cases that proceed annually to youth courts across

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1 D.P. Farrington, “Childhood, adolescent, and adult features of violent males “, in L.R. Huesmann (ed.), Aggressive behaviour: Current perspectives, New York, Plenum Press, 1994, p. 215-240 ; L.R. Huesmann, L.D. Eron, M.M. Lefkowitz and L.O. Walder, “ Stability of aggression over time et generations “, Developmental Psychology, vol. 20, 1984, p. 1120-1134 ; L.A. Serbin, A.E. Schwartzman, D.S. Moskowitz and J.E. Ledingham, “ Aggressive, withdrawn and aggressive-withdrawn children in adolescence: Into the next generation “, in D. Pepler et K. Rubin (ed.), The development et treatment of childhood aggression, Hillsdale (N.J.), Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991, p. 55-70; and L.A. Serbin, P.L. Peters, V.J. McAffer and A.E. Schwartzman, “ Childhood aggression and withdrawal as predictors of adolescent pregnancy, early parenthood, and environmental risk for the next generation “, Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 1991, vol. 23, p. 318-331.

2 D.P. Farrington, “Early precursors of frequent offending,” in J.Q. Wilson and G.C. Loury (eds.), From children to citizens (vol. III). Families, schools and delinquency prevention (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987), pp. 27-50.

Canada, less than a quarter involve violence, and in nearly half of these cases the principal charge is minor assault.

The challenge is to explain why some adolescents and some adults frequently resort to physically aggressive behaviour while others do not. Although they are relatively small in number, they frighten a large part of the population, and they represent a heavy burden of suffering for their victims, their families and themselves. Adolescents with behavioural problems are also much more likely to be unemployed, suffer poor physical health or have mental health problems.

19.3 Physical aggression during childhood

A number of high-profile cases have made it poignantly clear that extremely violent behaviour does not suddenly appear with adolescence. For example, in February 1993, two 10-year-old boys bludgeoned to death a two-year-old boy they had lured from his mother in a Liverpool shopping centre.[3] In 1994, the world was again shocked to hear that in peaceful Norway a five-year-old and two six-year-old boys had kicked and stoned to death a five-year-old girl.[4] Across the Canadian border, in March 2000, a Michigan kindergarten boy used a semi-automatic handgun to kill a female classmate in the classroom.[5]

These rare cases serve as a reminder that young children can be extremely violent. In fact, longitudinal studies of large samples of boys and girls followed from school entry to the end of adolescence show clearly that younger children are more physically aggressive; as they grow older they generally resort to less and less physically aggressive behaviour.[6] Cross-sectional data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) random sample of 16,038 Canadian children aged four to

3 " Killing of child shocks Britain: Brutal slaying sparks anger and soul-searching ", Montreal Gazette, February 18 1993, p. B-5.

4 Associated Press, " Just like the Ninja Turtles: Networks cancel kids' program after Norwegian girl, 5, is stoned to death ", The Gazette, October 19 1994, p. A-14

5 R. Rosenblatt, " The killing of Kayla ", Time, March 2000, p. 16-19.

6 R.B. Cairns and B.D. Cairns, Life lines and risks: Pathways of youth in our time, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994 ; M. Choquet, " La violence des jeunes : Données épidémiologiques ", in C. Rey (ed.), Les adolescents face à la violence, Paris, Syros, 1996, p. 51-63.

11 years confirm this developmental pattern. As seen from figure 19.1, four-year-old boys and girls have the highest levels of physical aggression, while 11-year-old boys and girls have the lowest levels of physical aggression. As expected, at each age girls have lower levels of physical aggression than boys. These data are based on mothers' reports of their children's behaviour. However, studies using teachers, peers and self-reports have all found the same developmental trends.[7]

Figure 19.1 **Physical and indirect aggression of boys and girls from 4 to 11 years of age**



Interestingly, these patterns are completely reversed in the case of indirect aggression, which is defined as behaviour aimed at hurting someone without the use of physical aggression. For example, a child who is mad at someone may say bad things behind the other's back or may try to get others to dislike that person. As shown in figure 19.1, girls have higher levels of indirect aggression at each age from four to 11, and the level of

[7] R.B. Cairns, B.D. Cairns, H.J. Neckerman, L.L. Ferguson and J.L Gariépy, " Growth and aggression: 1. Childhood to early adolescence ", Developmental Psychology, vol. 25, 1989, p. 320-330.

indirect aggression increases with age for girls and boys.[8] Thus, the process of socialization may involve learning to use indirect means of aggression rather than physical aggression.

Most people will readily accept that the majority of children are less and less physically aggressive with time, when shown the type of data presented in figure 19.1. But they will continue to believe that a minority of children commence or increase the frequency of their acts of physical aggression as they grow older. Nagin and Tremblay[9] have addressed this issue by attempting to identify the developmental trajectories of teacher-rated physical aggression in a sample of boys from poorer socio-economic areas in Montreal. Those boys were assessed regularly from kindergarten to high school (figure 19.2): 17 per cent of the boys appeared never to have been physically aggressive; four per cent showed a high frequency of physical aggression from six to 15 years of age; 28 per cent started with a high level of physical aggression at age six and became less and less physically aggressive with time; while the majority (52 per cent) had a low level of physical aggression at age six and also became less and less aggressive with time. In contrast to hypotheses concerning late onset of antisocial behaviour,[10] Nagin and Tremblay did not find any group of boys in which there appeared to be an "onset" and maintenance of moderate or high levels of physical aggression for a significant number of years after age six. They also observed that for every group of boys the peak level for frequency of physical aggression was during the first year of the study when they were in kindergarten.

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8 K. Björkqvist, K. Österman and A. Kaukiainen, "The development of direct and indirect aggressive strategies in males and females," in K. Björkqvist and P. Niemelä (eds.), Of mice and woman: Aspects of female aggression (Toronto: Academic Press, 1992), pp. 51-64.

9 D. Nagin and R.E. Tremblay, "Trajectories of boys" physical aggression, opposition, and hyperactivity on the path to physically violent and non violent juvenile delinquency," Child Development, Vol. 70 (1999), pp. 1181-1196.

10 T.E. Moffitt, "Adolescence-limited and life-course persistent antisocial behaviour: A developmental taxonomy," Psychological Review, Vol. 100 (1993), pp. 674-701; G.R. Patterson, B.D. DeBaryshe and E. Ramsey, "A developmental perspective on antisocial behaviour," American Psychologist, Vol. 44 (1989), pp. 329-335.

Figure 19.2 **Developmental trajectories of physical aggression for boys from 6 to 15 years of age**



These results clearly challenge the idea that the frequency of acts of physical aggression increases with age. They also challenge the notion that there is a significant group of children who show chronic physical aggression during late childhood or adolescence after having successfully inhibited physical aggression throughout childhood. If, between kindergarten and high school, children are at their peak level of physical aggression during their kindergarten year, when do they actually start to aggress physically?

19.4 The nature of the preschool years: hobbes, rousseau and recent evidence

There are surprisingly few longitudinal studies that have tried to chart the development of physical aggression during the preschool years. This

lack of attention to physical aggression during the early years appears to be the result of a long-held belief that physical aggression appears during late childhood and early adolescence as a result of bad peer influences, television violence and increased levels of male hormones.[11] This view of antisocial development was very clearly described more than 200 years ago by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.[12] The first phrase of his book on child development and education, Émile, makes the point very clearly: "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man." A few pages later he is still more explicit and appears to be writing the agenda for 20th-century research on the development of antisocial behaviour: "There is no original sin in the human heart, the how and why of the entrance of every vice can be traced." Rousseau's strong stance was in clear opposition to Hobbes,[13] who, a century earlier, described infants as selfish machines striving for pleasure and power, and declared: "It is evident therefore that all men (since all men are born as infants) are born unfit for society; and very many (perhaps the majority) remain so throughout their lives, because of mental illness or lack of discipline…Therefore man is made fit for Society not by nature, but by training."[14]

This debate has far-reaching consequences, not only for child development investigators and educators, but also for political scientists, philosophers and policy makers. Because the underlying debate is clearly grounded in our views of human nature, it is not surprising that investigators are likely to prefer the "origin of aggressive behaviour" that best fits their view of human nature, and their political commitment. However, since most political philosophers appear to agree that society must be built on the natural tendencies of man, it is surprising that research on early childhood development has not been a priority for the social sciences.

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11 D.S. Elliott, D. Huizinga and S.S. Ageton, Explaining delinquency and drug use (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985); L. Ellis, and P. D. Coontz, "Androgens, brain functioning, and criminality: The neurohormonal foundations of antisociality," in L. Ellis and H. Hoffman (eds.), Crime in biological, social and moral contexts (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 162-193; L.R. Huesmann and L.S. Miller, "Long-term effects of repeated exposure to media violence in childhood," in L.R. Huesmann (ed.), Aggressive behaviour: Current perspectives (New York: Plenum Press, 1994), pp. 153-186.

12 J.-J. Rousseau, Émile or On education (New York: Basic Books, 1762/1979).

13 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis, IN: Liberal Arts Press, 1651/1958); T. Hobbes, De Cive (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1647/1998).

14 Hobbes, De Cive, p. 25.

Longitudinal studies of small samples of preschool children have found that the most physically aggressive toddlers tend to remain the most aggressive preschoolers.[15] However, mothers' reports of their children's physical aggression from the first wave of the NLSCY indicate that the mean frequency of physical aggression peaks at the end of the second year after birth and then steadily declines (figure 19.3).[16]

Figure 19.3 **Frequency of hitting, biting, and kicking from 2 to 11 years of age** *(age in month)*



So, if the frequency of physical aggression is at its highest at the end of the second year after birth, at what age does physical aggression

15 K. Keenan and D.S. Shaw, "The development of aggression in toddlers: A study of low-income families," Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, Vol. 22 (1994), pp. 53-77.

16 R.E. Tremblay, B. Boulerice, P.W. Harden et al., "Do children in Canada become more aggressive as they approach adolescence?" in Human Resources Development Canada, Statistics Canada (ed.), Growing up in Canada: National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1996), pp. 127-137.

begin? Within a longitudinal study of a large sample of babies born in the province of Quebec in the mid-1990s, mothers were asked to rate the frequency of physical aggressions at ages 17 and 30 months and, at both times, to indicate at what age the child had started to show such behaviour.[17] At age 17 months, close to 90 per cent of the mothers reported that their child at least sometimes was physically aggressive toward others. Figure19.4 shows the cumulative age of onset of physical attacks against others. At 17 months, 20.2 per cent of children were reported by their mothers to hit others. This figure had increased to 25.9 per cent by 30 months of age. One of the interesting results of that study is the fact that mothers who were reporting that their child at 17 months had started to hit others in the previous months appeared to have forgotten this early onset, since they were reporting that at age 30 months their child had started to hit others after 17 months of age. This memory failure as children grow older, taller and bigger could in part explain why parents of physically aggressive adolescents report that the aggression problems started only a year or two before.[18]

Figure 19.4 **Cumulative age of onset of physically attacking others before 31 months of age** *(cumulative percentage, age in month)*



17 R.E. Tremblay, C. Japel, D. Pérusse et al., "The search for the age of 'onset' of physical aggression: Rousseau and Bandura revisited," Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, Vol. 9 (1999), pp. 8-23.

18 R. Loeber and M. Stouthamer-Loeber, "Development of juvenile aggression and violence. Some common misconceptions and controversies," American Psychology, Vol. 53 (1998), pp. 242-259.

19.5 Why are the early years so important?

How can the increase and decrease in physically aggressive and disruptive behaviour during early childhood be explained? One would expect that physical, cognitive and emotional development play an important role. Within the first 24 months after birth, babies grow in height by more than 70 percent, and almost triple their weight. At birth babies can hardly lift their heads, nine months later they can move on all fours, by 12 months they can walk, and by 24 months they can run and climb stairs. Compared to other periods of development, the early years are on “fast forward.”

The ability to grasp objects is an important development for social interactions. At birth babies do not control their arms, at six months they can reach and grasp for objects. If they see an interesting toy in the hands of another six-month-old, they will reach and grasp the toy. A struggle for the toy will occur if the other child does not let go. Note that, at six months, the child does not have the language ability to ask the other child for the toy -- this ability will come much later -- but the frequency and complexity of interactions between babies and other persons in their environments increase at least as rapidly as their physical growth. Infants' waking time is spent exploring their physical environments. Before 12 months of age, they spend most of their playtime exploring one object at a time. Between 12 and 18 months, they imitate real-life activities alone. By the end of the second year they are “pretend playing” with others.[19]

Thus, over the first 15 months after birth, with increased physical mobility and cognitive competence, children also become more and more able to discover their environment. The frequency of their interactions with peers increases with age, and playing with others increases dramatically from the end of the first year to the end of the second year.[20] This is the period when the rate of physical aggression increases to its maximum. At this age, children are exploring social interactions with their newly acquired walking, talking, running, grasping, pushing, kicking and throwing

19 K.H. Rubin, G.G. Fein and B. Vandenberg, “Play,” in P.H. Mussen (eds.), Handbook of child psychology (New York: Wiley, 1983), pp. 693-774.

20 H.S. Ross and B.D. Goldman, “Infants' sociability toward strangers,” Child Development, Vol. 48 (1977), pp. 638-642.

skills. Most of their interactions are positive, but conflicts become more frequent.[21] Most of these conflicts are over possession of objects. During these conflicts children learn that they can hurt and be hurt. Most children will quickly learn that a physical attack on a peer will be responded to by a physical attack, and that adults will not tolerate these behaviours. Most children will learn to wait for the toy to be free, and that asking for toys rather than taking them away from someone will more likely prevent negative interactions.

Learning to wait for something you want (delay of gratification)[22] and learning to use language to convince others to satisfy your needs may be the most important protective factors against chronic physical aggression. Stattin and Klackenberg-Larsson[23] showed that language skills between 18 and 24 months were a good predictor of adult criminality in a Swedish sample of males followed from birth to adulthood. In fact, numerous studies have shown an inverse correlation of verbal skills with impulsivity and criminal behaviour.[24] We need to understand the mechanisms underlying these associations. They are clearly operating in the first two years of life.

By 12 months of age, children have the physical, cognitive and emotional means of being physically aggressive toward others. It appears that most children will at some point hit, bite or kick another child or even an adult. Children's individual characteristics can explain part of the variance in the frequency and stability of this behaviour, but the quality of children's relations with their environment, and the environment's reaction to this behaviour, will very likely be important factors. If children are surrounded by adults and other children who are physically aggressive, they will probably learn that physical aggression is part of everyday social interactions. On the other hand, if a child lives in an environment that does not

21 A. Restoin, H. Montagner, D. Rodriguez et al., "Chronologie des comportements de communication et profils de comportement chez le jeune enfant," in R.E. Tremblay, M.A. Provost and F. F. Strayer (eds.), Ethologie et développement de l'enfant (Paris: Editions Stock/Laurence Pernoud, 1985) pp. 93-130; D.F. Hay and H.S. Ross, "The social nature of early conflict," Child Development, Vol 53 (1982), pp. 105-113.

22 W. Mischel, Y. Shoda and M.L. Rodriguez, "Delay of gratification in children," Science, Vol. 244 (1989), pp. 933-938.

23 H. Stattin and I. Klackenberg-Larsson, "Early language and intelligence development and their relationship to future criminal behaviour," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. 102 (1993), pp. 369-378.

24 T.E. Moffitt, "The neuropsychology of conduct disorder," Development Psychopathology, Vol. 5 (1993), pp. 135-151.

tolerate physical aggression, and rewards pro-social behaviour, it is likely that the child will acquire the habit of using means other than physical aggression to obtain what he or she wants or for expressing frustration.

19.6 Conclusion

Clearly, Plato, St. Augustine, Erasmus and Hobbes understood the importance of early education in creating a civic society. Rousseau correctly described Plato's Republic as a book on education. In “Law,” Plato defined early education as learning suitable habits in response to pleasure and pain. Some 750 years later (1600 years ago!), St. Augustine of Thagaste may have written the most sensible page on the development of aggression. In the seventh chapter of his Confessions he describes the physical aggressions of infants and concludes: “Thus it is not the infant's will that is harmless, but the weakness of infant limbs… These things are easily put up with; not because they are of little or no account, but because they will disappear with increase in age. This you can prove from the fact that the same things cannot be borne with patience when detected in an older person.”[25] More than a thousand years later Hobbes, in De Cive (“On the citizen”), makes a similar statement when he refers to a wicked man as a robust child.

In his attempt to blame the arts, sciences, and civilization in general, for inequalities among men, Rousseau invented a human child, born innocent, who had to be kept far away from society until early adolescence. Living alone with nature was the best way for a child to follow nature and avoid becoming corrupted by society.[26] Children had to be kept away from peers and from books. Whatever led Rousseau to this romantic perception of child development appears to be an extremely common experience. Many late 20th-century adults, including psychologists and psychiatrists, appear to be convinced that social behaviour is natural (“God-given” or “genetic”) and antisocial behaviour is learned. For example, social learning has been one of the most influential theories in the area of child

25 St. Augustine, Confessions (New York: Doubleday; 1960) pp. 49-50.

26 M.W. Cranston, The noble savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754-1762 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

development in the last 30 years. In his 1973 book Aggression,[27] Albert Bandura, one of the leading social learning theorists, starts his chapter "Origins of aggression" with the following phrase: "People are not born with preformed repertoires of aggressive behaviour; they must learn them in one way or another" (p.61).

For those who believe that Rousseau is the cause of this attitude toward child development, consider the fact that 200 years before the publication of Émile, Erasmus in his "Declamation on the subject of early liberal education for children" criticized those "who maintained out of a false spirit of tenderness and compassion that children should be left alone until early adolescence" and argued that "one cann ot emphasize too strongly the importance of those first years for the course that a child will follow throughout his entire life."[28]

Twentieth-century longitudinal studies of thousands of subjects from childhood to adulthood have confirmed the old philosopher's experience. Children who fail to learn alternatives to physical aggression during the preschool years are at very high risk of a huge number of problems. They tend to be hyperactive, inattentive, anxious, and fail to help when others are in need; they are rejected by the majority of their classmates, they get poor grades, and their behaviour disrupts school activities.[29] They are thus swiftly taken out of their "natural" peer group and placed in special classes, special schools and institutions with other "deviants," the ideal situation to reinforce marginal behaviour.[30] They are among the most delinquent from pre-adolescence onward, are the first to initiate substance use, the first to initiate sexual intercourse, the most at risk of dropping

27 A. Bandura, Aggression: A social learning analysis (New York: Holt, 1973).

28 Erasmus of Rotterdam, "A declamation on the subject of early liberal education for children," in Collected works of Erasmus, literary and educational writings 4 (pp. 297-346) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1529/1985), pp. 299 and 309.

29 R.E. Tremblay, L.C. Mâsse, L. Pagani and F. Vitaro, "From childhood physical aggression to adolescent maladjustment: The Montréal Prevention Experiment," in R.D. Peters and R.J. McMahon (eds.), Preventing childhood disorders, substance abuse and delinquency (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), pp. 268-298; F. Vitaro, R.E. Tremblay, C. Gagnon and M. Boivin, "Peer rejection from kindergarten to grade 2: Outcomes, correlates, and prediction," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1992), pp. 382-400; J. Haapasalo and R.E. Tremblay, "Physically aggressive boys from ages 6 to 12: Family background, parenting behaviour, and prediction of delinquency," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 62 (1994), pp. 1044-1052.

30 Haapasalo and Tremblay, op. cit.; T.J. Dishion, J. McCord and F. Poulin, "Iatrogenic effects in early adolescent interventions that aggregate peers," American Psychologist, Vol. 54 (1999), pp. 755-764.

out of school, having a serious accident, being violent offenders, being charged under the Young Offenders' Act and being diagnosed as having a psychiatric disorder.[31]

From this perspective, failure to learn alternatives to physical aggression in the early years appears to have the long-term negative consequences on the social adjustment of an individual which Hobbes described in his 1647 *De cive*. The modern studies that have followed aggressive children into their adult years have indeed shown that there are extremely negative consequences not only for the aggressive individuals, but also for their mates, their children and the communities in which they live.[32] The stage is set for early parenthood, unemployment, family violence and a second generation of poor children brought up in a disorganized environment. From this perspective, failure to teach children to regulate violent behaviour during the early years leads to poverty much more clearly than poverty leads to violence.

[31] Nagin and Tremblay, op. cit.; Haapasalo and Tremblay, op. cit.; P.L. Dobkin, R.E. Tremblay, L.C. Mâsse and F. Vitaro, “Individual and peer characteristics in predicting boys' early onset of substance abuse: A seven-year longitudinal study,” Child Development, Vol. 66 (1995) pp. 1198-1214; R.E. Tremblay, B. Boulerice, M. Junger and L. Arseneault, “Does low self-control during childhood explain the association between delinquency and accidents in early adolescence?” Journal of Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, Vol. 5 (1995), pp. 330-345.

[32] Farrington, op. cit.; Huesmann et al., op. cit.; Serbin et al., op cit.

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TWENTY

PRIVATE SECURITY AND CRIME VICTIMISATION IN RISK SOCIETY

20.1 Introduction

"The history of risk distribution shows that, like wealth, risks adhere to the class pattern, only inversely; wealth accumulates at the top, risks at the bottom. To that extent, risks seem to strengthen, not to abolish, the class society. Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, the wealthy (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk" (Beck, 1992: 35)

As Ulrich Beck argues in his seminal book The Risk Society (1992) not only has contemporary society produced new forms of risk - those 'manufactured' from our social relations - but that as these risks emerge as a predictable and expected feature of social relations so they become embedded in the structure of everyday life. As a result, people come to acquire social risk positions in relation to such risks (Beck, 1992). Yet these new risk positions may reproduce nevertheless existing, structural divisions in society. The purpose of this paper is to suggest how social inequality has come to be reflected in the distribution of crime between communities.

20.2 Inequality in community safety

Analysis of the British Crime Survey suggests that the risk of crime vic-

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timisation is very unequally distributed between communities. Looking at the distribution of property crime rates between neighbourhoods, we can estimate that around a fifth of the victims of household property crime in England and Wales live in the ten per cent of the residential areas with the highest crime rates, and suffer over a third of the total of household property crime (which itself constitutes just under a half of all victimisation recorded in the BCS). Over half of all property crime - and over a third of all property crime victims - are likely to be found in just a fifth of the communities of England and Wales. Conversely, the least affected half of the country experiences only fifteen per cent of the crime, spread between a quarter of victims (Hope, 1996, 1997). Furthermore, analysis of the British Crime Survey and the national Census suggest not only that there is an inequality in the distribution of community crime risks but that it is related to the distribution of income and wealth. A substantial amount of crime victimisation research suggests that there are different risk factors - that

Figure 20.1 **Inequality and property crime** (a) (b) (c) (d)



Source: Hope (2001) - 1992 British crime survey/1991 census

(a) Data from the 1991 Census were attached to individual responses in the 1992 BCS (N = 10,059) according to the respective postcode 'sector' in which respondents' home addresses were located (n = 576). Respondents and sectors were randomly selected in the BCS sample design. Mean rates for each sector were calculated and sectors were further aggregated into deciles according to the measure of area deprivation, where 1 = the 10 per cent least deprived and 10 = the 10 per cent most deprived. Mean rates for each decile were then calculated and standardised to a normal distribution.

(b) Property crime includes burglary, theft from a dwelling, and criminal damage to household property.

(c) Area deprivation' is a additive variable composed of the proportion of households in each area in: overcrowded households, large families, housing association rental tenure, and unemployment.

(d) Area affluence' is an additive variable composed of: the average number of cars per household, and the proportion of detached dwellings.

reflect opportunities for, and exposure to, crime risk towards property crime. Research by my colleagues in the Quantitative Crime Group at the University of Manchester shows that these diverse risk factors characterise both individual households and the areas in which those households are located. Yet these risk factors present an initially confusing pattern - because they reflect both advantage and disadvantage. I suggest that an answer to this apparent paradox of crime risk affecting both rich and poor simultaneously can be found in the balance of opportunities to crime and exposures to risk attaching to individual households, relative to their social context (Hope, 2001).

Property crime risk increases appreciably according to the level of

Figure 20.2 **Property crime rates and poverty concentration**



deprivation of the community (figure 20.1). Yet within this broad ecological distribution, rich and poor have different risk positions. Further analysis of the British Crime Survey suggests that the poor who live in predominantly affluent areas have a lower risk than their more affluent neighbours. The pattern of higher risk rates for the 'rich' relative to the 'poor' seems to hold generally in the 40 per cent of communities that are the most affluent. However, the pattern of risk seems to reverse when one begins to approach the 'other Britain' - the half of the country with the more disadvantaged communities. Here, it is the poor who are more likely to be at risk than the rich. Even so, in the top decile of the most disadvantaged communities, there is no difference in risk by social class - all are equally at risk.

However, this apparent equality of misery between rich and poor is misleading. The poorest neighbourhoods have both disproportionately higher crime rates and an acute absence of the rich. This can be illustrated by figure 20.2 which shows how the risk of property crime tracks closely the ratio of 'poor' to 'rich' within communities.

20.3 Safety as the dependent variable

An analysis such as this conventionally evokes enquiry and remedy - in the light of rising crime rates, a social democratically-inspired analysis would focus on how crime comes to be concentrated in communities of concentrated poverty; and how the alleviation of the latter would lead to a reduction of the former. This is necessary and worthwhile. But it is not the whole story about how crime comes to be a feature of social exclusion. The remainder of this paper focuses not on the crime-consequences of social exclusion but on a more overlooked but equally important social process - how the risk of crime drives the pursuit of safety by the more affluent to the extent that it creates a greater inequality in access to security from crime.

Citizens' demands for safety - and their apparently unmet needs - are driving many European States' public policy towards crime. In The Culture of Control, David Garland (2001) argues that the state's present stance towards its citizens about crime is one responsibilization - of shifting the

burden of responsibility for crime reduction and security onto its citizens - as an adaptation in the face of its inability to alter crime rates. Citizens should do more to provide for their own private security in their everyday lives, especially by changing their routine practices and 'lifestyles'. It is assumed that, if this happens, crime rates will diminish. Yet, as Garland describes it, this has to be done covertly since there is a consensus that both public anxiety and crime rates are continuing to rise together remorselessly. Governments cannot then afford to admit to failures or uncertainties in crime control because they believe this will provoke a crisis in the legitimacy of the 'sovereign state'.

20.4 The decline of burglary in the West

Yet volume household property crime (especially burglary and vehicle crime) has been declining steadily in the United States and in many Western European Societies. Nevertheless, the most recent findings of the British Crime Survey show that the majority of people are not only worried about the risk of crime but actually believe it to have increased recently. There seems another paradox here: Garland argues that crime is a normal social fact, but 'domestic' crime is declining; governments hope they have been doing good in crime control, the public believes otherwise; government tries ever harder to convey its optimistic news to the public, the public persists in 'exaggerating' its risk. Yet part of the difficulty in explaining this apparent paradox lies, not in the correctness or otherwise of the 'evidence', or of the difficulty of getting this message across to a frightened yet ignorant public, but in the common belief that it is the actions of the state alone that are responsible for changes in the level of crime in society.

'Anti-crime activity' is not exclusively a property or function of the state, undertaken for the benefit of society as a whole - that is, a public good - but also an activity of private citizens - that is, a private good - in which they seek to engage for their own purposes alongside any greater social benefit that might be had from them so doing (Hope, 2000). The main form of private citizen anti-crime activity lies in acquiring private security, that is, (relative) freedom from the threat of crime in the conduct of their

everyday lives. First and foremost, private security responds to citizens' individual self-interest, that is, in protecting their own persons, families and property.

Theories about changes in crime rates fail to acknowledge the role of private citizens in civil society. An exception is the hypothesis of an 'equilibrium model' proposed by van Dijk (1994). As crime rates rise, so citizens take private actions to avoid crime risk, for example, by not visiting city centres in their cars, target hardening their homes, joining-in with their neighbours in mutual surveillance, or moving to a safer neighbourhood. Such actions reduce the proximity of potential victims to potential offenders, thus limiting the opportunities for the latter to commit crime against the former. As a result of the avoidance behaviour of those who have the means to remove themselves from risk, following an increase, crime rates will reduce to a new equilibrium level.

Developing this argument, we might infer two additional attributes: first, that a key driver in this process is private security consumption, which furthermore is stimulated and sustained by the threat of crime, real or imagined, in the minds of private citizens. Rather than see the fear of crime as necessarily destructive (although it may be for the public sphere) 'fear' may well also play a 'productive' role, functioning as a stimulus for private action and accommodation to risk. Second, if avoidance is crucial, then not all citizens have equal access to the means of crime avoidance. The British Crime Survey shows there is a considerable class/income bias in most forms of security behaviour (Hope, 2001; Hope and Lab, 2001). Access to the means of security depends upon access to economic and related forms of social capital -as crime rates reduce to a new social equilibrium, they are likely to produce or reinforce inequalities in risk and risk-avoidance, which are correlated closely with inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. If the risk of property crime closely tracks the ratio of poor to rich in a community, then risk avoidance may take the form of a strategic positional game between the social classes.

Simply put, the likely most effective strategy of property crime risk-avoidance on the part of the poor is for them to remove themselves from high-risk areas - and of neighbours of the same status - and move-in amongst richer neighbours. If they can get into the richest neighbourhoods their risk will greatly reduce, possibly to the extent that they become less at risk

than the rich. Unfortunately for them, the most rational individual strategy for the rich to avoid property crime is to avoid the poor - because the rich in poor areas face a higher risk than that of the rich in rich areas. Other things being equal - which they most definitely are not - neither poor nor rich have intrinsic crime victimisation propensities which they carry around with them. So, in principle, the individual rich do not have anything to fear from the individual poor by allowing them to live alongside them. But they do seem to have something to fear by way of increased risk if they allow too many poor to be their neighbours, presumably because they reason that this would increase the chances of living in closer proximity to active offenders. (In any event, it does not matter whether this is true or not; property-owners are sufficiently risk-adverse, and in possession of sufficient resources, not to want to test this proposition empirically) . Whatever the niceties of the situation, the strategies of risk avoidance for rich and poor end up as radically opposed because, rationally, each would see the other as playing a part in solving their individual problems of risk-avoidance.

20.5 The clubbing of private security

Yet that is not the end of the struggle for private security - not only do the rich avoid the poor but increasingly they will tend to distance themselves, even to the extent of excluding the poor, since they fear a threat to their security not only through congestion of their community's security goods from too many apparently-risky people crowding in on them, but also a dilution of security if the externality benefits of their private security actions are not retained for their exclusive use (Hope, 1999).

Security from crime is a collective product of private crime prevention activity. In this sense, it is also a collective good, as well as a private good for individuals, since the private actions of individuals produce positive externalities - such as a 'safe neighbourhood' - that may benefit all residents and from which they cannot be excluded. However, if we assume that private security is only consumed for self-interest, then residents are only likely to be persuaded to invest in actions which will be commensurate with their direct needs for security, leaving unaddressed the social

benefits of crime. Private citizens, acting only in their self-interest, have no direct incentive to take actions to produce positive externality benefits for the wider social good. On these grounds, the logic of reliance upon individual self-interest implies that the level of prevention in society as a whole will be less than optimum, since investment to cover the social costs of crime will be under-provided voluntarily (Hope, 2000). This suggests a classic problem in social policy - the public goods problem - where the problem for the group or individual actor that generates the good (i.e. crime prevention) of retaining or internalising externality benefits in return for their efforts leads logically, under voluntaristic conditions, to under-provision and 'market failure'. The suburb thus fails to protect its residents, leading to greater calls for the State's protection, as long as the externalities of private security continue to be dissipated, rather than turned into collective, social benefit.

So, where the state fails to maintain equitable, public goods provision, those additional security goods that are generated will reflect the inequitable distribution of the forms of capital that are necessary to ensure retention of their externality benefits; thereby increasing provision of security in such social milieu by reducing both the incentives for free-riding and the congestion of collective safety. Suburbs that are able to ensure social exclusivity for their members will be able both to generate additional security 'club goods' for themselves (by providing the necessary ingredients of trust so as to generate social capital) and ensure that they are voluntarily provided by being able to retain them within the 'club' by virtue of the social mechanisms that exclude others (Hope 2000). In this line of reasoning, 'gated communities' also provide exclusive club goods of security for their members, though, in these cases, the providers act as 'mini-states' in the provision of the necessary public goods available within the club largely by imposing membership contracts, charging fees and excluding others from access. It follows that the provision of such mass private property leads to both a growth in demand for private security and policing and a capture of public policing resources by those in possession of the necessary (social and symbolic) capital.

While economic capital can purchase freedom from risk, few except the very rich have sufficient quantities to isolate themselves so completely from risk that they do not need the security efforts of their neighbours.

Most people need the help of their neighbours to ensure their own safety. This help is also provided by their neighbours. The additional, social capital of middle-class suburbs is to be found in their networks of weak, overlapping ties. The web of group activity in middle-class suburbs not only indicates the availability of social capital - deriving from assured, trust relations - but also its capacity to be transformed into collective action. Such groups' success in sustaining themselves - thus countering free-riding - is that continuing access to the benefits of belonging to the 'security club' depends not simply on residing in a conducive area of like-minded people but is also reinforced by the benefits accruing from membership or support of other community groups delivering social and cultural benefits. With the kinds of social sanctions available, members can trust that their fellow-members will continue to contribute to the collective generation of private security goods and that they will not free-ride, thus undermining and diluting the efforts of those who do participate in private security production.

The externality benefits produced by private security action thus become a club good, for the exclusive benefit of the membership. Such social sanctions may become less necessary the more exclusive the club since membership exclusivity ensures that the externalities of individual private security efforts will be retained within the club for the benefit of club-members only and will likewise not be seen to suffer from the threat of congestion of the club's security from external parties wishing to share in the benefit. Generally, the price-mechanisms of the housing market tend to ensure that the more affluent suburbs are the most exclusive, usually through increased social and spatial 'distance' placed between themselves and the perceived sources of risk. Thus, membership exclusivity is preserved by insulating the club's boundaries (Hope, 1999).

20.6 The 'security club' of neighbourhood watch

However, the social boundaries of communities themselves need to be 'policed' to avoid encroachment and, hence, congestion. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, Conservative governments in England and Wales encouraged the growth of resident-based, community groups - 'neighbourhood watch' (NW) - as a means of providing security goods through collective self-help. This approach was consistent with their prevailing notion of support for the 'active citizen'. More or less willingly, the

public police were persuaded to serve as 'agents' for the development and support of NW (Laycock and Tilley, 1995). The growth of NW in England and Wales peaked circa 1992, which also coincided, as it happens, with the peaking of the property crime rate (figure 20.3).

Figure 20.2 **Neighbourhood Watch Membership**



An analysis of British Crime Survey data suggests that the state's 'responsibilisation' strategy, c. 1985-1995, in the form of Neighbourhood Watch, required not only fertile social conditions - in the form of social capital based upon a sense of community reciprocity, present in chiefly middle-class communities - but also a strong and ever-present threat of crime in the minds of residents (Hope and Trickett, in press). In this respect, both victimisation experiences and dissatisfaction with one's

neighbourhood fuel worry about crime which, if the social 'soil' is right, can galvanise people into 'doing something' (albeit in a relatively mild

way) about their own risk of crime in their residential locality; at least if the level of resulting anxiety has not become too debilitating so as undermine reciprocity.

Given these conditions, NW may then go on to serve the 'useful purpose' for the state of responsibilisation, becoming a conduit for delivering and implementing 'private security' into the community. Analysis of data from the 1994 British Crime Survey found a distinct cluster of crime prevention activities associated with NW membership; these included: security-marking of household property, asking neighbours to watch the home when away, and having household-contents insurance (Hope and Lab, 2001). These activities reinforce private (target-hardening) security with additional collective and institutional reassurance. These are the 'club-goods' associated with NW membership - public police encourage residents to form NW groups, disseminate home security advice and security-consciousness, and introduce them to the idea of marking their property to deter theft and/or aid its recovery; the groups introduce neighbours to each other and encourage them to share their routine activities; and insurance underwriters, accepting their lower risk and confirming their security practices, offer discounted premiums to NW members (Laycock and Tilley, 1995).

While such measures individually may have limited value in reducing risk (Hope, 1995), they provide, nevertheless, a 'bundle' of social assurances about risk, presumably addressing the particular needs of property-owners, who may be especially risk-averse (Field and Hope, 1990). Crucially, these assurances, deriving from membership in civil associations and institutions, complement and enhance other private, individualised security actions of a physical, target-hardening nature but are only available to those who, in addition to financial capital, also have access to the social capital needed to gain membership. Indeed, the main feature that distinguished participation in the NW cluster of prevention activities from other clusters of physical-based, property prevention activities (all of which were most common amongst the propertied middle-classes), was membership of other community-based groups and associations (Hope and Lab, 2001).

20.7 Conclusion

In England and Wales, the growth of Neighbourhood Watch may have been more an expression than a particularly effective cause of a re-ordering of suburban social order around the pursuit of safety. Nevertheless, its social distribution reveals how a self-sustaining and self-interested anxiety about the risk of crime victimisation combines with the availability of social capital to produce a socio-cultural mechanism that enhances the clubbing of private security within increasingly 'exclusive' suburbs. Not only does this generate a security 'club' (or rather adds private security to the exclusive benefits of the suburb) but because it is also a mechanism for the invocation of police authority, thereby forms an elective affinity with the public police and consequently diverts their (the state's) symbolic and material resources of protection for the greater benefit of club members. Not only does inequity in social capital help increase inequality in private security but it also increases inequality in access to the scarce resource of public policing.

The collective consequence of crime risk avoidance in risk society is the creation of risk pools according to social position, reproducing structural inequality in the new arenas of social risk. In Britain, the collapsing credibility of the State's 'universal insurance policy' against crime victimisation risk (Garland, 2001) may have induced a dynamic that encourages the 'clubbing' of private security (Hope, 2000). The more affluent members of society have greater capital to create and sustain security club-goods. In this case, the logic of collective action is an unintended consequence of individualised strategies of risk-pooling and risk-avoidance, acting to reinforce a form of social exclusion around crime risk. Thus, the threat of crime victimisation - the 'fear' of crime - becomes not just a consequence of social exclusion but also now a contributory cause. The challenge facing the state still remains how to intervene - not just to reduce the crime rate but also how to distribute fairly the means for dealing with the socially manufactured risks that produce it and the social exclusionary practices that sustain it.

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TWENTY-ONE

CONCLUSIONS

The Convention aimed to make the point on the criminality situation, starting from the most recent studies carried out in Western Countries by the major international experts. Intervention about preventing policies have underlined the importance of reliable and suitable statistics. Challenges that official statistics will have to face at a European level were individuated.

Participants to the final round tables are much involved in the activity to fight crimes, but joining the Convention they have shown a great sensitiveness about the role that statistic information has or could have to plan crime preventing and fighting policies. Furthermore their participation witnesses that from the collaboration between Intelligence officers and statistic researchers a more pertinent and efficient information can be born to develop a more safe society.

All the speakers dealt with some fundamental aspects of criminality. Such aspects, being partial, nevertheless are the most relevant for the contribute they offer to official statistics in quantifying the topic.

In some Countries victimisation surveys are carried out since many years allowing analysis of long periods data, also regarding the dark figure of crimes. The quantity of available information in some Countries at forefront as USA and Great Britain, both on victimisation surveys than on criminality statistics, is a great heritage from which all of us has to start. It is to be underlined that a first added value is given by the coordination and integration of various statistic types that such Countries have look forward and obtained. It is obvious that such a work caused wide investments and costs, nevertheless allowing a picture of the reality needed to plan suitable preventing and fighting crime policies.

Linda Laura Sabbadini, Istat, Italy

As regarding victimisation surveys, there are various emerging elements. First of all the victimisation risk is distributed not uniformly among people and in the case of individual crimes it varies according to gender and age. In Italy, for example, women have a higher probability to be victims of a bag-snatching and pick-pocketing, while men are more frequently victims of robberies or assaults. Controlling for gender and age, the risk to be victim of bag-snatching, pick-pocketing, robbery is as higher as it is the victim social class. Furthermore richer households have higher probabilities to suffer car thefts and burglaries. In Switzerland too more rich households have reported a higher number of burglaries.

On the contrary the United States survey outcomes show that people belonging to worse social classes are more at risk of assaults, rapes, bag-snatchings, pick-pocketing and robberies. Households placed at the two opposite boundaries of the social classes scale are more frequently victims of burglaries. In Great Britain the situation is similar to USA.

In Italy, since 1992, considering statistics from reporting to police, many changes happened in criminality. Murders have dropped, and also bag-snatchings, vehicles and objects from vehicles thefts decreased. The drop of burglaries began some years later, that is in 1998.

Victimisation surveys show that the drop happened especially for burglaries with breaking and entering, while burglaries due to distractions of the owners increased (windows left open). The decrease of such crimes is to be related to the wide increase of the adoption of home-safety systems. As regards vehicle thefts, the role and interest for the stolen objects changed, as the recycling market also has changed. For example vehicles thefts decreased, especially considering small capacity cars, also due to changes occurred in recycling market of spare parts. Time also has changed preferences of robbers. Today less radio for cars are stolen, perhaps as car-radio are default standards for new cars.

Considering the two very spread crimes, robbery and pick-pocketing, after a first decrease in the second half of the '90s, as shown by reporting to the police, a new increasing trend has occurred. Also in this case victimisation survey data agree with the corresponding ones from justice statistics. The victimisation survey adds that pick-pocketing against young people have increased. Also stolen objects are changed. For example, due to its large spread among the younger, the stole of mobiles increased.

In Great Britain, where a similar situation was observed, the government have agreed with phone companies to block and make un-useful the stolen mobiles, also alerting citizens. Such an initiative looks successful. Italian outcomes are common to other Western Countries, especially regarding the decrease of car and objects from car thefts, and in some Countries, burglaries.

Victimisation surveys have also the merit to collect data measuring the perceived un-safety of the population related to criminality. Un-safety feelings not only exist but they have become an important social phenomenon we can not neglect or simply ignore. It is to be measured and monitored. Istat is doing it and will go on. In Italy fear of crime and un-safety are not uniformly distributed among people, they are higher among women, the elder and the younger, people living in metropolitan centres or in the South, and finally among people belonging to lower social classes. Such a fear appears not actually motivated as groups more at risk to be victims of crime belong to higher social classes. So fear by gender and age not always correspond to the corresponding actual risks.

Fear is related to the actual victimisation's experiences, to the social decay of the living area and to physic or economic or social vulnerability. Knowing the 'fear mapping' is so really important to plan crime preventing policies. Citizens, from their side, often react to fear adopting various strategies of defence: the adoption of reinforced doors or alarm systems, blocking windows, turning on home lights in the evening before coming out, are now quite common. Nevertheless the judgement about the police control of the living area is better, yet a great demand for a stronger presence on the territory is made. The increase of the rate of more safe people, very positive, is accompanied by a decrease of the intensity of such a feeling: people declaring to feel 'very safe' decrease, while those declaring 'enough safe' increase. Very interesting are experiences from the other Countries.

Criminality trends in large cities is another very important topic. It was addressed on the basis of reported crimes. The analysis of recent criminality trend in Paris has shown the new increase of criminalities by young people. Such criminality is more and more violent, related to the dopes market. In '80s and the first half of '90s strangers were the main authors of crimes in Paris, while now the youth are the main perpetrators of crimes and violent acts.

In Russia the analysis of criminality shows a general increase of it at a national level. Such increase is more and more higher for every crimes in the two metropolis Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Russia has become one of those countries with the highest crime rates, after Colombia and South Africa.

The homicide rates in Saint Petersburg that was high in '80s, increased from 3.4 per 100,000 inhabitants to 20.7 in 2007 and in Moscow from 2.3 to 14.8 per 100,000 inhabitants.

Crimes against properties have doubled in the same period 1987-2001, and they increased from 285.9 to 590.3 in Saint Petersburg and from 146.6 to 527.4 in Moscow. Robberies increased ten times more or less.

In New York and the other American cities the situation is different. In particular New York experienced a big decrease of crimes since 1992, mainly as regarding homicides, sexual violence, robberies, assaults, burglaries, car thefts and in general crimes against properties. Experts have discussed very much about such decrease. One of the many hypothesis proposed is that the change that affected the dopes market could have had an influence in such overall decrease. In details: in '80s very young people became the main peddlers of crack in big cities. Such young people used mainly guns to defend themselves against a very violent and decayed scenario. In ‘90s a decrease in the crack demand caused the uselessness of young peddlers. Furthermore the police efforts to limit the use of guns and the recovery of economy in '90s has offered more and better opportunities to young people, preventing them from becoming authors of crimes.

ITALY SHOWS AN INTERESTING AND NOT UNIFORM SITUATION.

The size and trend of urban criminality varies depending on the type of crime and the area of the Country. As regarding violent crimes, homicides decreased very much both in the big cities of the Centre-North than in those of the South. In particular in Southern cities homicides by both the organised criminality and the common one decreased very much since 1992. Nevertheless the same decrease was not reported for the two violent crimes: tempted homicides and intentional injuries. Yet injuries increased everywhere in Italian cities. As regards crime against properties, pick-pocketing are more higher today than in 1985, both in the North

than in the South. In northern cities the growth was stronger, especially in Torino and Bologna. Bag-snatching reported a strong decrease since '90s, but there are some exceptions. In particular Bag-snatching in Naples reached e peak in 1997. Also considering robberies Naples reported the highest rates since 1992, comparing with corresponding rates reported in '80s and ‘90s and rates observed in other Southern cities as Catania and Palermo.

Finally, some important ideas were suggested as regarding preventing policies. The importance of citizens' safety in political agenda of various Countries and in common people attention suggest to reflect carefully on preventing criminalities.

Crime prevention is the set of the whole of initiatives, public or private, with the aim not only to reduce criminal events, but also to prevent uncivil and disordering actions, not necessarily classified as illegal acts. The actors of prevention can be local units (Municipalities, Regions, etc.), police, social services, voluntary work, private firms and common citizens.

Preventing models are various, but they can be summarised in three types: preventing the situation, social prevention and communities prevention.

At the basis of preventing the situation there is the idea that intervening on the context at any level, also considering very small areas, can decrease criminal acts.

Social prevention aims to realise a better context in which social deviances that can produce likely criminals, take not place. It is a strategy focused on crime authors, considered as part of a class at risk. Examples of such policies are actions of healthy and urban policies, educational policies for families, for work and social integration.

Finally, Communities prevention considers the community as an actor able to self-organize itself to promote informal social links (which discourage deviances), to create positive housing conditions and relations, to develop defence skills.

For official statisticians the point on existing methodological problems regarding crime statistics was made.

The Statistic Institutes' interest on such topics is not homogeneous, and still now there is not a common strategy in Europe.

The Convention has represented an important moment to think about

existing problems regarding statistics from administrative and non administrative sources, and regarding potentialities of the official European statistics. The international Organisms too have underlined the importance to go further, planning initiatives to think more about methodological issues. A coordination at an international level is required. Since now Eurostat has not considered such coordination and National Institutes of Statistics are involved not homogeneously.

The lack of coordination could cause a value reduction of the information richness of each Country. A democratic Europe has not to give up the goal of having a reliable system of criminality statistics which assure a suitable comparability. Indeed it was underlined that differences in criminality among European Countries are often caused by different adopted criteria to collect data. In some Countries data is considered when the crime is reported to the police, in other Countries only since the police have completed the investigation. More, in some Countries multiple crimes are considered as they are one only, differently in other Countries. The various ways to collect data have an important influence on the information together with cultural, economic and politic differences.

Besides traditional administrative sources of data to study criminality, victimisation surveys are becoming more and more important. Such surveys, made to households with the aim to estimate the dark figure of specific crimes and to measure the risk of some social actors to be criminalised, are carrying out in many European Countries and other Countries are planning to do in the future, but everyone is acting alone, without any kind of harmonisation.

Harmonising criminality statistics from administrative sources is difficult due to different justice systems and different ways of data collection; further problems of comparability will rise also when considering data from victimisation surveys, actually carried out without coordination among countries.

It is also important to invest money on criminality statistics. A political willingness should rise in Governments and in the European Commission.

The above are some of the main remarks emerged from the work of the International Conference on Crime.

ESSAYS

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